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SUMMARY 
Standard financial literature contains various explanations for the unique role of 
deposit-taking intermediaries in an economy. None of these reasons adequately 
explains the extensive degree of banking regulation evident in practice. 
The nature of a deposit, which guarantees capital repayment independent of bank 
performance, uniquely incentivises banks to be exposed to financial risks. In the 
absence of appropriate regulation, banks may be tempted to assume an 
unacceptably high level of risk that could ultimately result in bank failure. Thus, the 
regulation of banking risks is justified in terms of the public interest theory whereby 
banking regulation seeks to avoid the market imperfections arising from informational 
asymmetries and "domino" externalities associated with bank failure. Accordingly, the 
rationale of banking regulation lies in the protection of consumers and in preserving 
the stability of the financial system. Direct monetary controls, on the other hand, 
impact adversely on the risk-management activities of banks. 
The framework utilised to analyse and compare banking regulation consists of three 
broad categories namely: preventative regulation, protective regulation and monetary 
requirements. 
Preventative or prudential regulation is aimed at managing the levels of risks 
assumed by banks. This form of regulation relates to entry requirements; limitations 
on certain business activities; the disclosure of risk-related information; the adequacy 
of capital resources; portfolio restrictions on risk assets; and the sufficiency of 
liquidity. 
Protective regulation is concerned with the immediate protection of depositors and 
maintenance of overall financial stability once a bank has failed. lt consists of crisis 
management measures and deposit insurance schemes. 
Direct, and hence inappropriate, monetary requirements are variations in reserve 
asset requirements, as well as interest rate and credit controls. 
The banking systems of South Africa, the United Kingdom and Germany were 
chosen to perform a comparative analysis of financial regulation. 
The London financial markets are mature and a large variety of banks are regulated 
in a flexible manner by the Bank of England. By contrast, the strictly regulated 
German banks dominate their domestic financial system. South Africa is a hybrid of 
the former systems with a modern banking industry operating in well developed 
financial markets and supervised according to advanced risk-management 
considerations. 
The analysis of preventative and protective regulation in all three financial systems 
indicates that banking regulation is indeed concerned with the regulation of banking 
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risks. The efforts of the Bank for International Settlements to harmonise regulation 
across domestic financial systems has contributed significantly to improved 
regulatory techniques for the management of these risks. None of the three systems 
make use of direct monetary requirements which suggest awareness of the costs 
associated with such regulation. 
A number of recommendations are made to improve financial regulation in South 
Africa: extension of regulatory coverage to include other types of financial 
intermediaries who also engage in risky activities; further relaxation of exchange 
control regulations which restrict the foreign exchange risk management; the 
adoption of a formal deposit protection scheme; increased consolidated supervision 
by a single regulatory authority with executive powers; further deregulatory measures 
in instances where regulations are not appropriate from a risk-management 
perspective; and re-regulation to the extent that the risk-management activities can 
be regulated more efficiently. 
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OPSOMMING 
Die finansiele literatuur bevat verskeie verklarings vir die unieke rol wat 
depositonemende instellings in 'n ekonomie vervul. Geeneen van die redes verskaf 
'n bevredigende verklaring vir die wye omvang van bankregulasies in die praktyk nie. 
Die aard van 'n deposita is sodanig dat die terugbetaling van die kapitaalsom deur 'n 
bank gewaarborg word, onafhanklik van die winsprestasie van die bank. Gevolglik 
het banke die unieke eienskap om hulself aan finansiele risikos bloat te stel. Sander 
gepaste regulering sou banke moontlik daartoe geneigd wees om oormatige hoe 
risikovlakke na te streef wat tot bankmislukking kan lei. Die regulering van 
bankrisikos vind dus bestaansreg in die teorie van openbare belang, d.w.s. dat 
regulering die potensiele markmislukkings, wat voortspruit uit asimmetriese inligting 
en "domino" eksternaliteite, kan voorkom. Die rasionaal van bankregulering is die 
beskerming van verbruikers, asook die handhawing van 'n stabiele finansiele stelsel. 
Direkte monetere beheermaatreels, daarenteen, het 'n ongunstige uitwerking op die 
bestuur van risikos deur banke. 
Die raamwerk waarbinne bankregulering ontleed en vergelyk word, bestaan uit drie 
kategoriee, naamlik voorkomende regulering, beskermende regulering en monetere 
vereistes. 
Voorkomende regulering is daarop gemik om die risikos waaraan banke blootgestel 
is te bestuur. Sodanige regulering verwys na toelatingsvereistes, beperkings op 
sekere sake-aktiwiteite, die openbaarmaking van risiko-verwante inligting, die 
toereikendheid van kapitaalhulpbronne, beperkings ten opsigte van baterisikos en 
voldoende likiditeit. 
Beskermende regulering is gemoeid met die beskerming van deposante en bestaan 
uit krisisbeheermaatreels en depositoversekeringskemas. 
Direkte (en gevolglik ontoepaslike) monetere vereistes bestaan uit veranderlike 
reserwebatevereistes, asook rentekoers- en kredietbeheermaatreels. 
Die bankstelsels van Suid Afrika, die Verenigde Koningkryk en Duitsland is gekies vir 
'n vergelykende analise van finansiele regulering. 
Die finansiele markte in Londen is hoogs ontwikkeld en 'n groat verskeidenheid en 
aantal banke word op 'n pragmatiese wyse deur die Bank of England gereguleer. In 
direkte teenstelling daarmee word die Duitse banke, wat hul binnelandse finansiele 
markte domineer, onderwerp aan 'n streng formele toesighoudingstelsel. Die Suid-
Afrikaanse finansiele stelsel bevat elemente van beide bogenoemde stelsels, by 
wyse van 'n moderne banksektor, wat funksioneer in goed ontwikkelde finansiele 
markte en gereguleer word ooreenkomstig gevorderde risikobestuursbeginsels. 
Die analise van voorkomende en beskermende regulering in die drie finansiele 
stelsels, bevestig dat bankregulering inderdaad afgestem is op die regulering van 
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finansiele risikos. Die pogings van die Bank van lnternasiona~e Vereffeninge om die 
regulasies in finansiele stelsels internasionaal met mekaar in orreenstemming te 
bring het wesenlik hiertoe bygedra. Die vermyding van direkte monetere vereistes 
dui verder daarop dat toesighoudende owerhede bewus is van die nadele van 
sodanige regulering. 
'n Aantal aanbevelings word gemaak, naamlik: meer omvattende regulering ten 
einde ander finansiele instellings wat ook finansiele risikos bestuur, te dek; verdere 
verslappings van valutabeheermaatreels wat tans die bestuur van wisselkoersrisiko 
beperk; die totstandkoming van 'n formele depositoversekeringstelsel; 'n groter mate 
van gekonsolideerde toesighouding; verdere deregulering in gevalle waar regulasies 
vanuit 'n risikobestuursoogpunt nie wenslik is nie; en her-regulering in die mate 
waartoe die risikobestuurspraktyke meer effektief gereguleer kan word. 
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PREFACE 
This study was conceived during 1992 in Hamburg, Germany where, as an 
inexperienced trainee of the Deutsche Bank, I had to come to terms with a veritable 
minefield of German banking regulations. In typical German fashion, the statutory 
reports were completed with devotion by my colleagues, yet the underlying 
objectives of the Deutsche Bundesbank in demanding such detailed information 
remained vague. Over time it became apparent to me that the cornerstone of 
banking business is the assumption and management of financial risk and that, in a 
somewhat crude fashion, the Bundesbank was attempting to monitor and control 
banking risks. In contrast, I learned the South African Reserve Bank unambiguously 
embraced the optimisation of risk-management by banks as its regulatory mission. 
The risk-management approach to regulation did and still does not feature 
prominently in the conventional financial literature, although bank failures which 
occurred subsequent to the inception of this study have increased academic and 
popular interest in this fascinating field of study. 
My good fortune to have stumbled upon a relatively unexplored facet of regulation 
continued in South Africa when in 1993, Dr. Japie Jacobs and Prof. Andrie 
Schoombee consented to guide me through a comparative study of banking 
regulation. Apart from his academic prowess, Dr. Jacobs is eminently versed in the 
practical aspects of banking regulation, having been responsible for the banking 
supervisory function during its formative South African years. His insight proved to be 
invaluable. Prof. Schoombee's advice on financial theory considerably enhanced my 
initial attempts to formulate a risk-management approach to banking regulation and 
his grasp of the subject matter greatly improved the accessibility of the entire text. 
I am also indebted to a great many other friends, family-members, colleagues and 
mentors: to Prof. Sampie Terreblanche for hopefully engendering in me some of the 
qualities of an economist; to the late Hermann Josef Abs for inspiring a passion for 
banking; to my Father for his unreserved support, encouragement and constructive 
suggestions; to my Mother who managed to suppress the urge to enquire how my 
research was progressing; to Paul Harris for imparting some of his tactical banking 
skills; and to my friends who managed to put up with this for so long. 
Thank you 
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Gewidmet in Dankbarer Erinnerung an meine /iebe Grossmutter, Hedwig Caecilie 
Jordaan, gestorben am 5 Marz 1995. Sie war meine stetige Inspiration filr die 
Vol/endung dieser Dissertation. 
"Jucundi acti Jabores!" 
"Angenehm (sind) die getanen Arbeiten" 
Cicero : De Finibus 2, 32, 105. 
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SECTION A 
A SURVEY OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The White Rabbit put on his spectacles. 
'Where shall/ begin, please your majesty?' he asked. 
'Begin at the beginning,' the King said, vefY gravely, 'and go on till you come to the end: then 
stop.' 
Lewis Carrol in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 
1.1 Background 
A number of commentators1 have remarked upon the major structural trends and 
changes currently experienced in financial systems world-wide. A common theme is 
that the evolution of financial systems2 is to a large extent influenced by the 
simultaneous pressures of competition, increasing globalisation, the impact of 
opportunities created by technology, innovation and changes in the strategic 
objectives of financial institutions. As a result of these factors, financial systems are 
evolving in several fundamental ways: 
• Financial institutions are increasingly being transformed into multi-product firms 
engaged in a much wider range of services than has traditionally been the case. 
In particular, fee income and off-balance sheet business has increased. 
• The financial system is moving from a specialist base to a more universalist (or 
conglomerate) structure which has eroded traditional distinctions between the 
major areas of finance such as commercial banking, investment banking, housing 
finance, insurance, fund management and securities trading. 
• The financial system is becoming more market-orientated. 
Structural changes relate to a number of fundamental issues that need to be 
addressed in every financial system. Examples of these basic issues include the 
distinction between specialist and universalist principles in a financial system, the 
role and extent of competition in the financial system, the 'openness' of the financial 
system, issues related to the resource, allocative and functional efficiency of the 
financial system and the mechanism for ensuring the 'safety and soundness' of the 
financial system. Central to all these is the issue of financial regulation. 
1 See for instance Gardener (1988), Goodhart (1995), Llewellyn (1991), Metais (1989) and the OECD 
(1989). 
2 The financial system is understood as consisting of four essential elements being non-financial 
economic units (lenders and borrowers), financial institutions (intermediaries in the lending and 
borrowing process), financial instruments and financial markets. 
1 
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Historically, financial systems and particularly the financial institutions operating 
within the system have been extensively regulated. This is due to the strategic 
importance of the financial system in any economic system. As Gurley and Shaw 
(1970: 123) have pointed out, the 'real world and the financial world are one world'. 
Structural change in the financial system poses major new challenges to regulators 
and regulatees alike. In a dynamic model of regulator-regulatee action and reaction 
known as the 'regulatory dialectic' (Kane 1987), many structural developments in the 
financial system have also been stimulated by changes in the regulatory 
environment. Equilibrium regulatory structures (if they exist at all) generally develop 
adaptively over time. 
The fundamental regulatory challenge is therefore to constantly adapt regulations to 
structural changes in the financial system. lt is no longer adequate for regulatory 
policies to be developed primarily as a reaction to a banking crisis caused by 
excessive risk-taking. Regulatory innovations must match the corresponding 
innovations in the financial system. 
The evolution of national financial systems has been accompanied by major changes 
in the policy of financial regulation (Liewellyn 1991 (b)). First, there has been a 
decisive shift away from the concept of regulation based upon protecting financial 
institutions from competitive market pressures towards more competitive market 
structures. As stated by the OECD (1989): 
'there has been increasing recognition that the approach to bank regulation 
and supervision adopted in the twenties and the thirties which largely 
consisted of global protection of the financial system against the potentially 
destabilising impact of excessive competition was becoming 
counterproductive .... National authorities increasingly adopted the view that the 
highly diversified and complex and rapidly changing financial services needs 
of modern economies could no longer be adequately met by over-protected 
and over-regulated financial systems, particularly in an environment of 
increased internationalisation.' 
A second change in the approach to regulation has been a generally held view that 
considerations of 'efficiency' in the financial system should be accorded a higher 
priority and that this is most effectively achieved in a competitive financial system 
with a greater role given to market mechanisms. Related to these considerations is a 
third change: a greater emphasis in regulatory arrangements to the concept of 
'competitive' neutrality between potentially competing sectors and institutions. 
Finally, structural deregulation and other forms of deregulation in the financial system 
have been accompanied by a greater degree of supervisory (or prudential) regulation 
in a process of 'reregulation'. 
The regulation issue raises a number of basic questions. Why and to what extent is 
the regulation of financial markets and financial institutions justified? What are the 
principles that guide financial regulation? How and why does regulation vary in 
different financial systems? What are the lessons to be learned from differing (and 
2 
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similar) regulatory approaches? What forms of regulation are economically justified? 
In this context it is important to keep in mind that regulations normally imply costs. 
Thus, even if a regulation is judged to have beneficial effects, it is also important to 
investigate its costs and weigh them against the associated benefits. 
This dissertation will examine the financial regulatory regimes that apply to deposit-
taking institutions in three financial systems, namely the United Kingdom (UK), 
Germany and South Africa, in an attempt to answer the above questions. 
3 
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1.2 Research Problem 
'I have no data yet. lt is a capital mistake to theorise before one has data. Insensibly one 
begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts. ' 
Sherlock Holmes in The Strand Magazine. 
In the course of the last decade, financial systems around the world have been the 
subject of dramatic change, induced by factors such as the international integration 
and domestic liberalisation of financial markets. Moreover, periodically occurring 
financial crises have impacted significantly on the role played by various financial 
institutions. The conventional approach to financial regulation is no longer 
appropriate in the light of the far-reaching changes that have taken place in financial 
systems. This modern conviction is echoed in a classical remark by Tobin (1967: 
509): 
'I hope that those who continue to work on this fascinating subject will not 
hesitate to take from time to time a fundamental and radical look at the 
institutions they are appraising.' 
Tobin's 'fascinating subject' was financial regulation. 
The significant structural trends affecting all financial systems are likely to continue 
and even intensify during the next decade. In this rapidly changing environment, the 
ability to adapt has become a crucial condition for financial efficiency and economic 
soundness. Under these circumstances both banks and regulatory authorities have 
adopted a new approach towards financial regulation. This approach - which is 
based on risk-management - differs from the conventional approach which 
emphasises the prevention of a run on bank deposits. 
The leitmotiv of this dissertation is that modern banking entails the management of a 
series of financial risks and that regulation is (and indeed should be) aimed at 
ensuring that these risks are kept at acceptable levels. Accordingly, the research 
problem is as follows: to a large extent current regulatory frameworks accurately 
reflect the realities of modern deposit-taking financial intermediation (i.e. risk-
management). A supervisory approach based on compliance with a prescribed set 
of balance sheet ratios is no longer effective for the risk-management activities of 
banks. ·A new approach to regulation - with the aim of ensuring that banks have the 
ability to control and manage financial risk adequately - has developed in response 
to the changing financial environment. This dissertation will document and analyse 
the new approach to banking regulation with reference to three financial systems, 
namely the United Kingdom, Germany and South Africa. The purpose of these case 
studies is to demonstrate the new approach to banking regulation; and to focus on 
regulatory differences and similarities between the three sophisticated financial 
systems. 
In Chapter 2 an overview is presented of deposit-taking financial intermediation and 
the existing theories of finance which seek to justify the regulation thereof. The risk-
management approach to financial regulation does not intend to disprove these 
4. 
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theories, but rather intends to indicate their inadequacies from a regulatory point of 
view and to incorporate existing financial-regulatory theory into a more 
comprehensive risk-management paradigm. 
The risk-management approach towards banking regulation allows policy-makers to 
return to basic principles in constructing new regulatory systems. This is superior to 
building on existing frameworks that may largely have developed in ad hoc fashion in 
response to deficiencies revealed in banking failures and I or systemic crises caused 
by banks taking excessive risks. 
5 
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1.3 Value in Terms of the Possible Outcomes 
A survey of universal economic literature compiled from the American Economic 
Association's Journal of Economic Literature (Econlit CD-Rom 1996) reveals that a 
rich topical literature has developed around a variety of issues related to financial 
regulation. Although aspects of risk in finance have received due attention3, there is 
no generally accepted conceptual framework pertaining to the risk-related activities 
of deposit-taking financial intermediation. 
The dynamic nature of financial systems makes it imperative that the structure and 
policy of financial regulation be continually evaluated in order to determine that it 
accurately reflects changing competitive and market conditions. lt has been stated 
that risk rises geometrically with the pace of change - and the perception of risk lags 
behind (Cade 1987: 1 ). This indicates that the ability of the market to innovate is 
often greater than our ability to comprehend the accompanying risks. lt also serves 
to highlight the importance of risk-related financial regulation. 
By any standards, South African academic research in the field of financial regulation 
has been and currently remains sparse4 with only a number of pioneering exceptions 
proving the rule.5 Similarly, international comparative studies on financial regulation6 
have not included a South African dimension even though the general approach of 
the 1990 South African Banks Act and the risk-management regulatory approach 
adopted by the South African Reserve Bank may be said to be advanced by 
international standards. The paucity of interest in this field of economics is partly the 
result of South Africa's forced isolation from the international community especially 
during the period from 1985 to 1992. A case in point is that South Africa was not 
invited to participate in the formulation of international regulatory policy, a process 
managed by the Basle Committee of the Bank for International Settlements. The re-
integration of the local financial sector into the global market has necessitated a 
degree of regulatory adaptation, in order to obtain an internationally level playing 
field in financial markets. This research project seeks to be both a useful extension 
of the existing international literature, as well as a stimulus for further academic 
debate specifically within the South African context. 
On a practical level, it is submitted that prudential concerns with 'risk-management' 
implicitly or explicitly constitute a major part of modern regulatory frameworks and 
supervisory practices. By comparing differing regulatory approaches it identifies 
3 See for instance Schaefer (1987), Furlong (1988), Hogan and Sharp (1988), Kelly (1988), Berger and 
Udell (1990), Gilbert (1990), Kambu (1990), Avery and Berger (1991), Davies and McManus (1991), 
Furlong and Keeley (1991), Gelles (1991), Genotte and Pyle (1991), Levonian (1991), Mitchell (1991), 
Bundt {1992), Goyeau and Tarazi (1992), Mei (1994) and Eisenhauer (1994), Helwig (1995) and 
Santomero (1995). 
4 Computer search of the NAVO Database, Centre for Scientific Research, Human Sciences Research 
Council. 
5 See BrOmmerhof (1988), Marais (1991), Van Greuning (1991), Broadway (1994) and Van Greuning 
(1993). 
6 See for instance Dale (1982), Baltensperger and Dermine (1987) and Hall (1987). 
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those areas in which prudential and protective regulation should receive more (or 
less) attention from supervisors. The study also directs regulatory attention at 
remaining and inappropriate monetary controls. 
The analysis will also lend itself to a number of specific policy recommendations with 
regard to the respective financial systems as well as some general conclusions 
beyond the confines of deposit-taking financial intermediation. 
7 
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1.4 Methodological Framework 
The dissertation is divided into two separate but integrated sections. 
Section A contains a survey of current literature on financial regulation with the aim 
of constructing a theoretical model for the analysis of the topic matter as well as 
developing a framework within which empirical data can be presented. 
Against the background of deposit-taking financial intermediation as sketched in 
Chapter 2, both the rationale for financial regulation and the principles that should be 
guiding such regulation are presented in the third Chapter. The fourth Chapter is 
concerned with the identification and discussion of the prudential, protective and 
monetary components of financial regulation for the purpose of drawing international 
comparisons. 
Section 8 provides a country-specific comparison of financial regulation in three 
selected financial systems with regard to the framework constructed in section A, 
and concludes with a comparative analysis. 
The fifth Chapter is concerned with the selection of the three financial systems 
compared in the dissertation being the UK, Germany and South Africa. First, the 
motivation for their selection is stated. This is followed by a look at their financial 
markets and the institutions operating therein with the intention of providing a basic 
overview of each system. Chapter 6 deals with the regulatory authorities and the 
ger:leral approach to regulation within each financial system. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 
contain a discussion of the regulation of deposit-taking financial institutions in each 
financial system with specific reference to the various components of regulation 
identified in the fourth Chapter. 
Chapter 10 provides a comparative analysis of financial regulation. First, the major 
issues generated in Section A are considered and the research problem revisited. 
Second, the conclusions reached as regards prudential r~gulation, protective 
regulation and monetary controls in all three countries are compared. Third, the 
specific South African issues which became evident in the study are discussed. The 
dissertation closes with a conclusion and a general policy recommendation. 
8 
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1.5 Explanation of Terminology 
A study of this nature, being broad and specific at the same time is bound to involve 
a variety of terms. As the following are used throughout, it is appropriate to provide a 
brief explanation: 
Bank of England 
Bank of England, London - Executive body responsible for the regulation of UK 
banks which reports to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Supervisory duties are 
formalised by the Board of Banking Supervision. 
Deposit-taking (financial) institution I Bank 
Financial institution which accepts deposits from the general public as a regular 
feature of its activities. The term deposit-taking (financial) institution is used 
interchangeably with the term bank. Similarly, the terminology of 'deposit-taking 
(financial) intermediation' is used interchangeably with 'banking'. 
BIS 
Bank for International Settlements, Basle - the Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision is based at the BIS. 
FBSO 
Federal Banking Supervisory Office, Berlin - the central German regulatory organ for 
banks, subject to the Federal Ministry of Finance. 
FSB 
Financial Services Board, Pretoria - regulatory body responsible for the regulation of 
financial institutions and services in South Africa (with the exception of banks) and 
subject to the Ministry of Finance. 
Policy Board 
The Policy Board for Financial Services and Regulation, Pretoria - advisory body 
responsible for the co-ordination of financial regulation policy in South Africa. 
Reserve Bank I South African Reserve Bank I SARB 
South African Reserve Bank, Pretoria - executive body responsible for the regulation 
of South African banks and subject to the Ministry of Finance. Supervisory duties are 
carried out by the Department of Banking Supervision headed by the Registrar of 
Banks. 
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Risk 
Risk, in the general sense, is the probability that the actual outcome of a future event 
may be different from the expected outcome. As used here, the term refers to the 
possibility of negative consequences intrinsic to the process of deposit-taking 
financial intermediation. The following traditional banking risks are considered: 
capital risk, credit risk, interest-rate risk, market risk, currency risk and liquidity risk. 
Regulation I Supervision 
The terms regulation and supervision are used interchangeably to cover all forms of 
direct and indirect, formal and informal, interventions or practices of a bank regulator. 
In a stricter sense, regulation connotes a specific exercise of a legislatively or 
administratively delegated authorisation by an appropriate governmental authority, 
whilst supervision implies the oversight practices and functions of such authority over 
the subject matter of their authority (in the present case of deposit-taking 
institutions). 
10 
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CHAPTER2 
BASIC ISSUES 
2.1 Finance 
'Money is a mechanism for doing quickly what would be done (anyway); less quickly, without 
it' ' 
John Stuart Mill 
'One can easily exaggerate the importance of finance ... but the suggestion that it usually falls 
into line and accommodates real forces ... stretches belief 
Charles Kindleberger 
Finance in the modern economy performs many functions. A list of these can be 
found in many textbooks and is not repeated here.? But central to all financial activity 
is the transfer of funds from those whose current holdings of money exceed what is 
needed for immediate planned expenditures (surplus units or lenders) to those 
whose current holdings of money fall short of what is needed for immediate planned 
expenditure (deficit units or borrowers). This transfer of funds is subject to a number 
of differing conditions and consequently financial contracts can take a wide variety of 
legal forms. A basic distinction is between those where the contract between the 
lender and borrower is direct and those where each deals separately with a third 
party. 
In the first case, the surplus unit lends money directly to a deficit unit and thereby 
acquires a claim on the deficit unit. The two parties may be brought together by a 
broker, but the latter acts only in an agency capacity: the contract is between lender 
and borrower. lt follows that the contract will be largely symmetrical in that the rights 
of one party will correspond to the obligations of the other. 
This type of financing can take !?lace only to the extent that lenders' requirements in 
terms of risk, return and term can be matched with those of the borrowers. Generally, 
a conflict exists between the needs of borrowers and lenders. For instance, if it is a 
long-term loan then the lender has no claim on his money before the expiry of that 
period of time. However, in an uncertain world, most lenders demand the possibility 
of recovering their funds if they have need of them, whether for expenditure on 
goods and services or in order to take advantage of alternative investment 
opportunities. Lenders usually have a desire for some degree of liquidity, but many 
borrowers have a strong preference for long-term funds. 
This imbalance in the market can be overcome in two ways. One is by making the 
claims of lenders negotiable and having markets where these can be traded. A 
lender will be more willing to give funds to a borrower for a fixed term if he knows 
that, at any time within that period, he can sell his claim on the borrower to a third 
party. If the lender's claim is easily and inexpensively negotiable in an organised 
7 For an accessible text on the theory of finance see for instance Alien (1983). 
11 
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market, it is obviously a more liquid asset than in the absence of such negotiability. 
This is considered to be one of the prime economic functions of organised financial 
markets: to increase the liquidity of financial assets and so make them more 
attractive to lenders (Harrington 1991: 261-262). 
Second, the differences in the preferences of borrowers and lenders can be 
overcome by means of indirect, as opposed to direct finance. lt is this topic which is 
discussed hereafter. 
12 
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2.2 Financial Intermediation and Financial Institutions 
In the case of indirect finance, financial institutions acting as principals are involved 
and there are two transactions instead of one. Surplus units lend to the financial 
institution and acquire legal claims on that institution; the financial institution lends to 
deficit units and acquires claims upon them. There is no direct link between surplus 
units and deficit units and no direct claims of the former on the latter. The essence of 
financial 'intermediation' is the imposition of a third party between the ultimate 
borrower and lender. 8 
Why do financial institutions exist? Financial institutions perform several functions. 
The traditional view stresses three of these (Good hart 1989: 1 04-113). First, they 
alleviate imperfections in financial markets and in information gathering and portfolio 
management. If it were not for such imperfections, everyone could in theory manage 
his own financial assets as competently as a professional financial manager. A 
second function of financial institutions is to provide insurance services. This type of 
financial intermediation need not involve much risk-taking by the intermediary as long 
as assets can be matched to (the actuarial expectation of contingent) liabilities. 
However, it may also constitute managing insurance risks. The third type of financial 
intermediation involves issuing liabilities of a kind preferred by lenders (at relatively 
low yields) and investing a proportion of the funds in higher-yielding earning assets 
of a form which borrowers prefer to issue. 
The newly emerging theory of financial intermediation is focused on the role of 
information asymmetries9 in determining the need for, and form of financial 
institutions. The new approach follows the line of argument pursued by Bernanke 
and Gertler (1985: 1-5): 
'The basic premise is that, in the absence of intermediary institutions, financial 
markets are incomplete. This incompleteness arises primarily because of 
certain informational problems. By specialising in gathering information about 
loan projects, financial intermediaries help reduce market imperfections and 
thus facilitate lending and borrowing. Accordingly, changes in the level of 
financial intermediation due to either monetary policy, legal restrictions, or 
other factors, may have significant real effects on the economy.' 
In a broader setting, this model implies that banks play an important role in the real 
allocation process and are not merely acting as 'financial veils'. Critical to this result 
is the premise that both banks and depositors have their own information about 
certain aspects of their respective opportunities and needs. 
A number of economic benefits are created by the ability of financial institutions to 
transform the unacceptable claims on borrowers into acceptable claims on 
8 For an overview of the theory of financial intermediation see Hester ( 1994 ). 
9 The economics of assymmetric information (which is the study of all transactions in which not all of 
the parties have the same facts) have secured James Mirrlees and William Vickrey the 1996 Nobel 
prize in economics. 
13 
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themselves.1o First, through aggregating small amounts of funds for on-lending in 
larger parcels, liquidity is created for the lender. Second, through investing in a 
diverse portfolio of assets a financial intermediary can achieve a more efficient 
diversification of risk than an individual lender. Third, by providing liquidity and 
reducing risk, financial intermediaries are able to access savings that otherwise 
would not have been available. In the fourth place, by facilitating the availability of 
finance these institutions ease the constraint of income on expenditure, thereby 
enabling the consumer to spend in anticipation of income and enabling the 
entrepreneur to acquire physical assets. Finally, through their expertise financial 
intermediaries help to ensure that the flow of funds is allocated efficiently. 
10 For a more detailed elucidation of the topic see Faure (1976: 15-19). 
14 
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2.3 Deposit-taking Financial Intermediation 
In the previous section, the various functions which financial institutions perform 
were enumerated, and the reasons why financial institutions issue liabilities and hold 
assets were discussed, as well as the advantages to be gained therefrom. In this 
section attention is focused on the role, functions and the peculiar nature of one 
specific intermediary: the deposit-taking financial institution or bank. 
The general function of intermediation is performed by many different types of 
institutions. The distinguishing features are to be found in the nature of the claims 
and services offered to lenders and in the nature of the claims acquired and services 
offered to borrowers. 
Amongst financial intermediaries a basic distinction can be drawn between non 
deposit-taking institutions and deposit-taking institutions. As the name indicates, the 
most important differentiating feature is to be found in the special nature of a deposit. 
A deposit can be defined as an amount of money paid by a surplus unit to a financial 
intermediary subject to an agreement in terms of which an equal capital amount will 
be repaid. The legal nature of a deposit is therefore such that its value is stated by 
contract to be independent of the portfolio held by the intermediary. 
Consequently, there is a fundamental difference in the liabilities of deposit-taking 
institutions and those of contractual savings institutions. Deposit-taking institutions 
(banks) are those that accept deposits from the general public as a regular feature of 
their activities.11 
What differentiates banks from other financial intermediaries? Deposit-taking 
institutions fulfil a unique role in the economy of a country.12 Views differ as to why 
banks are different and what the implications of these differences are for financial 
regulation. A number of theories exist, each of which stresses a different aspect of 
the special nature of deposit-taking institutions. 
2.3.1 Payments and Money Transmission Services 
First, banks have traditionally provided and operated the main payments and money 
transmission services in the economy. They were the principal depository institutions 
where the public held its cash for transactions purposes. In the performance of this 
function, banks generated current account balances described as the 'bedrock of 
their resources' (Wilson Committee 1979). For a long time, current deposits have 
represented a stable base on which banking developed. Indeed Newlyn (1971: 16) 
argues that the 'only feature which is peculiar when the transaction is with a bank is 
that, in this case, the particular financial asset created functions as the generally 
accepted means of payment; it is money. In the case of all other financial institutions, 
the financial assets created, though they may be almost indistinguishable from 
11 lt is re_adily conceded that these general definitions are easily blurred by the complexities of modern 
financial systems. 
12 For a comprehensive analysis see Clark (1976). 
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money as assets, have to be changed into money in order to make payments'. 
Accordingly, the role of banks in the payments system is seen as the main reason for 
the special regulatory treatment of banks. 
There are obvious advantages in having a smoothly operating payments system. lt is 
extremely convenient if no risk of default applies to these balances. Thus central 
bankers have traditionally regarded the integrity of the payments system as a vital 
objective (Gowland 1991: 1 0). Although banks' hegemony in money transmission 
activities still remains, it is being increasingly challenged by new financial and 
technological innovations and by regulatory changes, the effect of which is to lower 
the barriers to entry and to disperse the money transmission and settlement services 
between institutions other than banks (Podolski 1986: 40). 
2.3.2 Conduits of Monetary Policy 
Second, as taught in all introductory textbooks, banks actually 'create' money 
whenever they make loans. In the words of James Tobin (1963): 
'Perhaps the greatest moment of triumph for the elementary economics 
teacher is his exposition of the multiple creation of bank credit and bank 
deposits. Before the admiring eye of freshmen he puts to rout the practical 
banker who is sure he 'lends only the money depositors entrust to him.' The 
banker is shown to have a worm's eye view, and his error stands as an 
introductory object lesson in the fallacy of composition. From the Olympian 
vantage of the teacher and the textbook it appears that the banker's dictum 
must be reversed; depositors entrust to bankers whatever amounts the 
bankers lend.' 
The money creating ability of banks is linked to their role in the money transmission 
mechanism13, as bank deposits serve as the generally accepted means of payment 
for most transactions. By accounting identity, changes in the money stock can be 
expressed in terms of changes in the high-powered money-base in an algebraic 
formula that (in its basic form) depends on the reserve asset ratio maintained by 
banks. Banks need to hold only a fraction k, set by regulation, convention or 
prudence of their deposit liabilities as reserves in base money. In an equilibrium in 
which they hold no excess reserves their deposits will be a multiple 1 /k of their 
reserves; they will have created (1-k)/k of substitute money. The orthodox, 
monetarist view on this base-multiplier process is that the high-powered base is 
exogenously given, i.e. determined by the central bank. Changes in the high 
powered base are taken to originate in the actions of the central bank's open market 
operations. Exogeneity of the money stock is defined by the ability of the central 
bank to control the quantity of money via the monetary base (Chick 1973: 85). 
13 The money transmission mechanism is not to be confused with the monetary transmission 
mechanism {the channels through which changes in monetary policy affect policy targets. For a 
discussion on the role of banks in the monetary transmission process see for instance Dale and 
Haldane (1993). 
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The alternative, post-Keynesian view is that the direction of causality is precisely the 
reverse of the conventional view, i.e. that the money supply is endogenously 
determined by changes in the demand for bank credit. lt is argued that central banks 
have no direct ability to restrict the growth of the high-powered monetary base. The 
policy implication of this view is that the only exogenous variable that the central 
bank c~n and does determine is the interest rate (Moore 1989). 
Post-Keynesians also differ from monetarists who treat the asset side of bank 
balance sheets as significant. Instead their attention is focused on the liability side of 
bank intermediation. 
Note that these are extreme views, with a variety of interpolar approaches existing in 
the literature.14 Regardless of which theoretical approach is adopted, there is an 
obvious balance sheet identity between total bank assets and total bank liabilities 
(i.e. total assets will always equal total liabilities). Furthermore, changes in the 
monetary environment will logically impact on both banking assets and liabilities. 
Consequently, the following discussions on the impact of monetary policy on bank 
behaviour will deal with both the asset and liability portfolio management practices of 
banks. The approach adopted here is therefore inclusive of both of the extreme 
monetary schools of thought and of the intermediate views. 
In effect the discussion on whether 'loans make deposits' or vice versa falls outside 
the scope of this study. The above exposition does, however, serve to accentuate 
the important role of banks, either as (passive or active) creators of money or more 
specifically as conduits of official monetary policy. 
2.3.3 Channeling and Allocating Financial Resources 
A third reason why banks are considered 'special' is derived from their key role in 
channelling and allocating financial resources to the rest of the economy and 
therefore in the financing of economic growth and development.15 Admittedly, banks 
are no longer the sole conduit for the flow of financial resources, but they remain 
critical in this process. Sustained economic achievement in any country depends on 
a good level of productive investment. Capital is seen as the embodiment of new 
production methods and the vehicle of technical progress. 
In a comparative study on the subject Goldsmith (1969: 48) concluded that in 'most 
countries a rough parallelism can be observed between economic and financial 
development when periods of several decades are considered'. The parallelism in 
the long-run development of financial and real structures raises the question of a 
possible causal connection. Goldsmith (1969: 48) was unable to supply a definite 
answer: 'there is no possibility, however, of establishing with confidence the direction 
of causal mechanism, i.e. of deciding whether financial factors were responsible for 
the acceleration of economic development or whether financial development 
14 See Pierce and Tysome (1985). 
15 According to Schumpeter (1911: 72-74) bankers are the gatekeepers of capitalist economic 
development; their strategic function is to screen potential innovators and advance the necessary 
purchasing power to the most promising. 
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reflected economic growth whose mainsprings must be sought elsewhere'. Arguably, 
financial institutions, while facilitating growth, do not act as entrepreneurs. In the 
absence of entrepreneurs, even the best financial system will not ensure economic 
growth. Kitchen (1986: 68-70) considers both the theoretical arguments and the 
historical evidence on the relationship between financial and economic development 
and although he finds no conclusive evidence it appears that the majority of opinions 
favour the view that financial development leads economic development. 
However, modern views on financial evolution stress the response to profit 
opportunities arising out of anomalies found in the financial sector. These frictions 
are produced by inadequate information reflecting market segmentation and 
excessive transaction costs. Thus, innovation designed to overcome such frictions is 
an important element in the evolving structure of the financial sector. Financial 
change is therefore increasingly seen as a process of making markets more efficient 
by overcoming market frictions or imperfections. As Diamond (1984) has shown, the 
delegation of screening and monitoring of borrowers to banks is an efficient 
allocation mechanism. Furthermore, banks can derive economies of scale in the 
acquisition of information and its use to take advantage of profit opportunities (Wood 
1981: 146-152). 
Differences in financial systems also have important implications for economic 
performance and development.16 The financial systems of different countries exhibit . 
considerable differences in both structure and practice and regulation is a major 
determinant of such differences. lt is therefore not surprising that the role of banks in 
economic development is a much discussed topic in financial literature and often the 
issue of heated political debate.17 Edwards ( 1987) argues that there is a strong link 
between the Anglo-American heritage for the organising of industrial finance and the 
record of relatively low growth. He stresses that the German economy, which is a 
largely integrated financial-industrial-government system, a product of the Great 
Depression, has produced productive industry by means of bank-industry co-
operation. A comparison of data on long-run economic growth, and financial 
structure by De Long (1988), also suggests that financial systems characterised by a 
greater reliance on bank finance and close links between banks and industrial 
companies have achieved higher rates of economic growth than systems where the 
relationship between banks and industry is less strong. The first group of financial 
systems include Japan, Germany and other continental European countries while the 
second group covers mostly Anglo-American countries such as Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, the United States and the UK. The issue will be taken up again 
when discussing the motivation for selecting the financial systems described in this 
study.1a 
16 Although, as Gertler (1988) points out, the working hypothesis of most economists has long been 
that the structure of financial intermediation is irrelevant. 
17 The proposals from some South African economic commentators that banks be forced to lend to 
certain sectors of the South African economy can be regarded as stemming not only from purely social 
but also from developmental considerations. 
18 See paragraph 5.2 
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2.3.4 Major Depository for the Public's Savings 
Fourth, banks serve as a major depository for the public's savings. Most of the funds 
deposited with deposit-taking intermediaries originate from a large number of smaller 
and less financially sophisticated savers. Clark (1976) discusses a number of 
propositions why funds obtained from households are in need of special protection, 
namely that it is easier for insiders to steal from financial intermediaries than from 
ordinary corporations, that the risk level of a -financial intermediary can be changed 
abruptly and without timely notice to savers, that households are systematically 
disadvantaged by market-imperfections (such as the cost of obtaining accurate, 
relevant and intelligible information) and the so-called thesis of human fallibility which 
holds that people need to be protected against themselves. 
2.3.5 Vulnerability to Financial Collapse 
A fifth and final reason why banks are considered unique in an economy derives 
from the conviction that banks are vulnerable to financial collapse. Why are deposit-
taking institutions thought to be inherently unstable? Three strands of thought 
emerge from the literature: high financial gearing, reliance on short-term deposits to 
finance illiquid assets and lack of transparency (Dale 1982: 53-55). 
The first strand of thought is that the intermediary function of banks necessarily 
implies a relatively high degree of financial gearing, or ratio of debt to equity capital. 
In the very early stages of the development of banking the lending and depository 
functions were largely separated. The early great banking houses lent out not other 
people's money but their own capital, while other institutions only accepted money 
for safekeeping. Following the integration of these functions by the early nineteenth 
century, equity capital resources relative to the total assets held by banks have fallen 
sharply. Therefore it is the intermediary, rather than the lending function of banks 
that determines the relatively low capital base and high gearing of these institutions. 
The second and related strand of thought is that because of their high financial 
leverage banks can best be described as 'conditionally solvent', the condition being 
that depositors do not collectively withdraw their deposits. An argument formalised 
by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and further explained by Postlewaite and Vives 
(1987), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) and Freeman (1988), is that an important 
activity of banks is to finance illiquid assets with short term deposits. This creates the 
potential risk that savers, motivated by bad news about the market value of assets 
held at financial institutions or by any other scare, may rush to withdraw their funds. 
In both cases there is a cost since illiquid assets may have to be sold at a loss.19 
Moreover, the failure of a single financial institution could eventually trigger a signal 
regarding the solvency of other financial institutions leading to a systemic crisis. 
19 However, Edwards and Mishkin (1994) outline how fundamental economic forces have led to a 
decline in traditional banking (that is the process of making long term loans funded by short-dated 
deposits). The declining competitiveness of traditional banking has increased the incentives of banks 
to make more risky loans or to engage in 'non-traditional' banking activities that promise higher returns 
but involve greater risk. 
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The third strand of thought centres on the reason for banks being prone to sudden 
precautionary deposit withdrawals in an unregulated market. The financial condition 
of a bank is not readily determinable by analysts, even with sophisticated techniques 
at their disposal, let alone ordinary depositors, since risk parameters cannot be 
adequately assessed on the basis of published reports or other publicly available 
information. Furthermore, even if the relevant information were obtainable it would 
very quickly become outdated since banks can adjust their risk-profile within a very 
short period. Finally, many depositors may find it difficult to interpret any rating or 
evaluation of a particular institution. This lack of transparency means that on the one 
hand a bank's financial condition can deteriorate markedly before financial markets 
become aware of it, while on the other hand even the soundest of institutions can fall 
victim to ill-founded rumours that cannot easily be dispelled. 
lt is therefore apparent that a number of reasons support the notion that finance in 
general and banks in particular fulfil a special role in the economy of a country. 
Without denying that the general framework of economics is relevant, it is the 
contention of this section that none of the above reasons why banks are special are 
entirely satisfactory to explain the entire range of non-monetary financial regulations 
that are applied in practice to deposit-taking institutions. A more pragmatic approach 
to deposit-taking intermediation is necessary. The conventional views of banking 
activity are no longer adequate to explain either the occurrence of bank failure or to 
justify preventative and protective banking regulation in practice. The next section 
will introduce the concept of financial risk in order to introduce the risk-management 
approach to financial intermediation. 
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2.4 Financial Risk 
Risk is at the heart of financial regulation. All financial intermediaries are exposed to 
risk and the management of risk is a function intrinsic to financial intermediation.2o In 
the case of banking the risk that depositors may demand payment on short notice in 
the face of illiquid assets is but one such risk. Modern banking exposes the 
deposit-taking institution to a wide variety of risks, each of which could be the 
underlying cause of instability and bank failure. 
What is risk? By its very nature risk is a somewhat elusive concept. In this regard it is 
worth quoting Tobin (1992) at length: 
'The risks incident to economic activity take many forms. Some are nation-
wide or world-wide - wars and revolutions, shifts in international comparative 
advantage, government fiscal and monetary policies, prices and supply of oil 
and other basic material. Some are specific to particular enterprises and 
technologies - the capacity and integrity of managers, the quality of new 
products, the local weather. A financial intermediary can specialise in the 
appraisal of risks, especially specific risks, with expertise in the gathering and 
interpretation of information costly or unavailable to individual savers. By 
pooling the funds of its creditors, the financial intermediary can diversify away 
risks to an extent that the individual creditor cannot, because of the costs of 
transactions as well as the inconvenience of lumpy denominations.' 
lt is important to note that in a market economy, all market participants are exposed 
to risk of various kinds. However, the issue of risk is of paramount importance to 
banks. If banks do not manage their risk exposure adequately, the instability which 
may result may have an disproportionate impact on financial stability and hence the 
overall economy. 
The following risks are usually identified as traditional banking risks (Cade 1987; 
Moore 1989: 48): 
Capital or solvency risk,_namely the risk that the capital resources of an institutiQn 
may be adversely affected by all the financial risk components named below and I or 
other external developments (i.e. event or business risk), can be regarded as an 
encompassing risk category. 
Credit risk: Credit risk can be defined as the risk that the counterparty to an 'asset' 
(debtor in respect of loans and advances or issuer of securities) will not be able to 
repay the full capital amount and I or accrued interest when .due. In an uncertain 
world asset losses cannot be avoided entirely. The task of bank management is to 
20 According to Hester (1994: 133-149) elemental risks in finance include: nominal interest rate risk, 
prepayment risk, default risk, liquidity risk, systemic risk, market risk, idiosyncratic risk, innovation risk, 
manipulation risk and purchasing power risk. 
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lend prudently, so that total loss of certain assets in the asset portfolio will be more 
than covered by the excess of asset income. 
Market I price risk: Market risk concerns the possibility of a capital loss resulting from 
making investments or taking positions in one of the following four economic 
markets: 
• commodities 
• fixed interest-bearing instruments, in both the 
money market and 
capital market 
• equities; as well as 
• currency 
Interest rate risk: When interest rates change, the value of the assets and loans held 
-in the portfolio of a deposit-taking institution also change, but not necessarily in a 
compensating manner. The risk that changes in rates might adversely affect the net 
portfolio value and portfolio income of institutions is referred to as an interest rate 
risk. 
Currency risk: Currency risk may be defined as the risk of changes in exchange rates 
having a negative impact on the mismatch between foreign receivables and foreign 
payables. 
Liquidity risk: Deposit-taking institutions must be able to meet their commitments 
when these become payable. Such commitments may take the form of demands for 
cash withdrawal, new credit and transfers. The inflow and outflow of funds will not 
necessarily balance. Deposit-taking institutions should therefore allow for the 
occurrence of possible liquidity mismatching stemming from contractual variations in 
cash flows over different periods. 
lt is the contention of this study that deposit-taking institutions do not passively 
accept their exposure to these risks. Instead modern banks are actively managing 
risks with due regard to the returns generated by risk exposure. 
The roots of this contention are to be found in Chant's (1992) 'New' theory of 
financial intermediation. Chant (1992: 62) highlights monitoring costs21 and 
enforcement costs22 to explain the concentration of non-marketable securities (such 
as loans) in the portfolios of deposit-taking institutions. Chant (1992: 57) reasons 
that: 'the deposit-taking institution appears to provide an efficient solution to 
monitoring and enforcement problems. The agent who is delegated with the 
responsibility for monitoring and enforcement, guarantees a fixed payment to his 
depositors and becomes a residual claimant to the remainder of the income. Thus, 
his returns are directly dependent upon his performance.' 
21 Monitoring costs are incurred to ensure that loaned funds are used for the intended purpose. 
22 Enforcement costs are necessary to make borrowers fulfil repayment obligations. 
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Although Chant (1992) does not cast the theoretical net wide enough when he 
singles out monitoring and enforcement as the primary risk-related banking activities, 
his analysis does provide the key towards understanding why banks actively manage 
risk. 
A more general explanation is as follows: The nature of a deposit is such that it 
guarantees the repayment of an equal capital amount to depositors independent of 
the performance of the assets in the bank's portfolio. Traditionally, banks have 
employed the deposits which they have received towards granting higher yielding 
loans; and have received a return for the credit risk thus assumed. lt is on this level 
that enforcement and monitoring are valid and indeed important banking functions. 
However, modern banks no longer confine themselves to managing credit risk. 
Consider the implications of a bank accepting a deposit from a customer at a fixed 
rate of interest and then investing the proceeds in a (higher yielding) variable rate 
security issued by the government. In this case the bank has assumed virtually no 
credit risk (as the government is considered to be one of the least likely 
counterparties to default on its loan obligations) and monitoring and enforcement 
functions therefore become irrelevant. However, the bank has assumed an interest 
rate risk, namely the risk that the value of assets and loans may change as interest 
rates change. Consequently, the bank has engaged in the management of another 
type of financial risk. 
Similar consideration obviously apply to the other categories of financial risk set out 
above. Modern banks manage the whole spectrum of financial risks in order to 
generate higher returns for shareholders. Certainly Chant's (1992) reasoning 
remains relevant, namely that banks are the direct beneficiaries of the returns 
generated by their portfolios. The basic point is that deposit-taking institutions 
themselves assume risks, whereas other financial intermediaries often pass the 
capital risk on to the investor (Jacobs 1992: 82). lt follows that banks are uniquely 
incentivised to actively assume risk in order to generate high returns. Modern 
banking has therefore evolved into managing financial risk to achieve appropriate 
risk-reward profiles. lt is in this context that the regulation of deposit-taking 
intermediaries acquires its justification. In the absence of regulation, banks may 
be tempted to assume too high a level of overall risk and thereby jeopardise the 
interests of depositors and other stakeholders. 
Accordingly, a key issue in managing risk in financial institutions is the identification 
of whose interests are being served. In principle there are a number of stakeholders 
in any financial institution whose interests can be affected through exposure to risk: 
owners I shareholders, management, board of directors, employees, auditors, 
depositors, loan customers, general public, supervisory authorities and taxpayers 
(Van Greuning 1993). lt has been argued that, ideally, management decisions 
should be taken in the interests of shareholders. However, in practice the 
management of a bank's risk exposure is often directed more towards the interests 
of depositors (Davis 1990). This reflects the pressure placed on financial institutions 
by regulators, who, motivated by the fear of a crisis of confidence among depositors 
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and the destructive effect of a 'bank run', see it as their responsibility to protect 
depositors. 
Once risk exposures of banks have been identified as well as stakeholder attitudes 
towards them, the practical problem of implementing a policy to achieve the desired 
exposure (i.e. managing the exposure) becomes paramount. Banks manage their 
exposure to risks in a number of different ways (Davis and Harper 1991: 5). One 
approach is to assume offsetting positions with different groups of customers or, 
more generally, to rely on the 'law of large numbers' to reduce aggregate exposure. 
Another approach to risk-management is to use specialised financial instruments 
such as options23, swaps24 and futures25 contracts whose function is the transfer of 
risk from one party to another. A third approach is to 'self insure' and attempt to 
incorporate an appropriate risk-premium in the price of the product. For instance, 
credit risk can be managed by a credit appraisal procedure which ensures that the 
interest margin on loans compensates for the risk-profile of a loan. 
Risk-management practices may differ between financial institutions for a number of 
reasons. One reason is that different lines of business give rise to different needs for 
risk-management. A second reason is that attitudes towards particular types of risk, 
and thus the incentive for risk-management, may vary across institutions. A third 
reason for differences in risk-management practices stems from the nature and 
source of regulatory control. Where financial institutions are forced to comply with 
various reporting guidelines and meet certain externally imposed prudential 
standards, the choice of a risk-management system is naturally affected. Finally, 
financial sophistication, perceptions of the need for risk-management and the ability 
to implement risk-management procedures vary across institutions. 
The above analysis of risk does not suggest that deposit-taking institutions and their 
activities can be explained adequately by any single set of factors. Nevertheless, 
risk-management considerations appear to be essential elements of any theory 
which seeks to explain the functions, activities and portfolio behaviour of deposit-
taking institutions. This approach recognises that deposit-taking institutions actively 
manage and shape risks rather than just adapt passively to risks that face them 
(Chant 1992: 62-63). 
This view is both old and new. lt is old in the sense that the advantages of pro-active 
economic behaviour has long been recognised by economists such as Keynes 
(1924) when he wrote: 
23 An option contract conveys onto the buyer (seller) thereof a right, but not the obligation to purchase 
(sell) the underlying instrument at a fixed price on a specified future date. 
24 A swap is a contractual agreement between two parties to exchange a series of payments for a 
stated period of time. When combined with an asset or liability, a swap can change its risk 
characteristics by changing the net cash flow, e.g. a fixed-rate liability can be converted into a floating 
rate liability. 
25 A futures contract is a form of a forward contract in that it conveys the right to purchase or sell a 
specified quantity of an asset at a fixed price on a fixed future date. The essential features of a futures 
contract is that they standardise the quantity of the underlying asset to be delivered (the contract size), 
the underlying financial instrument or index and the period of the contract. 
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'Unfortunately it is not possible to make oneself permanently secure by any 
policy of inaction whatever. The idea which some people seem to entertain 
that an active policy involves taking more risks than an inactive policy is 
exactly opposite to the truth. The inactive investor who takes up an obstinate 
attitude about his holdings and refuses to change his opinion merely because 
facts and circumstances have changed is the one who in the long run comes 
to a grievous loss.' 
Much has happened since these words were written. New ideas and events have 
tended to push these words aside. Yet they are as relevant today as when they were 
written, and in the present context suggest support for active financial risk-
management. 
Accordingly, the view also finds support in the more recent contributions on the 
theory of financial intermediation which have focused upon the role of intermediaries 
in overcoming information imperfections (Liewellyn 1995(a)). These imperfections 
give rise to a role for intermediaries as 'monitors' of contracts (Diamond 1984 ), 
information 'signallers' (Leland and Pyle 1977) and providers of insurance against 
such events as illiquidity, interest rate changes and other risks (Lewis and Davis 
1987). In brief, the services provided by intermediaries are those of risk-taking and 
insurance against risks. This perspective appropriately places a primary focus on the 
risk-management activities of intermediaries. 
Yet in another important sense this view of financial institutions is new. Much of the 
existing literature on the theory of financial intermediation contains more complete 
theories designed to explain the portfolio behaviour of intermediaries than to explain 
the existence and functions performed by intermediaries. Many of the implications 
arising from the recognition that financial institutions actively manage risks have not 
been fully developed. 
One implication of such a view is the danger that theories of portfolio choice 
developed for intermediaries do not adequately reflect the functions performed by 
those intermediaries.26 A second and for the purposes of this study more relevant 
implication is that regulatory efforts with regard to deposit-taking intermediaries 
should be directed at the risk-management activities of these institutions. lt is 
within this context that the rationale of and principles guiding financial regulation will 
be discussed in the next Chapter. 
26 The behaviour of deposit-taking institutions in response to market-changes is modelled typically on 
the basis of the Tobin-Markowitz model of portfolio selection (Tobin 1982). The choice of this model 
depends implicitly on the assumption that intermediaries serve mainly the risk-transfer function 
between investors on the basis of differences in their willingness to bear risk. Even in this context 
these models fail to incorporate the transaction costs required to explain the existence of 
intermediaries. More fundamentally this modelling fails to capture the essential elements of deposit-
taking intermediaries to the extent that their existence depends on advantages in risk-management. 
As a basis for further research on this topic the interested reader is referred to Carmichael and Davis 
(1991) and Chant (1992). 
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\ 2.5 Summary and Conclusion 
Profit is the result of risk wisely selected. 
Frederick Barnard Hawley ( 1843-1929) 
Enterprise and the Productive Process 
Financial activity essentially consists of the transfer of funds from surplus units to 
deficit units. Financial intermediation involves the imposition of a third party between 
the ultimate borrower and lender. The newly emerging theory of financial 
intermediation stresses the need for financial institutions to overcome information 
asymmetries between market participants. 
Deposit-taking institutions I banks serve a unique function in the economy as: 
providers of payments and money transmission services, conduits of monetary 
policy, allocators of financial resources as well as acting as major depositories for the 
general public's savings. Of greater importance, banks are also considered 
vulnerable to financial collapse because of their exposure to a wide variety of risks. 
The historical threat of deposit runs has faded only to be displaced by the threats to 
banks arising from the use of increasingly sophisticated financial products with 
accompanying financial risks. Modern banks actively ma_nage these risks with a view 
to attaining their desired risk-return profile. The major implication of this new view of 
deposit-taking financial intermediation is that financial regulation should be 
concerned with the risk-management activities of banks. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Rags make Paper 
Paper makes Money 
Money makes Banks 
Banks make Loans 
Loans make Beggars 
Beggars make Rags 
CHAPTER3 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 
Anonymous, 18th Century 
The above quotation may seem somewhat gloomy in content; but is intended to be 
so in purpose as well. As was argued in the previous Chapter, banks are not only 
considered to be subject to instability but the consequences of such potential 
instability are deemed to be far more serious than in the case of other economic 
entities. The risk of bank failure is without doubt the main raison d'etre for financial 
regulation, both within the domestic financial system and also from an international 
point of view. Similarly, the perceived causes and negative implications of bank 
failure are the major determinants of the scope and nature of financial regulation. 
What is regulation? Regulation generally suggests the intervention of government or 
some authoritative body in the economy. More often than not the legal framework is 
employed for this purpose although regulation may sometimes be more subtle. In a 
broader context, regulation is also performed by the unseen hand of the market. An 
efficient market regulates through penalising institutions which adopt inappropriate 
risk : return positions. A higher risk position invariably requires a higher 
compensating return. Excessive risk together with the inability to achieve this return, 
may be ultimately penalised by failure through the operation of market forces. 
Llewellyn (1986: 16) identifies six aspects of regulation: 
• Environment: This form of regulation occurs when the ability of a financial 
institution to operate is limited by the general economic environment such as 
occurs when restrictive monetary policy influences the credit extension of 
financial institutions. 
• Statutory regulation: This form of regulation occurs when limitations are placed 
upon the type of business that an institution may conduct. 
• Self-imposed regulation: Financial institutions may be part of a cartel or may have 
unilaterally agreed not to become involved in certain types of business. 
• Moral suasion: This type of regulation usually occurs when the overall authority of 
the regulatory organ is such that regulations are adhered to on request. 
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• Self-regulation: This form of regulation occurs when a formal agency for a specific 
financial activity is established by financial intermediaries in the private sector. 
The agency is empowered to regulate the business of the particular financial 
activity through the "formulation of standards, prudential requirements and rules. 
• External agency: This form of regulation normally involves an independent or 
external agency that is given statutory power to regulate an industry. In a number 
of countries, the function of bank supervision does not rest with the central bank, 
but with an external agency. 
lt is already clear that regulation is not an easy concept to pin down outside a 
specific context. The economics literature does not contain a universal and widely 
accepted definition of regulation; At one extreme is the strict definition of regulation 
which implies governing in accordance with the law. At the operational level, 
regulation refers to control over what individual economic units may do and 
sometimes how they can perform these activities (Gardener 1986: 29). 
For present purposes, regulation is identified broadly as all manners of direct 
intervention in the activities of banks. The term as used here therefore comprises 
three elements being preventative or prudential regulation, protective regulation and 
monetary requirements. 
Prudential measures are those aimed directly at policing the levels of risks assumed 
by deposit-taking intermediaries. Components of prudential regulations include entry 
requirements, permissible business activities, disclosure requirements, capital 
adequacy, liquidity adequacy and risk asset limits. Protective measures, on the other 
hand, offer protection to depositors or to the deposit-taking intermediaries 
themselves. Components of protective measures include various forms of deposit 
insurance and emergency assistance. Monetary measures covered here involve the 
use of direct, non market-orientated policy instruments such as interest rate controls, 
credit ceilings, credit allocation by regulation and changes in reserve asset 
requirements. 
This Chapter deals with the main reasons for and the principles which should (and in 
one case should not)27 govern such regulation. lt prefaces with an overview of the 
two major theories of regulation, namely the public interest theory and the private 
interest theory; as well as an identification of the costs generally associated with 
regulation. This is followed by a consideration of the rationale for financial regulation. 
Three major themes are discussed under this heading, namely the stability of the 
financial system, consumer protection and monetary considerations. After covering 
the evolution of financial regulation, the problem of establishing principles to guide 
policy and by which to judge intervention acquires relevance. The following principles 
are discussed: efficiency, stability, competitive neutrality and social objectives. 
27 Namely in the case of social objectives; see paragraph 3.5.4. 
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3.2 Theories of Financial Regulation 
Banks and banking activities are closely regulated and supervised in most financial 
systems. Yet the analytical basis justifying many financial regulations is not so 
secure, and indeed has been under strong challenge by economists.2s The 
traditional polar textbook theories concerned with regulation in economics are the 
microeconomics based public interest theory and the more cynical private interest 
theory popularised by Stigler (1978) and others of the Chicago school. 
3.2.1 The Public Interest Theory of Financial Regulation 
Under the public interest theory, regulation is required to maximise social welfare 
where various types of market failure have occurred. In the context of financial 
regulation, the most frequently cited examples are the existence of natural 
monopolies and other forms of imperfect competition, imperfect information and the 
existence of (negative) externafities (Goodhart 1989: 202-213; Hall 1991: 167; 
Thornton 1992). 
In terms of the public interest theory, regulation is imposed with the sole motivation 
of increasing economic efficiency. The regulator thus intervenes in situations where 
distortions such as imperfect competition and externalities exist in the market. This 
type of regulation, according to classical theory, is assumed to be virtually without 
cost and is implemented by means of instruments such as taxes, subsidies and 
tariffs. The motivation for the regulation is to create a 'second best' market where 
some measure of economic efficiency can be attained despite the existence of 
imperfect markets (Marais 1991: 40). 
Although the ultimate rationale of all regulation rests with various forms of market 
failure and market imperfections, the nature of these imperfections in the financial 
sector differ from those in the real economy. Indeed, the nature of regulation is also 
different in the case of non-bank financial institutions compared to banks (Liewellyn 
1995(a): 205). 
The first condition, which relates to the existence of natural monopolies, need be of 
little concern to a study of regulation in the financial services sector since there are 
only a few instances of such natural monopolies. One example of such a monopoly 
is the role of a clearing house within a payment system. lt may be efficient to have 
only a single clearing house provided that the owners of the clearing house (e.g. 
existing banks) do not exclude competitors, or allow them access on 
disadvantageous terms. There is, therefore, a case in these circumstances for 
regulatory intervention to ensure fair access to the services of the clearing house 
(Goodhart 1989: 202-203). 
28 See for instance Benston and Kaufman (1996) who argue that most of the arguments that are 
frequently used to support special regulation for banks are not supported by either theory or empirical 
evidence. lt is reasoned that banks should be regulated only to reduce the negative externalities 
resulting from government induced deposit insurance. 
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The condition related to the possible existence of externalities has greater 
application in the financial field. The failure of one bank may cast doubt on the 
viability of others, and a contagion of panic withdrawals may result. 
Even so, one may ask as Goodhart (1989: 203) does: 'where lies the externality?' If 
banks are solvent, they should be able to meet a run and continue. If not, the run 
may concentrate losses on those left behind in the queue to withdraw, but the losses 
would have been suffered anyway. The answer is twofold. First, the need to realise 
assets to honour deposit liabilities would drive down asset prices and raise real 
interest rates. Also, the fixed nature of capital and the weakness of secondary 
markets make the search for additional funds by a solvent but illiquid bank costly and 
difficuJt.29 
The literature is not clear about the precise source and cause of externalities arising 
from bank failures. Nevertheless the existence of such externalities has generally 
been accepted by most economists. Llewellyn (1995(b): 205) for instance, holds that 
the particular market failure justifying regulation is the social cost of bank failure 
exceeding the private costs borne by the bank's depositors and shareholders. The 
main line of defence is emergency assistance measures by the central bank, 
whereby the central bank lends to the bank experiencing difficulties in order to lessen 
the need for the bank involved to dump assets in depressed markets or to call in 
loans. A second line of defence is to introduce various forms of deposit insurance. 
The existence of externalities within the financial system justifies the regulatory 
control of the risks provided that the constraints imposed by the regulation of risk 
adequately are less than the potential social costs of the externalities involved. 
Related to regulation to limit negative externalities such as a contagious panic in 
banking and financial markets, a large part of modern financial regulation is intended 
to meet the third main market imperfection: information problems. 
Consumer choice lies at the heart of the economic notion of allocative efficiency. 
However, the choice of preferences by consumers will only result in allocative 
efficiency if decision makers have adequate information on the set of alternatives 
available, including the consequence to them of exercising choice in different ways; 
and if they are capable of processing that information and of 'rationally' behaving in a 
manner that maximises their expected utility (Ogus 1994: 38). 
Clearly, it is possible to identify situations in the financial services industry in which 
the information generated by the unregulated market is likely to be far removed from 
perfect (or even sub-optimal) information, thereby allowing for regulatory measures. 
29 There are many historic examples of occasions when the failure of a bank which had become 
overextended to a certain class of borrower is followed by a refusal of banks or other intermediaries to 
extend credit and even attempting to reduce their exposure to that class. Because of the fixed nature 
and weak second-hand markets for existing capital assets this may lead to potentially avoidable 
negative externalities. As Bernanke (1983) suggests, it may have been the failure of banks, and the 
impairment of their ability to grant credit, rather than the contraction of the money stock, as such, that 
was primarily responsible for the extent of the American depression in 1931-33. 
30 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions 
The cost to banking consumers to acquire adequate information on which to base 
the assessment of the risk-profile of the bank is substantial. Furthermore, the ability 
of depositors to understand the complexities of risk-management to such an extent 
that it allows for 'rational' utility maximising choices is questionable. 
Llewellyn (1995(a): 206) points out the various market imperfections or market 
failures which would not be in the public interest in a regulation-free environment. 
These include: 
• problems of asymmetric information; 
• problems of inadequate consumer information; 
• under-investment in information by consumers; and 
• inability of all consumers to assess the quality of financial products and 
institutions. 
As such, regulation can be justified on cost grounds, as supervisors will accumulate 
information relevant to the supervisory process which could only have been obtained 
by depositors at a much higher cost, if at all. The superior information of regulators 
on the management of risk by banks is therefore considered a justification for 
intervention within the public interest theory. 
The traditional justification of bank supervision is the prevention of 'welfare' losses 
arising from 'bank runs', which can result from such informational asymmetries. As 
was shown above this is not a completely satisfactory explanation. Instead it can be 
argued that regulators are in a better position to judge the overall risk exposure of 
banks than some other stakeholders and especially depositors. 
Moreover, the insights gained in the previous Chapter from the 'new' theory of 
deposit-taking financial intermediation presents the opportunity of enhancing the 
public interest theory to take explicit cognisance of banks as managers of financial 
risks. The line of reasoning is as follows: 
Banks perform a certain type of financial intermediation which allows them to retain 
the full rewards for the risks which they expose themselves to and also manage 
actively. Although banks generally steer a conservative risk-reward course, the 
incentive to increase risk in search of higher rewards may cause them to take 
excessive risks. Should a bank fail due to excessive risk-taking this does not per se 
represent a market failure; indeed it may confirm the effectiveness of market forces 
(excessive risk exposures should be 'punished' by the market). Yet as banks occupy 
a special position in any financial and economic system, bank failures have 
consequences stretching much further than the failure of other economic entities. 
Two considerations are of particular importance, namely consumer protection and 
systemic stability. 
Consumer protection can be justified in terms of the public interest theory if 
informational asymmetries existed. This would be the case if consumers were 
unaware of the riskiness of the banks to whom they entrusted their monies; or unable 
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to gauge the risk-profile of banks. In both cases there is a justification for financial 
regulation to counter the 'market failure' which has occurred. 
Market failure would also occur if the failure of a single banking institution were to 
lead to the contagion of the financial system via the so-called 'domino effect'. Again, 
the public interest theory permits both protective and preventative regulation, with the 
intention of counteracting the negative externalities inherent in systemic instability. 
Accordingly, the approach favoured here is the public interest theory of financial 
regulation according to which the regulation of banking risks is justified on account of 
the market failure which may arise due to the management of these risks. Other 
theories of financial regulation are presented below for the sake of 
comprehensiveness. 
3.2.2 The Private Interest Theory of Financial Regulation 
While British economists have been supportive of regulation in the financial field, 
mainstream United States literature has become strongly critical of government 
regulation in virtually every field of economic activity, including financial services 
(Goodhart 1989: 195-196). Early empirical studies of the effect of regulation 
generally concluded that regulation had failed to achieve the results that a public 
interest theory of regulation would have indicated (i.e. to counteract market 
imperfections), and that the most likely explanation was that the true underlying 
objectives of regulation were different from the stated objectives (Stigler 1971; 
Peltzman 1976). This led to the hypothesis that the regulatory process was subject to 
a process of 'capture' by the industry or interest group which it was initially intended 
to regulate. Over time, the more restricted capture theory evolved into a general 
private interest theory of regulation. 
In contrast with the public interest theory, the capture theory therefore postulates that 
regulation is the outcome of a struggle between various interest groups, each of 
which seeks to maximise its own private welfare. This welfare can be expressed in 
terms of profits for the intermediary, protection at least cost for the consumer, votes 
for the politician and low or no failure rates amongst intermediaries for supervisors. 
Thus, even though regulators may start out with good intentions, the capture theory 
contends that they may ultimately become 'corrupted' in the sense that other 
objectives may be allowed to influence their judgement. The ultimate danger is that 
the regulators become 'captured' by the regulated (Hall 1991: 169). 
The Chicago school under Stigler and Peltzman have argued that regulation should 
be viewed as a form of wealth transfer brought about by an essentially political 
process of maximising effective support for such measures. In such cases, a well-
organised cohesive lobby is likely to be the most effective. 
The approach emphasising the importance of lobbying on each issue is naturally 
fashioned on US political circumstances. The political calculus underlying US 
regulation seems less applicable in other financial systems and specifically the 
financial systems considered in this study. 
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Moreover, it appears unfeasible for any supervisory authority to operate effectively 
without a degree of voluntary co-operation from the supervised. In this sense, 
regulation always has to be designed to be acceptable to the regulated and a degree 
of 'capture' by the regulated industry is inevitable in all regulatory systems. 
Although emphasising some significant aspects of regulation, the capture theory is 
far too absolute. Some conflict between regulator and regulatee is inevitable. On the 
other hand, hostility between the various parties is neither essential to nor desirable 
for good regulation. Regulatory authorities can only perform their function properly if 
they understand the position of those whom they regulate, which does not imply 
being unduly influenced by the regulated. 
The essence of the public interest theory of regulation is that regulation can be 
beneficial if otherwise there would be market failure. lt therefore serves to elucidate 
the benefits of regulation. The capture theory approach to regulation acts as a 
balance to this by stressing some of the costs and dangers of regulation. The value 
of the capture theory is that is accentuates the fact that the case for regulation is not 
always self evident and requires more careful consideration than is sometimes given. 
The capture theory (which is essentially a theory of regulatory failure) prompted as 
many questions as it purported to answer. What was required was a more general 
theory which could explain how private interests operate in the public domain. 
On the basis of public choice analysis there has emerged, particularly in the 
American literature, an 'economic' theory which can be termed the private interest 
theory of regulation. According to this theory the existence and form of regulation is a 
response by politicians to the demands of interest groups who will derive benefit from 
the measure. The theory seeks to provide an explanation not only for regulation 
which overtly confers benefits on producers but also measures which ostensibly 
protect more generalised interests, such as consumers or the environment, but 
which serve to generate profits for the regulated firms or industries. 
The main criticism of the private interest theory of regulation is the unrealistic 
·assumption that self-interest motivates the behaviour of all those engaging in politics. 
Empirical studies, particularly by political scientists, did not always confirm the 
predictions made by private choice theorists (Lewin 1991 ). 
Neither the capture theory nor the private interest theory explains the large number 
of deregulatory measures which have been taken in the US and elsewhere in recent 
years. Consequently, the private interest theory of regulation cannot provide an 
adequate explanation for the existence of financial regulation. 
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3.3 The Costs associated with Financial Regulation 
There are a number of reasons why regulation is costly (Gowland 1991: 21-27; 
Goodhart 1995: 446). Most of these costs are difficult to quantify but they may 
nevertheless be significant. 
The first of these costs arises from what is usually termed moral hazard. Moral 
hazard describes those changes in the behaviour of the private sector, which occur 
in response to some institutional or other change and produce undesirable, 
counterproductive effects.3o Regulation, by inducing the private sector to take more 
risks, may thus lead to a reduction in normal standards of prudence. This may 
actually increase the dangers that regulation intends to avoid. 
Moral hazard certainly seems to be a problem in the case of deposit-taking 
institutions. In a totally free market, depositors would have to assess the safety of 
banks, yet in practice, the regulation of these institutions may lead depositors to 
believe that the bank concerned is safe or that the depositor will be refunded in the 
event of a bank failure occurring. In one way, this is a benefit since confidence in the 
stability of banks and the banking sector is a public good which is desirable on 
market failure grounds. Nevertheless, if depositors place their surplus funds with 
banks without regard to the risk involved, this will make it easier for badly managed 
financial institutions to obtain funds. 
'Moral hazard' can apply to both parties in a financial transaction. An important 
strand of academic literature (Di Cagno 1990) shows that banks are likely to react to 
regulation by increasing the riskiness of their loan portfolios. This is done in order to 
compensate for the costs of regulation by adding high-yielding and more risky assets 
to their portfolios.31 Generally, regulatory requirements may induce economic agents 
to take higher risks when part of the financial consequences is borne by others. 
The second category of regulatory costs is compliance costs i.e. the additional costs 
imposed on banks in order to comply with the regulations.32 An obvious example is 
hire purchase and usury regulations which limit the maximum interest rates charged 
on loans. 
30 The classic example of moral hazard is fire insurance: when an individual has insured his house 
against fire, he/she is likely to become more careless in handling cigarettes and more likely to take 
risks which might lead to fire. 
31 Moral hazard may affect the behaviour of the deposit-taking institution in various ways. For example 
a '120 km/h speed limit syndrome' may apply - if there is a speed limit on a road, then some drivers 
assume that it is safe to drive at that speed without assessing the conditions peculiar to the road that 
day. Similarly, bank management may believe that if their lending to a certain category of borrower is 
less than the official limit, it must be safe. 
32 Lomax (1987) has estimated the costs of complying with the Financial Services Act in the UK at 
between £100 million and £300 million per annum. The American Bankers Association has estimated 
the annual regulatory costs to the industry at nearly $11 billion, while other estimates exceed 
$15 billion (Phillips 1993: 6). 
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The third cost is the loss of economic welfare by agents performing fewer 
transactions than they otherwise would have as a result of the first two types of 
costs.33 Both these costs reflect loss of economic efficiency as agents behave in 
ways other than they would have without regulation. 
Goodhart (1995: 440-446) also names the direct resource costs of the regulatory 
system - people, equipment and buildings - which could have been used for other 
purposes. 
Fifth, there are the direct costs to the regulated institutions, such as the financing of 
deposit insurance funds. 
Regulation may therefore lessen competition, raise costs and lead to static 
inefficiency. There is also the possibility that the burden of regulation may direct 
financial activity to other financial systems. These static costs of regulation may be 
less important than the dynamic costs of regulation, especially if regulation acts as a 
barrier to change and so preserves an inefficient financial services structure.34 
A possibility exists that regulation could serve to hinder innovation in financial 
intermediation, leading to dynamic inefficiency. 
Note, however that according to the classical public interest theory, regulation with 
the aim of achieving economic efficiency is assumed to be virtually without costs. 
The inference is that although there are no problems with the explanatory value of 
the public interest theory, it cannot be regarded as a general theory of regulation. At 
most it can be viewed as an extremely useful instrument in explaining the need for 
and nature of regulation (Marais 1991: 59). 
Because of these costs of regulation, the objectives of regulation need to be defined 
unambiguously. Where possible the advantages to be gained from regulation should 
be weighed against the cost thereof. The approach adopted here is that the objective 
of deposit-taking regulation should be the optimisation of financial risk-management 
by banks, as it is the most cost-efficient means of attaining the regulatory objectives. 
33 A reduction in the volume of transactions in financial markets would not displease some advocates 
of regulation. A financial transaction may reflect private rather than social gain (a point made by, of all 
people, Milton Friedman (1969) with the example of a switch from non-interest bearing to interest-
bearing government securities). Others might ascribe to the dictum of Keynes (1936) 'that it would be 
no bad thing if access to both stock markets and casinos were difficult' (for those who cannot afford 
the potential losses). 
34 On the other hand, a major cause of innovation is the desire to avoid the impact of regulation, and 
such innovation may convey social as well as private benefits. 
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3.4 The Rationale of Financial Regulation 
A 'sound' banker, alas! is not one who foresees danger and avoids it, but one who, when he is 
ruined, is ruined in a conventional and orthodox way along with his fellows, so that no one can 
really blame him. 
John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) 
The Consequences to the Banks of the Collapse in Money Values in Essays in Persuasion, 1933. 
The case for banking regulation, as identified in terms of the public interest theory, 
rests on the identification of specific conditions within markets which may give rise to 
market failure. These were said to consist mainly of imperfect information and 
negative externalities, while imperfect competition is of lesser importance. 
Three reasons for regulation are discussed below: stability of the financial system, 
consumer protection and monetary stability. The rationales of consumer protection 
and financial stability are in accordance with the public interest theory of financial 
regulation as restated to incorporate the fact that banks act as mangers of financial 
risk. Monetary stability, on the other hand, acquires its justification in the monetary 
rather than the regulatory sphere. 
3.4.1 Stability of the Financial System 
A primary function of banking regulation is to reduce the probability of financial 
crises. The question arises: Are periodic banking and financial crises endemic to 
modern market economies? 
Minsky (1975: 6-13), an important student of financial crises, argues that periodic 
financial crises result from the normal functioning of a mature economy. Financial 
instability and crises are seen as facts of economic life. Financial instability is 
analytically viewed as a process in which rapid changes in asset prices occur relative 
to the prices of current output. Minsky (1975: 6) posits that the standard body of 
economic theory implies that financial instability is an impossibility: 
'Before theory became a victim of mathematics and observations were 
replaced by printouts, economists recognised that financial crises occurred 
and set their minds to explaining why they took place and their effects on 
system performance.' 
Minsky's model of financial crises, based on observed events, holds that the internal 
dynamics of capitalist systems lead to financial structures which are conducive to 
financial crises. The central bank's responsibility as provider of emergency 
assistance is to ·prevent the general fall in asset values caused by the risky 
financing policies of dominating economic units.35 Another important role of the 
35 Banks play a crucial role in the risky financing policies referred to by Minsky (1975) as it is banks 
which provide credit to deficit economic units. In the process of granting loans to these units, banks will 
incur excessive credit risk which may only be exposed when a financial crises occurs. Alternatively, if 
banks indiscriminately lend funds without regard for credit risk, the availability of credit may prompt 
economic units to engage in risky ventures which could cause economic instability. 
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central bank is seen as guiding the evolution of financial systems so that risk is kept 
at a safe and healthy level. In effect Minsky was advocating the regulation of 
systemic risk. 
Minsky's theory was neglected during the boom of the 1960's and even during the oil 
and Third World debt crises of the 1980's. However, Minsky's hypothesis cannot be 
ignored after the financial instability ushered in by the crash of October 1987.36 
Keen (1995) modelled the insights of the 'financial instability hypothesis' with 
Goodwin's (1982) limited cycle model which takes into account four factors: the 
tendency of capitalists to incur debt on the basis of euphoric expectations; the 
importance of long-term debt; the destabilising influence of income inequality; and 
the stabilising effect of government. Keen (1995: 633) finds that this very simplified 
model of capitalist finance confirms Minsky's predictions. Keen (1995: 634) 
concludes that: 
'this vision of a capitalist economy with finance, requires us to go beyond that 
habit of mind ..... that Keynes described so well, the excessive reliance on ihe 
(stable) recent past as a guide to the future. The chaotic dynamics explored 
. . . should warn us against accepting a period of relative tranquillity in a 
capitalist economy as anything other than a lull before the storm.' 
Barclay et a/ (1978) developed the hypothesis that the process leading towards 
financial crises is started through 'surplus' banking profits tempting a growing number 
of new entrants to these activities. He proposes that a cyclical pattern in bank risk 
assumption is observable. As the fringe financial institutions increasingly exploit the 
profit opportunities of market niches, more established institutions are tempted to 
compete in these areas. Eventually competition and the lure of profit attract the more 
prudent and established banking institutions to take higher risks. But this profitable 
activity is inherently more risky and problems arise when conditions deteriorate. 
Established banks are drawn into bad banking in order to rescue their profitability. 
This results in a kind of Gresham's law of banking, in which bad banking drives out 
good banking. 
Like Minsky above, Barclay is in fact expressing concern about the risk exposure of 
individual banks and the effect thereof on the financial system as a whole. 
Interestingly, their analyses provide justification for associating a high degree of 
competition with a high degree of risk in banking. 
36 The stock market crash of 1987 first occurred in the Japanese equities markets and then spread 
eastwards to New York and eventually to London. Significantly, the nearly uniform drop in equity prices 
around the world only had a small effect on economic output. lt appears that much of the credit should 
go towards the central banks in industrialised countries, which generally eased their monetary policies 
to ensure that businesses and consumers did not significantly curtail their spending even though they 
had suffered huge losses in the market value of their equities. Thus, the financial instability following 
the 1987 stock market crash did not result in much economic instability (as was the case in the crash 
of 1929). 
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No widely accepted theory of financial crises has as yet been formulated. However, 
the models of Minsky, Barclay and Keen provide some insight into how modern 
financial crises have developed. lt is evident that modern banking crises are not only 
possible but also potentially damaging to economic welfare. These crises undermine 
confidence in the financial system and thereby negatively affect economic growth 
due to the special nature of banks in financial systems.37 
The potential of a banking crisis3B has provided one of the strongest justifications for 
the regulation of banks. As Maisel ( 1981: 5) puts it: 
'Without regulation an undue percentage of financial institutions are likely to 
take excessive risks.' 
Similarly, Llewellyn and Holmes (1991) analyse how deregulation and increased 
competition are likely to induce competitive strategies that create more balance 
sheet risk. The consequence of these excessive risks is that bank failures will 
become more frequent and systemic crises become more likely. 
The stability of the banking system is regarded as an essential pre-condition to 
facilitate economic growth.39 One of the main tasks of bank regulation is therefore to 
prevent unstable developments in the financial sector from destabilising activity in 
other sectors of the economy. An unregulated banking system would be subject to 
unacceptable 'swings of confidence' (Lewis and Davis 1987: 136).40 Moreover, 
because the social costs of failure would exceed the wealth losses that would be 
borne by depositors, intervention may also be justified on welfare grounds 
(Santomero and Watson 1977). In essence this argument can be traced to the 'far-
reaching' negative externalities referred to by Gardener (1986) and Goodhart (1989). 
The failure of one bank may throw doubt on the viability of others, and a contagion of 
panic withdrawals may result.41 
The challenge faced by central banks in pursuit of financial stability was the focus of 
a lecture by the then Governor of the Bank of England, Mr. E. A. J. George (1993). 
He reasons that: 
37 As set out in paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4. 
38 This is nothing more than a specific form of market failure. 
39 For a stimulating and alternative view on financial crises see Prywes (1992) who reasons that crises 
bring needed restructu,..ing to economic systems which have gone awry. Prywes (1992) argues that 
crises leave the financial systems and markets cleaner, less leveraged, with stronger instruments and 
more stable markets. Consequently Prywes (1992) favours preventative regulation rather than the 
rescue of troubled institutions. 
40 Vide contra Kareken and Wallace (1978). 
41 Vide contra Benston and Kaufman (1996: 691) who reason that the 'failure of even many banks at 
about the same time would not result in a general economic collapse if depositors redeposited their 
funds in other banks and these banks kept reserves at about the same ratio to deposits as did the 
failed banks. There would be no decline in aggregate money or credit'. Such a line of reasoning 
underestimates the propensity to withdraw money from the entire domestic banking system, or, more 
importantly the reduction in the value of bank assets which may occur in a general economic collapse. 
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'central banks do not see it as their job to eliminate risks and put the financial 
system in cotton wool. No doubt the authorities could use their powers to 
shape the system in that direction. If society wanted a largely risk-free 
financial system, they could indeed produce one. But this would be only at 
enormous cost - by constraining financial intermediaries to such an extent that 
they would be able to provide far fewer of the services to industry and 
commerce than they do now. 
Even well short of draconian controls, any intervention by central banks is 
bound to affect the shape and dynamics of the system. This raises difficult 
questions about the appropriate balance between risk and stability. We see it 
as our task to provide a regime in which the users of financial services can 
benefit from robust competition among financial firms, which will not happen 
unless each individual firm takes on some public risk. But at the same time, 
we must ensure that there is public confidence in the monetary system as a 
whole. In short, lots of small uncertainties must add up to an overall certainty' 
(George 1993: 4 ). 
Financial crises and the issues revolving around them make for popular reading. In 
his book The Death of Money the American economist Kurtz (Finansies en Tegniek 
1994: 41) writes that money as we know it no longer exists in financial markets. He 
argues that money has become merely a figure on an electronic screen and that this 
figure is subject to very rapid change. One of his main conclusions is that the present 
international financial system has evolved largely because of this fundamental 
change in the nature of money.42 
Kurtz's analysis highlights two important and related issues, namely the maintenance 
of a stable payments system and the added dangers of international instability which, 
in view of the globalisation of financial markets, is almost instantly transmitted from 
one country to another. This is but one reason why regulatory authorities across 
financial systems need to co-ordinate their regulation. 
Although previously sharp distinctions between different forms of financial 
intermediation are increasingly becoming blurred, banks still play a dominant role in 
the payments system. Money has become part of an international network of 
payment systems that operate 24 hours a day and connect financial institutions and 
individuals over the entire globe.43 Modern electronic financial markets require 
immediate settlement. Should a large institution fail, the contagion effects arising 
from the payments system would be very large. 
What makes a banking system vulnerable to disruption if a bank fails? Bartholomew 
and Whalen (The Economist 1996(a): 10) have identified four common themes: 
concentration, hqmogeneity, information and connections. 
42 See also paragraph 5.6 on the Eurocurrency market which is largely free from monetary or other 
regulatory requirements. 
43 lt has been estimated that in New York alone daily electronic payments average $1 900 billion 
(Finansies en Tegniek 1994: 41 ). 
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The greater the concentration of a bank's loan portfolio in a single company, industry 
or country, the greater the chance that it will collapse if a single borrower or group of 
borrowers defaults. If a bank does fail others may also fail if depositors believe that 
there is a large degree of homogeneity between the failed bank and other banks. If 
there is sufficient information about the finances of the banks available, it will be 
easier for depositors, creditors and counterparties to assess the risk-profiles of 
banks. The final factor that determines the probability of a systemic threat is the 
extent of connections between different financial institutions. 
The prudential concern over financial stability acquires additional impetus through its 
international dimension. Indeed, international banking involves new and distinct risks 
which have no counterpart in domestic financial markets, such as foreign exchange 
risk and country risk. 
The possibility that banks may incur losses on their foreign exchange business can 
be broken down into three separate risks: the risk of dealing and taking a position; 
the risk of losses caused by delinquent employees acting in excess of their authority; 
and the risk of default by the counterparty in either spot or forward transactions.44 
According to the BIS, turnover in the foreign exchange market, in which banks are 
principal players, has reached an estimated $1,2 trillion a day (The Economist 
1996(a): 15). Regulators have responded to this risk by imposing upper limits on the 
foreign exchange exposure of banks, usually with reference to a bank's capital, seen 
relative to the capital and balance sheet of a particular bank or a country's banking 
system. 
There is also some concern among central banks about the risks to the international 
financial system that arise from the way in which foreign exchange trades are settled. 
The risks associated with the foreign exchange settlement process were first 
highlighted in 197 4 with the failure of Bankhaus Herstatt and the more recent cases 
of Drexel Burnham Lambert (1990), Bank of Commerce and Credit International or 
BCCI (1991 )45 and Barings (1995)46. The latest report by the Basle Committee on 
44 The introduction of floating exchange rates in March 1973 markedly increased this risk. The first 
casualty was the failure of the West German Bankhaus Herstatt in June 1974 and the US Franklin 
National Bank's downfall in the same year. Herstatt was the largest private bank in West Germany and 
its failure resulted from foreign exchange losses reportedly in the region of $200 million. To put these 
losses in perspective, at the end of 1973 Herstatt had an equity base of only $31 million. Many 
criticisms were levelled at the way this failure was handled and its damaging repercussions on 
confidence in the international system. Herstatt closed its doors at the end of its business day. Due to 
differences in time zones- New York was still trading foreign exchange- many banks were caught in 
the middle of spot transactions. These banks had delivered the foreign currency but had not yet been 
repaid by Herstatt. By closing Herstatt before dollar settlements for the day had taken place in New 
York, the Bundesbank exposed a risk of whose existence banks were until then unaware - the 
interbank credit risk involved in spot foreign exchange operations. 
45 BCCI was founded in 1972 with the objective of financing trade with the Third World. The bank was 
based in Luxembourg. By the mid-1970's BCCI had gained entry into nearly seventy countries and had 
more retail branches in the UK than any other foreign bank. The founders of the bank carefully 
structured the organisation to avoid consolidated supervision in the countries where it was active. The 
nonbank holding company was established in Luxembourg and subsidiary banks were chartered in 
countries with well-established secrecy laws: Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands. Nevertheless, 
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Payment and Settlement Systems identified two general approaches to reduce a 
bank's foreign exchange settlement exposure: one involving payment cancellation 
and receipt identification; the other utilising netting47 (Casson 1996: 2-4 ). Banks will 
be able to reduce their settlement risk by ensuring that the payment is made to the 
intended recipient otherwise it can be cancelled; and by paying only the net amounts 
due. 
Country risk has been defined as 'the possibility that sovereign borrowers of a 
particular country may be unable or unwilling, and other borrowers unable, to fulfil 
their foreign obligations for reasons beyond the usual risks which arise in relation to 
all lending' (Group of Thirty 1982: 6). Country risk must be evaluated relative to the 
capital resources and assets of an individual institution and the banking system in its 
entirety.4s 
The key weakness of what has come to be known as the international 'recycling 
mechanism'49 is the 'boom or bust' characteristic of banks' lending behaviour (i.e. 
most managerial decisions were made in London and in Pakistan. Furthermore, separate auditing 
firms were hired for each bank. As a result, no supervisory authority was in a position to anticipate 
clearly the bank's downfall until it happened in 1991. Neither Luxembourg nor the Cayman Islands had 
the resources to oversee BCCI's worldwide operations, and the Bank of England did not want the 
burden of supervising the global operations of a bank it did not charter. The BCCI affair clearly 
demonstrated the limitations of international bank supervision when regulatory loopholes are exploited. 
Although the failure of BCCI inflicted heavy losses on an estimated 530 000 unsophisticated investors 
around the world (many in less developed countries), the bank's collapse did not destabilise the 
international financial system as the international institutions that play a critical role in the interbank 
markets had isolated BCCI because of its doubtful reputation (Herring and Litan 1995: 104-105). 
46 The background to the failure of Barings Bank, the oldest UK merchant bank is covered in the 
Report of the Board of Banking Supervision Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Collapse of Barings 
(1995). The Board of Banking Supervision found that: 'Barings' collapse was due to unauthorised and 
ultimately catastrophic activities of, it appears, one individual (Leeson) that went undetected as a 
consequence of a failure of management and other internal controls of the most basic kind. 
Management failed at various levels and in a variety of ways .... to institute a proper system of internal 
controls, to enforce accountability for all profits, risks and operations, and adequately follow up on a 
number of warning signals over a prolonged period. Neither the external auditors nor the regulators 
discovered Leeson's unauthorised activities' (Report of the Board of Banking Supervision Inquiry into 
the Circumstances of the Collapse of Barings 1995: paragraph 14.1 ). A week after the failure of 
Barings the majority of its assets and liabilities were bought by lnternationale Nederlanden Groep N.V. 
{ING), a large Dutch banking group, thereby preventing any systemic repercussions. For a first-hand 
but inevitably subjective account of how a single futures trader in Singapore brought down one of the 
oldest British banks by incurring losses of some £890 million, see Leeson with Whitley (1996). 
47 Netting is the process of calculating debits and credits to give a net result. As regards settlement 
risk, a netting process will result in a bank only being exposed to the net (and not the gross) amount 
credited to it. 
48 See paragraph 4.2.5.2 for a discussion on the regulatory treatment of country risk. 
49 So termed because the international market for eurocurrency deposits and foreign exchange 
became to a large extent the vehicle for recycling the new wealth for the oil-producing countries. With 
the massive rise in the oil price in 1973 international banks found themselves awash with funds to 
lend. A large volume of lending was directed to lesser developing countries, but effective risk analysis 
of these countries by banks was often lacking and margins were inevitably narrow. Banks entered the 
1980s to face the mounting international debt crisis with inadequate capital bases and low-risk 
premiums in international lending. See Dale (1982: 73-89). For a more recent discussion of financial 
crises in emerging markets see Sachs (1996), who concluded that the emerging market contagion of 
1995 had mainly 'rational' causes. Countries with overvalued exchange rates, weak banking systems 
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lending cyclicality). The dangers of excessive country lending are compounded by 
the propensity of the international credit system to unravel when confidence is 
shaken. The reasons why this may occur are twofold: 
First, the relatively numerous creditors each of which has an incentive to withdraw 
when a debtor country is in difficulty. Second, there is the phenomenon of 'contagion' 
in financial markets which may, via its effects on confidence, transmit debt servicing 
problems from one country to another. Country debtors seem to have the same 
susceptibility to infectious collapse as do banks in an unregulated environment, the 
common characteristic being that both are dependent for their continued financial 
viability on the collective confidence of their creditors I depositors. so 
What are the regulatory implications of the threats to international financial stability? 
lt is clear that the market cannot always be relied upon to put a prudent ceiling on 
individual country indebtedness and thereby country risk; nor to absorb severe 
shocks to the system. One important operational difference between domestic 
financial systems and the international banking system is that the latter does not 
readily offer emergency liquidity assistance on an international basis. The threat of 
an international financial collapse has led to pressure for such assistance. lt is 
argued that governments in conjunction with international institutions should initially 
support commercial banks to overcome the immediate global financing and payment 
problems (Dean and Giddy 1981 ). Countries may collectively mount such assistance 
with the support of the International Monetary Fund.s1 
Llewellyn ( 1995(b)) argues that the next phase in the global banking industry is likely 
to be one of more moderate growth of balance sheet positions and a relative decline 
in some aspects of the role of banks in the financial systems, especially through the 
capital market but also in regard to non-bank financial institutions and non-financial 
banking institutions. The continued overwhelming pressure will be increased 
competition. This trend will be accompanied by an ever growing focus on the 
management of financial risks by banks and will require a comparable growth in 
regulatory sophistication. 
The issues involved in the regulation of non-bank financial services are different to 
those applicable to banking. The systemic risk is considerably less evident (and often 
does not exist at all) compared with banking (Mayer 1993). Contagion is less likely to 
occur and the potential disruption of the payment system does not arise. The 
concern with financial stability therefore goes a long way in explaining the existence 
and low reserves were more likely to suffer speculative attacks. Interestingly, other economic factors 
such as the size of a country's current account deficit or the extent of previous capital inflows did not 
seem to matter. 
50 If caused by an unfounded rumour the conditions may therefore be such that international financial 
contagion may be described as a progression from the random walk through the bank run to capital 
flight. 
51 Interestingly, the USA recently ( 1995) lent considerable support to the Mexican financial system in 
the wake of the fall of the Peso and the flight of capital from Mexico. lt was feared that the 'tequila 
effect' would adversely impact on US banks. 
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of extensive regulations covering the risk-management activities of deposit-taking 
institutions. 
Moreover, the nature of the contracts (i.e. deposits) entered into by banks differs 
from that of contracts entered into with other non-financial institutions. This brings to 
the fore the issue of consumer protection which is discussed below. 
3.4.2 Consumer Protection 
Apart from the systemic interest, regulators may also be concerned with the 
protection of small and by implication less sophisticated investors. As defined, banks 
accept deposits from the general public as a regular feature of their business. lt 
was argued above that because banks serve as major depositories for the 
public I household sector's savings, banking regulation should aim at some degree of 
protection for these savers. Such concerns are normally linked to doubts about the 
availability of low cost information available to investors (Fama 1980). 
Regulation in this regard therefore usually also involves the imposition of minimum 
disclosure requirements. However, this may be insufficient for a proper risk 
assessment of a bank. Even in the presence of strict disclosure requirements, 
published reports may still lack transparency - not only for the unsophisticated 
investor. Problem areas include: hidden reserves and provisions,52 off-balance sheet 
risks and the principles applicable to balance-sheet consolidation. 
Two main arguments in favour of protection for the consumer can be advanced 
(Baltensperger and Dermine 1990: 26). The first is that the evaluation of the financial 
position of banks is a costly exercise which has the characteristics of a public good. 
Once it has been produced, it is available to consumers at a very low transfer cost. 
As such the monitoring and evaluation of banks need not be undertaken by each 
depositor but could be delegated to a public agency or private rating firm. 
Second, small depositors may still find the cost of interpreting the evaluation high. 
Two alternatives could be developed. The first is to introduce a system of deposit 
insurance.53 The second is to create risk-free banks, i.e. intermediaries investing all 
deposits in almost risk-free assets. Depositors would then have a choice between 
banks offering a higher but more risky return and those providing quasi risk-free 
deposit facilities at lower returns. 
52 Revel! (1986) provides a historical perspective on hidden reserves and the influence of hidden 
reserves on requirements of capital adequacy. He finds that the perception still exists that the real 
position of a bank is and should be a little better than the position as certified by auditors. He 
concludes that although it will never be possible to eliminate hidden reserves entirely, effort should be 
made to restrict these as far as possible. 
53 However, deposit insurance per se is no panacea. During the 1980s roughly 1200 banks 
representing $130 billion in bank assets failed in the USA and required the assistance and resources 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Insurance Fund to rescue and restructure troubled 
commercial banks. After a peak of $18 billion in the mid 1980s the absolute size of the fund declined 
sharply to the extent that it faced insolvency with obvious implications for the American taxpayer 
(Bryan 1991: 82). 
43 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions 
Another aspect of consumer protection revolves around the issue of consumer 
education. The Jacobs Committee (Committee of Investigation into the Promotion of 
Equal Competition for Funds in Financial Markets in South Africa) argues that 
consumer involvement should be encouraged by 'much more and meaningful 
education and information exercises' and simplified disclosure, highlighting who runs 
the risk (Republic of South Africa 1992: 71 ). 
Although generally intended for unsophisticated communities, consumer education 
may also be helpful to combat the popular perception amongst many depositors that 
they will always and somehow be 'bailed out'. This approach (consumer education) 
would increase private sector incentives for monitoring risk and reduce the 
perception that the government generally underwrites the soundness of banks. 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand have made a number of innovative proposals in 
regard to the protection of depositors. They are (Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
1993: 2-10): 
• strengthened public disclosure requirements for registered banks; 
• mandatory credit rating of banks; and 
• reduced role for prudential rules. 
In effect it is proposed that the use of the existing statutory returns as a routine 
means of monitoring banks be discontinued. Rather, monitoring would be primarily 
based on banks' publicly disclosed financial statements and other publicly available 
information. Registered banks would be required to physically display a credit rating 
in a manner which enables depositors and other creditors to be readily informed of 
their rating. These requirements would serve inter alia the purposes of enhancing 
market disciplines by facilitating better market scrutiny of a bank and at the same 
time increasing the ability of creditors and others to protect their own interests by 
providing them with more meaningful information on a bank's affairs. The central 
bank would retain its emergency assistance role and powers, but the market would in 
essence be the true regulator. 
The advantage of such an approach is that informed albeit relatively unsophisticated 
consumers, aided by reliable but easily understood credit ratings, could play a crucial 
role in· protecting their own interests. However, explicit deposit protection and 
emergency assistance measures may still be provided, either as a means of 
compensating 'small' depositors for any losses incurred as a result of individual bank 
failures occurring despite "market" regulation or in order to stabilise the system in the 
face of isolated bank collapses. 
Clearly then, the concern about consumer protection cannot be divorced from the 
concern about the stability of the financial system. These objectives interrelate in 
several ways (Baltensperger and Dermine 1981: 72-73). For example, one of the 
basic objectives of protective regulation is the creation of confidence in the banking 
system through the reduction of overall risk. However this will also have a beneficial 
influence on the probability of systemic crises. Contrariwise, protective measures 
involve the danger of moral hazard which may have adverse effects on the riskiness 
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of banks. Clearly, the common denominating factor is the influence that financial 
regulation has on the management of risk by banks. 
3.4.3 Monetary Stability 
Monetary stability is a subset of the overall goal of financial stability. Monetary 
stability relates to three inter-related functions of a central bank - implementation of 
monetary policy, supervision of banks and overseeing of the payments system (Van 
Greuning 1993: 55). 
However, as Van Greuning (1993: 61-62) reasons, bank superv1s1on must be 
independent from monetary policy, because the considerations surrounding the two 
regulatory functions differ. Supervision concentrates on a micro function with regard 
to individual institutions, namely 'risk-management', whereas monetary policy deals 
with the macro function of evaluating the impact of monetary measures in the 
industry as a whole. lt is maintained that the latter should be exercised through 
market-orientated means of achieving monetary stability. This issue will be advanced 
in paragraph 4.4 which will analyse the remaining component of direct monetary 
requirements from a prudential perspective, arguing that any such requirements that 
remain are inappropriate as these may actually increase financial risk. 
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3.5 The Evolution of Financial Regulation 
Risk-management in banking is not a new concept. Banks have always placed limits 
on particular aspects of their activities, such as exposures to individual 
counterparties. However, this approach has been somewhat unstructured. The new 
approach to financial regulation emphasises risk-management as a more 
encompassing and scientific concept whereby the various types of risk across the 
business as a whole are systematically identified, measured, monitored and 
controlled. What is also new is the interests of regulators in how these advances in 
risk-management can be incorporated in supervisory techniques. 
Carse (1996: 26-29) identifies three main stages in the risk-management 
evolutionary process, namely: direct regulation, capital-based supervision and risk-
based supervision. 
Direct regulation 
The direct regulation stage is characteristic of financial systems in which banks are 
subject to tight official control. In this environment, the banks are regulated in terms 
of the interest rates they can pay and demand, the types of lending and the 
permitted range of activities that can be undertaken, the permitted growth in credit 
extensions and the balance sheet, and the ability to establish new branches and 
subsidiaries both domestically and abroad. In such a system, banks have only a 
limited incentive to pay close attention to risk. 
The role of the supervisor is also limited as far as risk-assessment is concerned. 
The main regulatory preoccupation is ensuring that banks are observing the various 
rules and regulations that control their activities. 
Capital-based supervision 
In the second stage of evolution, direct controls on the activities of banks are relaxed 
as part of a more market-oriented approach towards the economy. This relaxation 
involves the lifting of interest rate and exchange controls and the liberalisation of 
lending and business restrictions. Banks are also given more freedom to · 
internationalise their activities. Competition is further encouraged by permitting the 
entry of new banks, including foreign banks. This deregulation brings large benefits 
to the economy in terms of the ability of banks to mobilise savings and channel these 
savings into commercially viable projects. On the other hand, increased competition 
and greater commercial freedom may encourage the banks to assume higher risks. 
In the phase when banks were strictly regulated they were unlikely to have 
developed the banking skills and, particularly, the expertise in credit assessment to 
manage these risks prudently. 
Consequently, deregulatory measures must be accompanied by increased and 
more effective supervision to avoid competitive excesses that may result in financial 
instability. In a deregulated environment, supervision must be indirect in the sense 
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that it should allow banks to rely on their own commercial judgement in accepting 
risk but within a supervisory framework of rules and guidelines. A particular 
emphasis in this approach is ensuring that banks have enough capital to support the 
risks on their balance sheets. 
Risk-based supervision 
A supervisory approach based on forcing compliance with a prescribed set of 
balance sheet ratios is no longer effective for regulating the risk-management of 
financial institutions, however refined the definitions and calculations might be. 
Moreover, while adequate capital is essential to protect a bank against losses, it is 
clearly preferable if the losses do not arise in the first place. This recognition has led 
to the third stage in the evolution of supervision in which there is an increased 
emphasis on prevention rather than cure. The importance of capital adequacy is not 
neglected, but there is more focus on identifying the quantity of the risk within a bank 
and determining the quality of the bank's systems for managing the risk. 
According to Carse (1996: 28) the key elements of this new approach are: 
• the systematic identification and classification of the various types of risks to 
which banks are subject; 
• ensuring that banks have adequate systems to measure, monitor, and control risk 
across the whole range of their activities; 
• giving banks incentives to improve their risk-management techniques by looking 
for market-based solutions to supervisory problems; 
• ensuring that adequate capital is held against risks in banks' portfolios, both on-
and off-balance sheet; and 
• supplementing the discipline excercised by the supervisor with that excercised by 
the market by encouraging more public disclosure by banks. 
The principles applicable to financial regulation - a topic next discussed - should be 
adapted to conform to the new approach of risk-based supervision. 
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3.6 Principles of Financial Regulation 
Once the case for and approach to financial regulation has been accepted, one has 
to establish a set of principles by which to guide and judge regulatory policy. The 
principles underlying the process of regulation should be deduced from the rationale 
and objectives of regulation. No definite statement of principles commanding 
unanimous support has as yet emerged. 
The Campbell Committee, in its deliberations on the Australian financial system, 
which culminated in the publication of a final report in 1981. (Australian Government 
Publishing Service 1981 ), was one body to identify such principles. The report 
embraced the following convictions: 
• financial institutions should be allowed to fail; 
• a liquidity safety net should be available to financial intermediaries; 
• investors should receive reasonable protection against fraud and malpractice; 
• there should be a 'fair' and well-informed market in securities; 
• entry requirements should be concerned solely with the issue of depositor 
protection; 
• prudential requirements should be applied in a flexible manner • leaving 
intermediaries with maximum freedom to adjust to changing circumstances; 
• should aim at ensuring competitive neutrality amongst intermediaries; and 
• regulations should not impair the provision of a reasonably full spectrum of risk-
return investment 'opportunities, including a 'safety haven' for the small 
unsophisticated investor. 
In a similar fashion, the Jacobs Committee, in its investigation into the promotion of 
equal competition for funds in financial markets in South Africa specified the 
following guiding principles (Republic of South Africa 1992: 50-51): 
• proper disclosure in published financial statements in terms of current market 
value; 
• practitionary based regulatory arrangements - the regulator must consult with the 
regulated; 
• the use of explicit cost-benefit analyses; 
• competitive neutrality between financial intermediaries; 
• explicit co-ordination between regulatory authorities, combining functional and 
institutional regulation; 
• maximum competition in the market; 
• timeous action by regulators, a delay in action being taken generally increases 
the risk and possible loss to the investor I depositor; 
• each regulatory arrangement must be related to specific objectives - this implies 
that information requested by regulators must be aimed at the management of 
specific risks; 
• regulators must be flexible - they must be capable of adapting their information 
requirements and regulatory techniques when financial markets change 
fundamentally; and 
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• the regulator should act as a consultant by chairing meetings or acting as a 
referee. 
Most of these principles can be divided into broader categories. Llewellyn (1992: 
246-264) identifie~ five broad categories. efficiency-related principles, stability-
related principles, conflict-conciliatory principles, principles related to the regulatory 
structure and general principles. The Campbell Committee stresses the following 
considerations: efficiency, diversity of choice, competitive neutrality, stability and 
social objectives. The taxonomy adopted here is intended as a selective synthesis of 
the most important elements of both the above approaches. Four categories are 
considered: efficiency, stability; competitive neutrality and social objectives. 
3.6.1 Efficiency 
In discussions on the efficiency of the financial system, the following aspects are 
usually considered (Australian Government Publishing Service 1981 ): (a) 'allocative 
efficiency', or the extent to which savings flow to the investment opportunities 
offering the highest risk-adjusted rates of return; (b) 'operational efficiency', or the 
extent to which real resources are consumed during the savings transfer process; (c) 
'dynamic efficiency', namely the ability of the financial system to adapt to the 
changing needs of the users of the financial system. 
Tobin (1984) adopts a more extensive approach, identifying what he terms 
'information arbitrage efficiency', 'fundamental valuation efficiency', 'full insurance 
efficiency' and 'functional efficiency'. 'Information arbitrage efficiency' occurs when, 
on average, it is impossible to gain from trading on the basis of generally available 
public information. 'Fundamental valuation efficiency' arises when the market 
valuation of an asset accurately reflects the value of the future payment to which the 
asset gives title, i.e. if the price of the asset is based on 'rational expectation' of those 
payments. 'Full insurance efficiency' is said to exist when economic agents are able 
to 'insure for themselves deliveries of goods and services in all future contingencies, 
either by surrendering some of their own resources now or by contracting to deliver 
them in specified future contingencies'.54 Finally, 'functional efficiency' is concerned 
with economic issues such as the ability of the system to provide opportunities for 
the diversification of risks and for the allocation of risks to those willing to bear them, 
the extent to which the full range of insurance services described above is provided, 
and the 'success' with which transactions and payments mechanisms are provided 
and savings are allocated to their most socially productive uses. 
The principle of efficiency is based on the conviction that financial regulation may 
have adverse effects on efficient financial intermediation. For instance, excessive 
attention to depositor protection imposes costs on market participants and may even 
restrict the options available to investors. A practical example is the South African 
stokvel concept. lt is argued that excessive formal regulation would burden stokvels 
to an extent that is excessive relative to the needs of the relatively unsophisticated 
54 This is based on the Arrow-Debreu concept of efficiency (Arrow and Debreu 1954 ). 
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nature of these operationn.55 Protective measures should therefore be based on 
explicit recognition of efficiency and cost considerations. 
Apart from the possible distorting effects of regulation itself, the two factors most 
likely to impair the efficient functioning of the financial system are inadequate 
competition and imperfect information and knowledge (Australian Government 
Printing Service 1981: 2). Effective competition is important for the efficient operation 
of the financial system. The maximum attainable level of competition requires 
freedom of entry into the financial services industry as well as relative freedom of 
choice regarding the financial services that any market participant chooses to 
provide. This implies freedom of entry to foreign participants as well as unrestricted 
access by local market participants to global financial markets (Liewellyn 1992: 24 7). 
Adequate information should be available to assist investors and depositors in 
assessing the risks and intended returns of various financial assets. This means that 
the benefits to be gained by having adequate information to gauge the risk-profile of 
a bank are usually considered to outweigh the costs of collection of such information 
and compliance. 
3.6.2 Stability 
One of the prime regulatory aims is the promotion of financial stability, which is 
regarded as being of vital importance to the stability of the economic system as a 
whole. 56 The ·system is not able to function efficiently unless investors have 
confidence in the solvency of financial institutions (individually and as a group) and in 
the stability of financial markets overall. Special importance is attached to the 
maintenance of the payments mechanism, because of the integral role it plays in 
facilitating economic activity. 
The attributes of stability can also be applied to the principles of financial regulation. 
Stability-related principles should contribute to the promotion of stability in the 
financial system by ensuring the safety and soundness of the system. The most 
important principle in this context should be the optimisation of the quality and 
effectiveness of financial risk-management by banks and other financial institutions. 
Regulatory authorities should impose acceptable minimum standards to be observed 
in respect of risk-management. Another feature that should enhance financial 
stability is the introduction of 'fit and proper' standards for participants. 
Llewellyn in Falkena (1994: 4) identifies three stability-related principles: 
• a proper assessment and management of risks; 
• the use of regulatory requirements based on current market values rather 
than historic values; and 
• a willingness by the regulators to take timely action. 
55 See paragraph 9.2.1.1 for a discussion of the issues. 
56 See paragraph 3.4.1. 
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Developments threatening the stability of the financial system should be dealt with 
expeditiously. This entails that regulatory authorities should take the necessary 
corrective action whenever actual or potential market deficiencies are detected. 
Postponing action could cause an accumulation of adverse effects and even result in 
domino-style contagion (Liewellyn 1992: 247-248). In practice the action taken by 
authorities will be largely influenced by the size of the institution. 
Nevertheless, it is in the interests of a competitive and efficient market that individual 
institutions be allowed to fail, except where there are strong reasons for believing 
that stability of the system would be impaired. The failure of a single institution is not 
necessarily accompanied by widespread instability. Failure therefore serves a useful 
purpose in providing an incentive for good management (Australian Government 
Printing Service 1981: 285-286). 
3.6.3 Competitive Neutrality 
Competitive neutrality can be defined as 'a situation in which no party to a financial 
transaction would enjoy a competitive advantage due to regulation' (Liewellyn 1992: 
247). The principle embodies the desire to ensure that regulations cause minimal 
disturbances to the competitive balance existing between financial intermediaries. 
Competitively neutral financial regulation involves the creation of a 'level playing field' 
in financial markets and between financial institutions. 
There are two fundamentally different frames of reference for the analysis and hence 
regulation of financial intermediaries. One is the institutional perspective which 
assumes as given the existing institutional structure of financial inJermediaries, and 
the other is the functional perspective which assumes as given the economic 
activities performed by the financial intermediaries.s7 In practice the creation of a 
level playing field requires the avoidance of functional or institutional discrimination 
against intermediaries. 
The creation of a level playing field raises especially difficult conceptual and practical 
problems. The Campbell Committee identified three possible approaches (Australian 
Government Printing Service 1981: 4 ): 
• every financial intermediary could be subject to the same financial regulation; 
• each class of intermediary could be subject to different regulation, but with the 
balance of costs and benefits being the same across all intermediaries; and 
• functionally similar operations could be subject to similar regulation. 
Given the wide variety of intermediation activities, the first approach is clearly not 
feasible. The second 'balancing act' approach involves two fundamental problems. 
First, it is doubtful if such an approach can ever, in practice, achieve competitive 
neutrality, especially in areas where entry is restricted and competition is not 
57 For a discussion of the functional conceptual framework for analysing the dynamics of institutional 
changes in financial intermediation see Merton (1995: 23-41) 
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effective. Second, even if such a balance is achieved, regulation may have indirect 
effects on the efficiency of the system. 58 
The Campbell Committee therefore suggested that, in principle, the best way of 
achieving competitive neutrality is by a functional approach - a group of 
intermediaries performing a particular activity should be subject to comparable 
regulation, with due regard to the differing characteristics of their assets and general 
perceptions of risk. 59 
The main reasons for the regulation of financial institutions are consumer protection 
and systemic stability. Llewellyn (1995(a): 212) argues that regulation with the aim of 
protecting financial consumers is more appropriately conducted on a functional basis 
so that consumers are afforded the same degree of protection of each service 
irrespective of the type of institution providing it. Llewellyn (1995(a): 212) also 
considers functional regulation as more likely to ensure competitive neutrality 
between different types of institutions providing the same service. However, as "it is 
institutions and not functions which become bankrupt" (Liewellyn in Falkena 1994: 5), 
a different type of regulation is required for purposes of safety and soundness. 
The Jacobs Committee acknowledged that perfect neutrality between financial 
institutions is not possible but rejected the view held by the Campbell Committee that 
only financial functions and not financial institutions should·be regulated. The Jacobs 
Committee argued that when different institutions compete in the same markets for 
similar objectives, then the way in which they are regulated must promote 
competitive neutrality as far as possible. The implication is that the principle of 
competitive neutrality requires one to take an overall view of, or 'holistic approach' to 
the financial services industry (Republic of South Africa 1992: 45). Regulation should 
therefore combine functional with institutional regulation. 
3.6.4 Social Objectives 
Government intervention in pursuit of social objectives may aim to (Australian 
Government Printing Service 1981: 6-7): 
• assist particular sectors in the community; 
• influence the ownership structure of financial institutions; and 
• alter savings behaviour. 
58 For instance, portfolio restrictions may reduce the allocative efficiency of the system. 
59 The Campbell Committee conceded that the 'drawing of lines' around financial activities is not easy; 
however, it maintained that 'freedom of entry would assist in ensuring that, in the long run, there is a 
balance of costs and benefits across activities, and that users of financial services receive neutral 
treatment' (Australian Government Printing Service 1981: 5). The Campbell Committee concluded that 
'competitive neutrality and efficiency considerations would best be served by regulating intermediaries 
undertaking similar lending activities in a consistent and comparable manner, i.e. by a functional 
approach to regulation, though having due regard for 'differences in the risks particular to the 
operations of different intermediaries' (Australian Government Printing Service 1981: 289). 
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However, financial regulation should be restricted to a narrow range of objectives. lt 
should not be employed as a means of achieving the wider economic, sectoral or 
social objectives of the state. This is so for three crucial reasons (Liewellyn 1992: 
246). First, regulation of financial institutions and markets is not the most efficient 
way of securing wider social objectives, as such objectives are assumed to be best 
achieved by fiscal policy. Second, the more the objectives are widened, the greater 
the complexity of regulations and the potential for conflicts. Third, these wider 
objectives are the responsibility of the political rather than the regulatory authorities. 
The objectives of financial regulation should therefore not be political issues. 
Consequently, it is economically undesirable that social principles should guide 
financial regulation. This aspect of financial regulation may become a contentious 
issue in the South African financial system. 
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3.7 Summary and Conclusion 
Regulation can be viewed as any means of direct intervention in the activities of 
banks. The appropriate role of bank regulation, or even whether banks should be 
regulated at all, is a matter of controversy. The strongest theoretical support in favour 
of financial regulation is to be found in the public interest theory, which sees a role 
for regulation to correct market imperfections. In the case of banking, two facets of 
market imperfections are significant, namely the negative externalities which arise in 
the case of bank failures and the informational deficiencies on which banking 
consumers base their decisions. Examples of other, less applicable forms of market 
imperfections are natural monopolies and imperfect competition. 
The risk-management approach to deposit-taking financial intermediation is 
compatible with the public interest theory of regulation as it is excessive risk taking 
by banks which leads to bank failure (and hence to negative externalities); and due 
to the informational asymmetries which exist between the actual risk-profile of a bank 
and the risk as perceived by depositors. Hence, market failure can occur when banks 
take excessive risks. 
lt should be recognised that the public interest theory is not without flaws. The 
private interest theory (which has its origin in US anti-regulatory sentiment) has 
highlighted that there are also significant costs to regulation - a facet of regulation 
not recognised in the classical public interest theory. The capture theory, in 
particular, stresses the danger that regulators may be captured by the regulated. 
The main costs of regulation are moral hazard, compliance costs, loss of economic 
welfare, direct resource costs, direct costs and dynamic costs. Many of the 
regulatory costs are not directly quantifiable but may nevertheless be large. lt is 
therefore important that regulators clearly define the objectives of regulation and 
approach the attainment of these benefits in a cost-benefit paradigm. The 
optimisation of financial risk-management by banks is the most appropriate means of 
achieving regulatory objectives at the lowest cost. 
The objectives of financial regulation should be twofold, namely ensuring financial 
stability and consumer protection. The objective of a stable financial system can be 
traced back to the negative externalities of the public interest theory as applied to 
banks. In the absence of regulation banks are more likely to take excessive risks 
which are bound to increase the probability of bank failures and thereby augment 
systemic risk. Modern banking crises are possible because of excessive risk 
exposure and such crises are potentially damaging to economic welfare. The 
challenge to the regulator is to achieve an appropriate balance between overall risk 
and stability. 
An important issue related to financial crises is the contagion effects arising from the 
payment system, including the international dimension thereof. International financial 
stability is hampered by the absence of international emergency assistance. 
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Banks accept deposits from the general public as a regular feature of their business, 
hence regulators are also concerned with the protection of small and unsophisticated 
depositors. Protective regulation usually involves strict disclosure requirements, 
supplemented by explicit deposit protection schemes and emergency assistance 
facilities by central banks. Consumer education should play an important role in 
raising the risk-awareness of depositors. 
The objective of consumer protection is linked to the information problems identified 
by the public interest theory. Banks receive deposits from the general public who 
may be unable to fathom the risk exposure of banks due to inadequate disclosure. 
The public may simply not be able to interpret the data or the cost of interpretation 
may be too high. 
The research problem - which holds that risk-management is inherent to banking 
activity and that banking regulation should consist of the supervision of various 
banking risks - is consistent with the 'financial stability' and 'consumer protection' 
rationale of financial regulation. Only through adequate management of and control 
over banking risks can these obj~ctives be attained. 
Concerns with monetary stability stem from the belief that banks can cause 
undesirable instability within the monetary and financial system. lt is generally 
accepted that the costs of direct 'non market-orientated' monetary policy instruments 
are greater their benefits. Remaining direct monetary requirements are therefore 
deemed inappropriate, both from a monetary and risk-management perspective. 
Monetary stability is obviously related to the overall objective of financial stability. 
However, the regulation of the risk-management activities of banks is divorced from 
the considerations relating to monetary policy. 
At the risk of simplification it is possible to identify three stages in the evolution of 
financial regulation, namely direct regulation, capital-based supervision and risk-
based supervision. Risk-based supervision is an embracing and scientific concept 
whereby the financial risks across all banking activities are systematically managed. 
Having accepted that there is a prima facie case in favour of banking regulation, it is 
necessary to formulate the principles which guide regulatory policy. These principles 
should emanate from the rationale of regulation - namely the optimisation of risk-
management by banks. 
There is no generally accepted group of principles to guide and judge financial 
regulation. Four categories of principles were discussed: efficiency, stability, 
competitive neutrality 'and social objectives. The principle of efficiency seeks to 
balance the costs and benefits of regulation. Stability-related principles should 
ensure the safety and soundness of the financial system. Competitive neutrality 
requires that regulations cause minimal disturbances to the competitive balance 
between financial intermediaries. Social objectives should, however, not guide 
financial regulation. 
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CHAPTER4 
COMPONENTS OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 
4.1 Introduction 
A study in the field of financial regulation as conducted here, necessitates the 
identification of components of regulation that facilitate both comparison and 
analysis. The following section is based on a number of such components that has 
been discussed in economic literature (Dale 1982; Baltensperger and Dermine 1987, 
Hall 1987; OECD 1989 and Polizatto 1990). These are presented within an original 
framework that has been developed in accordance with the theoretical rationale of 
financial regulation, namely financial stability and consumer protection. 
The comparative section of this study contains a detailed description of each 
selected national financial system, with reference to these components. The general 
and risk-related considerations underlying these components are outlined in this 
Chapter. 
The purpose of this Chapter, which remains theoretical in content, is to illustrate that 
each component of financial regulation relates to the various risks which banks 
manage in the course of their activities. Accordingly, this Chapter demonstrates the 
theoretical application of risk-limitation and risk-management by prudential 
authorities; as well as the nature of the remedial action taken if excessive risk-taking 
leads to the financial distress of a bank. 
The Chapter also includes a section on direct monetary requirements, which are 
argued to be unnecessary for the attainment of monetary stability (as more 
appropriate market-orientated measures are available) and are unwarranted from a 
prudential perspective (as these measures may actually increase financial risk). 
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4.2 Prudential Regulation 
Prudential or preventative regulation encompasses those requirements instituted by 
regulatory authorities to ensure that the risk-exposure of deposit-taking institutions 
are kept within acceptable bounds in order to reduce the risk of bank failure. The 
risk-management activities of banks logically commence at entry level while the 
extent to which banks may engage in risk-taking is dependent on the scope of 
permissible business activities permitted by regulators. Prudential regulation also 
consist of requirements relating to the disclosure of risk, adequate capital to support 
risk-management activities as well as explicit risk-asset limits. The foregoing main 
components of preventative regulation are discussed below. 
4.2.1 Entry Requirements 
The regulation of banks begins at the market entry stage. Control of market entry 
usually takes the form of a licensing practice. lt is also influenced by the 
authorisation procedures regarding foreign bank entry. Entry requirements are often 
justified on the grounds of risk-reduction and hence stability and depositor protection. 
This also involves requirements relating to banking experience and expertise. In 
each case these assumed benefits must be weighed against the likely costs in terms 
of competition and efficiency. 
4.2.1.1 Licensing and Ownership Control 
The power to grant licences provides the possibility of exercising preventative action 
against the entry of institutions whose activities are deemed likely not to be in the 
interests of depositors and the soundness of the financial system. This type of 
regulation is a method of formal control in every financial system, although the extent 
and modalities thereof vary considerably from system to system. The range of 
authorisation regulation reflects different attitudes towards the implications of free 
entry into banking activities, based on views related to the advantages and costs of 
competition in the financial services industry. 
Before banks can be authorised, they must normally satisfy various requirements. 
These typically include a reputable 'fit and proper' management and a minimum 
amount of paid-up capital. In general, regulators retain the ability to screen owners 
and the management of banks in order to prevent individuals lacking professional 
qualifications, experience, financial support and sound ethical standards from 
obtaining a banking license. This applies both in the case of de novo entry as well as 
in the acquisition of an existing institution. As a formal check of adherence to law and 
of the professional reputation of prospective management, licensing may therefore 
be seen as an obvious and unobjectionable part of any prudential policy. 
However, this form of admission procedure must be clearly distinguished from 'real' 
entry controls based on the demonstration of economic 'need' for additional deposit-
taking facilities, i.e. a 'public interest' criterion. The objective of this kind of regulation, 
which usually results from fear of 'overbanking' under unregulated entry, is to restrain 
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undesirable competition and affect market structure by protecting existing banks and 
their profitability. so 
The negative consequences of these types of entry controls are that they confer 
monopoly rents to existing financial institutions and may lead to corresponding 
inefficiencies, which are well-known from general economic analysis. In particular, 
they may result in a tendency to prevent bank failures from occurring by shielding 
existing banks, regardless of how inefficient they may be, from competition by new 
and potentially more efficient banks. In the long-run the objective of establishing a 
safe and sound financial system is not achieved by restraining banking competition 
in this way (Baltensperger and Dermine 1987: 83). 
From a prudential perspective, licensing concerns should therefore relate to the 
soundness of new institutions (i.e. whether they will survive) and their capacity to 
make a positive contribution to the financial system, rather than to tests based on 
economic needs. If the authorities wish to restrict entry for reasons of stability, entry 
requirements should (Australian Gdvernment Publishing Service 1981: 297): 
• be simple and straightforward; 
• be publicly available; and 
• minimise discretionary judgements as to the optimum number of banks. 
In line with the general tendency towards market-orientation, the emphasis on this 
regulatory measure has decreased, with growing acceptance that competition is 
basically healthy and as appropriate in banking as in other areas. This has led to 
increased reliance on other methods of regulation. 
4.2.1.2 Foreign bank entry 
Foreign banks wishing to enter domestic markets may be faced with regulatory 
requirements differing from those applicable to domestic institutions. Entry of foreign-
owned banks may be limited to subsidiaries on the grounds that domestically 
incorporated and legally independent entities can be more effectively regulated by 
the host authority. In contrast, other authorities may prefer the establishment of 
branches as these can be considered to enjoy the full support of the integrated 
group to which it belongs. In a number of countries it is the practice to request letters 
of comfort from foreign banks seeking to establish local subsidiaries. Countries may 
prefer to protect domestic banks from foreign competition, but as argued above this 
is not economicly efficient. 
The Basle Concordat sets out the principle that host authorities should discourage or 
prevent the establishment of foreign banking operations whose parent institutions are 
not adequately supervised. Alternatively, the domestic host regulators may impose 
specific conditions governing the conduct of such establishments. The Basle 
Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices has also developed a 
so See for instance Bhatacharya (1982) who discusses how appropriate combinations of entry controls 
and interest rate ceilings can limit the probability of bank failure but leads to economic inefficiency. 
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number of general principles which should govern the examination of applications for 
entry by foreign institutions. These procedures aim at ensuring that the host 
authorities ·are satisfied with the status of the applicant, the standing of its parent 
institutions and the extent to which the latter is properly supervised (OECD 1987: 
49). 
In general, policy attitudes towards foreign bank entry and the physical presence of 
domestic banks in foreign financial markets have become more liberal over time. 
Such change was motivated by the desire of domestic authorities to put their banks 
. in a position to compete in rapidly expanding global markets. The banks that are 
more likely to enter foreign markets are those with a large home base and those 
engaging in foreign trade and investment in the countries concerned (Goldberg 
1993: 53-71). 
Whilst regulatory provisions regarding the establishment of a foreign bank presence -
in particular licensing procedures - have been scaled down in importance, this should 
be accompanied by a stricter application of prudential regulation designed to ensure 
the maintenance of high banking standards and appropriate risk-management. 
4.2.2 Permissible Business Activities 
Risk varies inversely with knowledge 
lrving Fisher (1867-1947) in The Theory of Interest (1930) 
Important differences between various countries exist with regard to the regulation of 
banks' permissible business activities. There is no generally accepted view as to 
what legitimate banking activity is. This is due to historical differences in approaches 
to the structural regulation of banking and differences in the perception of the relative 
importance of a number of factors which may influence the safety and soundness of 
the banking system. In addition, regulations of this type may involve both prudential 
considerations and other non-prudential concerns such as potential conflicts of 
interest or undue concentrations of economic power. 
The most basic legal separation of business activities is that made between 
commercial and investment banking. Deposit-taking activities can also be separated 
from other areas of finance and business. Restrictions are also often imposed on 
banks' investment in property and also on equity investments in non-bank entities. 
4.2.2.1 Scope of Banking Activity 
Limitations on the scope of permissible business activities generally reflect three 
broad categories of concern: conflicts of interest, safety and soundness, and the 
specialised character of certain activities (OECD 1987: 58). 
The justification for the legal separation of commercial and investment banking is the 
perception that banks' involvement in underwriting as well as in investment business 
may give rise to serious conflicts of interest. In particular, the concern exists that the 
wish to preserve customer relationships might induce banks to underwrite and 
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distribute high rrsk stocks, or to overlend to underwriting clients, thereby impairing 
the safety of the underwriting institution.61 
In the strict sense, the issue of 'conflicts of interest' is not a prudential consideration 
unless it adversely affects the risk exposure of the institution(s) involved. Although, 
the potential for conflicts of interest between commercial and investment banking 
cannot be denied, the attention should rather be focused on the appropriate 
remedies. lt is doubted whether a formal legal separation serves this objective most 
efficiently.62 Instead, other methods such as (internal and external) compliance 
procedures (which are used in many financial systems that tolerate universal 
banking) have proven to be more flexible. To the extent that conflicts of interest may 
increase the risk exposure of universally orientated institutions, these should be 
incorporated in the assessment of risk by regulators. This can be done by requiring 
higher capital adequacy requirements from institutions engaged in a larger number of · 
activities. 
Restraints on the extent to which banks can directly engage in other areas of finance 
(such as insurance services, leasing and factoring) are also frequently motivated by 
prudential and regulatory considerations. In particular, regulators have been 
concerned about the availability of expertise in highly specialised activities which 
differ in both concept and approach from 'normal' banking. lt is reasoned that, in view 
of their intrinsic high riskiness, certain financial activities should be kept separate 
from the banking entity and should be carried out only through specialised 
subsidiaries or affiliates. 
Separation of this nature can facilitate supervision and regulation if these practices 
are suited to the specific characteristics of the subsidiary. However, such a division 
does not necessarily insulate the parent from the risks incurred by their subsidiaries. 
Both markets and regulators (by means of consolidated supervision) tend to assess 
the standing of a banking institution as a whole. Consequently, regulations of this 
nature may not reduce the risk of the particular institution nor of the greater financial 
system. 
61 Experiences of this nature in the late twenties and early thirties in the United States led to the 
introduction of the Glass-Steagall Act (1933) which severely restricted the activities of domestic banks. 
In the 1980's the Federal Reserve, which is charged with overseeing the US banking system 
progressively loosened the Glass-Steagall restictions. In 1987 J.P. Morgan, a commercial bank found 
and exploited a loophole in section 20 of the Act which states that a bank may not be affiliated with any 
firm 'engaged principally' in underwriting and dealing in securities. Two other big banks, Bankers Trust 
and Citicorp, quickly followed suit. Over time the Federal Reserve came to sanction these 'Section 20 
affiliates' on condition that they earned no more than 5 per cent of their revenues from securities (in 
1989 the limit was lifted to 10 per cent). In October 1995 it decided to allow bank employees to work 
for Section 20 affiliates, to let banks market subsidiaries' products and to ease restrictive regulations 
on financial asset sales between banks and affiliates. Documents released in July and August 1996 
suggest that the revenue limit be raised to 25 per cent. If these suggestions are implemented they will 
in effect dismantle the central pillar of the Glass-Steagall Act and allow US banks the same scope of 
banking activity allowed to banks in London and the rest of Europe (The Economist 1996(c): 88). 
62 lsimbaki (1994), for instance, undertook a comparative analysis of the risk of large bank holding 
companies and nonfinancial sectors in the US. The findings provide no strong basis for concluding that 
a less risky banking system would result from the removal of the US barrier separating banking and 
commerce. 
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Furthermore, the legal segmentation of the financial services industry in a number of 
highly compartmentalised institutional sectors gives rise to the emergence of 'grey' 
areas which may not fit into legal definitions. The relative importance of such 
financial services has been increasing due to market forces and competitive 
conditions. With the distinction between traditional banking and other financial 
services becoming increasingly blurred, traditional regulatory frameworks need to be 
adapted. Under these circumstances, a reassessment of the scope and legal basis 
of the regulatory system is necessary in order to reduce regulatory anomalies and 
distortions as well as to bring institutions operating in the 'grey' areas into the 
regulatory ambit. 63 
Finally, limitations on the scope of permissible business activities may lead to an 
'unlevel playing field' between financial institutions which does not conform to the 
principle of competitive neutrality. 
4.2.2.2 Investments in Property 
Concerns about the potentially high risk of illiquid investments in property have been 
the main reasons behind limitations placed on such activity. Restrictions range from 
outright prohibition on the offering of property related services or to investment in 
property (other than for the bank's own operating needs) to limits relating to the size 
of real-estate investment relative to the bank's capital. 
4.2.2.3 Equity Participation in Non-financial activities 
Three prudential arguments have been put forward to justify regulatory constraints 
placed upon banks' equity participations in non-financial activities (OECD 1987: 60). 
The first relates to the relatively illiquid nature of equity participations. Under adverse 
circumstances these may only be realised at a loss. Second, it is argued that the 
excessive conversion of deposits into equity capital should be avoided to preserve a 
bank's solvency and the integrity of primary banking functions. Third, substantial 
equity participations and especially controlling interests are considered to be a 
weakness for a bank when the relevant entity experiences difficulties. 54 
63 Such reassessments may involve a balancing of contrasting political and sectoral interests. In 
particular, they imply an evaluation of the impact of structural regulatory changes on a number of 
broad policy goals such as the degree of competition, the requirements of monetary policies, the 
desire to avoid concentration of power, and the need to ensure an equitable treatment of the various 
groups of financial institutions. See for instance the Report of the Committee of Investigation into the 
Promotion of Equal Competition for Funds in Financial Markets in South Africa (Jacobs Committee 
Report) (Republic of South Africa 1992). 
64 The issue of concentration of power is also a fundamental consideration relating to the acquisition of 
significant equity participation by banks in non-financial activities. Banks may for instance take over 
failing companies by converting loan exposures into equity stakes. Similar considerations apply to 
lending by a bank to its non-bank subsidiaries and related companies. The extent to which banks are 
able to influence the management of the company and the potential conflict of interest between the 
bank as shareholder and as lender is emphasised. Concern has also been voiced about the public 
policy implications of bank's access to inside information, the potential competitive advantage gained 
by 'insider' banks and the undue influence on lender-customer relations. 
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There are obvious weaknesses in such an approach. Small equity investments in a 
wide range of industries may contribute to a diversification of assets, sources of 
income and spreading of risk. In some cases the conversion of credit into equity may 
preserve the creditworthiness of a debtor engaged in restructuring and prevent or 
limit the extent of write-offs or losses. On the other hand, the resulting investment 
may be more negative than liquidating or even writing off a bad loan. 
Clearly the issue of equity participation and property investment can be resolved by 
an application of general prudential principles. As in the case of 'normal' banking 
activities, equity participations and property investments carry a risk. The justification 
for regulation in this area is purely to ensure effective financial risk-management of 
these investments and participations. As such, the issue can be incorporated into the 
general framework of risk-related regulation. For instance, if a bank uses its own 
capital to invest in the equity of other enterprises, this should be regarded as 
impairing its own capital. The implication is that the outright regulatory prohibition of 
these activities is not justified but that the risks associated with these activities 
should be accommodated in a framework which regulates risk-management across 
functional activities. 
4.2.2.4 lnterbank Equity Participation 
A general prudential concern with regard to interbank equity participations relates to 
the transparency of such relationships. A second consideration involves the 
soundness of the individual institution and the implications of interlocking ownership. 
However, bank investment in institutions specialising in bank-related business may 
strengthen the capacity of the bank to compete with non-bank financial 
intermediaries and I or foreign institutions. lt may also foster the innovative process 
in financial services. 
Admittedly, interbank holdings are a more complicated prudential issue than equity 
participations in industrial companies. This is due to the likely contagion effect that 
the failure of one banking institution could have on another institution which 
participates in its equity. Contrariwise, it can be argued that cross-shareholding by 
banks may in fact reduce the dangers of a crisis of confidence if a viable institution is 
perceived as supporting a weaker one. Again, the problem can be related to the risk 
exposure of the individual institutions and the influence on systemic risk. The 
regulatory dilemma lies not in the prohibition of such equity participations but in 
determining what the implications of these are on the risk exposure of the institutions 
both separately and jointly. 
4.2.2.5 Limitations on Insurance Business 
A special prudential concern relates to the acquisition of controlling interests in 
insurance companies. There are some prudential justifications for separating the two 
activities on the grounds that the risks incurred by and the supervision applied to the 
two industries are different. Thus it is reasoned that 'the close linking of banking and 
insurance business may give rise to forms of risk whose importance and character 
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cannot be easily incorporated within the existing framework of banking supervision' 
(OECD 1987: 61). 
The inability of regulators to identify and understand insurance risks which are 
nothing but another form of financial risk does not amount to a convincing 
justification for the prohibition or limitation of insurance business by a bank. Rather 
the risk inherent in insurance activities should be taken into account in the overall 
risk assessment. 
4.2.2.6 Limitations on Securities Business 
Limitations on securities business may range from the prohibition of such business 
by banks (as is still formally the case in the US) to requirements that such business 
be conducted in separately capitalised entities. The purpose of erecting such a 
''firewall" between banks and their securities units is to financially insulate banks from 
their securities affiliates and that emergency assistance facilities need not be 
extended beyond the banking sector to securities firms. 
However, the firewall approach merely compartmentalises the risk of these activities. 
The risks related to conducting securities business should be evaluated together with 
the overall risk attached to the banking portfolio. A legal separation is not favoured. 
Daskin et a/ (1984) analysed the separation of commercial banking and investment 
banking in the UK and Germany and concluded that the efficiency gains from 
eliminating traditional legal inter-industry barriers outweigh efficiency losses. · 
4.2.2.7 General 
From a prudential perspective, measures related to the range of banks' permissible 
business activities are justified in so far as they seek to keep the risk exposure of 
these institutions at an acceptable level. However, the outright prohibition of some 
activities may not be justified, since from a risk-return efficiency point of view the 
performance of additional services by a deposit-taking institution and the availability 
of additional assets to an institution should prove beneficial for performance. As Hall 
(1987: 160) argues: 
'The overriding drawback, apart from breeding inefficiency, of most of these 
restrictions is that very often they can cause the event against which 
protection is sought by denying intermediaries the flexibility to deal with 
problems as they emerge.' 
As already noted, structural change in the financial system is blurring the lines of 
business among financial institutions. Regulatory authorities are increasingly faced 
with the dilemma of specifying the acceptable range of business activities of different 
financial institutions. Regulatory actions in this field will tend to lag behind market 
developments because of existing legal and practical constraints and the complexity 
of the issues involved. The scope for regulatory action may be limited by the need to 
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test regulatory adjustments motivated by principles of efficiency and competitive 
neutrality against their implications for safety and soundness. 
The process of relentless structural change and the inevitable broadening of banks' 
permissible business activities will perforce increase the complexity of the functions 
performed by banks as well as the heterogeneity of banking organisations. This has 
major consequences for regulatory policies and methodologies relating to the 
management of risk. 
First, the complexity of techniques involved in the various sectors of financial 
markets require far greater knowledge and specialised skills than is required for 
traditional deposit-taking activities. This applies to market participants and regulators 
alike. lt is therefore regarded as imperative that entry requirements pertaining to 
these financial markets remain such that only fit and proper participants are able to 
engage in specialised activities. In some cases this may imply, as Mark Twain 
humorously observed, putting all one's apples in one basket, provided that the 
basket is watched very carefully. Formulated differently, bankers attracted by new 
opportunities should take care not to neglect their core business, which entails acting 
as deposit intermediaries. Besides providing a number of services, their basic 
function remains the borrowing and lending of money. Likewise, in broadening the 
scope of regulation, regulators will be required to increase the depth of their 
knowledge of financial markets. Begging this knowledge, adequate prudential 
supervision will not be possible. 
Second, there is both a qualitative and a quantitative difference in the weights of the 
risks incurred in traditional banking intermediation and other financial activities. The 
assessment and management of all financial risks are important. This point was 
echoed by Robin Leigh-Pemberton, then Governor of the Bank of England (The 
Banker 1993: 16): 
'There are lessons for bankers. Close attention to the control and pricing of 
risk is ... at the heart of the banker's professional life, and no amount of 
competition or marketing strategy should ever divert from it.' 
Ultimately, all business activities of banks should - by means of the risks thus 
incurred - be reflected in institutions' capital requirements. 
Third, greater involvement in other financial activities may lead to the emergence of 
new forms of risk resulting from the interrelationship between various market 
compartments and the covariance of risk. On the other hand, some of the risks may 
be compensated for by rewards of additional activities, as argued above. 
Ideally, therefore, management and regulators should focus on the net result with 
regard to risk exposure that the provision of new services entails for individual 
financial institutions and the system as a whole. 
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4.2.3 Disclosure Requirements 
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient Policeman. 
Louis Brandeis (1913) 
4.2.3.1 Disclosure in Financial Statements and Supervisory Returns 
Financial institutions are usually required to disclose a far greater deal of information 
and follow more detailed procedures than is the case with other economic entities. 
The importance of information in the regulatory process can be traced back to the 
newly emerging theory of financial intermediation, which stresses the role of financial 
intermediaries in overcoming informational asymmetries between market 
participants. 65 
Disclosure requirements are a form of regulation that may carry significant 
compliance costs. The question is not necessarily one of increased information, but 
rather of how the quality of information can be improved so as to maximise its 
usefulness to stakeholders, while minimising the costs to financial institutions 
(Australian Government Publishing Service 1981: 290). 
On the other hand, disclosure may also bring benefits to the disclosing bank. As 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) have shown, revealing public information to reduce 
information asymmetries can reduce a bank's cost of capital by increasing the 
liquidity of its securities. 
Disclosure requirements are deemed necessary to be able to evaluate the risk 
exposure of individual financial intermediaries as well as the financial system as a 
whole. The focus should be on the disclosure of risks undertaken and the results 
achieved by management in managing these risks. 
The objective of disclosure in financial statements must be to obtain 'full disclosure' 
in terms of generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP). The philosophy of full 
disclosure should therefore contain the following principles (Van Greuning 1993: 
106-107): 
• financial statements should provide information on whether financial 
intermediaries manage funds in their capacity as agents or as principals; 
• disclosure policies should provide the same information to depositors than is 
available to shareholders; 
• assets should be disclosed at market value; 
• reserve accounting practices should not be allowed; 
65 The theory of Mirrlees and Vickrey, the 1996 Nobellaureates for economics, have for instance been 
applied in the study of insurance. Insurers cannot observe whether their customers have taken proper 
precautions. By charging deductibles and making claimants bear a portion of losses, insurers can align 
their incentives properly. If the premiums reflect the risks which would occur in the event of the 
precautions being taken, the customer must face big enough losses to induce him to take them (The 
Economist 1996(b ): 94 ). 
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• all (hidden) reserves should be disclosed; and 
• the consolidated activities of financial intermediaries should be adequately 
disclosed. 
Because full disclosure should essentially relate to the disclosure of risk exposures 
by a bank, it should also entail disclosure of off-balance sheet business as well as all 
other major risks not adequately identified by balance sheet information. 
Kluger (1989: 275-282) reasons that in periods of financial distress, bank 
management may attempt to suppress unfavourable information from creditors and 
investors through the use of undisclosed changes in accounting methods, estimates, 
and procedures, thus reducing the quality of the information contained in financial 
statements. The danger that this may occur, directs the attention to the important 
role of auditors in the prudential context. 
4.2.3.2 The Role of Auditors 
Traditionally the role of the bank's auditor has been to report to the shareholders of 
the bank on the truth and fairness of the annual accounts. In the performance of this 
duty, auditors were subject to self-regulation by international accountancy bodies 
such as the Institute for Chartered Accountants or Chartered Institute of 
Management Accountants. 
To a very large degree the effectiveness of banking supervision depends on the 
knowledge, experience and integrity of bank auditors. Consequently there has been 
a growing tendency for bank auditors to become more involved in reporting to or for 
the supervisory authorities on matters relating to prudential regulations. For example, 
in various countries auditors are required to: 
• report on prudential and statistical information not relevant to the annual 
accounts; and 
• give an opinion on the administrative organisation and the information control 
systems of the bank. 
These matters raise important questions about the relative levels of responsibility 
undertaken by the auditor, by bank management and by the supervisor. This was the 
subject of a recent survey on the involvement of auditors in the prudential control of 
banks, conducted by . the Federation des Experts Comptables Europeans (FEE 
1993). The survey covers the following areas of involvement by auditors in prudential 
regulation: 
• appointment and responsibility; 
• relationship with the supervisory authorities; 
• relationship with the bank; 
• reporting; 
• different roles of external auditors; and 
• future developments. 
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Supervisors normally have some degree of influence on the appointment or re-
appointment of the external auditor. This may range from requiring consultation to 
the legal authority to object to an appointment. Apart from the statutory audit 
responsibilities, the external auditor may be involved in the prudential controls of 
banks as a consequence of further regulations imposed by the regulatory authorities 
on auditors and banks. Examples of specific activities of the bank which the auditor 
is required to audit or review are as follows (FEE 1993: 14 ): 
• reporting on large credits and credit limits and other banking risks; 
• review of electronic data processing; 
• reporting on money laundering; 
• reporting on insider trading; 
• reporting on participation in tax-evasion schemes; 
• audit of safe custody, administration of and dealing in client assets; and 
• involvement in review work of supervisory authorities. 
Clearly these responsibilities go beyond the auditor's responsibilities in relation to the 
audit of the annual accounts. Auditors may also have a responsibility to the 
supervisory authorities for the audit or review of prudential returns submitted by 
banks to the authorities. In addition, the auditor may be required to evaluate the 
organisational and internal control systems of a bank. 
In order to bring about a transparent division of responsibilities amongst bank 
stakeholders, it is desirable that the responsibilities of auditors which lie outside the 
statutory audit boundaries, be formulated by the authorities in the form of policy 
statements or guidelines. 
The relationship between the auditor and the supervisory authorities can be viewed 
from a number of different perspectives (FEE 1993: 16-20). First, in relation to the 
duties imposed on the auditor to communicate details of irregularities or 
infringements to the supervisory authorities; second, in relation to the auditor's duty 
of confidentiality, both to the bank and to the supervisory authorities; third, in relation 
to standards or guidelines issued by the supervisory and other authorities as regards 
auditing procedures for the external audit of the bank's annual or interim reports and 
accounts and the form of the auditor's report thereon; fourth, in relation to the 
situation where the auditor is considering qualifying a published report; and fifth, in 
relation to any obligation on the part of the auditor to provide the supervisory 
authorities with a copy of his audit report to the shareholders. 
Regarding the auditor's relationship with the bank, it is usually accepted that the 
bank's management is responsible for financial statements, prudential returns 
submitted to the supervisory authorities etc. The role of the auditor is to inform the 
bank management of the 'highest level' of material weakness in a report submitted 
either to the management of the bank or the supervisory authorities. The bank 
management may be allowed or even required to respond to the auditor's report of 
material weaknesses (FEE 1993: 20-21 ). 
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There are four categories of audit reports which the auditor may be required to make 
to the supervisory authorities (FEE 1993: 21-26): 
• on the annual accounts; 
• on published interim accounts; 
• on prudential returns reflecting interim information; and 
• other reports. 
In principle, auditors should be required to provide the supervisory authorities with a 
description of, or opinion on, the bank's exposure to the differing banking risks, the 
bank's approach to the monitoring of such risks, the adequacy of the bank's 
assessments of risks and their hedging or covering of such risks. 
The different roles of external auditors consist of three types, namely (FEE 1993: 26-
27): 
• the 'statutory auditor', appointed by the shareholders at the annual general 
meeting; 
• the 'bank auditor', approved by the supervisory authorities; and 
• the 'extraordinary auditor', appointed by the supervisory authorities to carry out 
specific investigations on its behalf. 
In some cases there may be little distinction between these rotes, especially as 
regards the functions of bank auditor and the statutory auditor. In some cases, the 
bank auditor may also be allowed to perform other functions, such as consultancy 
services, for the bank. 
Some of the aspects of the work currently performed by auditors for the supervisory 
authorities may give rise to concern or discussion. As such, certain issues may be 
identified which may give rise to additional future responsibilities of the auditor. 
The tendency of supervisory authorities to increasingly involve auditors in the 
prudential supervision of banks is to be welcomed as it serves the free flow of 
information and therefore benefits the process of risk assessment and management 
by banks. However, the responsibilities of the auditor should not fall outside the 
normal range of competence of the auditing profession. Moreover, the respective 
responsibilities of the various bank stakeholders should be clearly defined. A 
misconception about such roles can lead to inappropriate reliance being placed by 
one on the work of the other. 
A framework for the division of responsibilities between bank supervisors and 
external auditors was proposed by the International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC) in 1989. The statement observes that the supervisor and auditor have, in 
many respects, complementary concerns regarding the same issues, though the 
focus of their concerns may not be the same. For example, the supervisor is primarily 
concerned with the stability of the bank and the protection of depositors, whereas the 
auditor is primarily concerned with reporting on the financial position of the bank and 
on the results of its operations. 
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These complementary concerns necessitate that regulatory authorities recognise 
that financial statements have not been prepared primarily for a prudential purpose. 
The IFAC-statement recommends that the supervisor should bear in mind, inter alia, 
the accounting policies used in the preparation of the statements and their 
appropriateness for prudential purposes and that financial statements are prepared 
on the basis of judgements and estimates made by the management and assessed 
by the auditors, which to some extent makes the information subjective. 
In addition it is stated that, given the different purposes for which internal control is 
evaluated by the supervisor and the auditor, the supervisor cannot assume that the 
auditor's evaluation of the adequacy of internal controls will necessarily be 
appropriate for the purposes for which the supervisor carries out his evaluation. 
Despite the validity of some of the limitations expressed in the statement, it is 
contended here that external auditors should form part of the risk-management 
process in banks. The process of risk-management is intrinsic and essential to the 
activity of any bank and consequently greatly influences the going-concern basis on 
which the financial statements are prepared. A risk-based approach to bank 
supervision would therefore require a reassessment of the fundamental approach 
adopted by external auditors. In essence, this would entail a change from a balance-
sheet audit to an audit of the risks inherent to the banking activity. 
The IFAC-statement (IFAC 1989) provides the following as examples of criteria that 
need to be established for a possible extension of the auditor's role as a contribution 
to the supervisory process: 
• the basic responsibility for supplying complete and accurate information to the 
supervisors must remain with the bank management; 
• the normal relationship between the auditor and his client needs to be 
safeguarded; 
• before concluding any arrangement with the supervisor, the auditor should 
consider whether any conflicts of interest may arise; 
• the supervisory requirements must be specific and clearly defined in relation to 
the information required; 
• the tasks which the auditor is asked by the supervisor to perform need to be 
within his technical and practical competence; 
• the auditor's task for the supervisor should usually be complementary to his 
regular audit work; and 
• certain aspects of confidentiality need to be protected, in particular the 
confidentiality of information obtained by the auditor through his professional 
relationship with other clients, that is not available to the bank or public. 
The greater recognition of risk-based prudential regulation and the increasing 
complexity of banking risks will result in a greater reliance by supervisory authorities 
on auditors in those areas for which the auditor is particularly suited. Some examples 
of such tasks are: 
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• th1~ verification of prudential returns; 
• the evaluation of a bank's information and control systems on the basis of criteria 
provided by the supervisor; 
• the expression of an opinion on adherence to appropriate accounting policies; 
and 
• the expression of an opinion on general and specific risk exposure. 
In all cases the focus of these activities should be the risk-management processes of 
the bank. This process should benefit from the exchange of information between all 
stakeholders (especially management, supervisor and auditor) as this provides an 
independent assessment in important risk-areas. The role of external auditors is 
therefore crucial to the success of a co-ordinated approach to risk-management in 
the banking sector. 
4.2.4 Capital Adequacy 
4.2.4.1 The Role of Capital 
One of the most important prudential regulatory measures is to limit the risk of 
financial failure by imposing capital adequacy requirements. There is an essential 
link between capital adequacy and bank failure, as a bank can only be considered to 
have failed when it has exhausted its capital resources. 
As a measure of the ability to repay stakeholders, especially depositors, in the event 
of liquidation, capital adequacy must be judged in relation to the risk that financial 
intermediation involves. Capital requirements are necessary not only because they 
reduce the risk of bank failure but also because they limit the incentives to take risk 
(Baltensperger and Dermine 1987: 85). The larger the capital base, the larger the 
combined losses of shareholders in the case of bankruptcy. 
Why can the market not be relied upon to determine an adequate level of bank 
capital? Four reasons have been put forward (Dale 1982: 57-58). In the first place 
the market will be unable to take account of the economic externalities caused by 
bank failure (as noted above). Second, market forces will tend to drive capital ratios 
down in order to maximise the return generated by the capital resources. Third, 
protective regulatory measures such as deposit insurance or emergency support 
facilities may allow banks to lower their capital ratios without having to pay an 
additional risk premium to attract deposits. Finally, the mere existence of banking 
regulations may lead banks to feel protected and therefore assumed that the 
regulatory authorities would be obliged to provide support in the interest of systemic 
stability.66 
Capital adequacy requirements can take a variety of forms. In most financial systems 
a minimum amount of capital is required. In addition, many regulatory authorities 
66 lt is submitted that the above approach of Dale ( 1982) is not in all respects analytically sound as the 
penultimate and ultimate reasons rely more on the aspect of moral hazard (which is caused by 
regulations) than on considerations of market failure. 
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require the maintenance of a capital- (or solvency) ratio. This may consist of a 
minimum balance sheet ratio (such as between capital and total assets or liabilities), 
or some weighted measure of risk assets. Although in some cases no formal and 
generally applicable ratio is established, capital adequacy is still carefully monitored 
by regulators, even if this occurs in a less formal way (Baltensperger and Dermine 
1987: 85). 
What conceptual criteria of capital adequacy should be applied? In the broadest 
terms, capital is adequate when it reduces the possibility of future failure to a 
predetermined level.67 However, this begs the question of the nature of economic 
conditions against which a bank should be protected, i.e. going-concern or disaster 
scenarios. On a conceptual level, the challenge for regulators is to strike a balance 
between these two scenarios, based on their subjective assessment of the overall 
health of the financial system. 
In addition to ordinary operational functions, (i.e. capital required for the conduct of 
banking activity) there are three specific functions of capital for banks which are 
relevant from a regulatory perspective: 'buffer' functions; public confidence and 
management constraint (OECD 1987: 105-106). 
A primary role of bank capital is to provide a cushion against losses. As argued 
above, the assessment of capital for precautionary purposes is problematic. This is 
particularly so in times of rapid economic and financial change. The buffer that 
capital provides against unexpected losses is of vital importance for the protection of 
depositors and other stakeholders. This role acquires additional importance once the 
active risk-management by financial institutions is recognised. The total risk 
exposure of a bank should therefore be measured in relation to its capital. 
A second and related function of capital adequacy is derived from the fact that the 
viability of a bank critically depends on public confidence. Although the availability of 
capital is neither a perfect indicator of the viability of a bank nor a sufficient condition 
for the maintenance of confidence by depositors and stakeholders, it is a major factor 
influencing their perceptions regarding the institution. Capital is the most visible 
symbol of a bank's strength. lt is the main 'yardstick' against which the market 
assesses the capacity of a bank to withstand losses and to manage risk. In this 
sense capital requirements provide the support for other prudential requirements. 
A third fundamental, safety-orientated function of bank capital is to discipline bank 
management. This is fostered by regulatory standards on the level and composition 
of capital and its relationship to risk factors. By focusing on the required level of 
capital adequacy, regulators are able to influence the potential for and the relative 
cost of financial activity. The introduction of constraints on risk-management, suggest 
67 Sheldon (1995} proposes an alternative to the capital adequacy requirements proposed by the BIS, 
namely setting a maximum risk of insolvency that no bank may exceed, and each bank complying by 
holding a capital-to-asset ratio commensurate with its overhead costs and with the expected value and 
volatility of its rate of return. The main advantage of Sheldon's (1995} approach is that it is a 
framework for assessing the costs and benefits that increasing capital standards entail. 
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that regulators must also assess the implications in terms of competition and 
effectiveness. 
The various conceptual difficulties encountered in assessing capital adequacy and 
functions of capital, complicate the related problems of defining and measuring 
capital, two issues discussed below. 
4.2.4.2 The Definition of Capital for Regulatory Purposes 
General 
The definition of bank capital varies significantly across financial systems. This is due 
to differences in accounting principles and methods, specific institutional features of 
banks and the difficulty of comparing various financial instruments. However, there is 
some agreement amongst regulators as to the conditions applicable to the inclusion 
of capital and the treatment of some of the components of capitai.6B 
There is general agreement on the conditions that should apply to 'core' capital. Core 
capital must (OECD 1987: 107): 
• be permanently available to absorb losses; 
• not impose contractual charges against earnings; and 
• not be redeemable at the holder's request. 
On this basis it is possible to identify several balance sheet items that belong to the 
capital base. The most common of these are: 
• paid-up ordinary shares; 
• irredeemable and mandatorily convertible preference shares; 
• share premiums; 
• disclosed reserves; and 
• retained profits. 
These items having been identified, disagreement may exist on the following balance 
sheet items: subordinated debt, undisclosed reserves and provisioning as well as 
disagreement regarding the approach adopted towards the consolidation of a 
balance sheet for capital purposes. In inflationary environments the revaluation of 
assets may also become a contentious issue. 
Subordinated Debt 
The primary characteristic of subordinated debt is that the claims of the lender on the 
borrowing institution are subordinated to those of other creditors. However, the 
extent to which such debt may form a part of capital depends on the specific 
conditions of the loan contract . 
68 The international efforts to promote convergence in this area are spearheaded by the BIS. 
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Theoretically, subordinated loan stock does not possess any of the essential 
attributes of capital: it is not necessarily permanently available, it usually carries 
contractual servicing obligations, and it cannot be used to absorb losses of a going 
concern. On the other hand, subordinated loans differ from other forms of debt 
insofar as they provide protection to depositors and other stakeholders in the event 
of liquidation, and, when so structured,- lend support to bank funding and also 
increase market confidence (OECD 1987: 1 07). 
Regulatory practices differ considerably with regard to the treatment of subordinated 
debt. Historically, supervisors did not accept subordinated debt as part of the capital 
base. However, developments in financial markets have in some cases persuaded 
regulators to adapt this view. First, innovations such as perpetual maturities and 
automatic convertibility have reduced the differences between subordinated debt and 
capital. Second, banks active in international markets often use subordinated loans 
denominated in a foreign currency for international activities and to reduce currency 
and maturity mismatching (OECD 1987: 108-109). Finally, investors display a 
preference for subordinated debt instruments rather than conventional equity, 
thereby making it easier for banks to obtain such funds when access to the stock 
market proves difficult. 59 
Consequently, some regulatory authorities permit the inclusion of subordinated debt 
as well as certain special capital-market instruments, such as variable-rate preferred 
stock and participation certificates into the capital base. Such inclusion is usually 
made subject to conditions in terms of maturity, redemption and payment. Limits 
have also been placed on the amount of subordinated debt eligible for inclusion. 
Undisclosed Reserves 
The treatment of undisclosed or hidden reserves is contentious. The rationale for 
considering such reserves as part of the capital is that they represent an available 
source of financial strength for the bank to meet unexpected losses. 
Some countries do not consider undisclosed reserves to form a part of capital, others 
allow them but do not include them in supervisory ratios whilst others incorporate 
them in the capital base, provided that such reserves are identified and accepted by 
the supervisor. Empirical evidence on the relative competitive effects of the adoption 
of risk-based capital requirements indicates some uncertainty on behalf of the market 
regarding the treatment of hidden reserves (Cooper et a/1991: 367-381 ). 
Provisioning 
Capital adequacy is closely connected to provisioning since the main purpose of 
provisions is to allow for future use of banks' capital resources. Capital and 
provisions can be considered complementary means of strengthening the position of 
69 Wansley et a/ (1989: 217-233) have argued that in general announcements of the issuance of 
additional common stock are associated with significant negative effects, but that the market does not 
appear to treat subordinated debt announcements as similar to equity. 
73 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions 
a bank. Provisions account for specific and general banking risks, whilst capital is a 
general resource that provides the basis for the risk-management activities of banks. 
The interaction between capital and provisions are determined by the specific 
regulatory, accounting and tax policies of a financial system. 
Although the differences in the treatment of provisions for certain types of risk are 
considerable, some general principles have emerged. These concern the specific 
techniques of provisioning as well as the respective roles of stakeholders, especially 
management. 
The nature of provisions is largely determined by the tax implications thereof. The 
general principle is that provisions are only allowable as taxable expenses where in 
the opinion of the tax authorities the claims may reasonably be regarded as 
irrecoverable. 
General provisions are made against general and latent risk of losses. As such they 
have some of the characteristics of capital. The methods used to compute general 
provisions are often based on average losses over a certain period of time. The 
recognition of increased risks and uncertainties in the present economic environment 
may suggest that a higher level of provisions than was applicable in the past may be 
appropriate. The most important consideration in this regard is whether general 
provisions should be tax-deductible, as many regulatory authorities require these to 
be made out of taxed income. This feature (i.e. non-tax deductibility) may discourage 
banks from providing for general risks beyond the required minimum. 
Specific provisions are made against current or future liabilities and represent a 
recognition of specific risk, even though the amount of loss cannot be determined 
with precision. Specific provisions cannot be regarded as a part of capital since they 
are not able to meet unexpected losses. In most financial systems, specific 
provisions are tax-deductible within limits specified by auditors or regulatory 
authorities. 
The responsibility for assessing and managing financial risk exposure and for making 
adequate provisions against risk rests primarily with the management of the bank. 
Management policy on provisioning must be reviewed and approved by the bank's 
auditors. The role of supervisors is to ensure that a bank's approach to provisioning 
is based upon a prudent and realistic assessment of the risks incurred and the 
bank's overall capital strength. 
By directly affecting the profits and dividends of a bank, provisioning influences the 
standing of a bank in the marketplace. Consequently, banks have to strike a balance 
between an appropriate level of provisions, an adequate amount of retained profits 
and distribution of dividends that is necessary to retain access to equity markets 
(OECD 1987: 111-112). 
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Consolidation 
The increasing diversification and internationalisation of financial institutions and the 
blurring of lines of distinction between banking and non-banking activities underline 
the importance of accounting consolidation and consolidated supervision. A 
consolidated approach is necessary to ensure that there is no circumvention of the 
requirements of risk concentration through bank subsidiaries and affiliates. 
Nevertheless, the application of the principle of consolidated supervision poses 
considerable analytical and practical difficulties in determining the existence of legal 
and economic connections between separated entities. These difficulties are 
compounded by internationally active banking groups, and also depends on the 
degree of disclosure allowed by regulatory authorities in foreign financial systems. 
Traditionally, balance sheet consolidation implied only a partial statistical 
consolidation of the banks in a banking group. lt has, however, become clear that 
non-bank activities have an important impact on the overall risk exposure of a 
banking group. 
Van Greuning (1993: 101-112) argues that the lack of an accounting consolidation 
on a principal I agency basis, is a deficiency of current international approaches to 
consolidated supervision. When a financial intermediary is acting as an agent, the 
risk of market participation lies with the investor and not the institution concerned. 
However, when the financial intermediary is acting as a principal, the financial 
intermediary accepts all the risks involved and guarantees the investor a specific 
capital and I or return on the investment or deposit placed with that financial 
intermediary. lt is consequently reasoned that the capital adequacy of financial 
conglomerates will be significantly clearer if it can be shown (through consolidated 
financial statements) to what extent the group is acting as a financial intermediary on 
a principal basis. Van Greuning (1993: 112) concludes that in view of 'the so-called 
moral hazard that may attach to banks, a higher capital adequacy requirement might 
therefore have to be imposed on banks in such a group.'7o 
4.2.4.3 Measurement of Capital Adequacy 
lt is clear that even on a conceptual level, the determination of what constitutes 
capital adequacy is problematic. Moreover, there are a number of contentious issues 
in determining the definition of capital for supervisory purposes, as set out above. 
These problems are inevitably translated into practical complications when capital 
adequacy is to be measured for prudential purposes. Finally, there is an inevitable 
lack of precision in determining the quality and the size of the risks to be protected by 
the capital base. 
70 Whilst the merits of principal-based consolidation cannot be faulted from a risk-management 
perspective (in the sense that an intermediary engages in higher risks when acting as a principal), it is 
not conceptually correct to base this conclusion on the moral hazard argument, which is actually a cost 
associated with regulation. For a more in-depth discussion on the principal I agent distinction see also 
Republic of South Africa (1992: 52) and South African Reserve Bank (1992: 8-10). 
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There are several ways of expressing capital in relation to the overall business 
activities of a bank. In essence, however, these cohstitute variants of two basic 
approaches, being the gearing ratio and the risks assets ratio. These variants can 
also be used in a complementary way. 
The gearing ratio relates bank capital to total liabilities. By placing limits on the 
gearing ratio, regulators can limit the capacity of a bank to expand with given capital 
resources. The major advantage to this approach is its simplicity. The gearing ratio is 
therefore often used by analysts when assessing a bank's capacity for expansion as 
well as when making inter-bank comparisons. From the point of view of the bank it 
has the advantage that it does not constrain the structure of banking activities, 
thereby allowing maximum operational flexibility. 
From a risk-management orientated paradigm, the simple gearing ratio approach has 
severe limitations. A major disadvantage is the inflexibility with regard to balance 
sheet items, in the sense that they can only be included or excluded. lt does not 
incorporate off-balance sheet risk, nor does it recognise the fact that individual 
balance sheet items carry different risks. In addition, this approach encounters 
conceptual problems when other 'non-banking' financial activities are carried out 
within a financial institution. Finally, it does not appreciate that banks are not simply 
exposed to risk, but manage risk in a number of ways that_ cannot simply be deduced 
from balance sheet aggregates. 
Awareness of these limitations has led several regulatory authorities to adopt a more 
sophisticated approach based on weighted risk assets ratios. In the risk assets ratio, 
different weights are attached to different categories of assets. The weights reflect 
the perceived riskiness of the various banking activities. Depending on the asset 
structure, the use of the risk assets ratio improves the assessment of the overall risk 
exposure of a bank. 
One drawback of this approach is that it requires a subjective assessment by 
regulators of the risk of each particular activity or asset. Although theoretically such 
assessment can be based on historical experience, it inevitably involves an element 
of subjectivity by the regulator. Furthermore, assigning a fixed risk factor to particular 
activities or assets may result in moral hazardJ1 
Two approaches to the use of risk-weightings are possible. On the one hand, 
regulators may choose to use predetermined and fixed weightings. Apart from the 
relative simplicity of this approach, it is also in accordance with the principle of 
stability, as uniform standards are introduced. On the other hand, more complex 
systems with more highly refined cover ratios for different risk factors permit a 
differentiation of requirements according to the individual bank's nature and business 
structure. The latter approach favours the efficiency-related principles of financial 
regulation. 
71 See for instance lgawa and Konatas (1990} who find that in a credit market characterised by a priori 
asymmetric information, the use of security can result in moral hazard when making credit decisions. 
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Ryan (1981) argues that there is a cyclical element in the use of measurement 
approaches to capital adequacy. He reasons that in the beginning, simple ratios are 
used; however, when it is realised that these do not take a number of important 
factors into account, ratios become more complex. The more complex ratios become 
like 'straw men' and can easily be criticised because they are necessarily subjective 
but give the impression of precision, These are eventually replaced by more easily 
understood ratios. 
Whichever system of measurement is adopted, it is clear that a single ratio cannot 
incorporate all the factors pertaining to a bank's exposure to risks and the 
corresponding capital requirements. As Pecchioli (OECD 1987: 11 0) argues: 
'The ratio per se is unlikely to capture the overall quality of a bank's portfolio 
and the degree of concentration of business in certain sectors, markets or 
geographical areas. Furthermore, any judgement on the solvency of an 
institution cannot disregard such fundamental factors such as the quality of 
management, the standing of the bank in the marketplace, its profit potential, 
the strength of its provisioning policy and, of course, the adequacy of liquidity. 
lt is generally agreed, therefore, that the measurement of capital adequacy is 
only one, albeit very important, element in the overall process of assessment 
of bank soundness.' 
These considerations have led some regulatory authorities to refrain from prescribing 
fixed quantitative guidelines applying to all institutions irrespective of specific 
circumstances. Other regulators have adopted a uniform quantitative ratio while 
some authorities have the power to change the ratio in specified circumstances. 
4.2.5 Risk Assets Limits 
Behold, the fool saith, 'Put not all thine eggs in the one basket' - which is but a manner of 
saying 'Scatter your money and your attention', but the wise man saith, 'Put all your eggs in 
the one basket and- WATCH THAT BASKET. 
Mark Twain (1835-1910) in Pudd'nhead Wilson 
The use of risk assets ratios, where maximum holdings of certain types of assets are 
specified in terms of capital proportions was discussed above. This section focuses 
on the most important risk diversification rules. These specifically apply to loan 
concentration, interest rate risk, country risk and foreign exchange risk. In addition, 
there is growing awareness by regulatory authorities of the risk posed by the use of 
off-balance sheet instruments such as options and futures. 
Even though risk asset limits can technically be considered as portfolio constraints to 
the extent that they inhibit the flexibility of financial institutions, the diversification of 
risk is part and parcel of any policy of prudent risk-managementJ2 Correctly applied, 
risk assets limits can therefore be considered a justified objective from the 
perspective of all bank stakeholders. In short, the principles of stability and efficiency 
72 For a discussion on the use of portfolio theory in determining some of the shortcomings of the 
methods of risk assessment used in banking, see Schaefer (1987). 
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need not be seen as conflicting. The challenge here lies in determining the 
appropriate level and distribution of risks, with due regard to the interdependence of 
these risks and the risk-management activities of the banking entity as a whole. 
In assessing these risks and relating them to capital adequacy, care should therefore 
be taken not to rely too extensively on the 'building block' process. According to this 
approach, each risk should be covered by a minimum amount of capital. Yet if all 
risks are simply added, the result could be a stringent capital requirement that takes 
no note of how different risks affect each other. The building block approach, 
favoured by the Basle committee of central bankers, does not fully reflect 'portfolio 
effects': namely the fact that some risks counterbalance others (The Economist 
1993(c): 73-74). Rather, the focus of risk assessment should be on the sum of all the 
risks, and not the parts thereof. This may result in a completely different measure of 
overall risk. 
Dimson and March (1994) investigated the three leading regulatory approaches to 
setting capital requirements, namely the 'comprehensive' approach (used in the US 
and Japan), the 'building block' approach (preferred in the European Union) and the 
'portfolio' approach used since 1988 in the UK. Using a securities firm's equity 
portfolio for simplicity, the comprehensive approach would entail setting capital aside 
for both long and short positions; the building block approach uses both the gross 
and the net value of exposure to determine capital requirements; whereas the 
portfolio approach ties the amount of capital to a simple calculation of the overall 
riskiness of a portfolio. The latter approach focuses solely on the net position, and 
defines riskiness as the extent to which the value of the portfolio is likely to fluctuate. 
The study concludes that the US comprehensive approach makes no link between 
risk and capital. While the building block approach produced better results, Brittain's 
'portfolio' approach was the most sensitive to the measure of risk used (The 
Economist 1994: 86). While these findings have assisted in the resolution of 
academic disputes on how best to link capital requirements to risk it does not answer 
another crucial question namely the extent of capital required for the various levels of 
risk assumed. 
4.2.5.1 Loan Concentration 
The prudential concern regarding the credit risks arising from loan concentration 
usually results in regulations controlling large exposures. These exposures may 
relate to individual exposures or to concentration of particular categories of assets 
(and liabilities). Prudent diversification demands not only that banks spread their 
lending amongst different sectors of the community but also the avoidance of loan 
concentrations to businesses whose risks are eo-variant. In essence, limits on loan 
concentration are a means of reducing general credit risk.73 
The monitoring of large exposures is carried out by means of the prudential returns 
that banks are required to submit to regulatory authorities, Usually, regulations 
regarding loan concentration relate the size such exposures to a maximum 
73 For a definition see paragraph 2.4. 
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percentage of a bank's capital. In some cases, limits are also placed on the total 
amount of individual large exposures. 
Clearly, smaller and regional banks may be particularly vulnerable to loan 
concentration because of their excessive dependence on a limited number of 
customers and I or economic sectors. However, the issue of loan concentration 
applies equally to big banking groups subject to consolidated supervision.74 
Regulatory differences with regard to loan concentration usually involve the 
treatment of various types of claims. For instance, claims guaranteed by the 
government are usually excluded from the measurement of large exposures whereas 
those guaranteed by a public-sector body are treated differently according to the 
nature and legal status of the entity concerned. Similarly, differences arise from the 
treatment of certain types of claims on non-bank customers (such as short-term 
commercial bills and promissory notes, bonds and shares) or the nature of the 
security applicable to claims (such as claims backed by deposits and back-to-back 
loans) (OECD 1987: 75). 
4.2.5.2 Country Risk 
Another prudential occupation that can be traced back to concerns regarding credit 
risk is that of country risk, being the risk that borrowers of a country may be unable 
and I or unwilling to meet their external obligations. Country risk, as in the case of 
credit risk, is a matter for commercial judgement on a case-by-case basis. As with 
other types of risk exposure by banks, it is essential that country risk is not excessive 
in relation to the capital resources of the bank. From a general risk-management 
perspective, the concept of country risk should be broadened beyond the confines of 
external credit obligations to include all forms of risk relating to country exposure 
such as cross-border transfer (payment) risk and off-balance sheet risk. International 
portfolios should be managed in accordance with the general requirements of a 
proper diversification of risks. 
The responsibility of bank management is therefore to make an adequate appraisal 
of the risks concerned with country exposure and to manage these accordingly. The 
task of the regulators is to ensure that both the assessment and management of 
these risks are appropriate (OECD 1983: 88-90). They may also support 
management by facilitating the dissemination of information that is useful for the 
monitoring and controlling of country risk exposure, including aggregated data on the 
risk exposure of the banking system as a whole to particular countries. 
Some evidence suggests that in the absence of clear accounting principles, banks 
tend to make allowances for possible losses on country risk to the extent that these 
provisions are tax-deductible or as far as the bank's earning situation permits 
(Baxman 1990: 497 -522). The original objective of loan-loss reserves, which ought to 
be risk-related, is thus not attained. 
74 On the issue of large exposures to developing countries, see Taylor (1989). 
79 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions 
General considerations on the supervision of country risk have been set out by the 
Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices (1982) and the 
OECD (1983). No official ceilings or guidelines on the appropriate exposure to 
particular countries were laid down, leaving the responsibility within the domain of 
bank management. Without the existence of predetermined levels of risk exposure, 
regulatory authorities need to supervise these risks more informally through regular 
examinations. 
4.2.5.3 Interest Rate Risk 
As previously identified, interest rate risk is a basic risk of financial intermediation 
and can be defined as the risk that changes in interest rates may adversely affect the 
net portfolio value and portfolio income of a financial institution. Interest rate risk may 
exist even in the case of perfect maturity matching, to the extent that these may still 
involve differences in the interest rate sensitivities of an institution's assets and 
liabilities. 
The prudential importance of the issue of interest rate risk has risen in line with the 
increased volatility of interest rates. lt has acquired further impetus through the 
greater reliance by banks on wholesale market sources for funding and the greater 
involvement of banks in securities business. The mismatching of interest rate 
positions may bring greater profits but also involve greater risks. Consequently, 
prudent interest rate management techniques need to be developed. These must 
then be integrated into the overall risk-management processes of a bank. 
Although banks have improved methods for managing interest rate exposure, risk-
management techniques are often complicated and difficult to implement. As an 
integral part of overall risk-management, banks are relying on hedging instruments, 
such as swaps, financial futures and options.75 The development of markets for and 
the increased knowledge of these instruments have enhanced the potential for 
managing interest rate risk. 
4.2.5.4 Foreign Exchange Risk 
Foreign exchange or currency risk is another traditional banking risk that has been 
defined as the risk that changes in exchange rates may have a negative impact on 
the mismatch between foreign receivables and foreign payments. Three sub-risks 
were identified: the risk of dealing and taking a position76, the operational risk caused 
by employees acting in excess of their authority, and the risk of counterparty default. 
This applies equally to spot and forvvard exchange rates. 
75 The literature on these instruments and their use for hedging purposes is extensive, see Frankel 
(1984), Campbell (1985), Martin (1985) and Bank for International Settlements (1986). 
76 Hartman (1994) describes the efforts by the BIS to introduce foreign exchange position limits on a 
uniform cross-country basis, focusing on their effectiveness and their possible impact on the 
functioning of both mature and developing foreign exchange markets. The paper provides insight into 
the use of foreign exchange position limits in developing countries for other than prudential purposes, 
in particular to support exchange rate and exchange control policies. 
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The increased volatility of exchange rates and the potential risks involved have 
generally led to a strengthening of internal control procedures and the development 
of adequate standards for operational safety. The role of bank management is to 
monitor and manage the level and quality of foreign exchange risk exposure. 
Regulators have been forced to adopt a more integrated approach towards the risk 
exposure of a bank as a whole. This is effected by considering all forms of risk 
included in balance sheets as well as those arising from all types of off-balance 
sheet activity, a topic discussed in the following paragraph. 
4.2.5.5 Off-balance Sheet Business 
Three broad categories of off-balance sheet business can be identified: traditional 
banking operations, underwriting activities and derivative instruments. 
There are a number of traditional banking operations that are not directly reflected in 
a bank's balance sheet: acceptances, documentary credits, endorsements and 
guarantees, and unused overdraft and standby facilities. Information on such 
operations is usually included in prudential returns and the risks attached to them are 
often incorporated in capital adequacy requirements and large exposures. Different · 
weightings may be applied depending on the nature of the activities, the type of 
customer or the existence and quality of securities. The volume and variants of these 
instruments have grown considerably, with risk characteristics also differing from the 
original forms of financing. 
Another growing area of off-balance sheet business relates to a bank's underwriting 
activities to support a borrowers issuance of market securities. A general form of 
such instruments is represented by facilities whereby an underwriting bank or group 
of banks guarantee the availability of funds at predetermined terms either at or over 
a specific period of time to a borrower issuing paper. Underwriting facilities represent 
a form of credit extension, which risk may be borne by the final investor (to the extent 
that it is holding the paper issued) or by the underwriting bank (insofar as it is 
compelled to meet its underwriting commitments). Underwriting facilities are similar 
to conventional standby lines of credit, the size being determined by the difference 
between the amount of the underwriting commitment and the volume of paper placed 
in the market. However, underwriting clauses are usually activated when the paper 
concerned cannot be adequately placed in the market. This may be due to general 
market conditions or as a result of the negative perception of a borrower's 
creditworthiness. Under these adverse circumstances, the underwriting bank would 
be forced to carry a full credit risk on assets of a substandard quality (OECD 1987: 
81 ). 
Prudent risk-management requires that underwriting facilities should be included in 
credit limits and risk assessment for individual borrowers. Similarly, these exposures 
should therefore be included in risk concentration considerations. 
The third category of off-balance sheet risks are those relating to derivative financial 
instruments such as interest rate and currency swaps, repurchase agreements, 
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forward rate agreements, options and financial futurE\S. The application of innovative 
instruments is a key tool in the managing of the risks of financial intermediation if 
correctly used. 
De Swardt (1987: 7-8) analyses the underlying determinants of innovations in terms 
of demand- and supply-related factors. Demand-related factors can be classified into 
four categories namely: risk-transferring innovations, liquidity-enhancing innovations, 
credit generating innovations and equity innovationsJ7 Supply-related factors that 
have led to financial innovations are technological advances, changes in financial 
regulation, increased competition and the volatility of financial markets. These 
innovations implied that banks increasingly rely on off-balance sheet business. 
What are the regulatory concerns regarding the use of innovative financial 
instruments? One concern is that derivatives have reduced the transparency of 
balance sheets and made the nature and distribution of risks in financial markets 
more vague. An obvious example is the differing treatment of balance sheet items 
(which are usually denoted at cost) and off-balance sheet items (which can be 
denoted at market value). A second concern is that neither banks nor their 
customers always fully understand, or have the capacity to monitor, their true 
exposure. Third, regulators fear that a heightened sensitivity to risk amongst market 
participants could result in a rapid and indiscriminate withdrawal of credit lines by 
other banks. Yet another anxiety is that problems in one market could develop and 
spread more widely and more rapidly than in the past because of increased links 
between markets and participants, internationally and locally. 
Nevertheless, the conventional view is that derivatives are highly useful risk-
management instruments which need to be treated with circumspection.?B 
The regulators' prescription for these problems is: more disclosure of banks' off-
balance sheet activities, more statistics about the market, better management 
understanding of the risks, and improvements in the legal and institutional 
underpinnings of the markets.79 
77 Risk-transferring innovations refer to new techniques which allow lenders, borrowers and financial 
intermediaries to transfer amongst themselves the risk inherent in financial positions. Liquidity-
enhancing innovations increase the 'moneyness' or negotiability of existing financial instruments. 
Credit-generating innovations broaden the access to credit supplies, either by increasing the total 
volume of credit or by shifting traditional credit supplies. Equity-generating innovations are aimed at 
broadening the access to equity financing. 
78 See however Shah (1995: 17-33) who argues that this belief is misplaced and although useful for 
hedging, derivatives are high risk instruments which pose inherent threats to regulation and control, 
with consequential significant potential for catastrophy. 
79 The regulation of derivative markets, whilst a fascinating subject in its own right, falls outside the 
strict scope of this study, which focuses on the regulation of market participants (being banks), rather 
than the specific markets themselves. The interested reader is referred to SAICA (1995) for a 
discussion of the Group of 30 recommendations on the management principles for derivatives. The 
Group of 30 is a private, non-profit body consisting of 30 individuals representing international financial 
institutions and is chaired by Paul Volcker, former chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board. 
82 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions 
To the extent that it is possible, these risks should also be factored into traditional 
banking risks. For instance, the risks arising from currency swaps and options should 
be covered within the assessment of foreign exchange exposure. Similarly, 
derivative credit risks should be incorporated into categories of loan concentration 
and country risk. However, the assessment of the risks involved in the use of these 
instruments may be very complex and the management and supervision thereof may 
differ considerably from more traditional risks. 
4.2.6 Liquidity Adequacy 
4.2.6.1 The Concept of Liquidity 
Liquidity adequacy can be distinguished from capital adequacy in that it is concerned 
with the availability of funds in an 'on-going' business situation rather than at the 
point of liquidation. Like capital adequacy, however, it is concerned with ensuring 
that intermediaries are able to meet the risks of financial intermediation. Liquidity risk 
may take the form of transfers, demands for cash withdrawals, unused or new credit 
facilities, unanticipated expenditure, unexpected shortfall in earnings, as well as 
unexpected movements in the maturity profiles of assets and liabilities. so 
Although liquidity and solvency are conceptually distinct, it may be asked whether in 
practice a bank can contract a liquidity problem independent of a solvency problem. 
Should a sound and solvent bank not at all times be able to borrow from the market? 
For reasons already explained, credit markets are not always perfect or even nearly 
perfect. Moreover, the solvency of a bank can never be undoubted as the financial 
condition of a bank is a matter of uncertainty to outsiders. As Dale (1982) argues: 
'market fears that liquidity problems are linked to solvency problems, even if initially 
groundless, can soon become self-fulfilling.'81 
4.2.6.2 The Measurement of Liquidity 
Traditionally, liquidity was seen as the allocation of assets according to their capacity 
to generate the resources necessary to meet the requirements of bank liabilities. In 
an era of active liability and asset management as well as active risk-management, 
liquidity has become a function not only of asset allocation but also of the capacity of 
a bank to manage liquidity risk by acquiring additional funds from the market. 
BO Hall (1987: 150-160) distinguishes two main functions of liquidity, namely that liquidity is required to 
deal with funding risk (the risk that insufficient funds will be available as they fall due) and with interest 
rate risk (which 'arises in situations of maturity transformation when unexpected movements in interest 
rates occur'). Although a related risk, Hall (1987) does not clearly distinguish between maturity 
mismatch risk and interest rate mismatch risk. Theoretically, a bank could be exactly maturity 
matched, and still be exposed to interest rate mismatch risk. For instance, six-month fixed rate 
deposits could be funding six-month variable rate loans. lt is therefore submitted that interest rate 
mismatch risk is part of general interest rate risk and not liquidity risk. 
81 The corollary is that a bank that would otherwise fail may be kept solvent through a temporary 
injection of liquidity. This is one of the reasons for emergency assistance facilities, a topic discussed in 
more detail in paragraph 4.3 below. 
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To the extent that liquidity depended on the ability of a bank to turn existing assets 
into liquid funds at a negligible cost, its measurement in terms of assets and liabilities 
was historically regarded as a sufficient tool for liquidity risk-management. For this 
purpose, bank assets were classified by degree of liquidity. 'Liquid' assets, as so 
defined, could then be related either to overall bank assets or to certain liabilities 
representing a liquidity risk. 
Despite its simplicity and ease of application, the stock approach has two 
disadvantages (OECD 1987: 90). First, it implies that the liquidity of asset items can 
be determined with certainty. In practice, market changes can influence the value 
and marketability of assets which would normally be regarded as highly liquid. In 
many instances, the markets for 'precautionary' assets are relatively thin and 
therefore liquidity can decline sharply in adverse circumstances. 82 Second, the stock 
approach is inherently a static one, which takes account of neither the dynamic 
nature of banking nor of the active risk-management activities of banks. 
These considerations have induced the development of an approach to liquidity 
measurement which emphasises the maturity structure of bank assets and liabilities 
and on a measurement of liquidity based on a cash-flow concept. The maturity 
structure approach allows the measurement of maturity mismatching over certain 
periods of time, with considerable flexibility in determining the conditions under which 
individual assets or liabilities should be included in specific maturity categories. The 
cash-flow approach takes account of banking operations as reflected by the maturity 
pattern of its balance sheet, as well as to differentiated liquidity requirements, 
according to the degree of mismatching and the expected profile of future cash flows. 
4.2.6.3 Regulatory Approaches to Liquidity 
Although an important risk in view of the influence that liquidity may have on market 
perceptions, liquidity risk is but one of a number of banking risks. lt consequently 
deserves no special regulatory treatment and should be managed like the other risks 
of deposit-taking financial intermediation. 
Some general points can be made about the regulation of liquidity. Liquidity 
shortages can in principle be remedied by the emergency liquidity assistance 
facilities of regulatory authorities. The moral hazard problem accompanying such 
action could be eliminated by charging a penal interest rate that is calculated to deter 
banks from being exposed to excessive liquidity risk. Dale (1982: 62) therefore 
argues that, given the scope for such discretionary assistance, it is not clear that 
regulators need concern themselves with formal liquidity controls. He also points out 
that in a world where all deposits are covered by insurance, the issue of liquidity 
becomes largely irrelevant, as the link between illiquidity and insolvency is broken. 
The approach favoured here is that prevention is in all cases better than cure. The 
mere fact that a medicine suitable to the ailment exists, need not result in reckless 
behaviour by the patient. Consequently, preventative (prudential) regulation should 
82 Note that there is a difference between liquidity for a bank and for the system as a whole. 
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be favoured above protective regulation, even if the dangers of moral hazard 
inherent in protective regulation can be avoided. In line with the risk-management 
approach to financial regulation it can simply be stated that banks are exposed to 
liquidity risk and that this risk should be regulated. 
Protective regulation, the topic next discussed, should only come into operation 
when the risk-management processes of a bank have failed and the overall risk 
exposure of a bank is no longer adequately backed up by its financial strength. 
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4.3 Protective Regulation 
'Any aid to a present bad bank is the surest mode of preventing the establishment of a future 
good bank" 
Bagehot 
Banking regulation cannot and should not in all cases prevent bank failure from 
occurring. The possibility of bank failure is necessary for the health of the financial 
system and the efficiency of all other economic activity. Consequently, bank failure 
does not always represent a failure of banking supervision. 
In fact, the mere existence of protective arrangements may be a cost in terms of 
moral hazard and competitive neutrality, to the extent that certain institutions are 
perceived to be protected. 
Nevertheless, when bank failure seems likely, regulatory authorities must consider 
the options at their disposal. Banks should, for instance, not be allowed to fail if this 
were to seriously destabilise the financial system. Protective regulatory measures 
usually consist of crisis management measures and deposit insurance. 
4.3.1 Crisis Management 
The unique role of deposit-taking financial intermediaries in the financial systema3 
has led to the establishment of procedures for managing the problems associated 
with distressed banks. Crisis management procedures are devised to protect the 
public against the negative consequences of bank failure and to limit the risk of 
contagion and systemic instability. Although preventative supervision may be a 
powerful defence against bank failure and systemic instability, not all pressures can 
be avoided by prophylactic regulation. lt is then that crisis management measures 
become operative. 
One concern which must be addressed in any approach to crisis management is how 
to minimise the distortions in competitive conditions resulting from the involvement of 
the authorities. Crisis management may involve a disparity in the treatment of 
distressed institutions according to their relative size. Bigger institutions, sometimes 
regarded as 'too big too fail', are more likely to receive assistance. The more 
favourable treatment of big institutions may be reflected in better funding terms. 
A further concern is how to prevent crisis management of distress by authorities from 
softening constraints on financial discipline. In the short run the problem is relatively 
manageable. When assistance is provided, the authorities may either take over the 
distressed bank and hence control the restructuring directly; or grant support 
conditional on specific rehabilitation measures. In the longer run, however, market 
discipline may be relaxed to the extent that crisis management insulates those with 
claims on the intermediaries, from the losses incurred. Moreover, experience 
83 See paragraph 2.3. 
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suggests that public ownership may tend to exacerbate this risk (Bank for 
International Settlements 1993: 178-179). 
Crisis management can be divided into two broad headings, consisting of emergency 
liquidity assistance and corrective action. These measures can vary from country to 
country and according to specific circumstances. 
4.3.1.1 Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
lt is a function of most modern central banks to ensure, at discount rates and 
penalties which they determine, that adequate liquidity is available to the financial 
system. However, one should distinguish between the routine operation of the 
discount window for standard monetary purposes and emergency assistance 
measures for deposit-taking financial intermediaries made on a more discretionary 
basis. lt is the latter with which we are concerned here.s4 
Liquidity problems can be addressed through the provision of temporary liquidity by 
means of open market transactions, lending or even direct or indirect subsidies to the 
financial institution under pressure due to lack of liquidity. The primary consideration 
is to determine in which manner the liquidity is to be injected and which enterprises 
should be supported. 
Criterion: Systemic Stability 
Usually, the view taken is that liquidity assistance should only be made available to 
financial institutions which are temporarily illiquid but nevertheless solvent (and 
therefore fit for long-run survival). This is known as Bagehot's rule, after Waiter 
Bagehot, a former editor of The Economist who more than a century ago provided 
central bankers with a classic guide (named 'Lombard Street') to handle the problem 
of ailing banks. 
One approach to emergency assistance functions is that the central bank should 
never be concerned with the fate of individual banks, but only with the liquidity of the 
banking system as a whole (Humphrey 1975). The alternative approach, usually 
taken by central banks, is that due to imperfections in credit markets (such as an 
overall shortage of market liquidity), solvent but temporarily illiquid institutions may 
experience difficulties in finding sufficient funds from the market. This view may be 
based on the implicit assumption that the authorities have a better judgement of the 
soundness and long-term survival potential of individual financial institutions than the 
market. Alternatively, the authorities may be more concerned about the systemic risk 
which the failing of a bank might engender. 
lt was argued above that although liquidity and solvency can be distinguished on a 
conceptual basis, it is difficult for them to be completely separated in practice. 
84 In this regard a number of authors group both these functions under the broad heading of 'last-resort 
lending'. lt is contended that it is more appropriate to distinguish between traditional lender of last 
resort functions and emergency liquidity assistance. 
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Generally speaking, if liquidity or solvency difficulties experienced at one or more 
financial institution(s) create the danger of a liquidity crisis for the system as a whole, 
then it is often considered the duty of the central bank to use emergency type 
measures in order to protect the liquidity level in the economy. 
Discretion and Secrecy 
Generally, there are no detailed statements of policies relating to the precise scope 
and nature of emergency assistance facilities - a policy known as 'constructive 
ambiguity'. This is done to add to the risk-taking constraints of preventative 
regulation. The significant differences in rules and procedures for emergency 
assistance reflect differences of appreciation of the role of regulatory authorities in 
the case of distress. Regulatory authorities must obviously intervene if a particular 
emergency arises that could undermine the safety of the financial system. As this 
would usually arise only in the case of bigger banking institutions, this may result in a 
general impression that a 'too big to fail' doctrine may exist. If the factors and criteria 
that determine assistance were specified in advance it could impose a heavy cost in 
terms of moral hazard. In essence, emergency assistance facilities are most powerful 
when they are discretionary. 
4.3.1.2 Corrective Action 
Corrective action may imply changes in the management of the bank, recapitalisation 
from existing or new shareholders, the arrangement of special interbank credit lines, 
assisted mergers, other ad-hoc measures which take account of the specific features 
or finally, the liquidation of the distressed bank.B5 Usually action that upholds some of 
a failed bank's activities is regarded as superior, as it provides automatic protection 
to depositors and also prevents a disruption of banking services by safeguarding the 
bank's operating structures. Since there is a significant loss in the going-concern 
value when banks fail, the take-over of assets by a purchaser can reduce these 
losses (James 1991: 1223-1242). The latter consideration is particularly important in 
view of the economic externalities involved in bank failures. 
A device often applied in these circumstances by supervisory authorities is to place a 
failing bank under curatorship. The curator is tasked with either steering the failing 
bank back into profitability or winding it down in an orderly fashion and in a manner 
least prejudicial to the various stakeholders. Usually a curator will be afforded 
powers far in excess of those applicable to the bank management he is replacing. 
If the liquidation of a distressed bank proves inevitable, liquidation proceedings may 
not prevent depositors from incurring losses. However, the costs of insolvency may 
to some extent be absorbed by the shareholders, the regulatory authorities or by 
deposit insurance schemes. 
85 For comparatively recent discussions of corrective action in the US context see French (1992), 
Gilbert (1992), and Parry (1992). 
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The Economist 1996(a): 22-23) lists various possibilities for dealing with a failed 
bank. These are: 
• Burial (or liquidation). This involves reimbursing a bank's insured depositors and 
disposing of its assets to assist in the payment of any uninsured creditors, 
including the deposit insurer itself.B6 
• Reincarnation (or merger). If there remains value in a deceased bank, another 
bank may be willing to purchase it and take over its liabilities, possibly with some 
financial assistance from the supervisory authorities and I or the deposit insurer.B7 
• Resuscitation (or state guarantee). A bank may be revived either by providing it 
with a state guarantee or by 'stripping' some of its non-performing assets off its 
balance sheet and placing them in a state-financial bank. BB 
• Divine intervention (or nationalisation). This is the most extreme solution, 
reserved for occasion when a government fears that the collapse of a bank could 
trigger a systemic crisis.B9 
4.3.2 Deposit Insurance 
Deposit insurance is intended to increase the confidence of the public in the financial 
system and thereby also limit the risk of financial instability. The advantage of 
deposit insurance schemes are the stabilising of financial markets and the possible 
reduction in capital requirements and overall regulatory costs. The disadvantage lies 
in the costs of funding, administering and enforcing the schemes, as well as moral 
hazard in the case of flat insurance premiums. 
Deposit insurance can take a variety of forms. The following dimensions can be 
identified (Baltensperger and Dermine 1987: 73-79): 
• compulsory versus voluntary participation; 
• public versus private schemes; 
• the fee structure; 
• funding provisions; and 
• degree of coverage. 
Compulsory 
A first basic question is whether or not deposit insurance should be compulsory. If 
the sole objective is to enable some depositors to hold risk-free deposits, voluntary 
insurance may be viewed as sufficient. However, the goal of systemic stability may 
B6 BCCI was laid to rest in this way. 
B7 An example of a bank reborn is Barings, which was bought by ING of the Netherlands in March 
1995. 
BB Both France and Sweden have employed this method. 
B9 The Norwegian state took over some of its country's biggest banks in the early 1990s because it 
feared a bank run on them. 
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justify a degree of compulsory insurance. Consequently, most countries have deposit 
insurance on a mandatory basis covering the entire banking system (but usually with 
a limit on individual deposits). 
Private I Public 
Deposit insurance systems can be either public or private (usually created on a 
collective basis by financial institutions themselves). Private systems are normally 
administered under the control and supervision of the regulatory authorities. As 
Benston (1983) and Kane (1987) have argued, the introduction of competition in 
deposit insurance schemes may encourage adaptive efficiency. 
Fee Structure 
A basic question of any insurance system, especially with mandatory insurance, is 
whether insurance fees should be flat or variable, risk-related premiums. lt has been 
repeatedly argued in this study that risks are intrinsic to banking activity and that 
banks actively manage these risks. As a logical consequence of the risk-
management approach to the regulation of deposit-taking financial institutions and 
the principle of regulatory efficiency, the adoption of risk-related premiums is strongly 
favoured. An efficiently organised insurer would grade insurance premiums 
according to a bank's exposure to risk and its capital adequacy. Such a system 
would minimise the negative effects of moral hazard, being the adverse incentive 
effects which may otherwise result from deposit insurance. Under such a system, the 
individual bank bears the consequence of a higher risk and lower capital ratios in the 
form of a higher insurance fee. If this is not the case, banks have more of an 
incentive to assume higher risk and I or lower capital ratios than they otherwise 
would have. Although this may not be so simple in reality, one should attempt to 
approximate such a solution as far as possible. 
Arguments against this form of deposit insurance usually emphasise the 
administrative difficulty of calculating the appropriate fee structure. This argument 
does not provide a convincing justification for a flat fee structure, as even a basic 
differentiation amongst the major risk categories is superior to such a flat fee. lt is not 
clear why the problem of setting adequate risk premiums is inherently more difficult in 
banking than in other types of insurance. Although the risk-profile of a bank may 
change very quickly, the same consideration applies to conventional insurance risk. 
In fact, the recognition that risk-taking and risk-management are central to banking 
activity should actually benefit the assessment of risk exposure. 
Naturally, derivative financial instruments may allow the bank to considerably change 
its risk-profile within a short period of time. Nevertheless, the risk of inadequate 
internal controls can also be factored into an overall risk assessment of an institution. 
As Kane (1986) argues, risk-related premiums need not consist entirely of ex-ante 
payments, but may include provisions for an ex-post settling of insurance claims. 
Some economists (King et a/ 1991: 955-974) have further suggested that risk-
adjusted deposit insurance premiums or capital ratios be calculated by applying 
option pricing models to stock market data. Alternatively, the option methodology 
90 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions 
could be used to establish a risk-based examination schedule whereby riskier banks 
would be examined on a more regular basis. lt could also be done by credit rating 
agencies. Such an examination schedule would be consistent with prompt resolution 
strategies since it would relate the frequency of examination and closeness of 
supervision with a bank's risk exposure. 
Another argument against risk-related premiums points to the confidential nature of 
bank portfolios, which makes it impossible for banks to reveal the relevant 
information without giving away private information vital to their intermediary activities 
(Batchelor and Fitzgerald 1982). Although adequate information disclosure to the 
insurer is a prerequisite of such a system (as with any type of insurance), there is no 
need for information about individual portfolio items to become public information. 
However, the overall risk exposure of a bank may become publicly known under 
such a system. Indeed, a higher degree of transparency could improve investor 
confidence in a banking institution and thus promote systemic stability. 
Consequently, there a strong case can be presented for a system of deposit 
insurance based on risk-related premiums.9° Conceptually, under such a system the 
regulator could even do away with all forms of prudential regulation (i.e. capital 
adequacy requirements based on assets classified according to risk assessment) as 
both prudential aims of financial stability and consumer protection would be 
achieved.91 This is in marked contrast to the case of a flat fee insurance system. 
However, existing deposit insurance systems almost invariably rely on flat fees to 
cover deposits, regardless of a bank's risk exposure. lt is significant that, starting 
January 1994, deposit insurance premiums in the US have been legally required to 
be risk-related in terms of the FDIC Improvement Act (Shiers 1994 ). Flat rate 
schemes have negative effects on economic behaviour92 and will, in general, create 
an adverse incentive (or moral hazard) problem. This is the case both for depositors 
(who have no incentive to place their deposits with a safe institution) and bank 
management (which does not bear the consequence of increasing its exposure to 
risk and I or lowering its capital ratio). Although not empirically proven, the implication 
of such a system is that it may actually increase the risk of systemic instability even 
90 For a contrary opinion see Chan et at (1992) who considered the problem of designing an incentive-
compatible, risk-sensitive deposit insurance pricing scheme when the insurer is confronted by private 
information and moral hazard problems. Although agreeing that the insurer can elicit truthful disclosure 
regarding portfolio risks without intrusive regulatory monitoring, these researchers argue that deposit-
linked subsidies are necessary if such a system is to succeed in a competitive banking industry 
because of market disequilibria. See also Goldberg (1991: 233-239) who shows that the management 
of a deposit-taking institution exhibits increased risk-taking behnviour under flat rate deposit insurance. 
Goldberg (1991) argues that perfect monitoring or risk-based deposit insurance would eliminate this 
incentive if information were symmetric between bank management and the insuring agency. In the 
absence of symmetric information, it is argued that the only way to control the risk incentive through 
insurance rates is to levy a relatively high premium, which is not considered actuarial/y fair. 
91 According to Meltzer (1967), a risk-related insurance system could be voluntary, with variable 
coverage to be chosen by the depositor. Although this is in principle tempting to a market-orientated 
economist, a wide participation in such a system would be necessary to minimise the dangers of 
systemic instability. 
92 Giammarine et at (1989: 109-127) argue that flat rate deposit insurance premiums have resulted in 
significant cross subsidisation among banks. 
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above the risk when no deposit insurance is required. This is the basic reason for the 
co-existence of deposit-insurance schemes and other forms of prudential regulation 
designed to minimise the risks of bank failures. 
Funding Provisions 
There are some differences between various countries with regard to other aspects 
of funding practices. While most deposit insurance schemes are funded, the size of 
the insurance fund relative to the insured volume of deposits may vary considerably. 
However, the size of the fund should rather be seen in relation to the potential claims 
as well as the possibility of raising additional funds. Nevertheless, the capacity to 
make large payouts may be quite limited, thereby creating the need for discretionary 
backup support such as emergency assistance facilities. Some national systems 
may even operate without explicit funding, relying either on ad hoc contributions by 
insured banks when payouts have to be made or on the regulatory authorities as 
'guarantor in the last instance'.93 
Degree of Coverage 
Possibly one of the most important differences between national systems of deposit 
insurance relate to the extent of coverage. In all systems, there exists a maximum 
amount per depositor and institution beyond which there is no insurance. Usually, 
this maximum is stated as a fixed amount, which varies considerably between 
countries. Although the 'small deposit' criterion is not ideally suited to protect only the 
less wealthy depositor (for at minimal transaction costs, wealthy depositors could 
divide their money amongst banks), income and wealth criteria may be too 
complicated to administer. 
The degree of coverage has important practical consequences. On the one hand, 
partial coverage weakens the potentially beneficial effect of insurance on the stability 
of the financial system. One the other hand it may reduce the moral hazard attached 
to flat-rate insurance schemes by inducing greater awareness of banks' risk 
exposure. 
Finally, it should be noted that in most cases deposit insurance does not cover all 
deposits and therefore the banking risks remain of concern to the regulator. 
93 The latter option represents an unnecessary and undesireable expansion of the role of the 
regulatory authorities. lt is also incompatible with the principles identified in the paragraph 3.5. 
Competitive neutrality considerations are particularly important, as such funding arrangements would 
accentuate the differences between banks and non-deposit-taking financial institutions unless similar 
protection is also provided to the latter. 
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4.4 Monetary Requirements 
The debate about the rationale of monetary policy and its theoretical underpinnings 
is well-known. Without discussing in detail the advantages and disadvantages of 
indirect 'market-orientated' versus direct 'non market-orientated' policy instruments,94 
it can be stated that it is now generally accepted that the costs associated with the 
distortions induced by direct controls far outweigh the benefits thereof. Hall (1993: 
176) for instance, argues that direct controls are likely to breed inefficiency, distort 
the competitive balance between financial institutions and achieve only a cosmetic 
change in monetary aggregates. 
The aspect of direct monetary requirements is included in this dissertation for the 
sake of completene~s. lt is relevant because some of these requirements on banks 
remain. lt is argued that these are in the majority of instances inappropriate. The 
rejection of monetary requirements is not intended to deny that banks do play an 
important if not crucial role as conduits of monetary policy. However, from a 
prudential perspective, the rigidity of direct monetary policy instruments may actually 
increase the risk exposure of banks and therefore conflict with prudential regulatory 
objectives as banks have lesser opportunities to reduce the risks brought about by 
monetary controls.95 
Monetary policy consists of decisions that are made and implemented by the 
monetary authorities to assist in attaining, through the influence of these decisions 
on the volume or composition of domestic expenditure and output or in other ways, 
certain broad, 'ultimate' objectives with regard to the country's economy (Meijer 
1992: 287). Such ultimate objectives may, for example, be to maintain a stable 
general price level, to maintain a high and stable level of employment and to 
establish a satisfactorily high rate of real economic growth. 
In order to bring about the ultimate objectives of their policy the authorities are likely 
to adopt intermediate objectives which consist mainly of targets or guidelines in 
respect of one or more of the following (Stals 1991: 9): 
• the rate of increase in the money supply; 
• the rate of increase in the total credit extension of banking institutions; 
• the level of interest rates; 
• the level of gold and foreign-exchange reserves; and 
• the exchange rate of the currency. 
94 The topic has been discussed ad nauseam in almost all standard works on monetary policy. 
95 Interestingly, prudential regulation may impact negatively on monetary policy. Brinkmann and 
Horvitz (1995) argue that the failure of the US banking system to play its normal role in the 
transmission of the monetary stimulus to the economy may have contributed to the 1990-91 recession 
and the sluggish recovery from it. Their paper examines the 1988 Basle Agreement on risk-based 
capital standards as a possible shock to the credit supply system and finds that US banks with larger 
capital surpluses resulting from the risk-based requirements had faster loan growth between 1987 and 
1991 than those with no surpluses or which failed the new standards. 
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Monetary policy can be conducted by means of direct, non market-orientated or 
indirect, market-orientated policy instruments. Indirect, non market-orientated 
measures seek to guide, tempt or coax participants in financial markets into 
appropriate lending and borrowing behaviour. They do so by creating price and 
interest rate incentives in the financial markets to which the private market 
participants respond spontaneously and voluntarily. Meijer (1992: 294) therefore 
argues that the authorities' deficit financing, public debt management, and open 
market transactions, the central bank's buying and selling in the foreign exchange 
markets, and the central bank's discount policy can truly be regarded as the only 
market-orientated policy instruments. 
In contrast, direct, non market-orientated measures essentially involve the monetary 
authorities prescribing to banks, other financial institutions and market participants 
what to do as regards their lending, borrowing and investment activities. Failure to 
comply with these controls may render the private market participant liable to some 
form of penalty or sanction. Direct monetary controls, include deposit and I or lending 
interest rate controls, variations in reserve asset requirements, the imposition and 
variations of quantitative restrictions on bank lending (credit 'ceilings') and the 
allocation of credit by regulation. 
4.4.1 Variations in Reserve Asset Requirements 
In many financial systems minimum reserve requirements were initially introduced for 
prudential reasons, namely to ensure the adequate liquidity of banks. However, the 
minimum reserve requirement has evolved to become a monetary policy tool, which 
has a dual function. Firstly, it serves as an instrument of ongoing liquidity 
management in the money market, and secondly, it acts as an automatic constraint 
in the money creation process (Van Greuning 1993: 263). 
Reserve asset requirements96 may form a direct or an indirect instrument of 
monetary policy. Within a market-orientated framework of monetary policy, it is the 
fixed nature of reserve requirements that facilitates the use of other indirect policy 
instruments by monetary authorities (McCarthy 1988: 186). As a direct instrument of 
monetary policy, variations in reserve asset requirements are used as an operating 
variable to influence the money supply. 
The philosophy behind variable reserve assets as a direct monetary instrument is 
essentially simple. Banks are required to hold a statutory minimum amount of 
reserve assets that is normally calculated as a percentage, or the sum of various 
percentages, of their various liabilities to the public. Because bank liabilities cannot 
be more than a certain multiple of their reserve assets, these requirements set a 
potential maximum to the banks' total liabilities and assets. Monetary control in this 
kind of system depends on the ability of authorities to regulate the supply of the 
banking system's reserve asset base. Variations in the reserve asset requirements of 
96 Although similar in some practical respects, reserve assets requirements and liquidity adequacy 
requirements are distinguished in conceptual terms in this study; the former being primarily an 
instrument of monetary policy, the second concerned with principles of prudent portfolio and risk-
management. 
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banks should only be temporarily employed in situations in which authorities have 
unintentionally allowed the banks' reserve asset base to expand or contract too 
much or too rapidly. Eventually, corrective action will have to be aimed at the reserve 
asset base itself (Meijer 1992: 314 ). 
The important point to note is that reserve assets are no longer required from a risk 
perspective as the liquidity risk-management activities of banks will be governed by 
regulations related directly to liquidity risk. 
4.4.2 Interest Rate Controls 
Another form of direct monetary controls is the control of deposit and lending interest 
rates. The control of interest rates limits price competition among financial 
intermediaries and usually leads to increased reliance on substitute forms of 
competition, such as the provision of free (or underpriced) services to depositors, 
increased branching or advertising. Interest rate regulations can create serious 
distortions when the determined rates are not in accordance with market rates 
(Baltensperger and Dermine 1987: 84 ). 97 
From a prudential perspective, interest rate controls may increase risk exposure by 
(Australian Government Publishing Service 1981: 309): 
• impairing the flexibility of banks to adjust to changing market conditions, to the 
extent that they are unable to increase the rate that they can charge on a 
substantial proportion of their loans, and their ability to compete for deposits is 
impaired (i.e. increased interest rate risks); and 
• inhibiting their ability to charge fully for the risks inherent in various loans and 
thereby increase credit risk. 
Consequently, both from a prudential and a monetary policy perspective, the general 
tendency is to place reduced reliance on this type of regulation in favour of market-
orientated policy measures. 
97 A basically similar situation can result from the setting of cartel rates, although the flexibility of such 
rates with respect to underlying market conditions is probably greater than in the case of regulated 
rates. The US provided a good example of the negative effects of interest rate controls by means of 
Regulation Q, which placed a regulatory interest rate ceiling on deposits. The American Savings and 
Loans (S&Ls) industry was prevented from granting adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) but historically 
funded itself by means of short-term deposits where interest rates are adjustable. In September 1969, 
the US Congress enacted the Interest Rate Control Act, extending Regulation Q {which had previously 
only applied to commercial banks) to S&Ls and effectively placed a ceiling on the interest pa)•able to 
S&L depositors. During 1979 - 1981 US interest rates soared in response to rising oil prices and 
inflationary expectations. The surge in interest rates drastically reduced the market value of fixed-rate 
mortgages. Until 1981 depositors neutralised the effect on S&Ls by their willingness to accept deposit 
rates which were much lower than market rates. By late 1981, however, regulatory ceilings on deposit 
interest rates could no longer solve the interest rate problems of the S&Ls, as depositors had no 
access to an attractive alternative- money market funds (Steward 1993: 38-39). Burdened by sharply 
higher funding costs, at least 85 per cent of all S&Ls lost money in 1981, the aggregate net operating 
loss for the industry being $7,1 billion. By 1982 the capital of all S&L institutions was completely 
eroded and nearly all the institutions had large negative net worths when their assets and liabilities 
were valued at actual market rates (Steward 1993: 39). 
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The determination of maximum lending rates is sometimes intended to serve the 
essentially social purpose of protecting poorly informed and relatively defenceless 
borrowers against exploitation, such as provided by the South African Usury Act. 
Although it was argued that social aims should not form part of a regulatory policy, it 
is contended that the aim of protecting loan customers can be attained without 
sacrificing market orientation. This can be effected by linking maximum lending rates 
to some benchmark market rate.9s 
The setting of maximum interest rates poses a problem in providing banking services 
to the informal sector (such as in South Africa) while retaining market orientation. As 
Schoombee and Smith ( 1995: 1) indicate, the informal sector displays a combination 
of high risk, high cost and low returns, thereby discouraging formal banks from 
trading with this sector. 
Furthermore, even if banks are allowed to charge higher interest rates which take 
into account the higher cost of operating in the informal sector, banks are still 
generally reluctant to provide credit to the informal sector. The solution, therefore can 
only be found in reducing the perceived and inherent risk; as well as the costs 
attached to these loans. 
Schoombee and Smith (1995: 13-14) provide a number of ways in which government 
can assist banks to reduce risk and costs. These are: providing start-up subsidies; 
safeguarding depositors against losses in the case of bank failure to induce greater 
propensity to deposit funds in banks; reducing information cost (by for instance 
infrastructural development) in the informal sector markets; and setting up an 
appropriate loan guarantee scheme. However Schoombee and Smith (1995: 14) 
stress that world-wide experience suggests that government subsidies to bank credit 
with the intention of lowering interest rates to the informal sector have been a failure. 
Banks were initially attracted by high margins, but withdrew due to disappointment 
when higher than anticipated default rates occurred. 
4.4.3 Credit Ceilings 
Quantitative restrictions on bank lending take the form of requests or directives to 
banking institutions in terms of which the banks' lending or extension of credit to 
specified borrowers, in specified forms, or for specified purposes is not to exceed a 
certain maximum amount (Meijer 1992: 317). 
As in the case of direct interest rate controls, the imposition of credit ceilings may 
induce a process of financial disintermediation. Because credit ceilings imply a 
limitation of bank lending it may, in principle, be possible for banks to charge a higher 
98 More comprehensive consumer protection legislation should be such that (Australian Government 
Publishing Service 1981: 399) new entry is feasible; there remains effective and equitable competition 
amongst credit providers; there is full disclosure to borrowers of relevant information, particularly in 
respect of effective cost (interest and any other charges); the cost and availability of consumer finance 
are not impaired; and emphasis is placed on the development of consumer education and counselling 
programmes. 
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rate on the restricted amount of lending. This would increase the average rate of 
return on their total assets. Consequently, credit ceilings are usually accompanied by 
interest rate controls. One of the aims for the institution of credit ceilings may even 
be a lower level of general interest rates, which would correspond to monetary and 
credit restrictiveness. The response of banks that are forced to lend only a restricted 
amount at rates below the market equilibrium will probably be to attempt to lower the 
rates offered on their deposits. When official deposit and lending rates are not in 
accordance with market forces, dissatisfied depositors and unsatisfied borrowers are 
likely to bypass financial intermediaries in the non-bank-intermediated credit markets. 
The resultant increase in the 'disintermediated' provision of credit reduces the 
effectiveness of credit ceilings as a restrictive monetary policy instrument. 
A further effect of disintermediation may be the growth in inter-company lending with 
or without off-balance sheet finance, e.g. banks endorsing the paper issued by 
companies. 
Credit ceilings also inhibit the absolute and relative growth of banking institutions, 
hinder competition between banks, and prevent the efficient extension of credit. The 
existence of credit ceilings may result in arbitrary decisions by regulatory authorities, 
inter alia when new institutions seek to enter the credit market. Finally, credit ceilings 
may impose a cumbersome administrative burden upon regulatory authorities (Meijer 
1992: 318). 
The prudential implications of credit ceilings are unexplored. If banks are only 
allowed to extend a certain amount of credit one would expect the banks to charge a 
higher return on these assets (in the absence of interest rate controls). This would 
imply a move into riskier assets where higher rates are justified. Should interest rate 
controls not permit extending loans with higher margins, banks would probably lend 
to borrowers with the lowest credit risk at the maximum allowable interest rates. This 
would reduce risks in the banking system but transfer the risk to the disintermediated 
lending entities who would be assuming higher credit risk. 
4.4.4 Allocation by Regulation 
Allocation by regulation involves the imposition by the monetary authorities of formal 
or informal maxima or minima on the amounts of the banks' lending to certain 
specific borrowers or categories of borrowers, or for certain specific purposes (Meijer 
1992: 319). An example of this type of regulation is the requirement that banks invest 
a portion of their funds in certain prescribed assets. Allocation by regulation shares 
many of the disadvantages of direct quantitative credit controls. 
Allocation by regulation forces deposit-taking institutions into less-preferred and 
inferior portfolio compositions from a risk-return perspective, thereby affecting the 
ability of banks to compete in the deposit markets. lt may be difficult to ensure that 
favoured credit facilities are not abused by their beneficiaries and that credit 
extended for favoured purposes is in fact used for these purposes only. The 
attainment of social or other non-monetary aims are therefore best achieved by fiscal 
policy and not by means of allocation by regulation. 
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4.5 Summary and Conclusion 
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the components of prudential regulation. The 
various measures which are undertaken by regulators of deposit-taking institutions 
are related to certain risk objectives. 
Table 4.1 Prudential Regulation - A Summary 
Component Measure(s) Risk objective 
Entry requirements • Minimum capital Ensuring the soundness and 
• Fit and proper management risk-management ability of new 
institutions 
Permissible business activities Restrictions on Limiting I preventing the risk 
• Property investments exposure of banks to certain 
• Equity participation activities 
• lnterbank equity participation 
• . Insurance business 
• Securities business 
Disclosure in financial Disclosure of all information Determining the level of risk 
statements and supervisory relevant to assessing the risk assumed and managed by 
returns exposure of banks banks 
Role of auditors Imposing additional Ensuring adequate risk 
responsibilities on auditors assessment and disclosure 
Capital adequacy Requiring a capital base Limiting the risk of bank failure 
commensurate with the overall 
level of risk assumed 
Risk asset limits Limitations on Controlling the risk attached to 
• Credit risk the portfolio of banking assets 
• Interest rate risk 
• Foreign exchange rate risk 
• Off-balance sheet activities 
Liquidity risk Limitation on liquidity risk Ensuring that banks are able to 
meet their funding commitments 
The research problem of this study holds that modern regulatory frameworks 
conform closely to the risk-management activities which are part and parcel of 
modern banking. This Chapter has examined the various components of banking 
regulation within an original framework, derived from the theoretical rationale of 
financial regulation, which is the achievement of consumer protection and overall 
financial stability by regulating the risks inherent in banking activity. The central 
theme of risk-management by banks was evident throughout and thus supports the 
above research problem. 
The regulation of deposit-taking financial institutions can embrace a number of 
objectives. Banking regulation can be designed to protect the consumers of banking 
services, mainly being depositors; to regulate banks for the purpose of ensuring the 
overall safety and soundness of the financial system; and to facilitate the role of the 
banking system as the conduit for monetary policy actions. 
The direct regulation of banking institutions and their financial risks to ensure 
financial stability can be divided into two broad categories which have been 
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described as prudential regulation and preventative regulation. Preventative bank 
regulation is intended to prevent excessive risk-taking by banks and thereby reduce 
the likelihood of bank insolvency. Protective regulation has the purpose of providing 
support to both banks and I or their depositors should problems arise. 
lt was demonstrated that prudential regulation, which is aimed at controlling the 
levels of risks assumed by banks, relates to supervision regarding inter alia the entry 
requirements, the range of business activities, the required quality and quantity of 
financial information, the adequacy of capital resources, the portfolio restrictions on 
risk assets and the sufficiency of liquidity pertaining to the banking sector. 
Bank failure does not necessarily represent a failure of preventative regulation. 
Protective regulation seeks to offer protection to depositors and I or deposit-takers. 
Table 4.2 is a summarised version of the components of protective regulation and 
indicates how the regulatory measures undertaken are in line with specific risk 
objectives. 
Table 4.2 Protective Regulation -A Summary 
Component Measure(s) Risk objective 
Crisis Management • Providing emergency liquidity Reducing the risk of systemic 
assistance instability 
• Corrective action 
Deposit Insurance Allowing I requiring a deposit Protecting consumers from the risk 
insurance scheme of losing funds and reducing 
systemic risk 
Direct monetary requirements create monetary distortions and also adversely 
influence banks' risk exposure. Consequently, these should be avoided from a 
prudential as well as a monetary perspective. Table 4.3 summarises how direct 
monetary regulations can impact negatively on the risk-management activities of 
banks. 
Table 4.3 Monetary Requirements -A Summary 
Direct monetary measure Risk impact 
Variations in reserve asset requirements Not necessary for the regulation of liquidity risk 
Interest rate controls May increase interest rate and credit risk 
Credit ceilings Disintermediation of risks from banks to other 
financial institutions 
Allocation by regulation Inferior risk asset portfolio composition 
In the following country-specific Chapters it will be shown that each regulatory 
framework takes account of the risks outlined above. Hence it will be demonstrated 
that in practice, the regulation of banks is concerned with the risk-management 
activities of banks. From a theoretical point of view, supervisors should not only view 
the risks individually, but also focus on the overall risk exposure of a bank in relation 
to its capital base. The 'portfolio' approach, which takes cognisance of the overall 
riskiness of a banking portfolio, is considered best suited for this purpose. 
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SECTION 8 
A COMPARITIVE ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL REGULATION IN 
SELECTED FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
CHAPTERS 
SELECTED FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
5.1 Introduction 
This Chapter is concerned with the three financial systems that are the focus of this 
study, being the UK, Germany and South Africa. First, the motivation for selecting 
these systems are discussed. This is followed by an overview of the structure of 
each system with reference to the deposit-taking institutions and the financial 
markets in which they operate. Whereas the deposit-taking institutions are 
categorised according to the respective domestic conventions, the financial markets 
are reviewed in a more standardised fashion. The following markets are covered: 
money markets, capital markets, foreign exchange markets and derivative markets. 
The effect of financial regulation cannot always be contained within domestic 
markets. Accordingly, the Chapter includes, as a final paragraph, an excursion into 
the truly international Euromarkets, which have developed mainly to escape 
regulation in domestic markets. 
5.2 Motivation for Selection 
The choice of the three specific financial systems in order to perform a comparative 
analysis of their respective modi operandae of financial regulation should be seen 
against the background of the dramatic structural changes generally affecting 
national financial systems, which were described at the outset.99 These structural 
trends were said to be universal, influencing the evolution of all financial systems, 
differing only as to their extent and intensity amongst the various financial systems 
and in their elicitation of regulatory responses. 
The aim of the comparison lies not in superficially comparing structures and 
experiences with one another; the aim is to compare, to analyse and to illustrate the 
underlying principles contained within the systems whilst taking into account the 
broader theoretical context. A comparative analysis of national financial systems 
therefore involves elements of similarity as well as dissimilarity. Academic soundness 
requires that the inceptual conditions for the economic 'experiment' be consistent as 
far as possible. This implies that the financial systems being compared should show 
a reasonable degree of similarity not only with respect to their inherent features but 
also with respect to the forces driving structural change such as globalisation, 
99 See paragraph 1 .1 . 
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innovation, changing technology, changing business objectives and most importantly 
the factors of competition and deregulation. 
At the same time, meaningful analysis of the topic will benefit greatly from some 
degree of differentiation with regard to the structure of financial intermediation and 
intensity of financial regulation. 
Comparative financial studies with a South African point of departure have often 
focused on the similarities between the financial systems and policy approaches of 
the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and South Africa.1oo The approach adopted here 
is identical in the sense that it also stresses similarities (hence the selection of the 
UK). The financial system of the UK is generally regarded as the fons et origo of the 
South African financial system and as such it has heavily influenced the historical 
development thereof (Schoombee 1991: 2). In addition, the UK supervisory practices 
are held in high regard by regulators worldwide and British regulatory experiences 
often serve as examples to South African supervisors.1o1 
However, the approach adopted here differs (in the selection of Germany) in an 
attempt to obtain a greater degree of differentiation. In addition to the structural 
complexity of the German banking system, the degree of scope afforded German 
banks, the supervisory, regulatory, and monetary environment in which German 
banks and financial markets operate, differ significantly from that of banking systems 
in many other countries. These differences result in important distinctions in the role 
played by banks in intermediating between savers and investors, and in the 
incentives faced by bank management and supervisors.1o2 
Indeed, the differences between financial systems as regards their respective 
structure of financial intermediation are attracting increasing academic interest. 
Germany and the UK in particular, each represents a distinct model of corporate 
governance (The Economist 1994: 2-11 ). The British model of corporate governance 
emphasises the importance of liquidity in the stockmarket. Shareholders monitor the 
management of public companies through stockmarket trading. The system is 
underpinned by fairly full disclosure of financial data, and by strict laws on insider 
trading. 
The German model of corporate governance, on the other hand, relies less on 
liquidity, as many medium and especially small German companies are privately 
owned. Shareholders reduce their risk by closely monitoring the management of 
100 See for instance Schoombee (1991: 2). 
101 Interview with Dr. J.H. van Greuning, Registrar of Banks and Head of the Bank Supervision 
Department, South African Reserve Bank, 5 January 1994. 
102 Oelkers (1995) recently completed a comparative study of the Bundesbank Act and the South 
African Reserve Bank Act (including liability in banking supervision). The reasons cited by Oelkers 
(1995) for the selection of Germany to compare the law of central banking are twofold. Firstly, the fact 
that South Africa is now a federation, but with a centralised state structure and Reserve Bank. As 
Germany has a federal structure it may serve as an example. Secondly, s.35(1) of the South African 
constitution states that the Constitutional Court can refer to comparable foreign case law in interpreting 
the fundamental rights, and Germany would be an appropriate country in such a case. 
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companies, or by having a bank monitor on their behalf. Banks consequently forge 
close, long-term relationships with most industrial companies. Generally, the 
disclosure requirements of companies are less demanding and accounting 
information less revealing in Germany. 
The two models also reflect differences in the type of owners of corporations. 
Although banks in the UK are permitted to own shares they have historically largely 
refrained from doing so. Until the 1930s, British banks owned few non-banking 
assets and avoided the risk of participation in equities (Black and Coffee 1994 ). Also, 
from the 1930s to the 1970s, the Bank of England 'discouraged' bank ownership of 
shares.103 In Germany, however, the biggest shareholders in public companies are 
banks and firms that have close business links with the companies they own. Banks 
have been at the heart of German corporate governance at least since the era of 
Otto von Bismarck, who used them in order to promote economic growth. Starting as 
lenders, German banks became big shareholders when the firms they had earlier 
financed either went public or defaulted on their loans during the economic crises 
following on the two World Wars, such as the 1929 Great Depression. 
German banks are often criticised for the massive power they exercise not just 
through their own equity participations but also by casting proxy votes for individual 
shareholders who entrust their shares to their bank. Although shareholders are able 
to instruct banks how to vote, the usually refrain from doing so. With proxies and own 
shares combined, the three biggest German banks - Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank 
and Commerzbank, wield a majority of votes at the shareholders' meetings of many 
firms. They monitor (and sometimes control) management both as lenders, and, as 
shareholders, by electing representatives to supervisory boards which have the 
function of overseeing German companies.104 
Although there is no agreement on the best system, there now seems to be 
agreement that corporate governance does indeed affect economic performance 
. (The Economist 1994: 5). 
Whereas the German and UK models of corporate governance can be regarded as 
opposite ends of the spectrum, the South African structure of financial intermediation 
incorporates elements of both approaches. On the one hand, the South African 
system of corporate governance is characterised by low stockmarket liquidity. On the 
103 Resulting in a morally suaded UK counterpart of the US Glass-Steagal Act which expressly 
prohibits banks from owning large equity stakes in companies. 
104 This may misrepresent German banking for the following reasons that: the number of German 
firms a bank can control, although significant, is limited; although most of the largest 100 firms have a 
bank member on their supervisory board, this does not imply effective bank control; the role of the 
banker in the supervisory board has to be viewed in light of the rigorous legal standards of corporate 
governance on German public firms; bank ownership of industry is not pervasive, but is limited to a few 
special cases and has decreased during the last decade; and that proxy voting is more important than 
stock ownership as a potential means of control. See Edwards and Fischer (1994) who argue that 
German banks are not as powerful as they seem, because bank lending is not an especially important 
source of finance for German firms; supervisory boards meet no more than four times a year; banks 
have not used their proxies to elect as many representatives as they could; and those they do elect 
behave as advisers and not controllers, though they may do more if a firm is in trouble. 
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other hand, banks are not typically engaged in equity partlcipations of industrial 
companies and are not generally regarded as being as powerful as their German 
counterparts.1os 
Another conceptual feature of the German financial system that is analytically useful, 
especially as regards considerations of competitive neutrality, is the German model 
of universal banking1os. The South African approach to the provision of financial 
services approximates this 'AIIfinanz' model, rather than the historically somewhat 
more restricted UK version (Oosthuizen 1994(a)). 
lt is also interesting that UK and German banking are considered the least expensive 
in the world market because they can offer their services at an overall interest spread 
of 2 per cent of total assets (Leichtfuss and Simon 1995: 176). This contrasts 
markedly with the South African banking industry which enjoys margins in excess of 
4 per cent of total banking assets. 
Finally, as will be seen in Chapters 7 and 8, Germany and the UK have differing 
deposit protection schemes. Britain has a statutory deposit protection scheme that is 
in effect compulsory; Germany's is private and voluntary. The design of these 
systems is of specific interest to South Africa which has no explicit deposit insurance 
arrangement. 
The general thrust of this study - to illustrate that existing regulatory structures and 
practices reflect supervisory concern with the risk-management activities of banks -
is well suited to a comparative approach which stresses both similar experiences as 
well as allowing for differing regulatory responses. 
The following paragraphs are concerned with the structure of the three selected 
financial systems and are intended to provide a basic overview thereof. In each case, 
the financial institutions engaged in deposit-taking activities are discussed, followed 
by an appraisal of the main financial markets. In order to provide some perspective 
on the dimension of each system, reference is also made to the size and importance 
of the institutions and markets concerned. However, statistics are employed 
sparingly as the aim is to provide a functional rather than a quantitative comparison. 
105 lt is, however, noteworthy that the four biggest South African banking groups (Amalgamated Banks 
of SA (ABSA), First National Bank Holdings, Nedcor and the Standard Bank Investment Corporation 
(SBIC)) are controlled by the major insurance groups (SANLAM, Southern Life Limited, SA Mutual and 
Liberty Life Limited respectively) and I or indirectly by the corporate giants (Anglo American 
Corporation Limited and the Rembrandt Group) which together wield a remarkable degree of power 
over publicly listed companies. Ironically, one of the major causes of this concentration of economic 
power has been financial regulation itself, i.e. exchange control regulations which have prevented the 
free flow of capital. 
. 
106 Universal banking involves the grouping together of a variety of deposit-taking and even non-
deposit taking financial intermediaries into a single banking institution. The most important implication 
of this model is that; theoretically, the opportunities for regulatory arbitrage are reduced. 
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5.3 The UK Financial System 
5.3.1 Financial Institutions 
A concise description and classification of British financial institutions is complicated 
by the rather ambiguous and overlapping roles of many of the financial institutions. 
However, relatively recent legislation (the Trustee Savings Bank Acts of 1976, 1978, 
and 1988; the Building Society Act of 1986; the Financial Services Act of 1985; and 
the Banking Act of 1987) has somewhat clarified the situation. 
Banks in the UK can be divided into three main groups (Table 5.1 ): 220 commercial 
banks who together hold 41,7 per cent of total bank assets, 362 foreign banks which 
hold a remarkable 56,9 per cent of total bank assets; and 138 other deposit-taking 
institutions which hold the remaining 1 ,4 per cent of total bank assets. 
Table 5.1 The UK Banking system· August 1996 
Type of banks Number of Total assets Percentage 
institutions (£billion) of total bank 
assets 
Commercial banks 
Retail banks 21 710,7 36,2 
Merchant banks 31 46,1 2,3 
Other British banks 168 61,9 3,2 
Total 220 818,7 41,7 
Foreign banks 
American banks 44 158,9 8,1 
Japanese banks 29 198,5 10,1 
Other overseas banks 289 760,3 38,7 
Total 362 1117,7 56,9 
Other deposit-taking institutions 
Discount houses 8 25,1 1,3 
Building societies 78 2,3 0,1 
Total 86 27,4 1,4 
Total banking system 668 1963,8 100,0 
Source: Bank of England (1996(b)). 
The total banking assets of £ 1 963 billion far exceed the GDP of the UK which 
amounted to £ 586 billion in 1995. 
5.3.1.1 Commercial banks 
Commercial banks in Britain can be subdivided into retail banks, merchant banks 
and other British banks. 
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Retail banks consist of the clearing banks, the Tru~tee Savings Banks, the Co-
operative Bank, the National Girobank and the National Savings Bank. 
Clearing banks are dominated by the so-called Clearers, primarily the 'big four' -
Barclays, Midland, National Westminster and Lloyds. The 'clearing' appellation is of 
historical importance only, reflecting the once dominant role of these banks in the 
British money transmission and payments networks. The 'big four' commercial banks 
have extensive nationwide branch networks. During the 1970s and 1980s this group . 
expanded and diversified their activities into overseas operations, the home loan 
market, and investment banking, and hence became universal banks. However, 
unlike their German counterparts, they do not hold major equity participations in 
industrial corporations. 
The TSB (Trustee Savings Banks) group was created in 1985 as a holding company 
for its constituent members, who originated in the last century as public service 
trusts. During the 1960s they diversified away from small personal savings banks 
towards retail banking, and then into commercial banks. lt is now the eighth largest 
bank in the UK. 
The Co-operative Bank, recognised as a clearer in 1975, is owned by 100 retail co-
operatives and acts in a more limited manner, primarily providing personal banking 
services and local authority financing. The Co-operative Bank has a relatively small 
but expanding branch network. 
The National Girobank (NG) and National Savings Bank (NSB), modelled after the 
European giro systems, provide various money transmission banking services, 
mainly deposits and cash withdrawal facilities, through post office branches 
throughout the UK. In 1986 NG announced that it would offer mortgages. The NSB 
also offers various savings bonds and certificates and invests mostly in government 
securities. In 1990 the NG was sold to Alliance and Leicester Building Society. 
Merchant banks comprise banks involved in both wholesale banking and 
investment banking, including corporate finance. Recently, their deposit-taking and 
credit extension has been of less importance than other activities, such as 
international trade finance, mergers and acquisitions, financial advisory services, 
investment management, foreign exchange, and securities trading. The core 
members of this group include the 16 former 'accepting houses', who long enjoyed a 
special relationship with the Bank of England. 
Other British banks include miscellaneous UK registered institutions, institutions in 
the Channel Islands and Isle of Man, British overseas banks, and finance 
companies. Some of the Channel Islands and Isle of Man institutions are treated as 
UK banks for statistical purposes, yet are not authorised under the 1987 Bank Act. 
5.3.1.2 Foreign banks 
Foreign banks from 78 countries operating in London numbered 362 at August 1996, 
including 259 branches, 69 subsidiaries, and 18 consortiums. There are also 184 
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representative offices of foreign banks, 55 from the US, 32 from Japan, and 92 from 
EC countries. Whilst a few are active in retail banking, the majority concentrate on 
the corporate and wholesale banking markets. Foreign-owned banks held 56,9 per 
cent of the UK banking system's total assets at August 1996, but only 27,4 per cent 
of Sterling deposits. Foreign banks are especially prominent in the Euromarket and 
in the UK securities market. The attraction of the London market to Japanese and 
US banks lies in the opportunity to engage in security business, which they are 
prohibited at home. 
On the whole, UK banks have emerged relatively unscathed from deregulation due 
to the small gap between the capabilities and size of new entrants and existing 
banks; established placing power in Europe; stronger client loyalty; and the existing 
experience of UK banks in competing internationally (Schoenmaker 1995). 
5.3.1.3 Other Deposit-taking Institutions 
Other deposit-taking institutions are the building societies and discount houses. 
As was the case in South Africa, UK Building societies originated as mutually-
owned mortgage societies. By August 1996 there were some 78 of these institutions, 
operating a large network of branches. Traditionally, building societies obtain funds 
from depositors and finance home purchases. However, they are increasingly in 
competition with the clearers in both commercial banking services and mortgage 
lending. The 1986 Building Societies Act extended their permissible activities and 
building societies now offer insurance, credit cards, money transmission accounts, 
personal banking, and non-financial products. Societies are allowed to expand the 
non-mortgage element of their business by stages to a maximum of 25 per cent of 
their total commercial business. Even though the 1986 Act allows for a degree of 
competition with banks, in 1989 Abbey National, the largest building society, elected 
to go public and to obtain a banking licence. This trend has continued and since 
1989 (when there 130 building societies with 13,1 per cent of total assets) a great 
number of former building societies have elected to become banks in order to be 
able to compete on an equal footing. 
The eight discount houses still play a unique role in the UK banking system, acting 
primarily as intermediaries between the Bank of England and the rest of the banking 
system and play an important role in the implementation of monetary policy107 • Most 
discount house funds are obtained through the short-term money market and 
invested in short-term assets1os. 
107 A general shortage or surplus of funds (arising from net movements of money into or or out of the 
banking system) will end up in the discount market. If it is at a shortage, the market will rely on the 
Bank of England for 'lender of last resort' assistance. If there is a surplus of funds, the Bank of 
England will usually be willing to absorb this by selling bills in order to prevent undesired short-term 
fluctuations in interest rates. For an in-depth analysis of the role of the money market in UK monetary 
policy see Schoombee (1991: 104-159). Suffice it to note that it is by variations in the terms on which 
the Bank of England buys or sells bills (or refuses to buy or sell bills) from discount houses, that it 
exerts its influence over short-term Sterling interest rates. 
108 The distinction between banks, building societies and discount houses is no longer operative in 
South Africa, see paragraph 5.5.1. 
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5.3.2 Financial Markets 
The city of London is one of the prime financial marketplaces in the world, boasting 
highly sophisticated and largely deregulated financial markets. The following London 
financial markets109 are considered below: the money market, capital market, foreign 
exchange market as well as the newer derivatives market. 
5.3.2.1 The Money Market 
A traditional money market is the discount market. Each of the commercial banks 
operating the national payments mechanism needs to be able to finance deficits or 
absorb surpluses as they arise from the daily clearing. In order to do so without 
holding unnecessarily high levels of non-interest earning balances at the Bank of 
England, these banks usually hold money at call with discount houses. The bills 
traded in the discount market are mainly treasury bills11o and commercial bills111. The 
Bank of England has consistently preferred to conduct open market transactions in 
the bill market and by dealing largely with discount houses rather than, in most 
countries, by direct transactions with banks. 
Other most prominent instruments of the London money markets are certificates of 
deposit, Sterling Commercial Paper and ECU Treasury Bills.112 
Certificates of deposit (CDs)113 are negotiable instruments in bearer form issued by 
banks as evidence of a deposit of a fixed sum at a stated rate of interest and due for 
repayment on a stated date. Ownership of COs changes on delivery; there are no 
109 For a more detailed, but less recent survey than presented here, see Harrington (1991: 260-312). 
110 Treasury bills are marketed by the Bank of England through a weekly auction on behalf of the UK 
government. They are normally of 91 days' duration and are issued in amounts ranging from £5.000 to 
£1.000.000. Treasury bills do not pay explicit interest but are sold and subsequently traded at a 
discount prior to redemption at par. Given their short duration and the fact that they are backed up by 
the security of the UK government, they are regarded as low-risk assets. 
111 Commercial bills are usually drawn under an acceptance credit facility granted by a bank to one of 
its corporate clients. The client draws a bill on its bank requiring the bank to pay a specified sum at a 
stated date in the future. The bank accepts the bill, i.e. confirms by endorsement of the bill that it will 
make the payment on the due date. Provided that the bank is on the Bank of England's list of eligible 
banks, the bill becomes eligible for rediscount at the Bank of England. lt is then a highly liquid asset 
and can be sold at a discount to a bank or discount house. Accepted commercial bills are known as 
bank bills or bankers' acceptances. 
112 Another commonly used instrument in the London money market, which conceptually is a part of 
the Euromarkets, (vide infra paragraph 5.6) is Euro-commercial paper (ECP). ECP comprises short-
term bearer instruments that are issued by large companies, by public authorities (including some 
national governments) and by international organisations. ECP issues are managed by dealers (banks 
and security houses). Dealers place paper with investors, and although in principle it is negotiable, in 
practice there is little secondary trading. Unlike the position in the US commercial paper market, there 
is no requirement for a credit rating for issues of ECP, although an increasing volume of issues are 
now being rated. 
11 3 COs are issued primarily in Sterling and in US dollars, for periods ranging from the very short term 
(a minimum of 28 days in the case of Sterling COs} to five years but the majority of issues and the 
most active secondary trading are concentrated at the shorter end: six months or less. COs are issued 
at par and are subsequently traded on a yield to maturity basis. 
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endorsements and no contingent liability rests with the sellelr. The secondary market 
is composed of large banks plus discount houses. Their purchases of COs involve 
credit risk as with any other form of lending, and so will be counted against the 
individual limits set for lending to other banks. The main advantage of a CD is that it 
provides the issuing bank with term funds while for the purchaser (depositor) it is a 
highly liquid asset. Purchasing a CD is also an alternative to interbank lending. 
In 1986, the Bank of England allowed certain companies to issue Sterling 
commercial paper (SCP) with maturities of 7 - 364 days, exempt from the Banking 
Act restrictions on the taking of deposits.114 Programmes are managed by (mostly 
UK-owned) banks who issue paper and act as market-makers. The development of 
secondary markets in SCP has caused the share of outstanding paper held by banks 
to fall to low levels. 
Commencing in October 1988, the Bank of England issued a series of treasury bills 
denominated and payable in the European Currency Unit (ECU). 11 5 These ECU 
Treasury Bills are issued by tender in monthly intervals and have maturities of one, 
three and six months. A number of institutions are tendering for these bills and an 
active secondary market has developed. 
The interbank market is the largest of the short-term financial markets in London 
and an integral part of the global interbank market. The market is an over-the-
telephone market in short-term deposits denominated in a range of different 
currencies. Deals are commonly arranged through money brokers, but there is also 
direct dealing between banks. The market fulfils a number of roles. Short-term 
interbank deposits with a near maturity date are a prime source of liquidity for the 
depositor bank. Equally, however, the ability of the same bank to borrow funds itself 
is a further source of liquidity. The market offers great flexibility to banks in managing 
assets and liabilities. Normally short-term borrowing and lending can be revolved so 
that, in effect, the interbank market can serve as a long-term source or outlet of 
funds. In order to gain access to the interbank market, each bank must establish and 
maintain creditworthiness. Banks normally set limits on what they will lend to other 
banks and these will vary as perceptions change. 
The wholesale deposit market is the market in large deposits from non-bank 
sources, predominantly large companies. Because interest rates on wholesale funds 
are determined competitively, all large non-bank deposits are remunerated at market 
rates of interest - which are normally close to and vary with interbank rates. 
Corporate treasurers deal with a number of banks and move funds in response to the 
terms offered. 
114 The stringent conditions initially imposed on SCP issues were relaxed significantly in 1989. The 
size requirement of companies was reduced from a net asset value of £50 million to £25 million and 
the minimum denomination of issue was cut from £500.000 to £100.000. The maximum maturity of 
SCP was raised to five years and the range of permissible borrowers was widened considerably. 
115 The advantage of these issues to the Bank of England is that they add some short-term flexibility to 
government foreign currency borrowing, to the management of foreign exchange reserves, as well as 
providing a potential reduction in the debt service cost of foreign borrowing. 
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derivatives exchange is LIFFE (the London International Financial Futures 
Exchange).119 
LIFFE began trading financial futures in 1982. LIFFE now offers the most 
comprehensive range of contracts of any financial futures or options exchange in the 
world, reflecting the breadth of London's underlying international banking, securities 
and commodities business. 
Turnover in futures trading on LIFFE has increased steadily since its inception. In 
1983, the first full year of trading, the average daily number of contracts was around 
1 0.000; by 1986, this had risen to about 25.000. On 16 September 1992, trading on 
the LIFFE for the first time exceeded that of the longer established Chicago 
exchanges, which pioneered the development of futures and options (Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin 1992: 476). Presently LIFFE is the worlds third largest 
exchange behind CBOT (the Chicago Board of Trade) and CME (the Chicago Metals 
Exchange) with just over 30 million contracts traded in the last quarter of 1995 (Bank 
of England 1996(a): 27). 
Options, which may take the form of currency options, share options or share index 
options, are bought and sold in London in two ways. Over-the-counter (OTC) options 
are mainly options to buy or sell foreign currencies and involve transactions amongst 
banks and between banks and their clients. Second, traded options are standardised 
contracts which are traded on organised exchanges. 
The growth in options markets reflects an increase in their use both by non-financial 
companies and financial institutions. Non-financial companies have become more 
sophisticated in hedging risks, notably foreign currency risks, while financial 
institutions manage the risks incurred in their intermediary activities. For both, the 
trend to a more active management of risks, has promoted a greater use of 
derivative products in general. 
Although a number of banks undertake forward rate agreements (FRAs) with non-
bank clients, most transactions are between banks, often arranged through brokers. 
The market is international and the greater part of all transactions is in US dollars. 
The number and value of London currency and interest swap transactions have 
grown dramatically in the past two decades. The motives for swap transactions12o 
are varied, but, as both parties must profit for the transaction to be worthwhile, they 
all involve the principle of comparative advantage. This arises because different 
borrowers have different credit ratings in different markets and I or because 
11 9 Other (nonfinancial) derivative exchanges include LME (the London Metal Exchange), IPE (the 
International Petroleum Exchange) and LCE (the London Commodities Exchange). In November 1995 
the Boards of LIFFE and LCE reached agreement to enter into detailed negotiations to merge the two 
exchanges. The transaction is expected to be finalised by the end of 1996. 
120 A swap transaction is an agreement to exchange specific financial commitments between two 
parties. 
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regulations have different impacts on different markets.121 Financial institutions 
increasingly use swaps for purposes of asset and liability management. 
121 For a full discussion on the mechanism of swaps see Felgram (1988). 
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5.4 The German Financial System 
The financial system of the Federal Republic of Germany122 is predominantly 
orientated towards financial intermediation by banks as opposed to direct financial 
markets. 
Vittas (1991: 17) explains the relative underdevelopment of German financial 
markets with reference to five factors. First, the close links between corporations and 
the universal banks, which provide financial and managerial support for expansion 
plans and restructuring operations may mitigate the need for the financial 
independence of the corporate sector. Second, the preference of most medium sized 
companies to operate as limited partnerships. Third, the imposition of turnover taxes. 
Fourth, the limited role played by pension funds in the German financial system as 
many company pension schemes are based on internal reserves that are reinvested 
in the sponsoring companies and are not available for investment in marketable 
securities. And, fifth, recurrent crises in the German financial system, have 
undermined the confidence of the savings public in marketable securities and have 
interrupted the evolution of the German financial system towards a more revised and 
balanced structure. 
The weaknesses of German primary markets is therefore not entirely due to the 
dominance of banks in the economic system and financial markets. A number of 
other features of German law, tax policy, and regulation have also contributed to the 
relatively undeveloped nature of financial markets relative to German economic 
performance. German law, for instance, views options as 'gambling contracts', 
thereby limiting their enforceability. In addition, whole classes of potential issuers and 
holders of derivative securities (such as insurance companies and mutual funds) are 
prohibited from engaging in options and futures activity. Taxation policy also limits 
the attractiveness of high-value, high-turnover short-term financial assets. Germany 
levies a Stock Exchange Turnover Tax (Borsenumsatzsteuer) of between 0,1 per 
cent and 0,25 per cent of the market value of traded securities. Finally, the lack of 
122 In terms of the German Economic and Monetary Union Agreement, which took effect in July 1990, 
and The German Unification Treaty (implemented October 3, 1990) the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) absorbed the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany or GDR), adding to its 
former state 108.000 square kilometers (43 per cent), 16,7 million people (27 per cent), and 353 billion 
Ostmark in GNP (approximately 10 per cent). The East German banking system was state-owned and 
bore little resemblance to Western commercial banking. lt allocated income and credit on a centralised 
basis, in line with the command economy it served. Shortly before unification, the East German 
banking system had assets equivalent to DM 246 billion, representing a mere 7,5 per cent of the total 
assets of the Federal Republic's banking system at that time. lt comprised the State bank 
(Staatsbank), which functioned as central bank, some commercial and cooperative banks, and 196 
savings banks. Since unification, the former East German territories have become part of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. All responsibility for monetary policy has been transferred to the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, the former GDR banking system has become subject to the Banking Act of the Federal 
Republic, and its institutions subject to supervision by the Federal Banking Supervisory Office. For the 
purposes of this study, the former GDR area is regarded as fully integrated in the FRG banking 
system. In line with the approach adopted by the Deutsche Bundesbank, all former GDR figures are 
therefore aggregated in the FRG figures from the end of June 1990. 
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basic consumer protection, such as the absence of penalties against insider trading 
reduces public confidence in stock markets (Pozdena and Alexander 1991: 569). 
Edwards and Fisher (1994) assess the view that certain distinctive features of the 
German system of investment finance (i.e. where the savings - investment process is 
organised around the banking system) make it more efficient relative to the UK 
system (which accords a greater role to the stock markets). The analysis casts some 
doubt on the argument that German banks are an important factor in good German 
economic performance. 
5.4.1 Financial Institutions 
Banks are the most important type of financial intermediary, dominating virtually all 
financial activity. Banks in Germany can be categorised by their legal form, size, 
structure and business strategy. However, there is little structural division of 
functions. Bank groups differ mostly regarding the emphasis they place on different 
aspects of their business. 
The business of banking in Germany is defined in the Banking Act of 1961.123 The 
Act defines a credit institution engaged in banking as any enterprise engaged in the 
following activities124: 
• accepting deposits; 
• making loans; 
• discounting bills; 
• providing securities brokerage services; 
• providing trust (safe custody) services; 
• operating investment funds; 
• factoring; 
• providing financial guarantees; and 
• providing funds transfer (giro) facilities. 
Banks in Germany can be divided into four main groups (Table 5.2): 336 commercial 
banks, which are overwhelmingly universal full-service institutions and hold some 24 
per cent of total assets, 626 savings banks who hold nearly 40 per cent of total 
assets, 2.591 credit co-operatives with 15 per cent of all assets, and 89 specialised 
banks with 25 per cent of assets. All figures are stated as at November 1995. 
The size of the German banking system is impressive both in relative national terms 
as well as by international comparison. With total assets amounting to 
OM 7 668 billion, the banking system transcends German GOP which in 1994 
amounted to an already impressive OM 2 798 billion. 
123 Kreditwesengesetz, amended 1976 and 1985. 
124 These activities are discussed in greater detail in paragraph 8.2.2. 
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Table 5.2 The German Banking System- November 1995 
Type of banks Number of Total assets . Percentage 
Institutions of total bank 
(OM billion) assets 
Commercial banks 
Big banks 3 709 9,2 
Regional and other banks 198 958 12,5 
Branches of foreign banks 69 109 1,4 
Private banks 66 54 0,7 
Total commercial banks 336 1830 23,8 
Savings banks sector 
Regional giros 13 1344 17,5 
Savings banks 626 1486 19,4 
Total savings banks 639 2830 36,9 
Credit co-operative sector 
Regional credit corporations 4 256 3,3 
Credit co-operative 2591 867 11,3 
Total credit co-operative 2595 1123 14,6 
Specialised banks sector 
Mortgage banks 36 952 12,4 
Special functions 18 710 9,3 
Building and loan 35 223 2,9 
Total specialised banks 89 1885 24,6 
Total banking system 3659 7668 100,0 
Source: Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, January 1996. 
German financial markets were opened to limited foreign competition in the 1970s 
and the continuing deregulation of the financial markets is still mainly prompted by 
the process of integration with the European Community. Foreign banks have been 
unable to compete effectively with the 6 biggest German global banks with their 
strong capital resources and strong client relationships (Rosenzweig 1995). Thus 
German banks have been able to defend their domestic market successfully and 
they have also used the deregulation of the world financial markets to expand 
internationally .125 
5.4.1.1 Commercial Banks 
Amongst the commercial banks, the largest banking institutions in Germany are the 
three large branch banks - Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank 
(known as GrofJbanken). These banks maintain a nationwide branch network of 
more than 3.500 branches and controlled 9,2 per cent of total domestic banking 
125 Deutsche Bank has been a leader in international expansion and has used the expansion 
opportunity to pick up skills, particularly in the acquisition of the UK merchant bank Morgan Grenfell 
and the Australian investment bank Bain & Co. Deutsche Bank also recently (1995) acquired an 
interest in the South African stockbroker lvor Jones & Co. in a move prompted by the deregulation of 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
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measured by assets in November 1995. However, this figure is not a true indicator of 
the importance of these banks to the banking system. For example, the Grol3banken 
handle 60 per cent of Germany's foreign trade payments, account for 50 per cent of 
all bonds underwritten by banks, and hold 40 per cent of all securities in safe 
custody. Moreover, they exert a great deal of influence on German industrial 
conglomerates due to their exercising of voting rights of shares deposited with them 
for safe-keeping, and their direct investments in private firms.126 
The designation as regional bank is mainly historical, as no significant restrictions 
exist on the ability of a regional bank to branch elsewhere. Unlike the Grol1banken, 
which are all stock corporations (AG),127 regional banks are also organised as 
limited-share partnerships (KGaA)12B or limited liability private companies (GmbH).129 
This is a very heterogeneous group; while most of these banks maintain a distinct 
regional orientation, several operate nationwide and internationally, such as 
Bayerische Vereinsbank, Bayerische Hypobank, Bank fOr Gemeinwirtschaft (BfG) 
and BHF. Banks which specialise in foreign business, such as European Asian Bank 
AG and lbero-American Bank AG, are also considered regional banks. 
The oldest group of German banks, namely private banks (Privatbanken), are 
organised as sole proprietorships, an arrangement no longer permitted in the 
establishment of new banks. Private banking was the original form of German 
banking, and the founding names of Oppenheim, Warburg, Berenberg, and Hauck 
remain associated with German private banking. These banks represent a mere 0,7 
per cent of bank assets. However, their influence is greater than indicated by size, 
since private banks generally specialise in off-balance sheet activities or services 
which are only partially represented in balance sheets. Private banks differ 
considerably in their business activities, some of which include foreign trade 
financing, securities issuance and syndication, portfolio management, trustee service 
and corporate lending. 
Traditionally, foreign banks have been represented in Germany by branches, but the 
recent trend is towards incorporation. There are 66 established branches in 
Germany. These branches are considered domestic credit institutions and are free of 
any restrictions on competition with other domestic banks in all areas of banking. 
Foreign banks tend to specialise as bankers to subsidiaries of foreign concerns as 
well as emphasising credit services associated with trade. Approximately 170 other 
foreign banks have representative offices (Reprasentanzen) in Germany. 
5.4.1.2 Savings Banks 
There were·639 savings banks (Sparkassen) in Germany at November 1995, with 
assets of DM 2.830 billion. Savings banks are, with few exceptions, owned by 
126 See paragraph 5.2. 
127 Aktiengesellschaft. 
128 Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien. 
129 Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung. 
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regional governments or town councils130 and operate within localised areas. 
Although they were originally intended only for the collection of savings from the 
public for the purpose of property lending, savings banks now operate as full 
commercial banks. Sparkassen are directed by management committees (Vorstand) 
operating under a board of administrators (Aufsichtsrat or Verwaltungsrat) comprised 
of local business and government officials.131 
Twelve central savings institutes (Landesbanken or Girozentralen) serve as regional 
money centre banks for the Sparkassen. A thirteenth bank, Deutsche Girozentrale-
Deutsche Kommunalbank, operates as the central wholesale institution for the 
national savings bank sector. As the depository of the Sparkassen's liquidity 
reserves, central savings institutes play an important role in the German money 
market, and have been increasingly important in wholesale banking and international 
activities. Additionally, savings banks act as bankers for federal states, regions and 
their municipalities, and as mortgage banks through the refinancing of mortgages via 
bond issuance. 
5.4.1.3 Co-operative Banks 
Co-operative banks were formed in the previous century as part of a wider 'self-help' 
movement intended to collect savings and extend credit to members. They are called 
Vo/ksbanken (people's banks) or Raiffeisen (after the movement's founder, Friedrich 
Raiffeisen). Today 2 595 local co-operatives, with about 18 000 branches and nin'e 
million shareholders, act as universal banks for their shareholders and other clients. 
These banks are served by three regional co-operative banks that act as money 
centres. Regional co-operative banks manage member banks' liquidity and provide 
services such as financing and managerial consultancy. These regional banks are in 
turn served by the central commercial bank of the co-operative sector, Deutsche 
Genossenschafts-bank Frankfurt (DG-Bank) which engages in all aspects of the 
banking business including international transactions. 
5.4.1.4 Specialised Banks 
Specialised banks accounted for 24,6 per cent of all banking activity in Germany (at 
November 1995). The most important of these institutions are the 31 private, and 5 
public, mortgage banks (Hypothekenbanken). These banks concentrate on long term 
loans secured by mortgages on property and play a substantial role as lenders to the 
130 The German banking system is distinguished significantly from the British and other systems by 
the prominence of banks owned by the public sector. Privatisation of publicly owned banks is 
discussed periodically, primarily because of concerns over the public contributions to the capital needs 
of these banks. In most cases, however, the political pressure to maintain the traditional role and 
status ofpublic banking frustrates privatisation efforts. 
131 This structure creates serious problems from a risk-management perspective. The most important 
task of Aufsichtsrat is to supervise the major activities of the Vorstand. This cannot be done effectively 
by government officials with little knowledge of or experience in banking and the management of 
banking risk. In the 1970s, some serious mismanagement could be observed in these institutions, 
leading to losses of several billion DM and leading to even severe political pressure on state 
governments. The ability of such institutions to receive support from the state prevents them from 
failing. This is clearly an anomaly which distorts competition. 
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public authorities. They obtain funds primarily through the floatation of mortgage and 
communal bonds in the public market. 
The existence of specialised mortgage lenders in a country of universal banking is 
largely a consequence of financial regulation. Although universal banks may grant 
mortgage loans, the Mortgage Banking Act of 1963132 does not allow them to issue 
bonds to finance these assets; section 5a of the Act restricts the issuance of 
mortgage bonds to mortgage banks. Universal banks desiring to participate in this 
activity do so by operating a mortgage banking subsidiary. As a result, most private 
mortgage banks are wholly owned by universal banks. Clearly, this situation does not 
lend itself to competitive neutrality. 
There are 35 building and loan associations (Bausparkassen) in Germany who 
finance owner-occupied houses by collecting funds via various savings schemes, 
some of which enjoy government incentives and tax advantages.133 
5.4.2 Financial Markets 
Although there are various institutions engaged in German financial markets, the role 
played by banks in nearly all of these markets is so dominant that they can be 
characterised as interbank markets. Although non-bank intermediaries are not 
prohibited from participating, their role in the financial markets is relatively 
insignificant. In addition to the powerful role that banks fulfil in the financial system, 
the relatively underdeveloped nature of most financial markets is also a direct 
consequence of constraining financial regulations. 
5.4.2.1 The Money Market 
The money market is thus virtually an interbank market, used for the horizontal 
transfer of liquidity amongst the 200 actively trading deposit-taking institutions. The 
short-term paper market serves as an instrument of monetary policy, with nearly all 
trading done between the Bundesbank and the deposit-taking institutions. As a result 
the market in other short-term obligations is relatively underdeveloped. 
The German Commercial Paper (CP) market, established in February 1991, is the 
youngest of the major CP markets. lt has grown rapidly and since 1992, the amount 
of outstanding CP denominated in Deutschmark has surpassed that of the Sterling 
market. However, the investor base has remained narrowly domestic, due to a lack 
of credit ratings and the domination of CP arranging and dealing by the major 
German banks. 
132 Hypothekenbankengesetz, 1963, amended 1968, 1974, and 1988. 
133 Additional specialised banking institutions (not covered by the monthly balance sheet statistics of 
the Deutsche Bundesbank) include: installment credit institutions, Collective Securities Depositories 
(Kassenverein); Guarantee Banks; Investment Companies; Postal Giro and Postal savings; and 
Special Purpose Banks. 
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5.4.2.2 The Capital Market 
In contrast, the capital market in Germany is large and fairly well developed, but 
plays a much less important role than its size indicates. 
The bond market, although being the third largest in the world (after the United 
States and Japan), with outstanding issues of OM 2.870 billion at November 1995 
and gross sales of OM 627 million in 1994, is also dominated by the banking 
system.134 There are five main categories of bonds135 traded in German markets. 
The largest single component consists of the so-called Sonstige 
Bankschuldverschreibungen, made up of noncommunal and nonmortgage bank 
bonds that make up about 35 per cent of total bonds outstanding. These represent 
mainly the unsecured issue of debt by banks in the form of bearer bonds 
(lnhaberschuldverschreibungen). Historically, bearer bonds have had the advantage 
of not being subject to the high reserve requirements of non-bearer bonds. 
The second largest component consists of the direct debt placements of public 
authorities (state and federal governments and agencies). These bonds represent 
about 28 per cent of all outstanding bonds. 
Communal bonds (Kommunalobligationen) is the third category, representing about 
16 per cent of outstanding bond debt. These bonds are issued by banks and backed 
by public sector guarantees. 
The fourth category consists of the bonds of special purpose banks. Representing 
about 5 per cent of total bonds outstanding, these bonds consist of unsecured bearer 
bonds and communal bonds. 
Fifth in importance are mortgage bonds (Pfandbriefe ), representing about 4,9 per 
cent of outstanding bond debt. As discussed earlier, these bonds may not be issued 
by commercial banks, and are issued only by mortgage banks. 
Finally, a very small component of the bond market is the industrial bond market. 
Strikingly, domestic borrowing by German corporations or companies in the bond 
market represents less than 0,1 per cent of all German bonds outstanding. This is an 
indication of the importance of bank loans (as opposed to direct floatations) in the 
raising of funds by German corporations. 
While primary bond issues are large, most issues are held to maturity and 
infrequently traded. As a result, secondary market trading is narrow and illiquid. The 
market itself is also dominated by the banks, with new issues (including public debt) 
134 The largest commercial bank, Deutsche Bank, alone accounts for almost 50 per cent of bond 
trading activity. 
135 With the exception of direct placements of public authorities and industrial bonds, all remaining 
bonds are considered bank bonds. By this categorisation, nearly 71 per cent of all German bonds at 
November 1995 were bank bonds. 
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being bought through fixed syndicates of the major banks and in co-ordination with 
both the Bundesbank and the Central Capital Market Committee. The secondary 
market is predominantly over-the-counter in nature, with direct dealing far surpassing 
turnover on the exchanges. 
Of almost equal importance to the bond market in Germany is the market in 
'certificates of indebtedness' or Schuldscheindarlehen. Outstanding Schuldscheine 
are, in relative terms, about two fifths the size of the domestic bond market. 
Schuldscheine are negotiable, private placement, promissory notes. They are not 
securities, but can be traded by transfer or assignment of title. Schuldscheine are 
issued mainly by the public sector, banks and other credit intermediaries. 
The existence and prominence of Schuldscheine are testimony to the burden of 
regulation and other underwriting costs on traditional bond issuance.136 Because 
Schuldscheine are loans, rather than securities, they are exempt from registration 
and documentation requirements of listed securities. In addition, they do not need 
approval of the Ministry of Finance, as is required in the case of registered securities. 
The stock market in Germany is much smaller than the bond market, with a year-
end 1994 value of OM 190 billion at November 1994. Although in terms of market 
capitalisation it is the fifth largest equity market in the world (after the US, Japan, the 
UK and France) (The Economist 1995: 54), the market is relatively small given the 
size of the German economy with a GOP of OM 3 320 billion in 1994. In recent years 
the growth of the market has been slow, with German firms continuing to rely heavily 
on long-term, bank-financed loans. Stock trading remains regionalised, with seven 
regional exchanges in Frankfurt, OOsseldorf, Munich, Stuttgart, Berlin, Hanover and 
Bremen. Frankfurt and OOsseldorf are by far the largest of the exchanges, with about 
75 per cent of total turnover, but overly strong regionalism continues to hamper the 
development of a centralised German equities market. 
The relatively underdeveloped state of the German stock exchanges is illustrated by 
low participation (across all of the exchanges, only 550 companies are publicly 
traded), low turnover (currently only about 7 per cent of German GNP- OM 51 billion) 
as well as low public ownership and participation in the stock market (only 5 per cent 
of German households own equities). 
5.4.2.3 The Foreign Exchange Market 
By contrast, the foreign exchange market has always been important to Germany 
due to the large role of the foreign sector in the economy and the relatively early 
(1958) deregulation of capital flows and convertibility of the OM. By far the largest 
market in Germany is Frankfurt, following London, Tokyo and New York. 
5.4.2.4 The Derivatives Market 
136 Pozdena and Alexander ( 1991 : 569) estimate that the legal and documentary expenses associated 
with bond issuance in Germany result in unusually high underwriting fees of 2 per cent to 2,5 per cent. 
By comparison, Schuldscheine can be issued for about one quarter of these amounts. 
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Other financial markets in Germany have historically been relatively unimportant. 
Trading in options began in 1986 while the first financial futures and options 
exchange (Deutsche Termin Borse or DTB) only began its operations in January 
1990. However, the DTB has shown steady growth and in the second half of 1995 
the DTB became the world's fourth largest derivatives exchange (behind CBT, CME 
and LIFFE) with nearly 20 million contracts trading in the final quarter of 1995 (Bank 
of England 1996(a): 27). 
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5.5 The South African Financial System 
Although small in absolute terms, the South African financial system has a largely 
deregulated, highly competitive and sophisticated banking industry in addition to 
generally well developed financial markets. A distinctive feature of the system is a 
low degree of international orientation. This is a consequence of external as well as 
internal financial regulations. South Africa's history of politically motivated isolation 
was accompanied by external financial sanctions. Internally, this necessitated the 
imposition of onerous exchange control regulations. The impact of these regulations 
on the financial system was evidenced by the low participation and representation of 
foreign banks in the domestic economy as well as the relatively low liquidity 
experienced in some financial markets. However, the lifting of sanctions and the re-
acceptance of South Africa in the global economy has seen a substantial increase in 
the number of foreign banks represented or active in South Africa. 
5.5.1 Financial Institutions 
The South African exchange rate crisis of September 1975 focused attention on 
exchange rate policy and led directly to the appointment of the De Kock Commission 
on 16 August 1977. The De Kock Commission report (Republic of South Africa 
1984: 42) outlines how the South African banking system since 1942 reflected the 
philosophy of state regulation and intervention. The report states that excessive 
regulation led to an unnatural level of non-bank intermediation (resulting from the 
inability of banks to compete on a level playing field with non-banks) which in turn 
resulted in ineffective methods for the supply of finance in the economy (Republic of 
South Africa 1984: 38). The De Kock Commission report represented a milestone in 
the deregulation of the South African financial markets in order to render them more 
market-orientated. 
In South Africa all deposit-taking financial institutions are regulated by the Banks Act 
(Act 94 of 1990), 137 which extends to all areas of deposit-taking activities, unless 
such activities are specifically exempted from the provisions of the Act.138 The Banks 
Act consolidated and revised the previous Banks Act (Act 24 of 1965) and the 
Building Societies Act (Act 82 of 1986). 
Traditionally, banks were categorised according to their main areas of business. 
Under previous legislation, these institutions performed their intermediary activities 
as: 
• Discount houses; 
• Commercial banks; 
• Merchant banks; 
• General banks; and 
137 Previously known as the Deposit-taking Institutions Act in order to distinguish it from the preceding 
1965 Banks Act. 
138 Such as the activities governed by the Mutual Building Societies Act (Act 24 of 1965). 
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• Building Societies. 
The Financial Institutions Amendment Act (Act 106 of 1985), repealed the distinction 
between commercial banks, general banks and merchant banks. The Banks Act of 
1990 dispensed with the remaining different types of banking institutions and even 
suspended the special dispensation previously accorded to discount houses. 
However, banking institutions remain free to designate themselves as commercial 
banks, merchant banks or other types of banking institutions conducting specialised 
banking business. The Banks Act consequently constitutes a new approach by 
accommodating all deposit-taking institutions under one Act. 
At the end of 1995 the total assets of the South African banking institutions (Table 
5.3) amounted to R 402 billion. The importance of this sector in the South African 
economy is evident when this figure is compared to the Gross Domestic Product 
which in 1995 amounted to R 484 billion. 
Table 5.3 Combined Balance Sheet of South African Banks- December 1995 
December 1994 December 1995 
{R million) {R million) 
Liabilities 
Non-bank deposits 239.719 295.420 
lnterbank funding 22.835 15.330 
Foreign funding 18.917 25.213 
Repurchase obligations 7.074 6.263 
Other liabilities 20.788 23.604 
Acceptances rediscounted 7.415 7.335 
Capital and reserves 23.913 28.650 
Total 340.661 401.815 
Assets 
Loans and Advances 271 818 299 426 
Trading portfolio 8 576 11 009 
lnterbank advances 12.364 12.487 
Investments 17.593 20.932 
Fixed assets 7.957 9.484 
Acknowledgement of debt 7.415 7.335 
Other assets 8.281 8.898 
Monetary assets 6.657 10.496 
Total 340.661 401.815 
Source: South African ReseNe Bank: Bank SupeNision Department Annual Report 1995. 
At year-end 1995 there were 41 (thereof 34 finally and 7 provisionally) registered 
banks in South Africa. Of these, four banks (Absa Bank, The Standard Bank of 
South Africa, First National Bank of Southern Africa and Nedcor Bank) dominate the 
banking landscape with R 310 billion or nearly 80 per cent of total bank assets. At 
the same time there were 4 7 foreign banks with approved representative offices in 
South Africa and four foreign banks with local branch offices. 
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Finally, as at 31 December 1995, three mutual banks registered in terms of the 
Mutual Building Banks Act (Act 124 of 1993), employed funds of R428 million, while 
one bank (African Bank Limited)139 was under curatorship. 
Metcalfe (1996: 3) estimates that around 60 foreign banks have a presence in the 
South African market. The growth in the activities of foreign banks indicates that new 
entrants are able to exploit opportunities in key niche markets. The 25 foreign banks 
surveyed plan to double in size within 5 years and believe that the market share of 
foreign banks will eventually plateau at around 10 per cent (Metcalfe 1996: 66). 
While the South African market is obviously considered attractive, there is already 
widespread concern about the level of competition across different lines of business 
and the narrowing of loan margins. The banks unanimously expressed disinterest in 
retail banking although several banks commented that one or more foreign banks 
might enter the retail market through acquisition (Metcalfe 1996: 67). 
5.5.2 Financial Markets 
In general, the trading of securities in South Africa is governed by the Financial 
Markets Control Act (Act 55 of 1989)140 whilst the trading of equities falls under the 
Stock Exchanges Control Act (Act 1 of 1985). 
5.5.2.1 The Money Market 
The South African money market, which facilitates the borrowing and lending of 
funds for periods ranging from overnight to three years, is not a formalised market. 
Consequently, there is no separate exchange for trading in money market 
instruments and there is no legal restriction on entry to money market trading. In 
practice, only certain institutions namely banks and stockbrokers trade in the money 
market. From this it is evident that the money market can be described as an over-
the-eau nter -market. 
The interbank segment of the market exists for the placing of deposits, usually 
overnight, between banks. The market is active at the time of clearing, when banks 
with surplus funds place such funds with deficit banks. At the end of the clearing the 
net deficit (or surplus) of the entire banking system is reflected in the so-called 
'money market shortage (or surplus)', i.e. the extent of Reserve Bank 
accommodation provided to the banking sector. A net deficit is always maintained for 
monetary control purposes. 
The most important instruments of the South African money market are bankers' 
acceptances, trade bills, promissory notes, treasury bills, capital project bills and 
139 See paragraph 9.3.1.2 for a discussion of subsequent developments. 
140 The Financial Markets Control Act resulted from the conclusions and recommendations of both the 
'Committee appointed to examine the market for public sector securities' under the chairmanship of Dr. 
A.S. Jacobs and the 'Committee of investigation into the development of financial futures transactions 
in South Africa' under the chairmanship of Dr. C.L. Stals. Both Committees recommended the 
establishment of uniform and formalised markets in bonds, futures and options, and that the principle 
of self-regulation should be applied to these instruments under the umbrella of an Act of Parliament. 
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negotiable certificates of deposit (NCDs ). 141 Although formal provision for th13 
issuance of commercial paper by certain companies has been made, 142 the 
regulations are generally regarded as being too onerous143 and few of these 
instruments are currently being used (Pieterse 1994: 13). 
5.5.2.2 The Capital Market 
The capital market consists of the bond market and the equities market. 
The Bond Market Exchange (BME) was formally established in 1993 by the Bond 
Market Association (BMA) under the provisions of the Financial Markets Control Act 
(Act 55 of 1989). 
The main instruments used in the bond market are of a fixed-interest nature and 
include public sector securities, private sector securities and debentures. The 
maturity structures range from one to twenty six years. 
The large issuers of these securities, which also operate their own secondary market 
operations, are the Reserve Bank (on behalf of the Treasury), Escom, Land Bank, 
South African Housing Trust, Development Bank of South Africa and Transnet. 
Smaller issuers generally use (merchant) banks as agents for their issues. 
The exchange was licensed in May 1996 and took over the responsibility for trading 
in bonds from the present formal market operated at the JSE and the informal market 
outside the JSE. lt is presently considering the introduction of exchange traded bond 
options. 
The central government is the largest borrower, followed by the non-financial public 
enterprises. Financial institutions hold circa 75 per cent of marketable fixed 
securities. The largest holders within this group are the insurers, pension funds and 
the Public Investment Commissioners (PlC). The banking sector holds only 10 per 
cent of total marketable stock debt (South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, 
various issues). 
In South Africa the equity market is formalised under the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) licensed in terms of the Stock Exchange Control Act, (Act 1 of 
141 For a definition of these instruments see Faure (1992(a): 165-166). 
142 The issue of Commercial Paper is at present regulated in terms of Government Gazette 15309 
dated 10 December 1993. 
143 Objections that have been raised include those regarding inconsistent disclosure requirements and 
arbitrary net asset requirements. On the one hand, a company desiring to issue CP must provide both 
its most recent financial statements as well as a statement on its capital, reserves and liabilities as 
certified by an auditor, resulting in a duplication of effort. On the other hand, these statements need 
only be provided at the date of issuance. With no ceiling placed on the maturity of CP, this 'flies in the 
face of the principles behind the Jacobs report, which calls for greater disclosure and the closing of 
loopholes' (Financial Mail 1993: 38). The regulations also require the issuing company to have a 
minimum net asset value of R 100 million. However, this gives no indication of the credit quality of the 
paper, as a company with an asset value below this level may well be creditworthy and one above the 
level not. · 
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1985). The Act is administered by the Registrar of Stock Exchanges. The JSE has 
four markets, viz. the .main board, the development capital market, the venture 
capital market and the traded options market144. 
The JSE is the tenth largest equity market in the world (The Economist 1995:54 ). 
Although large in terms of market capitalisation, the historical turnover statistics on 
the JSE are low as evidenced in Table 5.3. This is due inter alia to the existence of a 
0,5 per cent marketable securities tax, uncertainty with regard to what constitutes a 
taxable profit in share transactions; concentration of ownership and the remaining 
foreign exchange control regulations on South African residents. 
A JSE research subcommittee chaired by Prof. Michael Katz released a report on the 
restructuring of the JSE in May 1994. The following recommendations145 contained in 
the report were subsequently accepted, in principle, by the members of the JSE: 
• the introduction of negotiated commissions on transactions exceeding R 3 million; 
• the revision of capital requirements for stockbrokers in line with international 
trends; 
• the removal of South African citizenship as a qualification for membership; 
• the establishment of limited liability corporate membership; 
• corporate ownership of broking firms up to 30 per cent; 
• retaining single-capacity trading; 
• improving access to a listing on the JSE; and 
• the provision of access to the equity markets by banks and other financial 
institutions as derivative members. 
The proposed changes, may be likened to those implemented in the UK in the 1980s 
- the so-called Big Bang. However, unlike the UK, these recommendations were 
phased in over a two year period, although the eventual changes went further than 
the Katz Committee recommendations such as allowing 100 per cent corporate 
ownership of broking firms. At present the deregulated JSE allows for fully negotiable 
commissions, full foreign ownership of broking institutions and dual-capacity trading. 
In June 1996 the JSE moved the last remaining equity sector to screen based 
trading from the older 'open outcry' method. 
These evolutionary regulatory changes, combined with the reduction in marketable 
securities tax from 1 per cent to 0,5 per cent in the 1996 Budget are likely to increase 
substantially the liquidity in the South African equity market. 
144 See paragraph 5.5.2.4. 
145 The committee differed on three core issues; single versus dual capacity trading; negotiable 
commissions; and corporate membership of the JSE. The majority opinion was opposed to dual 
trading capacity as it believed that this would remove the essential element of investor protection. The 
minority believed that dual trading should be permitted after a brief transitional period and that 
investors could be protected by a combination of automation, transparency and competition. The full 
subcommittee agreed on the linkage between dual capacity and fully negotiable commissions but the 
majority feared that it would result in higher dealing costs for the small investor. The minority group 
favoured fully negotiable commissions. The minority group was also in favour of a swifter transition to 
unrestricted corporate ownership of stockbroking firms than the initial 30 per cent limit favoured by the 
majority. 
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Table 5.4 Liquidity in The Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
,.Turnover. 
· (R millions) 
11.247 
20.720 
23.912 
22.231 
22.134 
44.080 
71.712 
63.194 
· Market Capitalisat.ion 
(R millions) 
291.660 
414.042 
386.510 
508.270 
501.324 
737.632 
919.802 
1 022.656 
Source: The Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
Liquidity 
3,9 
5,0 
6,2 
4,4 
4,4 
6.0 
7,8 
6,2 
Of great relevance to this study is the fact that banks are now allowed to participate 
in securities business activities via fully owned braking firms.146 
5.5.2.3 The Foreign Exchange Market 
The development and present structure of the foreign exchange market was largely 
influenced by the South African dual exchange rate system147 and the existence of 
strict exchange control regulations.148 Nevertheless, South Africa has an active and 
developed spot market in all of the major currencies. 
The ultimate provider of forward cover in the foreign exchange m?trket in South Africa 
is the South African Reserve Bank. Since the abolition of the financial rand in March 
1995 the South African Reserve Bank has reduced its involvement in the forward 
currency market; a move facilitated by greater South African access to international 
foreign exchange markets. Presently the Reserve Bank quotes commercial rand 
forwards against the US dollar up to a maximum of 12 months on a swap basis at a 
price determined by the interest rate differential between the two countries. Most 
146 See paragraph 9.2.2. 
147 Except for the brief period between February 1983 and September 1985, South Africa has 
maintained a dual exchange rate system since the Sharpeville political incident in 1960 when large 
outflows of capital occurred. The dual exchange rate system comprised the commercial rand (used for 
commercial trade and loan transactions) and the financial rand (reserved for certain transactions 
conducted by non-residents, immigrants and emigrants such as investments or disinvestments 
excluding loan capital). The financial rand traded at a discount to the commercial rand and the effect of 
this dual exchange rate system was to improve substantially the rate of return to foreign investors. In 
March 1995, the financial rand was abolished and all transactions involving foreign currency are now 
concluded through the commercial rand. 
148 The statutory basis of South African exchange control is section 9(1) of the Currency and 
Exchanges Act (Act 9 of 1933), which empowers the Head of State (or such person as he chooses to 
delegate his powers to) to 'make regulations in regard to any matter directly or indirectly related to or 
affecting or having any bearing upon currency, banking and exchanges.' Based on this Act the 
government, on 1 December 1961, issued Government Notices No. R1111 and No. R1112, which still 
forms the basis of South African exchange control. Over the years the control measures have become 
increasingly complex. Although exchange control is still seen as a matter of practical necessity to 
prevent the large-scale outflow of captive funds of residents, there are doubts about the effectiveness 
of these controls. 
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South African banks are increasing their participution in all areas of the liquid forward 
market. 
The net· daily turnover in the South African foreign exchange market, excluding 
transactions in futures and options, averaged $ 4,9 billion in 1995. The annual 
turnover of the South African foreign exchange market is about fifteen times the 
combined annual value of South African imports and exports. Compared to global 
annual foreign exchange transactions which are estimated to be forty times the total 
value of annual imports and exports (Faure 1992(a): 192), this is a modest amount. 
The limited role of speculation, limited access to international foreign exchange 
markets and restrictive foreign exchange control legislation has prevented significant 
growth in turnover. 
Despite these restraints the South African foreign exchange market has grown from 
a net daily turnover of$ 2,9 billion in 1991 to $ 4,9 billion in 1995. This growth record 
is accounted for by increased invisible trade, very large capital movements since 
1987 and a larger degree of foreign exchange speculation. 
The future development of the forward exchange market is largely dependent on the 
increased participation of foreign banks in the market, the development of a formal 
Eurorand market, and most importantly less onerous exchange control restrictions on 
South African residents. 
5.5.2.4 The Derivatives Market 
The South African derivative markets that are discussed below are the futures 
market and the options market. The markets for interest rate swaps and forward rate 
agreements (FRAs) are as yet small and underdeveloped. 
The South African futures market149 is formalised under the South African Futures 
Exchange (SAFEX) which was licensed by the Registrar of Financial Markets on 10 
August 1990 in terms of the Financial Markets Control Act (Act 55 of 1989). SAFEX 
was the first market to be licensed in terms of the Act and was authorised to regulate 
the trade in futures and options on futures. 
SAFEX has approximately 80 members comprising of banks, stockbrokers, futures 
brokers and certain other institutions. 
149 The financial futures market in South Africa was initiated by Rand Merchant Bank Ltd. in 1988 
when it began trading futures contracts based on the JSE Actuaries All Share, All Gold and Industrial 
Indices. Initially Rand Merchant Bank acted as the only market maker and clearer and guarantor of all 
futures trades, in effect performing the function of a formalised clearing house for futures. In 
September 1988, the JSE and 21 banks became the founding members of the South African Futures 
Exchange (SAFEX) and shareholders in the company established to clear futures, i.e. SAFEX Clearing 
Company (Pty) Ltd. (SAFCOM). All futures trades were transferred from Rand Merchant Bank to this 
company on 27 April1989. 
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The turnover in futures contracts is shown in Table 5.5. Since 1992, the value of 
futures trading has considerably exceeded the turnover on the JSE, indicating once 
again the low liquidity of the latter. 
Table 5.5 Futures Volumes in South Africa 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
Number of contracts 
511.420 
604.640 
1.363.029 
3.029.289 
4.087.483 
3.550.588 
Underlying Value 
(R millions) 
16.291 
23.291 
49.075 
103.616 
203.125 
194.310 
Source: South African Reserve Bank: Quarterly Bulletin, 1996. 
Turnover in futures contracts fell back slightly in 1995 mainly due to a more stable 
environment in the foreign exchange market, a decline in non-resident participation 
and the negative effect of the Barings Bank debacle on derivatives trading globally. 
The South African options market has both a formalised (i.e. an exchange) as well as 
an over-the-counter (OTC) dimension. Although the options market in bonds is a 
OTC market, the market centres around certain standardised options (predominantly 
the Escom 168 loan stock). In addition, there are the semi-standardised options 
which include the so-called daylight, overnight and tailor-made options. In 1992, the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange launched its Traded Options Market (TOM) for the 
trading of options on certain listed shares150 and share indices151. However, the 
volume of formalised trading in options has been disappointingly low mainly because 
of a lack of market-makers and exorbitant costs involved. 
150 Listed companies on whose shares options are offered on TOM include: Anglo American 
Corporation of South Africa Ltd., Barlow Rand Ltd, De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd., Rustenburg 
Platinum Holdings Ltd., Sasol Ltd., and Vaal Reefs Exploration and Mining Company Ltd .. 
151 Index options are traded on the JSE All Share (overall), All Gold and Industrial indices. 
129 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions 
5.6 Excursus: The Eurocurrency Market 
The full importance of an epoch-making idea is often not perceived in the generation in which 
it is made ... The mechanical inventions of every age are apt to be underrated relatively to those 
of earlier times. For a new discovery is seldom fully effective for practical purposes till many 
minor improvements and subsidiary discoveries have gathered themselves around it. 
Alfred Marshal! ( 1842-1942) 
Any description of national financial systems is incomplete without reference to the 
international dimension. Indeed, the increasing internationalisation of financial 
markets have raised important new regulatory issues. As domestic financial markets 
have become more integrated in global markets, activities important to the domestic 
economy have passed beyond the control of domestic regulatory authorities. This 
problem is complicated, as attempts to tighten domestic regulations strengthen 
incentives for activities to move abroad. The development of the Eurocurrency 
markets is the most prominent example of this process (Levich 1990: 373-399). 
The Eurocurrency (originally Eurodollar) market originated when in the late 1950s, 
UK merchant banks were restricted by the regulations of the Bank of England on the 
use of Sterling for external loans. Necessity is the mother of invention, the old 
proverb states and the innovative solution152 of these banks was to use the US dollar 
to conduct these transactions from accounts based in London. Since Bank of 
England regulations did not cover the US dollar, UK merchant banks could set 
competitive interest rates to attract deposits and offer external loans denominated in 
dollars.153 
The Eurocurrency market was founded, above all, on the fact that international banks 
were able to offer holders of international currencies higher returns if they placed 
these funds offshore, in a centre like London, than if they deposited them in the 
domestic financial system, which is subject to monetary regulation.154 The margin 
was originally created mainly as a result of the absence of reserve requirements on 
banks accepting deposits in the form of Eurodollars. In addition, the costs of 
subscribing to the US federal deposit insurance scheme increased the margin. In the 
American case, therefore, the effect of domestic regulation has been to spur the 
development of offshore deposit markets (Van Niekerk 1987: 42). 
152 Perhaps the regulatory authorities realised the genius of this innovation and the impending 
snowball effect that it might have. When Paul Einzig, a Financial Times journalist, first discovered the 
market, he was requested not to write about it. 
153 Curiously, the growth of the Eurocurrency market was (unintentionally) aided by Russia. Intending 
to protect hard-earned export dollars from possible nationalisation by the United States, Russian 
officials deposited such funds in London and Paris affiliates of state-owned Russian banks. The Paris 
Bank, Banque Commerciale pour !'Europe du Nord, had the Telex address EUROBANK, which later 
became synonymous with the general activity of accepting deposits offshore. 
154 The Euromarkets do not operate independently of domestic financial markets. Domestic monetary 
policy will influence the Euromarkets, especially in the absence of restrictions on capital flows. Shaw 
(1984: 154) argues that interest rates on the Euromarkets are determined by domestic rates, i.e. the 
causality of changes in interest rates is from domestic markets to the Euromarkets. 
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Another important, though temporary, stimulus to tha Eurocurrency market was the 
imposition of credit restrictions and capital controls imposed by the US during the 
period 1963 - 1974.155 European governments also experimented with capital· 
controls during this period which similarly promoted the non-dollar segments of the 
Eurocurrency market. One example is the regulations of the Bundesbank requiring 
foreigners to place funds at the 'Bardepot' in non-interest bearing accounts, which 
was only abolished in 1974.156 
The lasting stimulus to the Eurocurrency market, then, has been the differential 
regulations between domestic and offshore banking operations. The majority of 
these regulations were direct monetary requirements. The introduction of these 
controls has lead to a process of monetary disintermediation in favour of offshore 
markets, on a dimension never before experienced by regulatory authorities. 
The rise of the Euromarkets is relevant to this study, as it accentuates that market 
participants and financial institutions have the alternative to arrange transactions in 
any of several financial centres. Therefore, regulatory authorities must be keenly 
aware of the costs imposed by domestic financial regulations and the implications for 
the co-ordination of international financial regulation. 
Indeed, as Kane (1987) has argued, domestic financial regulations are determined 
competitively and endogenously after taking into account the regulations, both 
present and prospective, in other financial systems and areas. The essence of 
Kane's (1987) analysis is that the market for suppliers of financial regulation is highly 
competitive. As such, the deregulation of financial markets and financial institutions 
is ascribed to national regulators who compete for market share. The 'market' for 
financial regulation is competitive in the sense that other regulatory authorities may 
offer (or potentially offer) more favourable regulations relative to the domestic 
regulator. This actual or potential competition serves to constrain the actions of 
suppliers of financial regulation.157 
This point is particularly relevant in the South African context. In an increasingly 
global environment, both South African market participants and regulatory authorities 
will need to adapt to new and global competitive challenges. This is likely to lead to a 
greater degree of convergence of financial regulation across financial systems. In 
155 In response to the undesired accumulation of dollars overseas (dollars that the US was commited 
to convert into gold at $35 per ounce) the United States adopted the Interest Equalisation Tax (lET), 
effectively an excise tax on US purchases of foreign securities. Instead of earning tax revenues or 
halting dollar lending to foreigners, the borrowing activity was simply displaced by the Eurocurrency 
markets in London and Luxembourg. Other US regulations such as the Foreign Credit Restraint 
Program ('voluntary' in 1965 and mandatory in 1968) provided firms with further incentives to conduct 
business in the Eurocurrency markets. These measures were eliminated in 1974. 
156 For an analysis of the impact of German capital controls on the differential between onshore and 
offshore interest rates see Dooley and lsard (1980). 
157 A German experience offers some indication of the sensitivities of both investors and regulatory 
authorities. In 1988, about OM 120 billion flowed out of the Federal Republic of Germany, partly 
because investors wanted to avoid the 1 0 per cent witholding tax on interest income that became 
effective on 1 January 1989. On 27 April 1989 the German government announced that the witholding 
tax would be abolished on 1 July 1989. 
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particular, regulatory convergence will drive further relaxation of exchange control 
regulations which are out of step with international trends. 
The nub of the argument, however, is not new. lt is a logical implication of the theme 
described at the outset, namely the constancy of structural change in financial 
systems and the importance of constantly evaluating financial regulation in the light 
thereof. 
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5. 7 Summary and Conclusion 
In conclusion, it can be said that all three systems surveyed, sport well-developed 
financial markets, as for instance demonstrated by the existence and growth of 
derivative markets in each of these. In Germany, banks have historically dominated 
the financial industry which inhibited development of a broader financial market, yet 
the existing financial markets allow German banks the opportunity to actively 
manage their financial risks. 
lt is interesting to note the large disparities between the market share of the large 
banks in each economy. In Germany, the three big banks (who are often criticised for 
their excessive power) hold only 9,2 per cent of the market whereas the four largest 
South African banks have a market share of over 80 per cent. Nevertheless, all three 
systems display a high degree of competition as exemplified by the number of 
market participants; and innovation as indicated by the level of development of the 
financial markets. 
Viewed from a South African perspective, there are compelling reasons for selecting 
the financial systems of Germany and the UK in order to perform a comparative 
analysis of financial regulation. The three systems are currently experiencing largely 
similar structural forces (such as deregulation, competition, globalisation, 
technological changes and innovation). Whereas Germany and the UK exhibit some 
dissimilar, indeed opposite, financial features (such as regards models of corporate 
governance and models of banking), South Africa can be regarded as a hybrid 
system, sharing features of both. 
Banks in the UK can be divided into commercial banks, foreign banks and other 
deposit-taking institutions. Building societies are regulated in terms of separate 
legislation. At August 1996 there were 720 such institutions holding total banking 
assets of£ 1 963 billion. 
The City of London provides the basis for some of the largest and most sophisticated 
financial markets in the world. The consistent deregulation of financial markets both 
preceding and antedating the 'Big Bang' has aided the development of the 
marketplace and resulted in a greater integration of domestic and international 
markets. 
The dominant position of German banks has resulted in the German financial system 
being orientated more towards financial intermediation than towards direct financial 
markets. The German banking system consists of commercial banks, state-owned 
savings banks, credit co-operatives and specialised banks. Although all of these 
banks fall under the supervisory ambit of one banking act, there are still some 
financial regulations which are not in accordance with the principles of competitive 
neutrality, most notably in the case of mortgage banks. In November 1995 the total 
amount of bank assets held by 3 659 of these institutions amounted to OM 7 668 
billion. 
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Compared to Germany's economic performance, its financial markets are relatively 
underdeveloped. This is mainly due to regulatory constraints as well as the 
significant role played by banks in these markets. 
In South Africa, no distinction is drawn between various categories of deposit-taking 
institutions as these are all considered banks. At the end of 1995 the total assets 
held by the 41 registered banks amounted to R 401 billion. South African financial 
markets are generally well developed and largely deregulated, the most notable 
exceptions being those markets that are affected by exchange control regulations. 
The Eurocurrency market developed as a result of the differential regulations 
between domestic and offshore banking operations. Because the 'market' for 
financial regulation is competitive, domestic regulators must also consider the 
actions of other regulatory authorities, 
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CHAPTERS 
A COMPARISON OF REGULATORY AUTHORITIES IN SELECTED 
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter provides a comparison of regulatory authorities in the UK, Germany 
and South Africa. In each case the relevant banking supervisory authority is 
described with reference to the historical development thereof, the supervisory 
approach adopted, the supervisory methodology embraced and finally, the 
relationship between the banking supervisory authority and other supervisory bodies. 
This historical development of each supervisory authority is useful as it provides an 
insight as to the manner in which supervisors reacted to changing economic and 
financial circumstances and underlines the concept of regulation being a dynamic 
process. 
Supervision entails much more than the ·application of rules, even if these are 
considered complex. lt is for this reason that the supervisory approach and 
methodology are discussed. The supervisory approach relates to the manner in 
which regulations are applied. This may range from a strict enforcement of very 
specific risk-related rules to the application of more general risk-related principles. 
The supervisory approach also encompasses the degree of formality adopted by 
regulatory authorities, (i.e. formal vs informal approach). 
The supervisory methodology distinguishes between 'on-site' and 'off-site' 
supervision, which indicates whether supervisory authorities are themselves involved 
in the collection of risk-related data (or rely on banks and I or auditors to do so) as 
well as the degree of interaction by regulators with bank management. Finally, 
banking supervision cannot be seen in isolation from the remainder of the financial 
system and it is therefore necessary to understand how the banking supervisory 
authorities fit in with the overall supervisory structure.1ss 
158 Good hart ( 1995: 333-359) considers the institutional separation between supervisory and monetary 
agencies. A major argument for divorcing the monetary from the bank regulatory authority is that the 
combination of functions might lead to a conflict of interest. This conflict is argued to bring about a bias 
towards additional money creation insofar as the central bank, in its role of lender of last resort, will 
extend emergency assistance facilities to a troubled bank. This is an unconvincing argument as the 
central bank will know the precise amount of assistance and will be able to adjust monetary policy 
measures accordingly. There are, however, stronger grounds for claiming that those concerned with 
financial stability may seek to restrain interest rate increases needed from a macro-economic 
perspective, although this will depend on the particular structure of the financial and banking system in 
each country. The main historical basis for arguing in favour of such a combination was the central 
bank's objective of preventing contagious crises. Until the development of alternative efficient and safe 
payment systems has occurred, the central bank is likely to retain its important role both in organising 
and supporting the payment system. This implies both an assumption of credit risk, and /or a need to 
deal with emergency liquidity risks. This is the strongest ground supporting the continuing combination 
of such functions.Goodhart (1995: 359) argues that central banks are tending to retreat from the 
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6.2 Regulatory Authorities in the United Kingdom 
6.2.1 Historical Development 
In order to understand the current UK supervisory system, it is useful to examine the 
forces that have shaped its development. Until 1979, there was relatively little 
statutory provision for banking supervision and monetary regulation in the UK. The 
Bank of England (the Bank) maintained a rather informal supervisory system based 
on 'moral suasion', derived from its status as central bank. The system was notable 
for its considerable reliance upon self-regulation by the institutions concerned. There 
were. few formal regulations or prescribed codes. The system emphasised periodic 
interviews between bank management and the Bank. Although the Bank monitored 
certain prudential ratios, no minimum ratio levels were prescribed. The cash, liquidity 
and reserve assets ratios imposed by the Bank were laid down for reasons of 
monetary policy. Until1974, supervision was carried out by the Discount Office of the 
Bank, whose main function was to influence short-term interest rates. One 
consequence of this approach was that no generally accepted definition of a bank 
existed. This system, unique to the UK, worked well for a considerable period. 
However, the increasing risks in banking and financial systems throughout the world 
resulted in the adoption of a more formal regulatory structure. 
The specific impetus was provided by the secondary or fringe banking crisis of 1973-
1975. Secondary or fringe banks were newer banks which had grown up alongside 
the established primary banks.159 In the first significant academic survey of the 
Discount Office's approach to supervision, Revell (1975) suggests that the major 
cause of the fringe banking crisis was not the Bank of England supervisory system 
itself, but the loophole in that supervision resulted from Section 123 status. Some 
Section 123 banks did not have to make returns to any official body, although they 
were required to publish half-yearly accounts. Section 123 banks were effectively 
free to accept deposits and make loans. When the property and stock markets 
plunged in 1974, the value of the assets held by secondary banks dropped so much 
that their capital was wiped out. The Bank, together with the big clearing banks, 
responded to the crisis with the Lifeboat rescue operation. In total, 26 banks and 
financial concerns were assisted. through the Lifeboat group and at least the same 
number received forms of support from their own banks or major shareholders. In the 
previous primary role as provider of emergency assistance for two related reasons. First the banking 
system is becoming less clearly defined; consequently it is more difficult to persuade the members of 
the banking club to agree to co-operate in financial rescues. Second, the central bank is less able to 
organise co-operation on a self-regulatory basis, thereby increasing the need for the government to 
provide ultimate financial support. This means that the regulatory I supervisory function is shifting 
away from central bank control to an independent body which is more directly under political control. 
Notwithstanding this structural trend, the continuing role of the central bank as the only available 
source of immediate last resort liquidity means that, even if formally separated, the two bodies who 
have to work closely together in practice. Consequently, even though a formal separation of 
supervisory and . monetary functions may become more common, this change may not impact 
significantly on practical realities. 
159 lt is, however, significant that a number of banks that were fully recognised by the Bank of England 
also engaged in the riskier banking practices of the fringe banks. 
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well-known cases of Slater Walker and Edward Bates, extensive and costly support 
was provided by the Bank. The approximate total sum set aside by the Bank for its 
rescue role was £ 100 million, while the total amount lent through the joint Lifeboat 
operation exceeded £ 1.300 million (Reid 1986: 101 ). Most of this was repaid in due 
course, usually by strong groups who took over the insolvent banks, often facilitated 
by the Bank. 
The obvious inference from this crisis was that it had been a mistake not to have 
monitored and supervised such a significant sector of banking activity. The Bank 
responded with new measures in August 197 4. This marked the emergence of the 
modern bank supervisory function in the UK. A new Banking and Money Market 
Supervision section (BAMMS) was established by the Bank. Presided over by a 
more senior official than had headed the Discount Office, this action also 
considerably extended the previous supervisory responsibilities. The new system of 
supervision was immediately extended to cover more than 60 'non-bank' deposit-
taking institutions and 100 banks outside the clearers and other big groups. These 
were required to submit regular quarterly returns and to provide greater detail on the 
main components of their business (Gardener 1986: 74; Reid 1986: 103-104). 
Although the administration and status of banking supervision changed, the 
underlying supervisory philosophy was left intact. The most important part of the 
supervisory process remained the regular interviews with bank management to 
discuss and elaborate on the reports. 
The 1979 Banking Act was a landmark in that it was the first time that the regulatory 
powers of the Bank were formalised in specific legislation. The key elements of the 
Act reflect the lessons of the secondary banking crisis. An important aim of the Act 
was to prevent any bank or other financial institution from accepting deposits without 
the prior authorisation of the Bank. The Act defined the institutions which were 
subject to legislation and specified the criteria which had to be satisfied to obtain 
authorisation. The Act required banks to be either authorised as banks or licensed as 
deposit-taking institutions. Although the Act was silent on supervisory controls like 
minimum balance sheet ratios, the Bank was given statutory powers to monitor that 
banks continued to satisfy the conditions for authorisation. The Bank's supervisory 
style of dialogue and flexibility, and its special relationship with supervised banks, 
were not altered by the Act (Gardener 1986: 77-78). 
The failure of Johnson Matthey Bankers (JMB), which necessitated it to be rescued 
by the Bank in 1984, was the catalyst for the reform of the 1979 Act. This reform 
culminated in the new Banking Act of 1987. To fully appreciate the nature of this 
reform, it is necessary to review the shortcomings in banking supervision exposed by 
the JMB affair. Hall (1989: 17-19) distinguishes three headings: auditors, 
authorisation procedures, and large exposures. 
Under the Companies Act, auditors were required to report to shareholders on 
whether or not financial statements reflected a 'true and fair view' of a bank's 
financial position. If auditors failed to form such an opinion they could either resign or 
qualify their opinion, both options which could lead to a run on the bank. Unlike the 
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case in other countries, auditors could not turn to supervisory authorities as this 
would have represented a breach of confidentiality. In the light of the above and the 
subsequent litigation16o that arose out of the JMB case it seemed desirable to allow 
for a regular dialogue between auditors and supervisors. Moreover, as the JMB 
collapse went undetected by the auditors, it was clear that more detailed reporting 
requirements would have to be imposed. 
Second, the merits of the two-tier authorisation process, whereby authorised banks 
were supervised less extensively than licensed deposit-taking institutions, were 
called into question by the JMB affair. The management of JMB, an authorised bank, 
evidenced gross material incompetence iri nearly every facet of commercial banking. 
Finally, JMB's failure to report certain large exposures and its persistent 
understatement of the size of its two largest exposures, indicated the need to move 
towards the statutory reporting of large exposures and to make misreporting, or 
failure to report, an offence. 
As a consequence of the JMB affair, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in 1984, 
established a committee to review banking procedures. The Review Committee, 
under the chairmanship of the Governor of the Bank reported in June 1985 {the 
Leigh-Pemberton Report). Following the publication of three consultative papers on 
issues raised in the Report and after extensive consultation with the principal 
banking and accountancy associations, the government issued a White Paper on 
Banking Supervision in December 1985. The proposals contained in the White Paper 
formed the basis of the 1987 Banking Act. The major statutory amendments 
introduced under the Act relate to an extended role for auditors, 161 new authorisation 
procedures, 162 new treatment of large exposures, 163 new criminal sanctions, new 
Bank of England powers and the formal establishment of the Board of Banking 
Supervision (Hall 1989: 23-25). 
Certain changes were made to the UK Banking Act with effect from 1 January 1993 
to accommodate European Community law (most notably that associated with the 
implementation of the 'single market' programme in financial services). In the light of 
the BCCI affair, Lord Justice Bingham made a number of recommendations for the 
reform of domestic supervisory practice, which _were accepted in full by both the 
government and the Bank. The Bingham Report recommendations can be found in 
HMSO (1992). The Post-BCCI Directive ('Directive of Reinforce Prudential 
Supervision within the European Union following the Collapse of BCCI') was 
implemented in 1996. The Directive covers not only European credit institutions but 
also investment firms and insurance companies. lt has four main provisions: first, it 
gives supervisors powers to refuse authorisation where group and ownership links 
prevent effective supervision; second, it requires financial undertakings to have their 
160 Both the Bank of England and JMB sued Arthur Young, the auditors of JMB, for alleged negligence 
while Arthur Young, in turn, sued the Bank of England and the Chancellor of the Exchequer for 
defamation. 
161 See paragraph 7.2.3.2. 
162 See paragraph 7.2 .1 . 
163 See paragraph 7 .2.5.1. 
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head office in the same Member State as their registered office; third, it allows a 
widening of the range of disclosure gateways allowing supervisors to provide 
information to, among other, those supervising the accountancy profession and 
bodies responsible for the detection and investigation of branches of company law 
(including external inspectors); and fourth, Member States must place a duty on 
auditors, and experts (such as reporting accountants) appointed by supervisors, to 
report material breaches of relevant laws and certain other concerns to the 
supervisory authorities. In the UK, auditors have had a statutory duty to report 
relevant information to supervisors since May 1994164 (Bank of England 1996( c): 30). 
British banking supervision will also be influenced by changes due to the failure of 
Barings Bank in 1995. The Bank recently conducted a nine month review of banking 
supervision. Although the review had its origins in the Board of Banking Supervisions 
Report into the Barings collapse, it was more wide-ranging and investigated the 
standards and processes of supervision. The review confirmed that the Bank should 
maintain its style of supervision characterised by discretion, pragmatism and the 
avoidance of bureaucracy. Nevertheless, certain improvements were recommended 
and the following actions will be taken (The Banker 1996: 13): 
• reorganising the supervisory staff into smaller divisions to reduce the 
pressure on senior management; 
• raising the experience level of supervisory staff, especially in complex 
areas; 
• developing a more systematic model of risk assessment which will drive the 
supervisory programme in respect of each individual bank which will 
determine the supervisory priorities for the period ahead. This will involve 
the supervisors spending more time 'on-site', but is not a move to 
'examinations'; 165 
• reviewing the use made of input from internal and external auditors. The 
current Reporting Accountant (Section 39) regime, which focuses on 
internal controls, will be improved;166 and 
• continuing to forge more effective, practical and better documented links 
with other supervisors. 
Another initiative in the broader area of supervision and regulation concerns the 
establishment of the Personal Investment Authority (PIA) during 1994. The PIA was 
established to regulate retail financial services covering those areas previously 
covered by FIMBRA and LAUTRQ.167 
164 See paragraph 7.2.3.2. 
165 See paragraph 6.2.3 below. 
166 See paragraph 7.2.3.2 below. 
167 See Diagram 6.1. 
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6.2.2 Supervisory Approach 
Despite the existence of a statutory framework, the Bank continues to rely heavily on 
its informal authority.1ea The objective of supervision explicit in the 1987 Act is the 
protection of the interests of depositors and the wider concern with the soundness 
and stability of the overall banking system. The Bank prides itself on the flexibility of 
its supervisory approach and the degree of consultation which takes place before 
supervisory initiatives are implemented. 
The Bank's approach to supervision is such, that it does not see itself as a regulator. 
As Brian Quinn (1993: 260), who had been an Executive Director at the Bank (until 
1 March 1996) argues: 
'Regulation, as the word indicates, is about rules and about the precise 
formulation and policing of those rules. In respect of financial services it calls 
for the codification of a corpus of strictly defined and detailed rules relating to 
particular activities, products and services. lt entails specialised techniques of 
monitoring and enforcement and is usually accompanied by sanctions which 
are equally precise in their nature and in the circumstances of their 
application ... Supervision is different, both in content and in style: the law sets 
the framework within which authorised companies may operate, rather than 
prescribing in detail how the relevant goods and services should be provided.' 
Hall (1989: 49) argues that the informal approach of the Bank 'serves to further the 
cause of the economy and the banking system as a whole by limiting the competitive 
distortions introduced and the damage done to the innovative capacity of the 
industry.' 
However, Metcalfe (1986: 139) expresses some doubts about the robustness of the 
system. One basic problem is the lack of a general definition of a bank. The 
supervisory system covers banks and other deposit-taking institutions, but the 
distinction between these is not clearly explained. Banks are identified according to 
their size rather than on conceptual grounds. 
A practical implication of this lack of conceptual clarity, is the UK regulatory 
distinction between banks and building societies. The latter are regulated by the 
1986 Building Societies Act, which came into effect in January 1987. The Act 
provides for the creation of a Building Societies Commission responsible for 
supervising the societies (Swary and Topf 1992: 153). This legal distinction between 
financial institutions which perform essentially similar functions, i.e. deposit-taking, 
168 However, as Hall (1989: 180) comments in a footnote, this approach could change 'if the number of 
institutions willing to accept it were to diminish in the face of an intensification of competition from 
overseas institutions unused to such a supervisory relationship and more concerned with the letter of 
law and rulebooks. Already, such a shift towards a legalistic frame of mind is evident in the indigenous 
City institutions heralding, perhaps, a new dawn for statutory purposes.' 
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forms the basis for a number of regulations169. which are not compatible with 
principles of competitive neutrality. 
A second potential source of problems is that supervisors base their decisions on the 
quality of bank management, rather than on prescribed financial ratios; However, it is 
difficult to define the quality of management operationally. Clearly, the track record of 
the individuals concerned will play an important role. Although the Bank does not 
claim to be able to make better commercial judgements than commercial bankers, 
they are claiming a more sophisticated and abstract competence, namely the ability 
to judge the managerial skills of commercial bankers (Metcalfe 1986: 139). To some 
extent Gardener (1986: 44) counters this notion when he argues: 
'The very existence of supervision is almost taken to be an insult to bank 
management competence. This view reflects a fundamental misconception as 
to the role of supervisors ... The supervisory authorities cannot (and would not 
generally wish to) run banks, because that is simply not their job. After all, with 
complete internal authority and full access to the relevant information, 
management itself is faced with a full-time task. Even with these 
·characteristics and data, control over all bank variables by management is 
never complete and always difficult. An outside body, like supervisory 
authorities, would be faced with a much more difficult task than management if 
it attempted to control each bank completely. Indeed, it would be an 
impossible task. ' 
Nevertheless, the basic point remains relevant. lt is a much easier supervisory task 
to monitor a bank's compliance with a number of prudential requirements, than it is to 
judge the quality of bank management. 
Finally, Metcalfe (1986: 139) feels that supervisors may lack the analytical tools to 
model the banking system as a network of organisations even though the danger of 
a domino effect in interbank relations is often discussed. The openness of British 
banking due to the pre-eminence of London in international finance, increases the 
vulnerability of the system to world events. In effect, increased reliance is placed on 
international arrangements to cope with disruptive changes. 
169 For instance, the Building Societies Act only allows building societies to purchase up to 40 per cent 
of their funds in the wholesale deposit markets. Whilst the Act extended the traditional role of building 
societies (providing loans secured by a first mortgage of residential property) by allowing unsecured 
loans up to 1 0 per cent of a building society's commercial assets (total assets, less fixed assets), this 
is not comparable to the much broader diversification possibilities open to banks. However, one may 
argue that this requirement is rather one relating to liquidity risk-management as it seeks to prevent 
building societies from lending excessively on the short end of the market. A government review on the 
regulation of building societies was published in July 1994, focusing on possible changes to the 
regulations concerning wholesale funding and asset holdings (Naisbitt 1995: 46). 
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6.2.3 Supervisory Methodology 
As is evident from the above, the Bank does not favour the inspection-based 
methodology to supervision. Instead, it relies upon frequent management interviews 
as the core of its supervisory approach. Discussions are based on the data from 
prudential returns, profitability forecasts and auditor's reports. The latter covers the 
bank's accounting procedures, record-keeping, internal control systems, reports that 
may have been made at the initiative of the accountants or reports that may have 
been made at the request of the Bank. Where deficiencies are identified, advice is 
given to the bank's management as to the manner and time-span of remedial action. 
Close monitoring then ensures compliance with the Bank's requests. (Hall 1989: 51-
52; Hall 1993: 32). 
The Bank's routine meetings are of two main types: the prudential interview to 
discuss the institution's performance and other supervisory issues; and the trilateral 
meeting attended by the Bank, the institution and its reporting accountants.11o 
Following the failure of BCCI and Barings, the Bank has committed itself to extending 
its on-site examinations of banks (The Banker 1996: 13 ). 
6.2.4 Relationship with other Regulatory Bodies 
The Financial Services Act of 1986 is intended to ensure the safety and protection of 
the investor. The Act represents the first comprehensive attempt in the UK to cover 
investment business. Under the provisions of the Act it is a criminal offence to 
engage in investment business without appropriate prior authorisation. 
Authorisation can be obtained either directly from the Securities and Investments 
Board (SIB), to which the Secretary of State has delegated his supervisory powers; 
or from the appropriate Self Regulatory Organisations (SROs ), which are responsible 
for the day-to-day supervision in various financial services. The full regulatory 
structure is depicted in Diagram 6.1. 
The SIB is also empowered to recognise investment exchanges, clearing houses 
and professional bodies, to draw up conduct of business rules, to establish 
compensation schemes171, and to discipline firms and individuals where necessary. 
170 At which the discussion is focused on reports produced by the reporting accountants under section 
39 of the Banking Act. (See paragraph 7 .2.3.1 ). In 1995-96 there were 652 routine prudential 
interviews with the UK authorised institutions and 347 trilateral meetings. In addition over 2 500 non-
routine meetings were held to discuss specific issues (Bank of England 1996(c)). 
171 Under the scheme introduced on 27 August 1988 for the entire financial services industry, 
investors who suffer losses as a result of fraud and mismanagement by investment businesses 
operating with full authorisation will be entitled to compensation of up to £ 48.000 being 1 00 percent on 
the first £ 30.000 plus a maximum of 90 per cent on the following £ 20.000. The amount of 
compensation may be reduced by the SIB if claims exceed the amount of£ 100 million. 
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Diagram 6.1 Structure of UK Regulatory Authorities 
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The deposit-taking function of banks is exempted172 from the Financial Services Act 
1986, because this function is regulated by the Bank under the Banking Act 1987. 
Banks nevertheless fall within the ambit of the Financial Services Act by virtue of the 
investment business in which they engage and are obliged to acquire separate 
authorisation for each category of investment business, and to abide by the relevant 
conduct of business rules. 173 The Act therefore espouses a functional approach to 
regulation (Liewellynn 1992: 250). 
In order to reduce an overlapping of supervision between the Bank, the SIB and the 
SRO's, the Act provides for a lead-regulator approach, whereby the supervisory body 
responsible for the majority of the operations of an investment business is required to 
co-ordinate the supervision. 
The formal division of supervisory responsibility is carried out according to the March 
1988 Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) between the Bank, on the one hand, and 
the SIB, TSA and IMRO (see Diagram 6.1 ). Under this agreement, the Bank has 
assumed the role of lead-regulator for all UK-incorporated banks engaged in 
investment business, with the financial services supervisor being required to monitor 
institutions' compliance with conduct of business rules. As lead regulator, the Bank 
will monitor the capital adequacy on behalf of the SIB/SRO according to an agreed 
set of risk-related rules174 (Hall 1989: 37 -38; 53-54). 
Historically in the UK, the institutional approach has been dominant, largely because 
institutions have tended to be specialist in nature. The lead-regulator approach of the 
Financial Services Act represents an attempt at combining the functional approach 
and institutional approach to regulation. Nevertheless, Llewellyn (Melamet Report 
1993: 6) argues that the UK has moved too far towards functional regulation and that 
this has caused difficulties. Llewellyn (Melamet Report 1993: 6) makes the point that: 
'however efficient functional regulation is, the user of financial services is put in 
jeopardy if the institution with which he deals is unsafe.' 
Hall (1993: 44) also argues that the cost-effectiveness of superv1s1on might be 
improved if the Bank relied less heavily on the 'lead regulator' principle in discharging 
its supervisory responsibilities, but admits that this may involve a fundamental re-
assessment of the merits of functional vis-a-vis institutional regulation. 
172 Unlike building societies and insurance companies, however, banks are obliged to contribute to the 
SIB's compensation scheme. This is clearly not in accordance with the principle of competitive 
neutrality. 
173 Banks are required, for instance, to adopt the 'polarisation rules' relating to the sale of life 
assurance, unit trust and pension products. Under these rules, a bank has to operate either as an 
independent intermediary (not selling its own products), or as a (tied agent) company representative. 
The rationale for these rules is to avoid conflicts of interest, but they may also stifle competition. Most 
banks are innovatively evading these rules by selling their own products from branch networks while 
the sales force operate as tied agents. 
174 For example, for bank members of TSA, the Bank will determine capital adequacy by taking into 
account both the risk-asset ratio on normal banking business and the TSA's counterparty risk 
requirements for securities trading, using the Bank's standard definition of capital. 
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Another criticism levelled at the structure of regulatory authorities in the UK is the 
fact that several regulatory authorities exist, creating dangers of complexity, 
inconsistency, overlap, duplication and high administrative costs. Llewellyn (1992: 
252-253) quotes Lord Clinton-Davis' summary of the problem in a House of 
Commons report: 
'The House of Commons Trade and Industry has raised important criticism of 
our system of regulation - part statutory, part self-regulatory - which has 
become so extremely complex and fragmented that its effectiveness must be 
flawed ... The complexity of our machinery for investigation is utterly 
remarkable. We have no fewer than eleven different authorities responsible for 
investigatory or regulatory work. Often, several of these may be involved at 
any one time. Important questions about the efficiency of such a system must 
be: is there sufficient competition between these authorities; and is there a 
likelihood of commercial malpractice slipping through the net as a result of this 
web of different authorities? In each case the answer must be yes.' 
The structure of UK regulatory authorities is clearly too complex. Under the 1986 
Financial Services Act banks, building societies and insurance companies may be 
subject to the same regulatory requirements as regards the conduct of similar 
business activities and the protection of consumers. However, depending upon 
which service is involved, these requirements are administered by either the SIB, the 
PIA, or the IMRO. Moreover, for prudential purposes, banks are subject to the 
requirements of the Bank, building societies to the Building Societies Commission 
and insurance companies are subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of Trade 
and Industry (Liewellyn 1995: 212). 
This is a good example of combining functional regulation for consumer protection 
with institutional regulation in the interest of systemic stability. Nevertheless, these 
objectives are confused by the multiplicity of regulatory authorities involved. 
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6.3 Regulatory Authorities in Germany 
Despite its size and diversity, the post-war German financial system has historically 
been reasonably free of bank failures. There are many likely explanations for this, 
including the relatively consistent and robust growth of the German economy, the 
geographical diversification enjoyed by German lenders, and the close relations 
between bankers and their commercial customers. In addition, German banking 
policy was designed to mobilise market disciplinary forces as well as the advantages 
of a firmly administered supervisory system. 
6.3.1 Historical Development 
The basic legislation enabling the present supervisory system was established in 
1934 in response to the worldwide economic crisis in the 1930s and the 
consequences of the German banking crisis of the time. Until this time the banks 
operated freely in an unregulated market. The 1931 Banking Act 
(Reichskreditwesengesetz or RKWG) provided for the establishment of a Bank 
Supervision Department (Aufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen). Although an important 
motivation that led to the passing of the RKWG was to nationalise banks according 
to the then dominant national socialistic philosophy, it was rather decided that 
(RKWG 1934: § 6): 
'die private Initiative mit eigener Verantwortung die zweckmaBigste Grundlage 
einer Organisation der Kreditinstitute darstelle, wenn zugleich durch eine 
entsprechende Gestaltung der Aufsicht dem Gesamtinteresse rilcksichtslose 
Geltung verschafft werde.' 175 
Although charged with supervisory responsibility, it was up to a separate body (the 
Reichskommissar fur das Bankwesen) to oversee that banking business was 
conducted in accordance with the specific regulations of the RKWG 176 and the Bank 
Supervisory Department. With a few exceptions, all banking institutions were 
subjected to regulation and supervision by these authorities. The focal point of the 
RKWG was the Golden Banking Rule (Goldene Bankrege/) which determined that 
the term structure of liabilities should approximate the term structure of bank assets. 
In 1939 the Aufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen was renamed to Reichsaufsichtsamt 
fur das Kreditwesen. In 1945, after the War, the authority of the latter was transferred 
175 'the most efficient way to organise banking business is to combine the responsibility of private 
initiative with a structure of banking supervision that will guard the common interest without scruples' 
(writer's own translation). · 
176 Examples of specific regulations contained in the 1934 RKWG include: §1: Supervision of (all) 
banks; definition of banking business; §§ 2 ff.: Duty to be licensed as a bank and the right to forbid the 
undertaking of banking business; §§ 8,9: Regulations concerning notification regarding a change in 
management; the merger of banks; and large credit exposures; §§ 11 ff.: Regulations regarding 
liquidity, capital and the relation of capital to liabilities; §§ 14 ff.: Loans to associated companies 
(Organkredite); §§ 20 ff.: Regulations concerning balance sheets, savings business and non-cash 
payments;§§ 30 ff.: Organisation of supervision;§§ 45 ff.: Enforcement powers and punitive charges. 
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to the Minister of Economic Affairs (Reichswirtschaftsminister) where it remained 
until1961. 
Despite the political and economic changes brought about by the end of the Second 
World War, the RKWG retained its basic validity. The years 1955-1956 saw the 
preparation of a new Banking Act. The central question posed was whether 
supervision should be exercised centrally, rather than federally, while the actual 
content of the Act received far less attention. 
The 1961 Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz or KWG) is still at the heart of the present 
supervisory system. In terms of the Act the Federal Banking Supervisory Office 
(Bundesaufsichtsamt fOr das Kreditwesen or FBSO) was established in Berlin. The 
main supervisory objective as contained in the motivation177 for the KWG was: 
'Die Funktionsfahigkeit des Kreditapparates zu wahren und die G/aubiger 
nach Moglichkeit vor Verlusten zu schiltzen.'178 
The KWG draws upon the 1934 RKWG for a number of definitions as is evident from 
the following regulations: § 1: Definition of a bank; § 10: Capital adequacy; § 11: 
Liquidity; § 13: l,.arge credit exposures; § 15: Credit exposures to related companies 
(Organkredite); §§ 21 ff.: Savings business;§§ 25 ff.: Balance sheet regulations. 
lt is remarkable that many of the regulations contained in the 1934 RKWG already 
addressed banking risks and could therefore be maintained in the banking legislation 
which is used to this day in Germany. 
In the early 1970s a number _of small to medium banks experienced financial 
difficulties. However, the 1976 Amendment was specifically brought about by the 
failure of the large Bankhaus Herstatt.179 In 1974 a special committee was 
established to investigate the German banking system and to make relevant 
recommendations. The committee found the banking system, in general, to be 
effective, but made certain recommendations regarding the risk positions of banks 
which were legislated in 1976 (BrOmmerhof 1988: 360). 
The Second Amendment (1985) to the Banking Act deemed it necessary to make 
provision for banking supervision beyond the purely domestic domain. As the popular 
financial daily, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung commented, banking supervision 
should 'mit ihren Kanonen nicht nur bis Aachen schief3en konnen, sondern auch bis 
Luxembourg' 180 (Habscheid 1988: 17). Again, the most urgent motivation for the 
Amendment was the financial difficulties experienced by a well-known bank 
(Schroeder, MOnchmeyer, Hengst & Co.) in 1983. 
177 RegierungsbegrOndung des Entwurfs eines Gesetzes Oberdas Kreditwesen vom 25.5.1959. 
178 
'safeguarding the functionality of the banking system and, where possible, (protecting) the investor 
from (incurring) losses' (writer's own translation). 
179 See paragraph 3.4.1 for a discussion of the circumstances and the reaction of the Bundesbank. 
180 The cannons (of banking supervision) should be able to bombard not only to Aachen, but also to 
Luxembourg' (own translation). 
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The Third Amendment to the Banking Act, which also came into force in 1985, 
introduced a consolidation procedure for banking supervision purposes in addition to 
the existing supervision of individual banks. Until that time, banks could build up 
credit pyramids through their subsidiaries without any increase in the parent 
institution's capital base and thus bypass the restrictions on business that are based 
on the bank's capital (Deutsche Bundesbank 1993: 6-7). 
In terms of the Fourth Amendment to the Bank Act, which came into force on 
1 January, 1993, two directives of the European Community (EC), viz. the Second 
EC Banking Directive and the Own Funds Directive, were transplanted into German 
law. These Directives constitute a substantial step towards harmonising banking 
supervision legislation in the EC and are the precondition for free transactions in 
financial services in the single European market. In accordance with these 
regulations the licensing and ongoing supervision of banks were harmonised 
throughout the EC. The branches in other EC member states of a bank domiciled in 
a specific EC country were, in principle, subjected to the sole supervision of the 
home country authority responsible for that domicile, and a uniform, extended 
definition of capital was agreed upon (Deutsche Bundesbank 1993: 7). The 1993 
Amendment also aimed to differentiate between various risk categories and to Weigh 
these accordingly (Muller 1993: 798). 
The most recent amendment to the Bank Act took effect on 31 December 1995. In 
terms of the Fifth Amendment to the Bank Act the European Guidelines regarding 
large exposures181 and consolidation guidelines182 were translated into German law. 
In terms of this amendment the following changes were decided upon by the 
financial committee of the German parliament: The term 'credit' will only be used with 
reference to large exposures (GrofJkredite) and loans exceeding the sum of one 
million German marks (Millionenkredite ); derivative instruments are to be included in 
the monthly returns to the Bundesbank for such loans; 'silent' equity participations 
are viewed more generously when determining capital adequacy; as are unrealised 
reserves pertaining to special funds. Other improvements to the Act were made with 
regards to market making operations, credit assessment, loans to associated 
companies as well as certain other loans (Handelsblatt 1994: 37). 
Thus the fulcrum of the present supervisory system remains the Banking Act of 1961 
(as amended in 1976, 1985, 1993 and 1995). lt defines the organisations that 
constitute 'banks' and lays out the principles for setting bank ratios and standards. 
The basis for banking supervision is summarised as follows in the preface to the Act 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 1993: 5): 
'The legal basis for bank supervision in Germany is the Banking Act. This Act 
is aimed at safeguarding the viability of the banking industry, which is 
particularly sensitive to fluctuations in confidence, by protecting creditors. The 
181 See paragraph 8.2.5.1. 
182 See paragraph 8.2.4.2. 
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Act seeks to fulfil this aim while paying due regard to market principles, i.e. the 
entire responsibility for business decisions rests with the bank managers. The 
activity of banks is restricted only by quantitative general provisions and the 
obligation to disclose their books to the supervisory· authorities; the 
supervisory authorities do not intervene directly in the banks' individual 
operations.' 
The authorities responsible for banking superv1s1on in Germany are the FBSO 
together with the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank). There is a clear 
division of functions between the FBSO and the Bundesbank in the area of banking 
supervision: 
• sovereign functions, e.g. the issuing of administrative guidelines and regulations, 
are the responsibility of the FBSO; 
• before issuing general regulations, the FBSO must confer with the Bundesbank. 
The degree to which the Bundesbank is entitled to participate is graded according 
to the extent to which regulations affect its functions; 
• the Bundesbank is fully involved in the day-to-day supervision of banks and. 
analyses their annual and other reports. Observations which the Bundesbank 
makes in the course of its own activities are also used in the monitoring 
operations (Deutsche Bundesbank 1993: 5-6). 
6.3.1.1 The Federal Banking Supervisory Office 
The function of the FBSO is to supervise banks in accordance with the Banking Act. 
Based in Berlin, the FBSO is an independent Federal Authority entrusted with 
maintaining the safety and integrity of all banking institutions. lt is required to take 
action against abuses of the banking system which tend to endanger the safety of 
assets entrusted to the banks, impair the orderly performance of banking 
transactions, or entail substantial disadvantages for the banking system as a whole 
(Banking Act 1961: § 6). The President of the FBSO is appointed by the Federal 
President acting on a proposal from the Federal Government which consults the 
Bundesbank on the matter (Banking Act 1961: § 5). The FBSO falls within the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance, although it has considerable autonomy in 
practice. The FBSO must obtain the agreement and co-operation of the Bundesbank 
for all its policies. 
The most important regulatory powers of the FBSO include (BrOmmerhof 1988: 363-
371; Swary and Topf 1992: 66): 
• the issuance and withdrawal of banking licenses; 
• the promulgation of regulations concerning capital adequacy, liquidity and lending 
limits; 
• the determination of standards for auditing and the internal organisation of banks; 
• the right to request reports and information of any type and to conduct 
investigation as it sees fit; 
• the approval of the selection of bank management; and 
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• the intervention in the affairs of a bank when deemed necessary, ranging from 
the limitation of certain activities to the forced liquidation of a bank. 
An interesting aspect of having a regulatory authority that does not form a direct part 
of the central bank, concerns the costs of operation. In so far as the costs of the 
FBSO are not covered by license fees and other charges, 90 per cent is paid for by 
the banking industry and the remainder by the Federal Government. 
6.3.1.2 The Deutsche Bundesbank 
The present Bundesbank was formally established in terms of the Bundesbank Act of 
1957. Although it enjoys authority and independence unparalleled with other central 
banks, it does not carry responsibility for the prudential supervision of banks. 
Nevertheless, due both to its other central bank functions such as being (monetary 
policy, banker to the government and banker to banks) and its mandated role of co-
operation with the FBSO, the Bundesbank plays an important de facto role in the 
supervisory system. 
The role of the Bundesbank in monetary policy has a regulatory impact through the 
setting of key interest rates such as the Lombard and the Discount rates, and the 
setting of minimum reserve requirements. As provider of liquidity to the banking 
system, the Bundesbank has made it clear that it will not automatically guarantee the 
solvency of a failing bank (Swary and Topf 1992: 66).183 
The basis for co-operation between the FBSO and the Bundesbank is set out in § 7 
of the Banking Act. lt entails exchanging opinions and making recommendations that 
may be useful to each other. In practice, most bank reports are submitted first to the 
Bundesbank, and are then passed to the FBSO with its comments. Although the 
Bundesbank assists in the evaluation of these supervisory reports, the 
implementation of sanctions is left to the FBSO. 
6.3.2 Supervisory Approach 
The regulatory approach to banking supervision in Germany is in sharp contrast to 
that of the UK. In particular, the historical development of German banking legislation 
has lent itself to a more formal and legalistic approach to supervision. Although the 
efforts to harmonise banking legislation within the European Community has seen 
the adoption of regulatory standards which are more explicitly related to risk-
management, German regulators tend to focus on detailed compliance requirements 
rather than overall risk exposure. Moreover, the German supervisory authorities 
require a very large degree of detail in the supervisory returns rendered by the 
banks. Finally, German banking regulations are characterised by a very extensive 
set of detailed rules. 
183 For legal opinion regarding the responsibility of the state in the case of insufficient (fehlsame) 
banking supervision, see Habscheid (1988). 
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Consequently, the supervisory apj:roach in Germany is not based explicitly on the 
finanCial risk.,.management of banks, even though the legal requirements and 
financial returns do relate to banking risks as will be indicated in Chapter 8. 
However, the extensive rule-based German regulatory framework has tended to be 
interpreted very narrowly, resulting in the exploitation of loopholes and the 
circumvention of the spirit of the rules (Swary and Topf 1992: 65). As Muller (1993: 
798) argues, the most spectacular bank failures in the post World War 11 German 
banking history have not been prevented by the existing regulations and supervisory 
procedures - but were rather caused by the intentional circumvention of these by 
bank management. 
6.3.3 Supervisory Methodology 
To enable the banking supervisory authorities to conduct a regular analysis of 
banking business, banks are required to submit monthly returns to the Bundesbank. 
The Bundesbank passes on these returns, together with its comments, to the FBSO. 
When the Bundesbank collects monthly balance sheet statistics for the purpose of its 
monetary analysis, these are at the same time considered to be monthly supervisory 
returns in order to avoid duplication of work for the banks. The holding company of a 
banking group must submit both its own monthly return and a pro rata consolidated 
monthly return for the group. 
The process of banking supervision is heavily dependent on the correctness of 
banks' data. For this reason the annual auditors' reports must meet particularly high 
standards. The FBSO and the Bundesbank have no such auditors of their own; 
instead, the banks are audited by independent certified auditors whom they select by 
themselves and who, in their audits, have to comply with the detailed auditing 
guidelines laid down by the FBSO. Section 29 of the Banking Act (1961) spells out 
the duties of the auditors. Savings banks and banks in the co-operative bank sectors 
are normally audited by the auditing bodies of their respective associations. 
Moreover, the FBSO is empowered to carry out its own audits without having to 
provide a special reason for them (Banking Act 1961: § 44 (1 )). External certified 
auditors are also entrusted with these audits, though not with audits of foreign 
exchange transactions, which are carried out solely by the Bundesbank. 
Further information is provided by the audit reports of the deposit guarantee funds. 
These reports must likewise be submitted to the supervisory authorities immediately 
(Banking Act 1961: § 26 (2)). The FBSO appoints special auditors for audits of safe 
custody accounts (Banking Act 1961: § 30). 
The FBSO may call and attend meetings of a bank's supervisory board and order or 
prohibit certain actions (Banking Act 1961: § 45, 46). However, the general 
supervisory methodology is off-site and visits by supervisory authorities are much 
less frequent than in the UK. Great reliance is therefore placed on the supervisory 
returns. 
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6.3.4 Relationship with other Regulatory Bodies 
Apart from the close relationship between the FBSO and the Bundesbank that is 
documented above, little evidence could be found of regulatory co-operation 
between these institutions and other regulatory bodies in Germany. Indeed, the only 
other major regulatory organ is the Bundesaufsichtsamt fOr das Versicherungswesen 
(Federal Insurance Supervisory Office), also located in Berlin and responsible for the 
regulation of all insurance business.184 
Consequently, all banking business as well as near-banking business are regulated 
by the FBSO and Bundesbank, which are in a conceptual sense a single regulatory 
authority. This state of affairs is facilitated by the universal nature of German banks 
and the encompassing role of banks in the German financial system. While the 
definition of banking business may already be considered broad185, the Federal 
Minister of Finance can also, after having consulted the Deutsche Bundesbank, 
designate other business as banking business by regulation (Banking Act 1961: § 1 ). 
The Banking Act provides that the FBSO may enlist the services of other persons 
and institutions to assist in the performance of its functions (Banking Act 1961: § 8). 
However, in many cases, 186 the FBSO will be the responsible supervisory authority, 
even if this does not fall within the conceptual ambit of bank supervision 
(Scharrenberg 1994: 90). 
Baums and Gruson (1993: 123-124) argue that some of the more obvious 
advantages of the German universal banking system and concurrent supervisory 
structure are the following: 
• in Germany there are no regulators with overlapping jurisdictions. The powers of 
the FBSO and the Bundesbank are clearly defined; and 
• there are substantially fewer laws and regulations in Germany in comparison to 
the US, consequently there is no need to engage in cumbersome procedures for 
granting exemptions from regulations. 
The points made by Baums and Gruson (1993) apply with equal force to the financial 
systems of the UK and South Africa, where the overall regulatory structure is 
obfuscated by the existence of multiple regulatory authorities.187 
184 Although banks may not conduct insurance business, banks may act as brokers for the sale of 
insurance policies issued by licensed insurance companies. Banks may also own insurance 
companies (Baums and Gruson 1993: 123). For a discussion on insurance regulation in Germany, see 
Rabe (1990). 
185 See paragraph 8.2.2 below. 
186 See for instance Scharrenberg (1994: 90-96) on the supervision of German equity and bond 
markets. 
187 This issue will be further advanced in Chapter 10. 
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6.4 Regulatory Authorities in South Africa 
6.4.1 Historical Development 
Banking in South Africa commenced in 1793 when the Lombard Bank (also known 
as Bank van Leening) opened its doors. This was followed by the establishment, in 
1808 of the Lombard Discount Bank. These banks were founded by the Dutch 
Commissioners and it was not until 1836 that permission was granted for the first 
private bank, the Cape of Good Hope Bank, to be formed. By 1861 there were 29 
local banks (Price Waterhouse 1995: 12). 
The first piece of banking legislation in South Africa was the Joint Stock Bank 
Statements Act of 1865, which required all banks and bank branches to publish a 
half-yearly statement in a prescribed format. 
In 1942, banking legislation provided for stricter regulations pertaining to commercial 
banks, particularly with regard to liquid asset and reserve requirements. Although 
this legislation was motivated by the ability of commercial banks to create money, it 
was emphasised that these provisions were not intended primarily as instruments of 
discretionary monetary policy (Republic of South Africa 1984: 40). 
Due to the changing nature of banking in South Africa, a Technical Committee on 
Bank and Building Society Legislation was appointed in 1960. The Committee 
concerned itself with three questions (Republic of South Africa 1984: 41 ): 
• could the existing bank and building society legislation still be regarded as 
adequate for effective monetary and credit control? 
• was the effect of the legislation still uniform and aimed at bringing about 
effectiveness and stable growth? 
• did the legislation still ensure liquidity, solvency and the security of the different 
types of banking institutions? 
The regulatory measures that were subsequently contained in the 1965 Banks Act 
included the following: 
• banks had to comply with liquid-asset requirements based on their liabilities to 
the public; 
• banks had to provide regulators with a quarterly statement of assets and 
liabilities; and 
• limits were placed on the following: 
• positions that could be taken in the currency markets; 
• certain investments in property and shares; 
• the discretionary refunding of fixed deposits; and 
• the structure of assets and liabilities. 
In 1984 the Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Monetary System and 
Monetary Policy in South Africa (De Kock Commission Report) was released. The De 
Kock Commission acknowledged the importance of a stable banking system to the 
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monetary authorities; and was of the opinion that bank supervision and capital 
adequacy requirements of banks had a direct, albeit limited, effect on monetary 
policy and monetary control measures (Republic of South Africa 1984: par. 6.52). 
An important aspect of monetary policy with regard to financial regulation was the 
view expressed by the Commission that control over the money supply should be 
exercised through control over liquid-asset requirements, which included cash 
reserves188 rather than through regulations attempting to control the deposit-taking or 
lending activities directly. The Commission was of the opinion that direct and semi-
direct control measures had negatively affected the competitive position of banks as 
financial intermediaries and had resulted in disintermediation; as well as distortions 
on the balance sheets of banks (Republic of South Africa 1984: par. 6.23; 6.24, 6.30; 
17.50). 
Other interesting, non-monetary aspects of the De Kock Commission Report 
regarding financial regulation is that the Commission expressed itself as being 
strongly in favour of the risk-based approach to capital adequacy (Republic of South 
Africa 1984: par. 6.60); and that regulation in the banking sector should be applied 
functionally, rather than institutionally. 
The Commission also considered the involvement of the central bank with the bank 
supervision function. lt found that the international tendency was for central banks to 
become more involved with bank supervision in general, since liquidity and other 
financial problems of specific banks tended to become the responsibility of the 
central bank as lender of last resort. Consequently, the central bank would prefer to 
be informed, on an on-going basis, of the financial stability of those institutions that 
might seek assistance. 
In 1987 the banking supervisory function was transferred from the Department of 
Finance to the South African Reserve Bank. Apart from the shortage of qualified staff 
in the Department of Finance; which was later expressly identified by the Van der 
Horst Committee, 189 the principal reason for this step was the South African debt 
crisis of 1985. The large short term foreign obligations of South African banks in the 
face of an excessively depreciated national currency was of grave concern to the 
banking supervisory authorities. Consequently it was decided to conduct the 
supervision of the then fragile banking system under the guardianship of the central 
bank in order to combat expeditiously any crisis that could occur.19o 
This step was accompanied by a fundamental reassessment of the nature and 
relevance of bank supervision in a changing economic environment.191 The problem 
that was addressed was the implementation of a structured, risk-based approach to 
188 The latter instrument was eventually recommended, although the Commission agreed in principle 
to control over liquid-asset requirements. 
189 See paragraph 6.4.4.1. 
190 Interview with Dr. C. J. de Swardt, (who was at the time Registrar of Banks and is presently Deputy 
President, South African Reserve Bank) on 6 June 1994. 
191 This was also the topic of a Masters thesis by Van Greuning ( 1991 ). 
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bank supervision. lt is useful to follow this reassessment by reviewing the returns 
required under the 1965 Banks Act with the subsequent supervisory procedures. 
The 1965 Banks Act required the completion of the following prudential returns: 
• liquidity and cash-reserve requirements; 
• capital adequacy requirement; 
• detailed balance sheet; 
• foreign currency open position; and 
• foreign assets and liabilities. 
This piece of legislation did, to a limited extent reflect the regulation of risks by 
banks. Nevertheless, Van Greuning (1993: 43) concludes that the only risks that 
were addressed with a reasonable measure of success by the returns required in 
terms of the 1965 Banks Act were those in respect of CL!rrency risk, risk in respect of 
off-balance sheet items and credit risk. Information on other financial risks such as 
liquidity risk, interest rate risk, and market risk were not adequately discernible in 
these returns. 
Similarly, South African banks expressed criticism with regard to the detailed 
emphasis on certain aspects of their business. Banks were of the opinion that the 
forms required the provision of too much information, resulting in unnecessary costs. 
Criticism was also expressed regarding the fact that the regulations under the Act 
were continually amended by means of circulars. Most importantly, since not all risks 
were measured in the statutory returns, the information required was not related to 
the needs of management (Van Greuning 1993: 43-44 ). 
At the same time, regulatory authorities regarded superv1s1on as a legal-
administrative process. The administration of the 196.5 Banks Act, in addition to the 
editing of the statutory returns, occupied most of the supervisors' time. Although 
individual supervisors did perform analyses and evaluations, little attention was given 
to a consistent, structured approach that would encourage in-depth analyses of 
trends and relationships in the banking sector. Moreover, there was little scope for 
follow-up work in respect of deviations from expected norms (Van Greuning 1993: 
44-46). The Van der Horst Report also indicated that the staff responsible for 
administering the regulations were poorly qualified and not remunerated well. 
A further critical appraisal of banking regulation at the time is provided by Koseff192 
(1984) who analyses the failure of six South African banks193 in the 1970s with 
regard to the reasons for failure in respect of each bank and the effectiveness of the 
regulations prescribed by the Registrar of Banks in terms of the Banks Act. Koseff 
(1984: 124) finds that the principle causes of bank failures were poor lending 
policies, especially relating to property companies, weak management and 
inadequate administration. lt is argued that the Registrar of Banks was successful in 
192 Managing Director, Investee Bank Limited. 
193 Namely Spes Bona Bank Limited, Rand Bank Limited, Breda Bank Limited, Rondalia Bank Limited, 
Concorde Bank Limited and UDC Bank Limited, selected for being the better known and largest of the 
9 banks that failed during this period. 
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preventing a major catastrophe from occurring in the banking industry by arranging 
take-overs of failed banks, and that the deposits lost in relation to the total funds 
deposited with banks were negligible. However, it is concluded that the information 
disclosed by the banks in their annual financial statements as well as in the returns 
to the Registrar of Banks did not provide enough meaningful information to provide 
bank supervisory authorities with advance warnings of possible deterioration in the 
financial condition of banks. 
A number of highly interesting recommendations were also made by Koseff (1984: 
50-52; 123-124). They are: 
• increased disclosure of information by banks to regulatory authorities and the 
public at large to develop early warning indicators in order to effect corrective 
measures; 194 
• increased self-regulation by means of two-tier boards of directors for each bank, 
consisting of a supervisory board of directors (appointed from senior members of 
commerce and industry approved by the Registrar of Banks), in addition to a 
management board; 
• an expanded role for external auditors in order to eliminate the need for an on-
site inspection by the Registrar of Banks; 
• that financial institutions that are not registered as banking institutions but 
effectively acted as deposit-taking institutions should be brought under the control 
of the Banks Act and the scrutiny of the regulatory authorities; and 
• the introduction of deposit insurance as a means of protecting the smaller 
depositors. £. 
lt is also important to note that although South Africa was not a signatory to the 1975 
Basle Concordant or the 1983 amendments thereto, the degree of 
internationalisation of the banking system resulted in South Africa accepting the 
principles incorporated in the agreement. In 1985, the then Minister of Finance, B. du 
Plessis, announced that the banking supervisory authorities were: 
'reeds besig om met die toesighoudende owerhede van oorsese lande oor die 
implementering van die ooreenkoms saam te werk. '195 
(Republiek van Suid-Afrika 1985: 842). 
Consequently, South Africa desired to conduct banking supervision in accordance 
with international trends and requirements. 
BrOmmerhof (1988) conducted a comparative study regarding the off-balance sheet 
financing activity of banks. The following general points regarding banking regulation 
at the time were raised (BrOmmerhof 1988: 422-429): 
194 On the other hand it can be argued that negative news may lead to a public run on the deposits of 
a bank. 
195 
"already co-operating with foreign supervisory authorities regarding the implementation of the 
agreement" (writer's own translation). 
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• the time allowed for the rendering of supervisory returns is excessive by 
international norms; 
• the use of average figures as opposed to month-end figures should be 
considered for supervisory returns; 
• the German methodology of requiring mid-month figures may avoid some of the 
distortions inherent in month-end figures; 
• · information regarding large exposures to individual clients is only received bi-
annually; 
• the greater involvement of the auditing profession in the supervisory process is 
necessary; 
• the quality of bank management as well as management information requires 
attention; 
• the annual report issued by the banking supervisory authorities should be more 
comprehensive; 
• a deposit insurance system should be considered in the interest of consumer 
protection; and 
• information regarding the activities of banks as agents and brokers is required as 
these occur 'outside' the balance sheets of banks 
Brummerhof (1988) specifically criticised the regulation of banks' off-balance sheet 
activities. The points made were (Brummerhof 1988: 426-430): 
• more risk-related data on off-balance sheet activities is required; 
• full disclosure of all banking activities is required; 
• relevant information on off-balance sheet activities should be included in the 
calculation of monetary aggregates and are relevant in monetary policy; 
• limitations on off-balance sheet exposures to individual clients or groups of 
related clients should be considered; 
• no information on new instruments such as 'caps' is required and there are no 
capital adequacy requirements for these. 
In conclusion, Brummerhof (1988:428) points out the importance of the supervision 
of off-balance sheet activity by suggesting that if comprehensive and adequate 
information on contingent liabilities to foreign parties had been available the debt 
moratorium which was instituted on 31 August 1985 might have been avoided. 
De Swardt (1994(b)) identifies three broad aspects of banking supervision that were 
at the time considered to be in need of reform, namely: 
• the legal framework; 
• the information supplied to the supervisory authorities in the prudential 
returns; and 
• a more consultative approach to banking supervision needed to be 
adopted. 
Many of the above suggestions were taken into account by the Technical Committee 
on Bank and Building Society Legislation which commenced its activities on 23 July 
1987 under the chairmanship of Dr. C. J. de Swardt, then Registrar of Banks and 
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Building Societies. The findings of this Committee eventually resulted in the passing 
of the 1990 Banks Act which comprehensively revised South African banking 
legislation. The Act emphasises risk-management as the basis for regulation and the 
supervision of banks. 
6.4.2 Supervisory Approach 
The Banks Act (Act 94 of 1990) provides for the establishment of an Office of the 
Registrar for Banks, which as part of the South African Reserve Bank, is responsible 
for the supervision of banks. The Office of the Registrar for Banks, more generally 
called the Banking Supervision Department sees its mission as creating: 
'a regulatory and supervisory environment that will facilitate the optimisation of 
the quality and effectiveness of financial risk-management in the system' 
(Oosthuizen 1994: 3). 
As in Germany, supervisory authorities rely on clear rules and guidelines instead of 
moral suasion. However, the South African approach focuses on both the rules and 
the principles underlying effective risk-management rather than a narrow rule-based 
interpretation. As such the South African approach of risk-management can be 
regarded as a hybrid of the German and UK approaches. 
This risk-management approach is effected by striving for a true partnership between 
various key players196 in the risk-management process, namely: 
Those directly or indirectly appointed by the shareholders: 
• board of directors197; 
• management of the bank;19B 
• audit committee and internal auditors;199 and 
• external auditors.2oo 
196 The roles and responsibilities of each of these key players have been described by Van Greuning 
(1993), and South African Reserve Bank (1991: 6-8); (1992: 7-8); and (1993: 12-13). 
197 Section 60 of the 1990 Banks Act codifies the common law responsibilities of directors as follows: 
'Each director should stand in a fiduciary relationship to the banking institution ... of which he is a 
director.' Regulation 11 of the Regulations to the Banking Act states that one of the fiduciary 
responsibilities is that a director must understand that the conduct of the bank's business entails the 
management of risks and understand that a bank's primary source of funds constitutes deposits from 
the general public. Therefore, it is the duty of directors to ensure that the risks are managed in a 
prudent manner. 
198 The management team of a bank is the single most important factor determining the success of an 
institution. By definition, management is appointed by the board of directors which delegates the 
powers and responsibilities to perform the day-to-day management of the bank. In the course thereof, 
management performs the detailed risk-management inherent in banking which requires a high degree 
of competence in identifying and managing the different risks (South African Reserve Bank 1993(a): 
12-13). lt is therefore imperative that members of management are 'fit and proper' persons capable of 
fulfilling their responsibilities. The 'fit and proper' concept encompasses both appropriate ethical 
standards (such as integrity) and appropriate knowledge, experience, skills and judgement. 
199 Vide infra paragraph 9.2.3.2. 
2oo Vide infra paragraph 9.2.3.2. 
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Other stakeholders: 
• the public;2o1 and 
• regulatory I supervisory authorities.202 
This approach developed by Van Greuning (1993: 78-95) provides a cohesive 
framework for the identification and role clarification for each of the key players in the 
risk-management process. The success of this framework depends on all key players 
understanding their role and fulfilling it to the best of their ability. Each has a 
different, but important, function in ensuring that risks are competently managed and 
that due regard is given to the fiduciary role that banks fulfil as custodians of the 
public's savings. lt is important to note that the existence of a supervisory authority in 
no way diminishes the responsibilities of the management process. 
To enable the implementation of its risk-management approach, the Banking 
Supervision Department has also defined a model whereby each of the 
aforementioned six key players is responsible for a dimension of the following nine 
major risk areas (South African Reserve Bank 1993(a): 5): 
• balance-sheet structure and changes therein; 
• capital adequacy; 
• profitability; 
• liquidity risk; 
• interest-rate risk; 
• market (price I position) risk 
• credit risk; 
• currency risk; and 
• operational and technological risk. 
Consequently, the South African supervisory approach meets the theoretical 
requirements of banking regulation as formulated in paragraph 3.4. The South 
African regulators have clearly recognised that banking effectively amounts to the 
managing of financial risks and that banking regulation should aim at the optimisation 
of banks' risk-management. Although South African banking supervisors have not 
adopted the very informal supervisory style of their UK counterpart, a great deal of 
201 Neither sound risk-management nor appropriate regulation takes away the responsibility of 
investors for their own decisions. Consumers need to protect themselves by assessing the risk-profile 
of the financial institution in which they are investing, as well as understanding who is assuming the 
risk, i.e. they themselves as investors, acting through agents, or the financial intermediaries as 
principals. 
202 The mission of South African bank regulators indicate understanding by regulators that they cannot 
prevent bank failure, but that it is nevertheless imperative for them to identify clearly what they are 
capable of achieving. The subsidiary goals of the Banking Supervision Department is to achieve the 
following: creation of a public understanding of management's responsibility in the risk-management 
process; extension of confidence in the banking sector; creation of level playing fields between 
different financial institutions and providers of financial ser\lices; establishment of a free-market 
orientation towards bank supervision; and establishment of a professional supervisory function (Van 
Greuning 1993: 93). 
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consultation with regulated institutions occurs prior to the enactment of legislation or 
the adoption of regulation. This allows banks to comment on regulations with 
reference to the overall objective of optimising risk-management. Once implemented, 
though, banks are required to adhere to the risk regulations which they assisted in 
developing. Consequently, the supervisory style is neither strictly formal nor very 
informal but a combination of both. 
6.4.3 Supervisory Methodology 
The South African methodology of supervision is primarily off-site. However, it does 
incorporate what it sees as the best of on-site supervision, namely the verification of 
obtained information by means of meetings with the various key players in the risk-
management process (Oosthuizen 1994: 6). 
Limited on-site supervision and interaction takes the form of quarterly meetings with 
banks and annual trilateral discussions between a bank's audit committee, its 
external auditors and the supervisors, as well as annual presentations to the board of 
directors, top management, risk managers and external auditors. Once a year the 
Banking Supervision Department also makes a graphic presentation to the directors 
and management of each bank, in which the information supplied by the 
management of the relevant bank is compared with statistics and trends for the 
banking sector as a whole. The same exercise is carried out on a quarterly basis with 
the managers responsible for the different risk areas of the respective banks. 
In the process of interaction with various key players, the duties and responsibilities 
of each are continually highlighted and emphasised. The interaction promotes 
communication and co-ordination and ensures that the supervisor remains in contact 
with the market. Because interaction with the key players at various levels of 
seniority is achieved, the effectiveness of the supervisory process is enhanced. This 
methodology is based on the concepts of accountability and risk-management, and 
ensures that the focus of supervision is not on the mechanistic application of various 
analytical techniques, but rather the optimisation of the banking system's 
effectiveness (South African Reserve Bank 1993(a): 11 ). 
The advantages of the South African approach is that it avoids a duplication of the 
work done by the external auditors of banks. When risk-management areas are 
identified that require more in-depth on-site supervision, the skill and expertise of 
external auditors and other specialists are used to assist in investigations and to 
provide inputs on areas of concern. As this obviates the need for an inspection 
division, this methodology is also less expensive than the on-site version. Finally, off-
site supervision does not create the illusion that supervisors are able to timeously 
identify and solve the problems that lead to bank failures, which could result in moral 
hazard (Oosthuizen 1994: 6; South African Reserve Bank 1993(a): 11-12). 
160 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions 
6.4.4 Relationship with other Regulatory Bodies 
6.4.4.1 Registrar for Financial Institutions 
For many years the responsibility for supervision of the financial services industry 
was imposed by legislation on the office of the Registrar for Financial Institutions. 
The Financial Institutions Office was established in 1956 as a branch of the 
Department of Finance. lt proved impossible for that office to fulfil the task of 
financial supervision of the financial services industry efficiently, as it was not 
possible to obtain and retain trained and professional staff due to the uncompetitive 
Public Service remuneration packages. 
In the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Winding-up of the Short-term 
Insurance Business of the AA Mutual Insurance Association Limited (1988 
paragraph: 4.6) the following remark appears: 'lt would appear that the difficulties in 
the Office of the Registrar were, and are, caused, in the main, by the lack of suitably 
qualified permanent staff. This is apparent from the various annual reports of the 
Registrar and the evidence before the commission. This shows that apart from the 
shortage, there has been an almost complete change in the staff supervising short-
term insurance over the past few years.' 
As a result of this finding the above Commission (1988 paragraph: 4.6 (e)) made the 
following recommendation: 'a commission or working group should be appointed to 
consider the creation of a national council or board for financial institutions on the 
lines of the National Energy Council.' 
6.4.4.2 The Van der Horst Committee and the Financial Services Board 
The Government accepted the Commission's recommendation and on 14 November 
1988 The Van der Horst Committee of Inquiry was appointed to consider the 
recommendation of the previous Commission. The Van der Horst Committee 
completed its investigation during September 1989 and a report was submitted to the 
Government in which the Committee stated that it had among other factors found the 
following: 
The institutions supervised by the Financial Institutions Office, and the Acts 
that this Office administers are of significant extent and import. Almost 13 000 
institutions are registered with the Financial Institutions Office of which 12 484 
pension funds, 90 insurers and 45 unit trusts are included. The assets of 
these institutions exceeded R150 billion in 1987 and will be significantly more 
now. This represents the major portion of the long-term savings of the country 
and there are very few South Africans whose financial well-being is not 
affected by these institutions. lt is thus of the greatest national interest that the 
Financial Institutions Office should exercise effective supervision over financial 
institutions and that the financial structure and markets should be adapted to 
keep abreast with changes. The Committee supports in full the findings of the 
Financial Institutions Office and the Melamet Commission and is of the 
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opm1on that it is of the utmost importance that the staff problem of the 
Financial Institutions Office should be resolved urgently. The evidence 
received by the Committee strongly indicates that a solution of the problem 
experienced with the remuneration and staff structure of the Financial 
Institutions Office simply cannot be foreseen within the present framework of 
the Public Service and that the shortage of expertise will in these 
circumstances continue. The Committee thus unanimously came to the 
decision that the establishment of a statutory body would be the most effective 
way in which the current problems of the Financial Institutions Office can be 
solved. This is highly recommended.' (Van der Horst Verslag 1989: 8-1 0). 
The Government accepted the findings and recommendations of the Van der Horst 
Committee and the Financial Services Board Act, was promulgated on 11 July 1990 
which provided for the establishment of the Financial Services Board (FSB) on as a 
statutory board with the following functions: 
• to supervise the exercise of control, in terms of any law, over the activities 
of financial institutions and over financial services; and 
• to advise the Minister on matters concerning financial institutions and 
financial services either of their own accord or at the request of the 
Minister. 
6.4.4.3 Banking Supervision and the Reserve Bank 
The South African Reserve Bank has, as one of its subsidiary objectives, the 
maintenance of the stability of the financial system. However, it was only in 1987 (as 
mentioned above) that it accepted a supervisory responsibility over deposit-taking 
institutions.2o3 As a result of later losses suffered by depositors and investors, the 
Reserve Bank was exposed to criticism regarding its application of emergency 
assistance measures. Taking into account that negative publicity resulting from bank 
failures could impact on the effectiveness of the Reserve Bank in the performance of 
its primary functions, it was considered necessary to determine whether it would be 
more appropriate to locate the bank supervisory function outside of the central bank. 
The problem was described as follows by the Reserve Bank (1992: 6): 
' ... regulation and supervision of banks, however, has the potential to create 
the illusion that an 'implicit' contract exists, in terms of which depositors 
believe that because banks are regulated, the safety of their deposits is 
assured. The increasing convergence of services provided by different 
financial intermediaries, with banks providing a wide array of financial services 
and non-financial companies entering the banking sphere, has exacerbated 
the problem. Because of the existence of bank regulation and supervision, 
many investors at institutions other than banks (as well as depositors with 
banks) mistakenly believe that their funds are automatically safe or even 
guaranteed.' 
203 The Supervision of other financial institutions was transferred from the Department of Finance to 
the statutory Registrar of Financial Services. 
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This occurred at a time when the general need for a greater co-ordination of financial 
regulation was recognised. The insufficient consistency in financial legislation and 
supervision was due to the existence of two regulatory authorities and the 
independent development of different forms of financial regulation. Greater co-
ordination was needed on account of the general tendency towards multi-functional 
financial institutions204 (or financial conglomerates) and the need for consolidated 
supervision. In addition, gaps in the regulatory structure were highlighted by certain 
institutions2os in the financial sector which were not covered by the existing 
jurisdictions of the regulatory authorities (De Swardt 1993: 11 ). 
6.4.4.4 Masterbond and the Nel Commission 
As so often happens, the gaps in the regulatory net were accentuated by the failures 
of two financial 'institutions' which were actually participation bond schemes, namely 
Masterbond and Supremebond. The Masterbond group (i.e. Masterbond Trust 
Investment Holdings and its 84 offshore and other associates) collapsed early in 
1992, separating more than R500 million from more than 20 000 investors. The 
activities of Masterbond (which sold debentures and participation bonds to the 
general public) were akin to deposit-taking. Yet, as no part of the group was 
registered as a deposit-taking institution it did not fall under the supervisory ambit of 
the banking regulators. Under the definition of the Financial Institutions (Investment 
of Funds) Act, it could be argued that Masterbond Participation Bond Trust Managers' 
was a financial institution and as such subject to regulation by the FSB (Finance 
Week 1992: 33). Yet anecdotal evidence suggests that the FSB declined supervisory 
responsibility even when early warning signals were brought to their attention. A lack 
of understanding of the functions and responsibilities of the various supervisory 
agencies resulted in fierce criticism of the South African Reserve Bank (South 
African Reserve Bank 1992: 4 ). 
The failure of Masterbond prompted the State President to appoint a judicial 
commission under the chairmanship of Justice Hennie Nel to 'assess the question 
whether the common law and legislation relating to deposit-taking institutions, other 
financial institutions, companies' share block and timeshare schemes, and any other 
relevant statutes, provide sufficient protection for investors similar to those of the 
Masterbond group and the public in general.' (Finance Week 1992: 33). The 
Commission was also asked to inquire and report on whether any functionary seized 
with statutory duties 'neglected any duty to look after the interests of investors or the 
public.' (Finance Week 1992: 33). At the time of writing the Nel Commission was still 
in the process of investigation and consequently the confusion reigning as to the 
appropriate supervisory authority for Masterbond had not been formally solved. 
204 For instance, ABSA Bank Limited (South Africa's largest banking group) encompasses not only a 
number of banks (Volkskas and Trust Bank) and previous building societies (United and Allied) but 
also a life insurance company (ABSA Life), a short term insurance company (ABSA Insurance 
Company), wills, administration, deceased estates and tax services (ABSA Trust) and a unit trust 
company (ABSA Fund Managers), amongst others. 
205 Most notably the Masterbond and Supreme debacles. 
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However, the need for closing regulatory loopholes across the financial system was 
clearly recognised. 
Nevertheless, a letter written by the secretary of the commission, Mr S.E. Mostert to 
the Financial Services Board, indicates that the Nel Commission favours a single 
regulatory authority. The Nel Commission states that the fragmentation of 
supervision between the Registrar of Banks and the FSB has led to inadequate 
supervision in the case of Masterbond, Supreme and Owen Wiggens. Letters written 
in 1994 between the Financial Services Board and the Registrar of Banks indicate 
such a lack of mutual respect that combined supervision became very difficult to 
maintain (Finansies en Tegniek 1996: 14). 
6.4.4.5 The Jacobs Committee 
In September 1992, the Committee of Investigation into the Promotion of Equal 
Competition for Funds in Financial Markets in South Africa (the Jacobs Committee), 
recomme-nded the implementation of a holistic approach to the regulation of financial 
services, as well as better co-ordination between the different regulatory authorities. 
In regard to the regulatory structure, the Jacobs Committee proposed that, instead of 
the Registrar of Banks reporting to the Governor of the Reserve Bank, both the 
Registrar and the Executive Officer of the FSB should report to an independent 
Financial Regulation Policy Board (Republic of South Africa 1992: 11 0). 
This recommendation was intended to ensure better co-ordination between 
regulators, as well as preventing the image of the Reserve Bank, as the central 
monetary authority, from being tarnished by regulatory and supervisory issues. Such 
a change was also seen to be iri line with the international trend towards the 
integration and specialisation in the provision of financial services. Nevertheless, this 
was not intended to preclude access by the central bank to micro-economic data on 
banks that might be required when decisions regarding the provision of emergency 
assistance were to be made (South African Reserve Bank 1992: 6). 
6.4.4.6 The Melamet Committee 
The Melamet Committee was subsequently appointed to enquire into the feasibility 
and implementation of the Jacobs Committee's proposals. At the end of March 1993 
the Melamet Committee submitted its report. The Melamet Report (1993: 4) stated 
that the need for a holistic approach to financial regulation is founded principally on 
the regulatory gaps which occur as a result of: 
• different philosophies and practices between regulators; 
• the lack of supervision and enforcement in many instances where 
regulation is in place but not given effect to; and 
• the existence of three main regulatory structures - The South African 
Reserve Bank, the Financial Services Board, and the Companies Office-
each with its own areas of jurisdiction. 
The Melamet Report (1993: 4) argues that the division of regulatory responsibility: 
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'does not give the necessary overall control of all financial activities which 
affect systemic risk in the financial sector, or which affect reasonable 
protection to the general public. With the international and national trend 
towards financial conglomeration and new product development where older, 
more specific structures are becoming inadequate it is necessary to consider 
financial supervision from a 'top down' holistic perspective.' 
The Melamet Committee consequently endorsed the feasibility of a holistic approach 
to the regulation of financial institutions and recommended that a single regulatory 
authority, the Financial and Investment Services Commission (FISC), should be 
created to assume responsibility for co-ordinating regulatory policy. The Melamet 
Report (1993) furthermore recommended that FISC should be constituted as an 
integrated body, into which should be merged the Office of the Registrar of Banks, 
the Financial Services Board (FSB), the Office of the Registrar of Companies and 
any other relevant supervisory authority. 
Comments received from interested and affected parties on these recommendations 
persuaded the government that the time was not yet opportune to integrate existing 
regulatory offices into a single structure. Consequently, the government decided to 
adopt the recommendation of the Jacobs Committee and to establish the Policy 
Board for Financial Services and Regulation (Policy Board). As Dr. C.J. De 
Swardt,206 Deputy Governor of the South African Reserve Bank and Chairman of the 
Policy Board motivates: 'there is still a concern that the supervision of the banking 
sector must be subject to the control of the Reserve Bank so as to enable the Bank 
to deal expeditiously with systemic problems when they arise. The banking and 
payment system could be disrupted if the close relationship with banking supervision 
were to be altered.' (De Swardt 1993: 10-11 ). 
6.4.4. 7 The Policy Board 
The Policy Board started functioning on 1 July 1993 and was transformed into a 
statutory body in November 1993 by virtue of the Policy Board for Financial Services 
and Regulation Act (Act 141 of 1993). The Policy Board was not provided with any 
executive powers but has the responsibility of formulating and co-ordinating policy 
relating to the further development of the financial sector (including financial markets) 
and to financial regulation. The Policy Board acts as adviser to the Minister of 
Finance and the areas of advice include developments in the financial services 
sector, changes in the regulatory structure, amendments to existing financial 
legislation, and improvements in financial supervision. The responsibility for the 
execution of financial regulation policy remains with the Reserve Bank and the 
Financial Services Board. The Policy Board is in many respects the South African 
counterpart of the SIB in the UK.2o1 
206 lt is interesting to note that, in his capacity as a member of the Melamet Committee, Dr. De Swardt 
visited regulatory authorities in two foreign countries, namely Germany and the UK. 
207 See Diagram 6.1. 
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The conceptual framework within which the Policy Board functions consists of a 
general philosophy, a set of objectives for financial regulation and a set of principles 
to support the adopted philosophy and objectives. As a general philosophy, the 
Policy Board adopts a market-orientated and consultative approach to financial 
regulation. The objectives relate to the safeguarding of efficiency and stability of the 
financial sector and the promotion of investor interests. lt is emphasised that financial 
regulation should not be employed as a means of achieving the wider economic and 
social objectives of political authorities (De Swardt 1994(a): 2). 
A set of sixteen guiding principles is identified, of which De Swardt (1994(a): 3) 
mentions the following specifically: 
• securing competitive neutrality among financial institutions, other financial 
service providers and financial market participants whenever they compete 
in the same segment of the financial sector; 
• promoting the proper assessment and management of risks and 
adherence to appropriate fit and proper standards in the conduct of 
business; 
• ensuring that regulatory arrangements are practitioner based and 
sufficiently flexible to adjust to the evolution of the financial system; and 
• striving to achieve effective and cost-efficient regulation. 
The Policy Board focuses on four broad areas of financial regulation (De Swardt 
1994(a): 5). The first area of focus is the elimination of gaps in the regulatory 
structure. De Swardt (1993: 11) envisages the development of a set of minimum 
requirements relating to registration, a code of conduct, proper disclosure and capital 
adequacy, to which all intermediaries acting as agents would have to adhere. There 
would be a legal requirement to register with the Policy Board or a self-regulating 
trade organisation. Thereafter it would· be up to the various trade organisations to 
apply more stringent membership requirements over and above the legal minima laid 
down by the Policy Board. 
An example of this focus area is the recommendations made by the Investment 
Business Advisory Committee (1995) which was appointed by the Policy Board to 
investigate the regulation of investment services in the non-securities field. The 
committee recommended the introduction of such regulation in South Africa with the 
emphasis primarily on the enhancement of investor protection and the focus on the 
market conduct of investment advisers (rather than on compliance with prudential 
standards). The Committee saw the need for direction by the regulatory authorities in 
order to elevate regulation from self imposed (low-intensity) to self-regulatory 
(medium-intensity) regulation. lt proposed the establishment of an Investment 
Service Co-ordination and Registration Office (ISCRO) which should be responsible 
for co-ordinating regulation carried out by the self-regulatory bodies with the FSB as 
the ultimate regulatory authority (Investment Business Advisory Committee 1995). 
The second focus of the Policy Board concerns the enhancement of quality 
standards and competitive neutrality in existing financial legislation. The purposes of 
such quality enhancement of financial legislation are to promote, through explicit and 
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uniform requirements, the achievement of regulatory objectives and to attain the 
maximum degree of competitive neutrality among providers of financial services. 
Requirements will cover such matters as fit and proper standards, internal and 
external auditing procedures, risk-management, prudential standards, risk-based 
information bases for supervisory purposes, full disclosure, consultation between 
regulators and regulated entities and appeal procedures (De Swardt 1994(a): 5). 
The third focus area concerns the harmonisation of financial regulation in South 
Africa with international standards and practices in order to reduce systemic risks 
emanating from cross-border financial services and transactions, and to facilitate 
South Africa's reintegration into the international financial system (De Swardt 
1994(a): 5). 
The fourth focus area concerns the adequacy of the existing financial services 
structure to meet the financial services demands of a future South Africa. Relevant 
issues are the expansion of financial services to satisfy the needs of a broader 
community of users2os and the improvement of the accessibility of financial services 
to such a community without sacrificing sound prudential standards (De Swardt 
1994(a): 5). 
Structure of South African Regulatory Authorities 
The present regulatory structure in South Africa, pursuant to the establishment of the 
Policy Board, is depicted in Diagram 6.2. 
Whilst the Office of the Registrar of Companies remains within the organisational 
structure of the Department of Trade and Industry, the Registrar of Companies may 
be invited, together with the Registrar of Banks and the Executive Officer of the FSB, 
to attend meetings of the Policy Board. The Office of the Registrar of Banks remains 
under the control of the Reserve Bank, but regulatory responsibility extends to the 
Minister of Finance. Similarly, the Office of the Executive Officer of the FSB remains 
under the control of a reconstituted FSB, but the regulatory responsibility also 
extends to the Minister of Finance. 
208 The integration of the presently underbanked informal black communities into the formal banking 
sector is discussed by Hurst (1994) and Moore and Schoombee (1993). 
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Diagram 6.2 Structure c1f South African Regulatory Authorities 
Minister of Finance 
Policy Board for 
Financial Services 
----------
and Regulation 
I 
I I 
Department of Financial Advisory 
Trade and Services Board committees 
Industry 
Banks 
Office of the Office of the Financial 
Registrar of Executive markets 
Companies Officer Pension funds 
~ Unit Trusts 
Appeal Boards 
I 
I I 
Insurers BME Unit trusts 
Pension funds JSE Part. bonds 
Friendly SAFEX Portfolio 
societies managers 
Abbreviations 
BME 
JSE 
SAFEX 
Bond Market Exchange 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
South African Futures Exchange 
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I 
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Indicates executive functions 
Indicates advisory functions Source: Falkena (1994: 62) 
The structure of South Africa's regulatory authorities does indeed represent a more 
holistic approach to the regulation of financial services and the co-ordination of 
regulation by the different regulatory authorities. However, it is also clear that the 
proposals of the Jacobs Committee report were not fully met by this structure.209 
209 The Financial Institutions Amendment Bill, which is presently still being discussed with all affected 
parties, proposes inter alia the following: broadening the definition of 'financial institutions'; explicit 
identification of the appropriate Registrar for various financial institutions, provision for curatorship on a 
voluntary basis; inspection of financial institutions; empowering the Executive Officer of the Policy 
Board to act against undesirable practices employed in the financial services industry; establishment 
of advisory boards which the Executive Officer may consult on technical matters relating to the 
industry and its proper regulation; disclosure by the Executive Officer of certain information to other 
domestic and foreign regulators of the financial services industry; and the creation of a single board of 
appeal in respect of all financial services industries to which persons may appeal against decisions 
taken by the Executive Officer. Once again, the majority of these proposals are to be welcomed as 
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Oosthuizen (1994: 4) criticises the uncertainty regarding the reporting responsibilities 
as well as the powers of the Policy Board (i.e. advisory versus executive) under the 
new regulatory structure. lt is argued that it is vital for the Policy Board to have 
executive powers in order to give full effect to the proposals of the Jacobs and 
Melamet Reports. The point is made most eloquently and coherently in the Melamet 
Report (1993: 12) itself: 
'The arguments for the retention of banking supervision within the central bank 
of a given country are not cogent enough for the committee to be persuaded 
that (with) increasing conglomeration in the financial sector, involving centrally 
the banks, can be adequately catered for by a co-ordinating mechanism. In 
principle, the concept of a co-ordinating body made up of disparate regulators 
fulfilling an advisory function is suspect. lt is likely to become a debating 
society for vested interests and, without being charged with responsibility nor 
clothed with authority, it is difficult to see how an effective holistic regulatory 
approach can be satisfactorily devised yet alone implemented.' 
Also, as can be seen from Diagram 6.2, some sectors of the financial services 
industry, such as trust companies and operators in the securities markets are not 
represented at all (South African Reserve Bank 1993(a): 9). 
Finally, a holistic approach to supervision acquires additional importance in view of 
the increase in the number of entities entering the domestic market and the 
corresponding number of South African entities entering foreign markets (South 
African Reserve Bank 1993(a): 6). 
these represent a further step towards eliminating regulatory gaps and to achieve greater competitive 
neutrality between financial institutions, yet the stated goal of the Policy Board relating to uniform 
mimimum standards will not be attained. Similarly, the strengthened position of the Policy Board and 
the establishment of a single appeal board is a bold step forward. Neverthless, the integration of all 
regulatory bodies into a single, powerful body remains to be achieved. 
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6.5 Summary and Conclusion 
A comparison of regulatory authorities in the UK, Germany and South Africa has, as 
was to be expected, revealed both common ground and areas of diversity. Until 
relatively recently, UK regulatory authorities have maintained a very informal 
supervisory style which was not anchored in strict regulations. A change in this mode 
of supervision only came about as a result of bank failures, which may entail a move 
towards a more systematic risk assessment of banks and lesser reliance on an off-
site supervisory methodology. 
The 1979 UK Banking Act remains exceptional for the informal supervisory approach 
it favours. Although tribute needs to be paid to the general quality of banking 
supervision conducted in the absence of prescriptive quantitative regulations, the 
overall supervisory system suffers from some conceptual weaknesses such as the 
distinction made between banks and building societies. The implementation of the 
lead-regulator approach in order to facilitate co-operation between domestic 
regulatory authorities represents a combination of functional and institutional 
regulation. However, the multiplicity of UK regulators reduces the effectiveness of 
overall supervision. 
Whereas the UK approach to supervision is largely informal and the regulations 
applying to banking institutions are subjectively applied, the German banking 
regulations have generally been far more rigid and formally enforced and have also 
been built on a much older historical base dating to 1934. Since that time, banking 
regulations have evidenced a remarkable consistency, with the main changes 
prompted by EC directives, with the aim of harmonising banking regulations across 
borders. The FBSO provides an example of how close co-operation with the central 
bank can be obtained by an independent regulatory authority. To a large degree, the 
German system of universal banking obviates the question of regulatory co-
operation. 
Whilst the first proper legal framework for banking supervision in South Africa only 
came into being in 1965, the present system of banking supervision is both 
advanced - due to the recognition of risk-management as the prime supervisory 
issue - and unique - in terms of the role-player approach to sharing the responsibility 
of the risk-management process. Similarly, the holistic approach to overall financial 
supervision represents a clear conceptual paradigm according to which financial 
institutions are regulated. However, the objectives of holistic supervision have not yet 
been fully met in practice. While there is evidence of a high degree of structural 
deregulation in South Africa, this has been accompanied by a growth in risk-related 
banking regulation to address the growing sophistication of risk-management 
practices by banks.21o 
21° Fortunately, none of the three systems display a regulatory structure as confusing as that of the 
United States. The US Secretary of State, Lloyd Bentsen (1994) calculated that the creation of a single 
federal agency to assume the overlapping supervisory responsibilities of the Office of the Comptroller 
of the currency, The Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Office 
of Thrift Supervision would save some $.150 - 200 million per annum. 
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The research problem of this dissertation is that financial regulation addresses the 
risk-management activities of banks. This Chapter has demonstrated that this 
research problem is borne out by regulatory changes in all three financial systems 
which have historically come about either as a response to bank failures (which 
cruelly exposed bad risk-management practices by the institutions concerned and 
the lack of regulatory control thereof), or the realisation by regulatory authorities that 
existing legislation did not adequately regulate risk activities by banks.211 
Table 6.1 provides a summary of three regulatory authorities as discussed in this 
Chapter. 
Table 6.1 Regulatory Authorities in the UK, Germany and South Africa 
UK Germany South Africa 
Su~ervisory a~~roach 
Rules vs Principles Principles rather Narrowly rule-based Rules and Principles 
than strict rules 
Formal vs Informal Informal Formal Formal and Informal 
Su~erviso~ methodolog~ 
On-site vs Off-site Off-site Off-site Off-site 
Interaction with bank Frequent Infrequent Frequent 
management 
Regulate~ authorities 
Central Bank Department Yes No, but close interaction Yes 
with Bundesbank 
Co-ordination of Lead-regulator No overlapping Yes, but Policy Board 
regulation by a single jurisdictions does not have executive 
body powers 
The differing approaches to regulation in the selected countries should be kept in 
mind when comparing the components of regulation in Chapters 7 - 9. In the UK, 
lesser use will be made of strict rules to enforce risk-management. In Germany a 
legalistic approach is utilised to effect appropriate risk-management by banks, 
although this is not clearly stated as an objective by the regulatory authorities, while 
in South Africa the principles of risk-management shape the supervisory approach. 
There is no single 'correct' supervisory approach, as these merely reflect the efforts 
of regulatory authorities in each financial system to most effectively supervise 
banking risks. The approach has varied from narrowly rule-based Germany to a more 
principle-based approach as was evident in the UK. South Africa displayed hybrid 
characteristics as it combines clear rules and guidelines with the underlying 
principles thereof in applying banking regulation. In practice, a combination of 
objective rules and a subjective assessment of management quality may provide the 
best results. This conclusion may be likened to a game of rugby, with the supervisor 
as referee and the banks as players. Whilst a proper rulebook is indispensable to 
allow fair play, it is not a sufficient tool to judge the quality of play, which is what the 
game is really about. Similarly, the supervisory approach may be formal (as in 
211 The latter consideration includes the efforts by the BIS and the European Community to introduce 
communality in banking supervisory guidelines. 
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Germany) or informal (as in the UK). Again, the South Afric:an supervisory approach 
marries both extremes. The South African system merits being singled out as having 
the only regulatory authority which explicitly recognises that the supervisory 
approach entails the optimisation of financial risk-management. 
Moreover, SA banking regulation is unique in identifying the key players involved in 
the overall risk-management process and in spelling out the responsibilities of each. 
All three regulatory authorities have adopted an off-site supervisory methodology 
although the Bank of England has recently indicated that it intends paying more 
attention to on-site supervision. UK and South African regulators interact frequently 
with the regulated banks while German bank management seldom has direct contact 
with the FBSO and Bundesbank. 
lt is unfortunate that the present overall structure of South African regulatory 
authorities does not comply fully with the recommendations of the Jacobs and 
Melamet Committees. The institution of a single and integrated regulatory authority 
with executive powers would have allowed for a combination of institutional and 
functional regulation which is required in view of the conglomerate nature of modern 
financial institutions. The common ground for such synchronisation can be found in 
the fact that risk identification and risk-management are common to both the 
institutional and functional approaches. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE REGULATION OF DEPOSIT-TAKING INSTITUTIONS IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
7.1 Introduction 
This is the first of three country-specific Chapters dealing with the regulation of 
deposit-taking institutions; in this case with that of the UK. The outline that has been 
adopted is derived from the framework expounded in Chapter 4. lt broadly covers 
prudential and protective regulation; and monetary requirements. 
Prudential measures are those aimed directly at managing the levels of risks 
assumed by deposit-taking intermediaries. Protective measures, on the other hand, 
offer protection to depositors or to the deposit-taking intermediaries themselves. 
However, no clear-cut separation can be made as these measures interrelate in 
several ways, with risk exposure being the most obvious consideration. Monetary 
measures have a different economic justification and are therefore distinguished as a 
separate regulatory category. 
Components of prudential regulations include entry requirements, permissible 
business activities, disclosure requirements, capital adequacy, liquidity requirements 
and risk asset limits. Components of protective measures include various forms of 
deposit insurance and crisis management facilities. The components of monetary 
controls that are discussed are reserve requirements, interest rate controls, credit 
ceilings and allocation by regulation. 
The research problem of this study states that in practice, regulatory frameworks 
reflect the realities of deposit-taking financial intermediation, namely risk-
management. As such, prudential regulatory frameworks are designed to influence 
the management of financial risks by banks; whereas protective regulations aim to 
counteract the economic problems which arise when individual banking institutions 
have exposed themselves to a higher than acceptable level of overall risk. The 
validity of this research problem is inter alia borne out by the great influence which 
UK bank failures (caused by excessive risk-taking) have had on UK banking 
regulation. More recent bank failures such as in the case of BCCI (1992) and Barings 
Bank (1995) have both resulted in changes to the UK Banking Act and supervisory 
procedure which have improved the regulation of the risk-management activities of 
banks. 
This Chapter details how the present UK regulatory framework seeks to influence the 
risk-management activities of banks; from the setting of entry levels through to the 
establishment of formal and informal exit arrangements for banks. 
When considering the components of UK regulation the reader should keep in mind 
the informal style of supervision which is preferred by the UK authorities. 
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Accordingly, many of the regulations provide only loose guidelines and a flexible 
framework within which the Bank is allowed considerable room to manoeuvre. 
Similarly, the risk-assessment of banks is conducted subjectively and informally, 
although a move to a greater degree of formalism is evident in the UK. 
7.2 Prudential Regulation 
Regulations concerning entry requirements are intended to serve the prudential 
purpose of ensuring the soundness of new banking institutions as well as detailing 
the ethical and skill capability of bank management to manage banking risks. 
7 .2.1 Entry Requirements 
7 .2.1.1 Licensing and Ownership Control 
Schedule 3 of the Banking Act 1987212 sets out the criteria that an institution has to 
comply with before authorisation for registration may be granted by the Bank. The 
minimum criteria can be summarised as follows: 
• the directors, controllers and managers of the institution must be fit and proper to 
hold the respective positions (Paragraph 1 ); 
• the business of the institution must be directed by at least two individuals 
(Paragraph 2); 
• in the case of UK-incorporated institutions there must be an appropriate number 
of non-executive directors (Paragraph 3); 
• the institution conducts, or will conduct, its business in a prudent manner 
(Paragraph 4 ); 
• the business of the institution must be conducted with integrity and skill 
(Paragraph 5); and 
• the institution must have, at the time of authorisation, minimum paid up capital 
and reserves of ECU 5 million (Paragraph 4(3A)) or an amount of equal value in 
another currency. 
In May 1993 the Bank published a new set of principles213 it uses in applying the 
above authorisation criteria. 
Fit and proper 
Paragraph 1 (2) of Schedule 3 provides that in determining whether a person is 'fit 
and proper' regard shall be given to the individual's professional probity, competence 
and soundness of judgement, and the diligence with which he I she fulfils or is likely 
to fulfil his I her responsibilities. Any threat or likely threat to the interests of 
212 This Chapter contains numerous references to the 1987 Banking Act. Except where otherwise 
indicated, the words 'section' or 'Schedule' may for purposes of this Chapter be regarded as referring 
specifically to this Act, whereas 'paragraph' refers to paragraphs under the various Schedules of the 
Act unless otherwise stated. Likewise, 'Bank' refers to the Bank of England. 
213 The approaches taken by the Bank relating to capital and liquidity adequacy and to the adequacy 
of provisions are covered in paragraphs below. 
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depositors or potential depositors which may arise by the hol:iing of that position, will 
also be of fundamental importance. 
With regard to a person who is, or is to be, a director, chief executive, managing 
director or manager (as defined in section 105 of the Act), the relevant 
considerations include whether he has sufficient skills, knowledge, and soundness of 
judgement properly to undertake and fulfil his particular duties and responsibilities. 
The standards required of persons in these respects will vary considerably, 
depending on the precise position held by the person concerned. Thus a person 
could be fit and proper for one position but not fit and proper for a position involving 
different responsibilities and duties. The diligence with which he is fulfilling or is likely 
to fulfil those duties and responsibilities is also considered, so that the Bank can 
assess whether the person does or will devote sufficient time and attention to them 
(Bank of England 1993: paragraph 2.44 ). 
The probity of the person concerned is very important: it is essential that a person 
with responsibility for the conduct of a deposit-taking business is of high integrity. In 
contrast to the other elements of the fitness and properness criterion, the level of 
probity required will tend to be much the same whatever position is held (Bank of 
England 1993: paragraph 2.45). 
In assessing whether a person has the relevant competence, soundness of 
judgement and diligence, the Bank considers whether the person has had 
experience of similar responsibilities previously, his record in fulfilling them and, 
where appropriate, whether he has appropriate qualifications and training. As to his 
soundness of judgement, the Bank looks to, inter alia, the degree of balance, 
rationality and maturity demonstrated in his conduct and decision-taking (Bank of 
England 1993: paragraph 2.46). 
Business to be directed by at least two individuals 
Paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 requires that at least two individuals must effectively 
direct the business of the bank. This is commonly referred to as the 'four eyes' 
principle. The Bank's principal aim is to ensure that at least two minds and four eyes 
are applied to the formulation and implementation of all significant decisions and 
day-to-day policies of the institution. In addition, 'both persons must have sufficient 
experience and knowledge of the business and the necessary personal qualities to 
detect and resist any imprudence, dishonesty or other irregularities by the· other 
person' (Bank of England 1993: paragraph 2.33). 
The four eyes principle aims to prevent excessive risk taking by any one individual. 
Composition of the Board of Directors 
Paragraph 3 of Schedule 3 provides that the directors include such a number of 
persons without executive responsibility for the management of its business as the 
Bank considers appropriate, taking into account the institution's circumstances and 
the nature and scale of its operations. This requirement for certain institutions to 
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appoint non-executive directors is an innovation of the Act. lt is clear from the Bank's 
Statement of Principles that it attaches considerable importance to the role of non-
executive directors, placing particular value on their ability to bring 'an outsider's 
independent perspective to the running of the business and in questioning the 
approach of the executive directors and other management' (Bank of England 1993): 
paragraph 2.35). The Bank also considers non-executive directors to have a 
particularly important role as members of an institution's audit committee. The Bank 
recognises that some small authorised institutions may find it difficult to appoint 
sufficient, suitable non-executive directors for an audit committee to be established; 
nevertheless, it is committed to the principle that authorised institutions and banking 
groups should have such a committee, unless there are sound reasons to the 
contrary (Bank of England 1993: paragraph 2.36). 
The regulations relating to composition of the Board of Directors seek to bring 
objectivity and independence to the high-level risk-management process in a bank. 
Business to be conducted in a prudent manner 
Paragraph 4 (1) of Schedule 3 requires that the institution conducts or, in the case of 
an institution which is not yet carrying on a deposit-taking business, will conduct its 
business in a prudent manner. The 'prudent manner' criterion is the standard which 
is the most relevant to the interests of depositors. lt is also fundamental in assessing 
whether the institution's directors, controllers and managers are fit and proper 
persons to hold their respective positions. 
Sub-paragraphs 4 (2) to 4 (8)21 4 specify a number of conditions which are to be taken 
into account in determining whether a particular institution is conducting its business 
in a prudent manner. However, sub-paragraph (9) makes it clear that the detailed 
requirements contained in sub-paragraphs (2) to (8) are not exhaustive. As the Bank 
points out in its Statement, there are other considerations, above and beyond these 
statutory criteria, which it must take into account when determining whether the 
business is being conducted prudently, namely that it is in the interests of depositors 
and potential depositors (Bank of England 1993: paragraph 2.4 ). These additional 
considerations include: 'the institution's management arrangements; the institution's 
general strategy and objectives; planning arrangements; policies on accounting, 
lending and other exposures, and bad debt and tax provisions; policies and practices 
on the taking and valuation of security, on the monitoring of arrears, on following up 
debtors in arrears, on interest rate matching, and recruitment arrangements and 
training to ensure that the institution has adequate numbers of experienced and 
skilled staff in order to carry out its various activities in a prudent manner' (Bank of 
England 1993: paragraph 2.31 ). 
The criterion that business be conducted in a prudent manner relates directly to the 
prudent management of financial risks in order to protect financial consumers. 
214 Sub-paragraphs 4 (2) to 4 (8) deal with the following conditions: capital adequacy; maintenance of 
adequate liquidity; adequate provision for depreciation of assets and for bad and doubtful debts; 
maintenance of adequate accounting and other records and adequate systems of control of its business 
records; business conducted with integrity and skills; and minimum net assets. 
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Integrity and Skill 
Paragraph 5 of Schedule 3 requires the business of a bank to be carried on with 
integrity and skill. 
This criterion, like the prudent conduct criterion, concerned with the manner in which 
the business of the institution is carried on (which will partly determine its exposure 
to 'reputational risk') and is distinct from the question of whether its directors, 
controllers and managers are fit and proper persons, lt covers two elements: whether 
the institution's business is carried on with integrity; and whether it is carried on with 
the professional skills appropriate to the nature and scale of the activities of the 
institutions concerned (Bank of England 1993: paragraph 2.37). 
The integrity element of the criterion requires the institution to observe high ethical 
standards in carrying on its business. Criminal offences or other breaches of statute 
will obviously call into question the fulfilment of this criterion. Particularly relevant are 
contraventions of any provision made by or under enactments designed to protect 
members of the public against financial loss due to dishonesty, incompetence or 
malpractice.21s Doubts may also be raised if the institution fails to comply with 
recognised ethical standards of conduct such as those embodied in various codes of 
conduct.21 6 
Professional skills cover the general skills which bankers should have in conducting 
their business as bankers, for example, in relation to accounting, risk analysis, 
establishing and operating systems of internal controls, ensuring compliance with 
legal and supervisory requirements and in the standard of the various financial 
services provided to customers, The level of skills required will vary according to the 
individual case, depending on the nature and scale of the particular institution's 
activities (Bank of England 1993: paragraph 2.39). 
Ownership Control 
Sections 21 to 26 of the 1987 Banking Act relate to the ownership and control of UK 
incorporated, authorised institutions. The primary function of these sections is to 
protect the UK banking sector from aggressive foreign or otherwise undesirable take-
overs and from the influence and control of individuals whose interests may be 
harmful to those of depositors.217 Once a prospective shareholder or controller has 
215 Examples of such enactments are the Theft Acts of 1968 and 1978, the Consumer Credit Act 1974, 
the Companies Act 1985 (as amended), the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, the 
Financial Services Act 1986, the Banking Acts of 1979 and 1987 and foreign legislation dealing with 
similar matters. 
216 Examples of such codes would be the London Code of Conduct for the wholesale markets in 
Sterling, foreign exchange and bullion, the guidance notes on money laundering, the Code of Banking 
Practice, and the Take-over Code. 
217 The attitude of the Bank towards changes of control and ownership of UK incorporated, authorised 
institutions was outlined in the Banking Act Report for 1987/1988, in which the Bank made reference to a 
number of notable takeovers, including the TSB's acquisition of Hill Samuel; National Australia Bank's 
purchase of Clydesdale Bank and Northern Bank; and Equitycorp's purchase of a majority shareholding 
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satisfied the Bank that he is a 'fit and proper' person, the only remaining impediment 
to him becoming one, is the ability of the Bank to block foreign stake-building by 
invoking this discretionary power.218 
Hall (1989: 111-112; 1993: 40-41) argues that the Bank is not opposed to foreign 
financial institutions taking up participations in UK banks and that these will be 
allowed under the following circumstances: 
• the shareholder controllers and indirect controllers satisfy its 'fit and proper' test; 
• the Bank is satisfied as to the nature and scope of the supervision exercised by 
the home authority and has received adequate assurances from the latter as to 
the institution's soundness; 
• such moves are not designed to lead to dismemberment of the bank or group; 
• the share participation does not relate to the clearing banks and probably the 
major merchant banks; 
• developments do not reach the point where a strong and continuing British 
presence in the UK banking system is threatened; and 
• UK institutions have, or are likely to have in the near future, reciprocal rights of 
action in the predator's home country. 
Arguably, the first three of the above factors relate to prudential objectives, namely 
. ensuring ability to manage financial risks, determining adequate (foreign) supervision 
and preserving the stability of the banking system. 
However, the last three factors have a narrower UK-centric aim of preserving the 
sovereignty of the banking system. However, there is no explicit economic needs test 
as applied in some jurisdictions. This is welcomed as there is no justification for such 
a test from a risk-management paradigm. 
As for equity participation by foreign non-financial companies, the Bank will take 
into account an additional range of factors, most notably the likely closeness of the 
ensuing relationship. As is the case with domestic industrial and commercial 
companies, the Bank will seek to avoid the creation of conflict of interest and the 
risks and consequences of contagion that are inherent in such moves. For these 
reasons, it appears that the Bank will have difficulty in granting consent for the 
control of a UK bank to fall into the hands of an industrial or commercial company, 
regardless of whether it is of foreign or domestic origin.219 
in The Guinness Peat Group, including Guinness Mahon. The Bank acknowledged that such take-overs 
and mergers are a normal feature of a competitive market place. However, it stressed the need to assess 
the motives and situation of potential controllers of banks. 
218 The application of the 'fit and proper' criterion to shareholders and indirect controllers is discussed 
in the Bank's statement of principles (Bank of England 1993: paragraph 2.50-2.59) 
219 The ambitions of the advertising company, Saatchi & Saatchi, in respect of proposed links with 
Midland Bank were put to an end by the Bank, for example, in September 1987. This is in stark contrast 
to the approach adopted in Germany and elsewhere. The legislation may have been drafted too heavily in 
response to the threat of overseas predators, and as a consequence, insufficient attention may have 
been given to the need to protect depositors from undesireable controllers. Shareholders are tested for 
fitness and probity only when they pass the 15 per cent threshold. Yet, as the events leading up to TSB's 
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The UK regulator is therefore concerned with the possible risks emanating from the 
convergence of commerce and banking. 
lt should be noted that the provisions regulating the control of authorised institutions 
under the Act operate in addition to the existing provisions which are provided under 
the Financial Services Act 1986, by the Securities and Investments Board and by the 
Fair Trading Act 1973220 and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. 
7 .2.1.2 Foreign Bank Entry 
Foreign banks not authorised in a member EC state 
The criteria relating to fit and proper persons, prudent conduct and integrity and 
professional skills for institutions whose principal place of business is outside of the 
UK are contained under section 9 (3) which provides as follows: 
'The banking supervisory authority in the country or territory where most of the 
business is conducted informs the Bank that it is satisfied with respect to the 
prudent management and overall financial soundness of the institution' 
(Section 9 (3) (a) ). 
'The Bank is satisfied as to the nature and scope of the supervision exercised 
by that authority' (Section 9 (3) (b) ). 
There is no requirement for the applicant to provide the Bank with references from 
the home supervisor, although the Bank encourages overseas institutions proposing 
to establish branches in the UK, to consult with it before making any formal approach 
to the Bank. 
Although the Bank does place some reliance on the assurances received from 
overseas supervisors related to the risk-profile of the parent bank, it nevertheless 
examines in detail the planned business of the applicant's UK branch, its business 
plan, its liquidity policies, its internal controls, its accounting and other records, and 
staffing and management arrangements. Authorisation will not be granted if the 
applicant or overseas supervisor fails to allay, either through implementing an 
advised course of remedial action or providing suitable assurances, any doubts that 
the Bank may have about the fulfilment of the statutory criteria (Bank of England 
1993: paragraph 4.8). 
acquisition of Hill Samuel showed, two parties can each independently acquire just under 15 per cent, 
thus exercising considerable influence (or even effective control) over a bank, without being tested. 
220 The Fair Trading Act provides a tautologous definition when it deems control to exist if the acquisition 
or proposed acquisition of a substantial shareholding results, or would result, in of two or more authorised 
institutions being controlled by the same person, or group of persons, and the value of the assets taken 
over exceeds £30 000 000 (Fair Trading Act 1973: Section 64 (1 )). The figure for the value of assets 
taken over was raised to £30 000 000 by the Merger References Order (1984); the acquisition may be 
referred by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. In 
the event that such a referral is made, and the report of the Commission is adverse, the Secretary of 
State may order the sale or cancellation of the substantial shareholding. 
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The UK regulatory authorities wish to establish for themselves that branches of 
foreign operations are capable of managing banking risks. Consequently, foreign 
banks desirous of entering the UK banking system need to convince the UK 
supervisors that the risks managed by their parent banks are adequately supervised 
by their home supervisor as well as having appropriate risk.:.management abilities on 
a branch level in the UK. 
A branch is regarded as an integral part of the overseas institution to which it 
belongs. The deposit-taking authority granted by the Bank therefore covers the 
institution as a whole. Thereafter, a separate authority is not required should the 
overseas institution decide to open more than one branch office in the UK. 
Furthermore, there is no requirement for the branch of an overseas institution to 
have its own endowment capital. 
Once authorisation to a foreign bank has been granted, supervision becomes a joint 
responsibility of the host (i.e. the Bank) and home supervisor. The allocation of 
responsibilities is determined according to the principles enshrined in the Basle 
Concord at. 
Foreign banks authorised in a member EC state 
The Second Banking Directive (1989) allocates the supervisory responsibilities in 
respect of European banking institutions. The Bank's Statement (Bank of England 
1993) contains the principles encapsulates the main standards and considerations to 
which the Bank has regard in exercising its duties. The Bank's powers in relation to 
European institutions are limited as under the Directive the competent authority in 
the home State has primary responsibility for the supervision of credit institutions 
incorporated in that State and certain of their subsidiaries. The host State authority, 
however, has a specific responsibility to co-operate with the home State authority in 
ensuring that branches of European credit institutions from that State maintain 
adequate liquidity in the host State. lt also has responsibility to collaborate with the 
home State authority in ensuring that the credit institutions and their subsidiaries 
carrying on listed activities in the host State take sufficient steps to cover risks arising 
from their open positions on financial markets in the host State (Bank of England 
1993: 21 ). 
7 .2.2 Permissible Business Activities 
Classification as a deposit-taking institution 
Like its predecessor, the 1987 Banking Act does not provide an all-embracing 
definition of either a 'bank' or 'banking business'. The central prohibition in both Acts 
focuses only on deposit-taking. Section 3 of the 1987 Act imposes an absolute 
prohibition on deposit-taking institutions which have not been officially authorised by 
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the Bank. Essentially, section 3 abolishes the distinction between recognised banks 
and deposit-taking institutions introduced by the previous Banking Act.221 
Definition of a deposit 
In section 5, the term 'deposit' is defined very broadly in order to prevent deposit-
takers from disguising their activity in such a way as to take it outside the scope of 
regulation. This definition is therefore intended to further competitive neutrality 
across all institutions engaged in the activity of taking deposits. A deposit is defined 
as a sum of money paid on terms: 
• under which it will be repaid, with or without interest or a premium, and either on 
demand or at a time or in circumstances agreed by or on behalf of the person 
making the payment and the person receiving it; and 
• which are not referable to the provision of property or services or the giving of 
security. 
Section 6(1) defines a deposit-taking business for the purposes of the Act as: 
• if in the course of the business, money received by way of deposit is lent to 
others; or 
• if any other activity of the business is financed, wholly or to any material extent, 
out of the capital of or the interest on any money received by way of a deposit. 
The prohibition on deposit-taking is, therefore, wide in scope, and clearly extends 
beyond those institutions which might commonly be regarded as banks, in order to 
encompass institutions which take deposits and use those deposits (or the interest 
generated by deposits) to finance an activity other than lending. 
Exclusion from the application of the Act 
The restriction on the acceptance of deposits provided by section 3 is, however, 
subject to certain other restrictions which exempt certain institutions from the need to 
obtain authorisation. Schedule 2 covers a wide range of bank-type institutions of 
which it has been deemed unnecessary or inappropriate to bring within the Bank's 
supervisory ambit. The Schedule includes four main categories: 
• building societies, friendly societies, authorised insurance companies and credit 
unions (which are regulated by other statutes); 
• institutions that form a part of the public sector such as the National Savings 
Bank, local authorities, municipal banks and the Crown Agents; 
• relatively small institutions which do not pose a serious risk to the public such as 
penny-savings banks and school banks; and 
221 However, a remnant of the two-tier system still exists in section 67 of the Act, which permits only 
those institutions with a paid-up equity capital of at least £5 million to use a name indicating that it is a 
bank or banker or carrying on a banking business. 
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• international or supra-national bodies inclu~ing the European Atomic Energy 
Corporation, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Finance 
Corporation. 
In addition, sections 4(4) and 4(5) of the Act enables the Treasury to exempt certain 
features from the section 3 prohibition. This flexible mechanism is generally used to 
grant exemptions in cases where appropriate safeguards, which protect the interests 
of depositors, are already in place.222 
Of these exceptions to the Banking Act the most significant relates to building 
societies. Similar to banks, these institutions accept deposits from the general public 
and grant loans (albeit on a secured basis). Unlike banks, building societies 
traditionally do not engage in all the other areas of risk-management available to 
financial institutions. Nevertheless, the activities of building societies can be 
accommodated in the supervisory process applied to UK banks. The UK distinction 
between banks and building societies operates against the supervisory principle of 
competitive neutrality. 
Limitations on certain activities 
The UK has no statutory provisions requmng the separation of banking from 
commerce, securities business or insurance business. However, the Bank of 
England will use its powers of moral suasion to deter non-financial companies and 
insurance companies from acquiring a controlling interest in banks. 
The UK authorities allow the full integration of securities activities within a bank 
although securities operations are usually conducted through subsidiaries. In this 
sense the UK banking model conforms more closely to the universal banking model 
prevalent in Germany. UK banks may operate freely in securities and other financial 
and non-financial activities provided that they agree to observe any capital and other 
requirements specified by the Bank of England and I or other relevant supervisory 
authorities (see Diagram 6.1 ). Additionally, assurances may be sought from large 
shareholders in securities operations that they accept ultimate responsibility for the 
liabilities thereof; and restrictions may be placed on the scope of its activities and on 
the nature of the transactions which can take place between the securities subsidiary 
and related entities. These 'firewall' requirements are seen as essential prudential 
safeguards (Hall 1993: 181-182). 
Similarly, banks may engage freely in insurance activities although these need to be 
conducted via subsidiaries (Herring and Litan 1995: 168). There are no limits placed 
on investments in property. 
222 The list of exempt transactions and exempt institutions in the Regulations made under these 
provisions includes (Penn 1989: 39): charities; church deposit funds; industrial and provident societies; 
agricultural, forestry and fishing associations; retail and other co-operative societies; solicitors; 
deposits accepted in the course of estate agency work; certain public undertakings; Sterling debt 
securities; Sterling commercial paper; and authorised and exempted persons under the Financial 
Services Act 1986. However, not all types of deposits which may be accepted by the particular bodies 
are necessarily exempt. 
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The integration of securities and investment activities with banking allows for a 
holistic assessment of all the financial risks managed by UK banks. 
7 .2.3 Disclosure Requirements 
7 .2.3.1 Disclosure in Supervisory Returns 
Once an institution is authorised, it remains under, and is subject to the supervision 
of the Bank. In order to fulfil its supervisory function, the Bank requires a flow of up-
to-date and accurate prudential information and statistics which will enable the Bank 
to monitor the continuing compliance with the authorisation criteria. Effective 
supervision in a system which emphasises co-operation and participation depends 
heavily on the voluntary provision of financial information by the authorised 
institutions.223 
These disclosure requirements are intended to ensure that the Bank of England can 
monitor the risk-management activities of banks. 
The 1987 Act includes a number of provisions which enable the Bank to request 
information and documents from authorised institutions, and various connected 
parties, supported, if necessary, by an accountant's report. Notwithstanding these 
changes, much of the financial information required by the Bank to perform its 
supervisory function continues to be supplied by the supervised institutions on a 
voluntary basis. However, the Act provides for the 'voluntary system' to operate in 
tandem with a number of statutory powers and requirements. 
Power to obtain information and documents 
Section 39 (8) enables the Bank to obtain, by notice in writing, such information 
from an authorised or former authorised institution as 'the Bank may reasonably 
require for the performance of its functions under the Act' (Section 39 (1 )). The 
Bank's general power to request information is given greater weight by its legal 
powers to compel an authorised institution to provide it with an accountant's report, 
containing information which the Bank has or could have required the institution to 
provide. This second opinion may include information which the Bank did not actually 
demand and gives the Bank scope to utilise the accounting as well as risk-
management expertise and judgement of other parties (Section 39 (1) (b)). 
Under Section 39 (3), the Bank mAy demand the production of specific documents. 
lt may also request the institution and its past or present staff to comment upon any 
of the documents produced (Section 39 (5) (a)). Furthermore, even where the 
documents are held by a third party, the Bank has the power to require these 
documents to be produced (Section 39 (4)). However, the Bank's power to obtain 
223 This 'voluntary' participation was highlighted by both the Leigh-Pemberton Committee Report and the 
Government's White Paper on Banking Supervision. Against the background of the collapse of JMB, the 
White Paper proposed a tightening of the Bank's powers and procedures to ensure that all returns used 
for supervisory purposes are submitted promptly and have accurate information. 
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documents does not extend to those which are covered by legal or professional 
privilege (Section 39 (13)). The definition of documents is wide enough to 
encompass computer or other electronic records (Definitions are to be found in 
Section 1 06). 
Section 39 of the Banking Act gives the Bank powers to require an institution to 
commission reports from accountants to establish, among other things, the adequacy 
of its systems and controls and the accuracy of its prudential returns. Section 39 
reports are commissioned regularly as part of the Bank's routine supervision of UK-
authorised institutions, and special reports may be commissioned if a specific area of 
concern is identified. In addition section 39 allows the Bank to require an institution, 
former authorised institution or other persons (for example an institution's controllers) 
to provide documents and other information to the Bank. During 1995/96, 64 7 
section 39 reports were commissioned (286 of them on branches of overseas 
banks), including 15 special reports (Bank of England 1996(c) 37). 
In practice, the UK regulatory authorities will strive to assess the risk-profile and risk-
management capabilities of a bank by virtue of management interviews in addition to 
the section 39 disclosure requirements. 
Right of entry 
Should an authorised institution not comply with section 39, by failing to provide the 
required information, reports or documents, the Bank may exercise a right of entry to 
obtain the information or documents it requires.224 
Power to appoint investigators 
The Act provides the Bank with the power to appoint one or more competent persons 
to investigate and report to the Bank on: 
• the nature, conduct or state of the institution's business; or 
• the ownership or control of an institution or a former institution. 
This power may be exercised where it appears to be 'desirable .... in the interest of 
depositors or potential depositors of an authorised institution' (Section 41 ). 
The investigator may also extend the ambit of his investigation to include group 
companies and other connected entities (Section 41 (3)). 
All of the above rights and powers of the Bank can be utilised to obtain information 
related to the risk-profile and risk-management of banks. 
224 Strictly interpreted, section 40 (1) gives any officer, servant or agent of the Bank the right to enter any 
premises. The power is therefore not only exercisable when a person fails to provide the required 
information. 
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Restriction on disclosure of information 
Section 86 of the Banking Act provides for the mutual exchange of information 
between supervisory authorities which is needed for a holistic risk-management 
supervisor. lt may at times be disadvantageous for a bank to disclose information for 
reasons of client confidentiality, competitiveness or because the disclosure of a 
certain risk-profile may cause undesired market reaction (e.g. a run on the bank). 
Part V of the Banking Act provides for the confidentiality of all information, gained by 
means of the Act. 
7 .2.3.2 The Role of Auditors 
Appointment and responsibility 
The responsibilities of the reporting accountant225 are set out in the Bank of England 
Guidance Notes, which specify the objective and scope, the extent of responsibilities 
to supervisory authorities, and the formal content of reports. There are few practical 
problems associated with the formulation of responsibilities in practice. Minor areas 
of doubt can be discussed informally with the Bank. 
The only direct responsibilities placed on an auditor are in respect of: 
• a duty to notify change of audit appointment; and 
• a statutory duty to pass information to the supervisory authorities where it is 
required to protect the interest of depositors.226 
Therefore, the duties of auditors regarding prudential controls are determined 
individually by means of negotiation between the respective bank and the auditor. 
From a risk-management perspective a more involved participation by auditors in the 
UK supervisory process would be beneficial. The absence of set guidelines for 
auditors together with the overwhelmingly off-site methodology of the supervisory 
authorities could result in important risk-related information not being disclosed 
adequately. 
Relationship with supervisory authorities 
Supervisory authorities must be consulted on the appointment of the reporting 
accountant. The authorities must also be advised of any intention of a UK bank to 
225 In the UK, most of the work undertaken by internal auditors on behalf of the banking supervisors is 
carried out in the capacity of 'reporting accountant' under the Banking Act rather than in the capacity of 
internal auditor. In practice, the internal auditor and the reporting accountant are usually the same firm 
and the work carried out by the reporting accountant is very similar to internal audit work. There are no 
restrictions placed on other services which a reporting accountant can provide. When discussing the role 
of the external auditor this will be stated explicitly. 
226 This follows the recommendations of the 'Bingham Enquiry' into the supervision of the Bank of 
Credit and Commerce ('BCCI'). 
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change its auditors or not to re-appoint existing auditors. The Bank has no formal 
right to object to the auditor's appointment or reappointment although informal 
representations may occasionally be made. The Bank can, however, veto the 
appointment of the reporting accountant (FEE 1993: 41 ). The auditor is required to 
inform the supervisory authorities of any irregularities or infringements he has 
become aware of during the course of his work, if they are sufficiently significant to 
prejudice depositors. 
In the UK, there is a general duty of client confidentiality, but this is specifically 
superseded by the Banking Act to allow the auditor to communicate directly with the 
supervisory authorities (FEE 1993: 45). 
In the UK, the auditor must inform the supervisory authorities of any intended 
qualification of the audit report. The audit report must be forwarded to the Bank 
within six months of the year-end (FEE 1993: 50). 
Relationship with the bank 
lt is clearly stated in the Banking Act that the bank's management is responsible for 
financial statements and returns submitted to the supervisory authorities. The 
respective responsibilities of the management of the bank and the auditors are 
usually formally confirmed in the engagement letter (FEE 1993: 52). 
The bank is made aware at the highest level of any material weaknesses noted by 
the auditor in a report submitted to the supervisory authorities. The bank is required 
to respond to the supervisory authorities by written submission, to be attached to the 
reporting accountant's report, which must be sent within one month of the issue of 
the report. There may also be further formal discussions at a trilateral meeting 
involving representatives of the bank, the Bank of England and the audit firms. There 
is no requirement for the client bank to respond to the auditor's management letter. 
However, the bank must respond to any report of the reporting accountant (FEE 
1993: 53). 
The upshot of the above is that the role of the auditor vis-a-vis the bank can be 
limited to traditional auditing functions and does not necessarily include an active 
role in risk-management, unless bank management decides otherwise. Again, a 
greater degree of involvement by auditors would be welcomed from a risk-
management perspective. 
Reporting 
In the UK, the auditor is however required to report on prudential returns and 
elements of a bank's records and systems as selected by the supervisor. For 
example, the auditor could be required to give an opinion on the reliability of 
computer systems being a part of a records and systems review. In the case of risk 
assessment, the auditor could be required to review the systems for monitoring and 
controlling exposures, but not on the efficacy of risk positions (FEE 1993: 55-61 ). 
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A survey published by Touche Ross only days after the collapse of Barings Bank in 
February 1995 analysed 100 financial institutions in the UK and found evidence that 
the majority had inadequate risk-management systems. lt found that almost 60 per 
cent of institutions admitted that their systems did not meet existing risk requirements 
and 43 per cent said that internal management reporting would require considerable 
investment in information technology systems (Financial Times 5 April 1995: 1 ). This 
clearly indicates that in the UK there is much scope for auditors to enhance the 
overall risk-management process by banks, including risk-management systems. 
Supervisory authorities may request the auditor to submit a 'long form' report when a 
special investigation is considered necessary by the supervisory authorities. The 
auditor provides reports (principally exception reports) arising from his examination of 
records and systems and prudential returns. The areas to be covered are selected 
by the supervisory authorities (FEE 1993: 62) but paid for by the bank in question. 
The role of external auditors 
The external auditor is required to provide a special report to the supervisory 
authorities should he become aware of any of the following: material liquidity 
problems; material defects in the financial systems and controls; material 
inaccuracies in or omissions from any returns of a financial nature; a criminal 
offence; irregularities or infringements; serious shortcomings in the relationship 
between the bank and one or several of its customers; or any other circumstance 
indicating a risk of serious loss for depositors (FEE 1993: 63-64 ). Consequently, 
external auditors have a gateway to supervisors should they become aware of 
excessive risk-taking by a bank. 
The supervisory authorities have the power to appoint a firm of accountants to 
undertake special investigations. This includes investigations into risk-management 
procedures as was carried out to determine the exact nature of the causes for the 
failure of Barings Bank in 1995. This can be the external auditor, the reporting 
accountant or external auditors. The supervisory authorities decide whether or not 
the extraordinary auditor's report is to be made available to the internal auditor and I 
or the external auditor (FEE 1993: 7 4 ). 
There is no formal inspection programme by the supervisory authorities themselves, 
yet three-man teams make occasional limited visits (FEE 1993: 75). The external 
auditor has no right of access to information obtained by either the internal auditors 
or the supervisory authorities. However, refusal of access to internal audit 
information is likely to lead to a potential qualification in the 3Udit opinion (limitation of 
audit scope). lt is therefore unlikely that internal auditors will refuse to disclose 
evidence of inadequate risk-management practices or excessive risk exposure of 
which they have become aware. Nevertheless, a statutory duty to disclose all 
information related to the overall risk exposure would be preferred (FEE 1993: 77). 
External auditors may make use of the work of other firms in forming their opinion on 
a bank's annual consolidated accounts. Usually, this would relate to the accounts of 
overseas subsidiaries and branches. However, external auditors remain fully 
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responsible to the shareholders for the opinion they give. External auditors 
consequently have a responsibility to ensure that the financial statements of a bank 
give a true reflection of its risk exposure. The extent to which external auditors rely 
on the work of other firms is at the discretion of the principal external auditor; 
approval of the supervisory authorities is not required. In the UK, in relation to work 
carried out as external auditor on behalf of the Bank, the position is less likely to 
arise since it is not normal for work carried out in this capacity to require an 
examination of the records of overseas subsidiaries and branches. If, for any reason, 
the use of other auditing firms is contemplated, there is no specific requirement to 
obtain the Bank's prior approval. However, in practice, it is likely that the Bank will be 
consulted before the work is carried out (FEE 1993: 78). 
Future developments 
The Report of the Board of Banking Supervision Inquiry into the circumstances of the 
collapse of Barings ('the Barings Report') specifically highlighted that top 
management and the audit committee have to ensure that significant weaknesses 
are resolved quickly and that the internal audit function is accorded sufficient status 
and has unrestricted access to top management (South African Reserve Bank 
1995(a): 22). 
The main intended changes are that reporting accountants may now be 
commissioned to form an opinion on the systems of controls over the accuracy of the 
information contained in an institution's records and its transfer to prudential returns; 
that the Bank may use section 39 reviews more flexibly, to cover group operations 
other than the institution itself; and that reporting accountants will be required to 
state the extent of the work performed for each section 39 review (Bank of England 
1996(c): 26) 
7 .2.4 Capital Adequacy 
lt is of considerable importance that deposit-taking institutions maintain a level of 
capital that is commensurate with the nature and scale of the institution's operations, 
and is sufficient to safeguard the interests of its depositors and potential depositors. 
In determining whether such capital is adequate, Sub-paragraph (3) of Schedule 3 
refers to: the nature and scale of the institution's operations; the risks inherent in 
those operations; and (where the institution is a corporate body) the operations of 
any other member of the same group in so far as they are capable of affecting the 
deposit-taking institution. Before examining how the Bank, in practice, ensures that 
the capital of authorised institutions is 'adequate', it is necessary to focus on the 
definition of 'capital' used by the Bank. 
7 .2.4.1 The Definition of Capital for Regulatory Purposes 
Capital adequacy is defined in section 4(2) by reference to risk-weighted assets 
and is interpreted by the Bank by reference to paid-up capital and reserves, together 
with other financial resources available to the institution. The current UK statistical 
definition of capital reflects recent developments in international supervisory eo-
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operation. In particular it reflects the BIS proposals on the measurement of capital 
and assessment of capital adequacy (Bank for International Settlements 1993(b)) 
which were adopted in June 1989 and the modifications necessitated to comply with 
the EC's 'Own Funds Directive' (1989) and 'Solvency Ratio Directive' (1989) which 
were adopted in January 1991.227 
The BIS proposals fundamentally changed the terminology hitherto used in defining 
capital. The terms primary and secondary capital were rejected in favour of the terms 
Tier One (core) and Tier Two (supplementary) capital. Core capital consists solely of 
ordinary paid-up share capital and disclosed reserves, and is included without 
limitations. Secondary capital however, comprising undisclosed reserves, asset 
revaluation reserves, general provisions, hybrid capital instruments and subordinated 
term debt may total a maximum of 100 per cent of Tier One capital.228 
The new definition of capital that is applied by the Bank is contained in Appendix I. 
One major change for UK banks brought about by the implementation of the BIS 
proposals is that the Bank will allow qualifying general provisions to be included in 
Tier Two capital up to a level of 1 ,25 per cent of weighted risk assets only. 
Previously, banks were allowed to include all such provisions in both the definition of 
the capital base and primary capital. 
A key purpose of capital is to provide a stable resource to absorb any losses incurred 
by an institution, and thus protect the interests of its depositors and potential 
depositors. Capital must therefore have two main qualities to achieve this purpose 
fully - a capacity to absorb losses and permanence. All types of capital recognised by 
the Bank in Tier One have these characteristics. Tier One capital will not be of an 
appropriate nature if there are concerns that it may be paid away to the detriment of 
depositors' interests. Thus, for example, the Bank will only permit distributable 
reserves to be included in the capital base if the likelihood of such reserves being 
paid away is remote (Bank of England 1993: paragraph 2.1 0). 
The Bank recognises that some other types of capital also provide protection to 
depositors on an on-going basis. In particular, certain other types of capital, while not 
meeting the two criteria of ability to absorb losses while allowing an institution to 
continue to trade and permanence, can provide protection to depositors. Some 
subordinated term debt is therefore eligible to be included in own funds subject to the 
conditions (Bank of England 1993: paragraph 2.11 ). 
227 All signatories to the BIS document were obliged to implement its proposals by the end of 1992 at 
the latest. See Bank of England (1992(a) and (b). 
228 Furthermore, the inclusion of subordinated term debt within the capital base is subject to a 
maximum of 50 per cent of Tier One capital, i.e. 25 per cent of the capital base. A further limitation 
applies to the inclusion of general provisions (the amount of such provisions or reserves will be limited 
to a maximum of 1,25 per cent of risk assets). Asset revaluation reserves in the form of latent gains on 
unrealised securities are subject to a discount of 55 per cent. 
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Provisioning 
The requirement to have adequate provisions is part of the 'prudent conduct' criterion 
which institutions have to satisfy in order to obtain authorisation (Paragraph 4 of 
Schedule 1, Sub-paragraphs (7) and (8)). Banks are required to make adequate 
provisions for the depreciation of or diminution in the value of the assets. To this end, 
the Bank expects an institution to make provision for liabilities which will or are 
expected to be discharged and for any losses which it will or expects to incur, such 
as bad and doubtful debts and tax liabilities. In effect, provisions will relate to the risk 
that amounts cannot be recovered (Bank of England 1993: paragraph 2.23). 
In examining an institution's provisions, the Bank will look at: 'its provisioning policy, 
including the methods and systems for monitoring the recoverability of loans (for 
example, the monitoring of the financial health of counterparties; their future 
prospects; the prospects of the markets and geographical areas in which they 
operate; arrears patterns and credit scoring techniques), the frequency with which 
provisions are reviewed, the policy and practices for the taking and valuation of 
security and the extent to which the valuation exceeds the balance sheet value of the 
secured loans' (Bank of England 1993: paragraph 2.24 ). The Bank expects liabilities 
and losses to be recognised in accordance with accepted accounting standards, as 
embodied in the Statements of Standard Accounting Practice. The Bank appreciates 
that subjective judgements may have to be made concerning internal systems, and is 
prepared to make such judgements. 
Although the overall evaluation of the adequacy of provisions is subjective, some 
objective indicators are provided as in the case of provisions against country debt. In 
February 1993 the Bank issued a paper setting out a revised framework for 
determining the level of such provisions, which institutions could use in establishing 
an adequate level of provisions against country debt. 
Consolidation 
The Bank's supervision of banking groups is based principally on consolidated 
statistical returns and the annual reports and accounts of group companies. The 
Bank also strives to ensure that effective co-ordination between the supervisors of 
different companies or divisions of financial conglomerates exists.229 
In the case of UK incorporated banks, risk analysis is undertaken both on a 
consolidated basis, in order to capture exposures arising in subsidiaries and other 
connected companies, as well as in the authorised institution, and on an 
unconsolidated basis, in order to assess whether there is an appropriate distribution 
of capital within a group.23o For the purposes of the consolidated supervision of 
229 To achieve this objective, the Bank has adopted the Lead Regulator principle outlined in the 
Financial Services Act 1986 (See paragraph 6.2.4). 
230 The second EC Directive on the supervision of credit institutions on a consolidated basis was 
implemented in 1993 by the Bank's notice Implementation in the United Kingdom of the Directive on 
the Consolidated Supervision of Credit Institutions (Bank of England 1993(b )). This requires that 
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capital adequacy, the assets of financial companies in the group are risk-weighted 
and added to the total of risk-weighted assets. For the purpose of large exposures 
monitoring, the exposures incurred by the group companies are aggregated with 
those of the authorised institution and measured against group capital. 
Consolidated returns covering capital adequacy and large exposures form only one 
source of information for the Bank's consolidated supervision, which aims to form a 
qualitative judgement of the strength of the overall group to which a bank belongs in 
order to evaluate the potential impact of the other group companies on the bank. 
Thus, for example, where a banking group fails to meet the trigger risk asset ratio set 
for it, the Bank would consider that this posed a threat to the bank so requiring it to 
consider whether to take action in respect of the institution (Bank of England 1993: 
paragraph 2.19). 
7 .2.4.2 Measurement of Capital Adequacy 
In assessing capital adequacy, the Bank will take into account all risks of loss to 
which the institution may be subject, namely: credit risks; foreign exchange risks; 
interest rate and position risks; operational risks; contagion risks arising from 
subsidiaries, associates and other connected companies, which might expose the 
institution to direct financial loss or a general loss of confidence by association; and 
risks arising from the concentration of business in either a geographical or economic 
sector. Consequently, the Bank takes into account both an institution's on-balance 
sheet and off-balance sheet activities. 
The minimum net asset requirement of ECU 5 million, stipulated in paragraph 4 (A) 
of Schedule 3, operates as a rough starting point. The Bank considers each 
institution individually and the results of its risk analysis, in each case, is 
encapsulated in the form of a minimum risk asset ratio (a 'trigger ratio'). This ratio 
relates an institution's capital base to the quantum of the risks identified above. The 
Bank will generally expect each institution to conduct its business so as to maintain 
its risk asset ratio at a margin above the trigger ratio. lt refers to this higher ratio as 
the 'target ratio'.231 
The risk asset ratio (RAR) is derived formally by expressing an institution's adjusted 
capital base as a percentage of its adjusted total risk assets (ATRA). The adjusted 
capital base for purposes of calculating the risk asset ratio is derived by subtracting 
from the capital base, the value of: equipment and other fixed assets (with the 
exception of premises); goodwill and other intangible assets; and investments in 
subsidiaries and associated companies as well as trade investments. Th~ 
denominator is derived by determining the products of the nominal values of each 
distinct balance sheet component and their corresponding risk-weights, according to 
a classification system established by the Bank (See Appendix 11). 
consolidated supervision covers capital adequacy and large exposures, and extends to banks' parents 
and the financial subsidiaries of parents where the majority of the group's activities are financial in 
nature. 
231 Paragraph 2.12 of the Bank's Statement of Principles, (Bank of England 1988(a): Appendix 1). 
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In considering the appropriate level for the trigger ratio, the Bank takes into account 
all the other risks to which a bank is exposed, its capacity to manage those risks, its 
profitability and general prospects. Individual trigger ratios are set for each individual 
institution after discussions with senior management. In this manner, capital 
adequacy assessment is extremely flexible, allowing supervisors the ability to 
accommodate differences between institutions. Although, no norms are established, 
the trigger ratios set for a group of similar institutions are not likely to vary 
considerably. Since 1992 a minimum RAR requirement of 8 per cent has to be 
observed by all banks active internationally. Although the Solvency Ratio Directive 
(1989) generally applies on a consolidated basis, the Bank continues to maintain a 
minimum risk asset ratio on a solo basis as well. 
Because 'trigger' risk asset ratios are 'agreed' with management on an individual 
basis, the unique characteristics of each bank can be accommodated. The 
avoidance of strict limits probably represents the closest approximation of risk-based 
regulation as well as being conducive to the flexibility of operations. 
7 .2.5 Risk Assets Limits 
7 .2.5.1 Loan Concentration 
The JMB collapse232 highlighted the dangers of large loan concentrations as a small 
number of JMB's loans were significantly higher than 10 per cent of its capital base. 
These loans and the consequent credit risk were identified as one of the main 
causes of the failure of JMB. The UK Government, in its White Paper, accepted the 
case against absolute statutory limits and agreed that the Bank should be left with 
discretionary flexibility. However, it was also of the opinion that the issue of 
exposures to non-bank customers was of sufficient importance to justify a degree of 
statutory limitation (Penn 1989: 135). 
The potential risk of concentrations of lending and other exposures to individual 
borrowers or economic sectors was emphasised in the Leigh-Pemberton Committee 
Report. The report made reference to the fact that many countries have imposed 
specific limits on large exposures to individual borrowers or groups of related 
borrowers but recommended against imposing such lending limits in the UK. The 
Report concluded that other countries' experience ' ... has shown that (to impose such 
lending limits) encourages banks to find ways around the requirement and may 
encourage them to trade up to the specified limit. For some institutions an exposure of 
even as high as 10 per cent of.capital may be excessive and the supervisors need 
flexibility to agree upon appropriate policies with individual institutions within overall 
guidelines' (HMSO 1985: Chapter 5.4 ). 
Section 38 of the Banking Act therefore imposes a requirement upon authorised 
institutions (other than those whose principal place of business is outside the UK) to 
report to the Bank any transaction or related series of transactions with 'any one 
person as a result of which it is exposed to the risk of incurring losses in excess of 10 
232 See paragraph 6.2.1. 
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per cent of its available capital resources' (Section 38 (1) (a)). Furthermore, section 
38 (1) (b) requires that such an institution must report to the Bank, before entering 
into such a transaction or transactions, where the risk exceeds (either separately or 
together with previous transactions already entered into) 25 per cent of those 
resources. 233 
The general policy of the Bank towards large exposures entered into by authorised 
institutions was set out in the notice issued by the Banking Supervision Division 
entitled 'Large exposures undertaken by institutions authorised under the Banking 
Act 1987', (Bank of England 1987(b)). The most important provisions contained 
within this notice are summarised in Appendix Ill. 
The Large Exposure Notice issued by the Bank clearly indicates that the Bank's 
approach to' large credit exposures will take into account the particular characteristics 
of individual banks, including the nature of their business and the experience of their 
management. Therefore, although 1 0 per cent of 'available capital resources' has 
been generally adopted as the cut-off level for reporting purposes, for some banks 
the Bank may consider it prudent to set a lower percentage. lt could be said, 
therefore, that section 38 provides for a maximum level of exposure, which may be 
amended during subsequent discussions with the Bank. 
7 .2.5.2 Country Risk 
Country risk234 refers to the risks involved in cross border lending, of which two main 
types can be discerned: 'Sovereign risk' and 'transfer risk'. The former is the risk that 
foreign governments will be unwilling to service their debts; while the latter is the risk 
that a government willing to repay its debt may be unable to do so due to a lack of 
foreign exchange necessary to service or repay its debt obligations (Hall 1993: 38-
39). 
The Bank's approach to country risk is set out in a publication by the Bank of 
England (1984(b)). While acknowledging that it is the primary responsibility of bank 
management to measure, assess and control country risks, the Bank will 
nevertheless aim to ensure that suitable risk assessment systems are in place and 
that adequate resources are devoted to the task; that adequate control systems for 
weighing the risks and controlling exposures are in place; and that these limits are 
appropriate and are maintained. The monitoring of statistical returns and reviewing 
country exposures at management interviews plays an important part in allowing the 
Bank to form a judgement on each bank's assessment and control procedures. 
233 For the purpose of Section 38, 'any one person' includes a partnership and also separate persons 
where these are connected in such a way that the financial soundness of any of them may affect the 
financial soundness of the others, or the same factors may affect the financial soundness of them all 
(Section 38 (2)). The 'same factors' aspect of the test includes the requirement to report the exposure 
to a particular economic sector. The extent to which a bank may be prudently exposed to a particular 
industrial sector or geographical region will vary considerably, depending on the characteristics of the 
bank and the sector or region concerned. 
234 The considerations applied in determining the adequacy of provisions related to country debt are 
covered in paragraph 7.2.4.1 above. 
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The regulation of the management of country risk is therefore subjective and no strict 
guidelines are set in this regard. 
When supervising a bank's country exposures, the Bank considers how these 
exposures affect its assessment of the overall financial position of the bank. This 
means that country exposures have to be considered in relation to the adequacy of a 
bank's capital and provisions. In general, the larger a bank's exposure and the 
smaller its provisions, the higher the required risk asset ratio. As regards UK 
branches of foreign banks, attention is focused on the concentration of lending to its 
country of origin and its dependence on the wholesale market for the funding of this 
lending. 
7 .2.5.3 Interest Rate Risk 
In assessing capital adequacy, the Bank also takes account of the risks arising from 
open interest rate positions. In the case of interest rate instruments, banks are 
exposed to the potential costs of replacing the cashflow arising from these 
instruments. This cost depends on the maturity of the contract and on the volatility of 
the underlying interest rates. Interest rate contracts include: single currency interest 
rate swaps, basis swaps, forward rate agreements and products with similar 
characteristics, interest rate futures, and interest rate options purchased. 
The management of interest rate risk by banks is not subject to formal measurement, 
nor are special reporting arrangements deployed to facilitate the monitoring of 
interest rate risk. Ultimately, the Bank's main objective is to ensure that each and 
every bank is able to identify and manage the interest rate risk to which it is 
exposed. In effect the main concern of the Bank is with funding rather than with 
interest rate risk.235 Nevertheless, a more formal measurement of interest rate risk 
would be preferred as this should enhance the overall risk-management process. 
In order to calculate the credit equivalent amount of these instruments, a bank 
should add the total replacement cost (obtained by 'marking to market') of all its 
contracts with a positive value. An amount for potential future credit exposure which 
reflects the residual maturity of the contract, is then calculated as a percentage of the 
notional principal amount according to the following matrix (Bank of England 1987): 
Term 
Less than 1 year 
1 year and over 
Interest Rate Contracts 
nil 
0,5 per cent 
No potential exposure is calculated for single currency interest rate basis swaps; the 
credit exposure on these contracts is evaluated solely on the basis of mark-to-market 
value. In the case of interest rate or cross currency swaps arranged at off-market 
prices, the Bank will require special treatment where the contract has been created 
in order to disguise a credit exposure to the counterparty. 
235 See paragraph 7.2.6 on liquidity adequacy. 
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7 .2.5.4 Foreign Exchange Risk 
In assessing exchange rate risk, the Bank takes account of all exposures arising 
from uncovered foreign currency positions including those resulting from the writing 
of options. Net positions in single currencies, including Sterling, are considered 
alongside the aggregate net position in all currencies. Although the Bank accepts 
that the primary responsibility of the control of exchange rate risk should rest with the 
bank's own management, it nevertheless agrees on dealing position guidelines with 
each bank individually, and strives to ensure that banks' internal controls are 
adequate to allow for effective and continuous monitoring of exposures against the 
guidelines. The agreed guidelines are designed to accommodate not only the 
business characteristics of a bank but also its relative expertise in managing foreign 
currency operations (Hall 1989: 97; Hall 1993: 36). 
The Bank (Bank of England 1981; 1984(a)) draws a distinction between structural 
positions (i.e. exposures of a longer term nature) and dealing positions (i.e. those 
creating exposures as a result of day-to-day operations). Structural positions are 
excluded from consideration when dealing guidelines are formulated. However, 
structural exposures are dealt with within the Bank's assessment of capital 
adequacy, as the 'aggregate foreign currency position' in the risk asset ratio 
framework includes both dealing and structural positions . 
• 
Typically, UK incorporated banks active in foreign exchange operations are required 
to adhere to the following guidelines: a limit on the net 'open' (i.e. the difference 
between assets and liabilities) dealing position in any one currency of 10 per cent of 
the adjusted capital base, as defined for the purpose of computing a bank's risk 
asset ratio (see Appendix 1), and a limit on the net 'short' open dealing (spot and 
forward) positions of all currencies taken together of 15 per cent of the adjusted 
capital base. 
The guidelines apply to both the domestic and overseas branches of UK banks. 
Subsidiaries are monitored on a separate basis. Eventually, such monitoring may be 
used to provide a consolidated assessment of banks' foreign currency exposures for 
purposes of capital adequacy. In line with the revised Basle Concordat, the foreign 
currency operations of UK branches of overseas banks are also monitored; and 
guidelines, in the form of exposure limits, will be agreed upon in cases where the 
Bank is not satisfied with the internal controls of the branches themselves or of their 
head offices, or is otherwise concerned with the monitoring arrangements adopted 
by the bank's home supervisory authorities (Hall1993: 36).236 
236 Domestic and foreign banks are required to provide monthly returns which will include the following 
information in contracted currency amounts: the net spot long or short position in each currency at the 
close of business on the reporting day; the net forward long or short position in each currency at the 
close of business on the reporting day; and all the occasions during the reporting period on which the 
agreed guidelines were exceeded (Hall 1989: 98). 
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7 .2.5.5 Off-balance Sheet Business 
The Bank follows the BIS proposals regarding the treatment of off-balance sheet 
activities. According to this approach, the notional principal amounts of certain off-
balance sheet activities are first converted into on-balance sheet loan equivalents 
(the deemed credit risk equivalence) by multiplying the appropriate conversion 
factors. As can be seen in Appendix IV these factors vary from 1 0 to 1 00 per cent. 
The loan equivalents are then factored into the basic weighting framework.237 
7 .2.6 Liquidity Adequacy 
In January 1996, the Bank implemented a new system for measuring the Sterling 
liquidity of the large UK banks (Bank of England 1996(a): 28). The approach is based 
on the four key principles of prudent liquidity management, which underlie the Bank's 
approach to liquidity policy. They require that a bank should: 
• be able to meet its obligations as and when they fall due; 
• maintain sufficient immediately available cash or liquid assets to meet its 
obligations; 
• have a profile of cash flows arising from maturing assets sufficient to fulfil its 
obligations ('adequate cash flow'); and 
• have an adequately diversified deposit base in terms of both maturities and range 
of counterparties. 
Most banks in the UK were supervised on what is known as the 'mismatch' 
approach, whereby assets and liabilities are allocated on a maturity ladder and limits 
are set on the size of the mismatch in various time bands. This approach is less 
suitable for very large banks whose balance sheets are characterised by a highly 
diversified retail deposit base. For these banks, it is more important that they hold an 
adequate stock of liquid assets. 
The Bank's objective in developing the new system for Sterling stock liquidity has 
been to establish a framework that directly addresses the liquidity needs of the major 
UK retail banks and introduces a common minimum standard. lt is designed to 
ensure that at all times a bank maintains a stock of highly liquid assets which it can 
mobilise quickly and discreetly to replace funding that has been withdrawn because 
of a perceived problem in the institution. The aim is to provide a breathing space 
during which the institution can try to arrange more permanent funding solutions. 
The Bank has decided that, in order to provide adequate time to investigate various 
forms of remedial action, a bank should, as a minimum, be able to meet its 
obligations without any renewal of maturing wholesale funding (on a new basis) for a 
period of five working days, after allowing for the loss of a proportion of its retail 
237 The treatment of interest rate and foreign exchange related instruments, which is similar to the 
above, is discussed under paragraph 7.2.5.3 and 7.2.5.4 respectively. 
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deposit base. To prevent stock holdings from becoming excessively volatile, 
institutions will also be expected to hold sufficient Sterling stock to meet a minimum 
'floor' requirement agreed with the Bank. 
An institution will thus be expected to hold a stock of Sterling liquid assets sufficient 
to cover the higher of: 
• its wholesale Sterling net outflow 'floor' over five working days, as agreed with the 
Bank; or 
• 100 per cent of the actual wholesale Sterling net outflow over five working days, 
plus 5 per cent of Sterling retail deposits falling due in the same period. 
The stock of Sterling liquidity comprises assets which carry a low credit risk, are 
traded in sizeable amounts in deep and liquid markets, and which the Bank is 
prepared, by convention, to lend against in the course of its money-market 
operations. 238 
The regulation of liquidity risk therefore relates to both normal conditions as well as 
providing for crisis circumstances. In the UK there are no minimum reserve asset 
ratios.239 Consequently, a clear conceptual distinction is made between monetary 
policy and prudential requirements. 
238 These assets comprise: cash and operational balances with the Bank; UK Treasury bills and gilts; 
UK bank bills eligible for rediscount at the Bank; UK local authority bills eligible for rediscount at the 
Bank; secured overnight and callable deposits with money-market dealing counterparties of the Bank 
which are authorised institutions under the Banking Act; secured overnight and callable deposits with 
Stock Exchange Money Brokers and Gilt Edged Market Makers. 
239 See section 7.4. 
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7.3 Protective Regulation 
7 .3.1 Crisis Management 
Unfortunately, prudential supervision and regulation cannot, in all instances, prevent 
bank failures from occurring. lt is then that the question of crisis management is 
raised. 
7 .3.1.1 Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
There is no legal requirement for the Bank to protect depositors or come to the aid of 
failing deposit-taking financial institutions; nor is there a formal statement of 
principles or guidelines according to which such assistance will be rendered. The 
clearest statement of principles that has been provided is that of Mr E. A. J. George 
( 1993: 11-13 ), then Governor of the Bank): 
'First, we will explore every option for a commercial solution before committing 
our own funds. Initially, we will always look to major shareholders to provide 
support. Short of that, we will encourage the bank to try to find a buyer, for 
some or all of itself, even at knock-down prices. Or a bank's major creditors 
may decide to provide support, to protect their own positions. Or there may be 
a coherent group of other banks with a common interest in an orderly 
resolution. 
Second, central banks are not in the business of providing public subsidy to 
private shareholders. If we do provide support, we will try to structure it so that 
any losses fall first on the shareholders and any benefits come first to us. And 
any support we provide will be on terms that are as penal as we can make 
them without precipitating the collapse we are trying to avoid. 
Third, we aim to provide liquidity; we will not, in normal circumstances, support 
a bank that we know at the time to be insolvent. Our own capital is not there to 
be used as risk capital. But it would be wrong to conclude from this that loans 
or guarantees never involve any risk. Even if a bank is apparently solvent at 
the time we provide support, it can easily become insolvent later. 
Fourth, we look for a clear exit. The company may be required to run down or 
restructure its operations, under our surveillance, to the point where it can do 
without our support within a given period. Making the terms of our support as 
unattractive as possible has the great advantage of encouraging this process. 
Alternatively the company may be wound down under our management -
which is what happened to JMB, and earlier to Slater Walker and many of the 
lifeboat banks. We aim to protect the system, not to keep in being unviable 
banking capacity and so interfere in the market process unnecessarily. 
Fifth, we usually try to keep the fact that we are providing systematic support 
secret at the time. In principle, I am against secrecy for the sake of it. And in 
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this field there can certainly be circumstances where the markets will be 
reassured by knowing that we are involved. Very often, however, the opposite 
is true. If people know that we are so concerned about systematic fragility that 
we have judged it necessary to provide support, that could lead to a wider loss 
of confidence. They would wonder how far that support would be extended, 
and we could rapidly find ourselves in the position where we were in practice 
underwriting all the liabilities of the banking system. lt could then be extremely 
difficult for us to disengage. We will as a matter of public accountability always 
reveal the fact of our support after the event, when the danger has passed. 
Even then, it will often be difficult to disclose publicly the details of our support. 
The full details could weaken even those banks that had succeeded in 
dispensing with our support.' 
The overriding principle is therefore that central bank support, whatever form it takes, 
is directed to safeguarding the financial system (and therefore preventing damage to 
the wider economy), not the institution itself. This entails looking after the interests of 
depositors in the first instance rather than shareholders. lt is also noteworthy that the 
Bank espouses a discretionary doctrine, i.e. it retains absolute discretion on whether 
a bank should be supported or not. Beyond that, there are various rules that are 
applied, as described above. 
7 .3.1.2 Corrective Action 
Apart from its traditional rediscount and emergency assistance facilities, the Bank 
has, in the past, called upon the banking community (and especially the major UK 
clearing banks) to limit any risk of contagion. The Bank prefers the formation of 
'lifeboats', whereby the major banks, creditors and the Bank itself contribute to a fund 
which can then be used to rescue the ailing yet fundamentally sound institutions. 
Support has not yet been extended beyond the banking sector, although Hall 
(1993: 39) argues that a serious crisis in some of the other sectors of the financial 
services industry, such as the securities, insurance or building society sectors is 
likely to necessitate such a shift in policy because of the substantial systemic risks 
associated with the financial operations conducted in such markets. The emergence 
of financial conglomerates has increased the problems that the bank faces in this 
regard.240 This is an important point which may also lead to a change in prudential 
supervisory policy in other financial systems. 
7 .3.2 Deposit Insurance 
Whilst the aim of prudential regulation is to minimise the occurrence of bank failures, 
the existence of the UK deposit protection scheme (the 'scheme') is a pragmatic 
acknowledgement that deposit-taking institutions will continue to fail and that 
disadvantaged depositors should be compensated. The scheme was inaugurated by 
the 1979 Banking Act which adopted a standing fund, contributed to by the 
240 The most recent example of such a bailout was the rescue of Johnson Matthey Bankers in 1984. In 
the early 1970s, a more extensive lifeboat support operation was mounted to stem the loss of 
confidence associated with the secondary banking crisis (see paragraph 6.2.1 }. 
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institutions authorised under the Act and administered by the Deposit Protection 
Board (the 'board'),241 with scope for further contributions should they become 
necessary. Protection under the 1979 Act was effectively limited to £7 500 per 
depositor per institution to reflect the sentiment that even small depositors must take 
some responsibility for assessing the credit worthiness of the institution in which they 
place their deposits. 
The 1987 Banking Act, which in a number of other areas of banking supervision has 
materially changed what was envisaged by its 1979 predecessor, left the Scheme 
largely unchanged, but for some technical amendments and the fact that the scope 
of protection was effectively doubled. lt seems that the legislature of the 1987 
Banking Act was happy to allow the deposit protection scheme to continue largely as 
it was; efficient, effective, uncontroversial and probably unknown to the majority of 
depositors. 
The quantum of protection 
The Credit Institutions (Protection of Depositors) Regulations 1995 came into effect 
on 1 July 1995. The Regulations amended the Scheme to meet the requirements of 
the EU Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive. They made a number of changes to 
the level and scope of the protection provided: in particular, the maximum level of 
protection for an individual depositor was increased from 75 per cent of £20,000 to 
90 per cent of £20,000 (or ECU 22,222 if higher).242 
The Scheme now covers deposits in ECU and the currencies of EEC states (rather 
than just Sterling deposits), and covers the branches of UK-incorporated banks 
throughout the EEC where coverage was previously limited to their UK offices (Bank 
of England 1996: 29). Banks are now required to provide depositors with details of 
deposit protection arrangements. 
Interestingly, corporate deposits still generally remain protected and there has been 
no attempt to restrict protection to the individual depositor. Consequently, the ambit 
of the scheme is wide in that all depositors regardless of their degree of financial 
sophistication are covered. On the other hand the quantum of protection is limited 
and gives little comfort for large corporate depositors. The UK scheme consequently 
does not protect large depositors who have deposited money in high risk banks. lt is 
assumed that such depositors will have the sophistication to assess the risk-profile of 
241 Schedule 4 to the 1987 Banking Act sets out the constitution of the board and the administrative 
regulations wh:ch govern it. The board consists of three ex-officio members namely the Governor of 
the Bank (acting as chairman), the deputy governor of the Bank and the Chief Cashier of the Bank. In 
addition, there must be a number of ordinary members appointed from time to time by the Governor. 
Three of the ordinary members must be directors, controllers or managers of contributory institutions 
and the remainder are Bank employees. The Board must keep proper accounts, audited by a 
recognised body of accountants and must, as soon as practicable after the end of a financial year, 
prepare an annual report on the performance of its functions during that year. In practice, the Board 
meets approximately twice a year, with the day-to-day administration delegated to a secretary who is 
an employee of the Bank. 
242 These changes also brought the Scheme into line with the Building Societies' Investor Protection 
Scheme. 
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banks. The Act maintains the board's general discretion to withhold payment to 
anyone who, in its opinion, was responsible for, or may have profited directly or 
indirectly, from the circumstances giving rise to the institution's financial difficulties 
(Section 58 (5)). 
Procedure and Assessment 
The Scheme is administered by the Deposit Protection Board, whose function is to 
maintain and distribute the Deposit Protection Fund. Established as a body corporate 
under section 21 of the 1979 Banking Act; section 50 of the 1987 Act provides for the 
continued existence of the board and sets out its duties in respect of the fund.243 In 
short, it is concerned with damage limitation after the event rather than damage 
prevention by assessing or influencing the risks taken by banks. 
Contributions to the Fund 
The institutions which must contribute to the Deposit Protection Fund and the 
machinery for the collection of such contributions are set out in sections 52 to 56 of 
the Act. The first and most fundamental point to note is that all institutions which are 
authorised under the Act are required to contribute to the fund. Building Societies are 
not covered by the scheme, which operates against competitive neutrality for all 
deposit-taking institutions although a separate scheme for the protection of building 
societies' depositors exists. Contributions to the fund consist of three types; initial, 
further or special contributions. 
Initial Contributions 
Initial contributions, as the name implies, are one-off payments by institutions levied 
by the Board as soon as they become contributory institutions. The amount of this 
contribution is subject to a minimum and maximum amount under section 56. The 
minimum initial contribution is £10 000 whilst the maximum contribution is £300 000. 
Subject to these parameters, the Board is given a wide discretion to levy such 
contribution as it considers appropriate to put the institution on a basis of equality 
with other contributory institutions.244 Under section 53 (4) the board may waive an 
initial contribution if the institution is to carry on 'substantially the same business' as 
that carried on by a previous institution. Thi~ would appear to apply to the case of 
mergers between contributors. 
243 These are limited to holding, managing and applying the fund according to the Act and levying 
contributions from the authorised institutions. lt should be recognised that the foregoing provides the 
limits of the role of the board within the supervisory structure; it is not a body that deals with complaints 
or disputes, nor can it initiate or assist in rescue operations. 
244 In most cases, this discretion is entirely theoretical, since the contribution is levied with reference to 
the deposit base and most newly authorised institutions do not have a deposit base. Such institutions 
simply pay the statutory minimum of £10 000. 
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Further Contributions 
Further contributions are dealt with in section 54, and are levied from contributory 
institutions in two different circumstances. First, if, at the end of a financial year the 
fund contains less than £3 million, further contributions may be required by the Board 
to restore it to its original value of between £5 million and £6 million. Second, 
contributions may be levied in the event that the Treasury takes a policy decision to 
increase the amount of the fund beyond £5 million to £6 million and need to levy 
further contributions to enable the new figure to be attained. Such a levy can only be 
made by an order, approved by both houses of parliament (Section 54 (2)). 
Special Contributions 
Special contributions are provided for by section 55. These enable the board to levy 
contributions if, during the course of any financial year, it appears that payments are 
likely to exhaust the fund.245 
Clearly, none of the contributions made to the fund are directly related to the risk-
profile of a bank or the risk that the deposits may not be repaid. Furthermore, the 
contributions do rJOt even take into account the actual total deposits covered at a 
given bank (i.e. when the individual limit of £18 000 is applied). There is therefore a 
high degree of moral hazard attached to the UK deposit insurance system. lt is 
recommended that the contributions should rather relate to the total amounts of 
deposits covered for each bank as well as the risk of default attached to these. 
Activation of the Scheme 
Section 58 states that if an authorised institution becomes insolvent or is the subject 
of an administration order under section 8 of the Insolvency Act of 1986, the board 
must, as soon as is practicable, pay out to each protected depositor 90 per cent of 
his protected deposit. Deposits made after the institution ceased to be authorised are 
not protected unless the relevant depositor did not know and could not reasonably 
be expected to have known that the institution was no longer authorised. 246 
245 Once the board has determined how much it would like to charge contributors, it will serve a notice 
on the relevant institutions, specifying the amount due and requesting payment within 21 days. As all 
contributions are levied on the basis of a percentage of an institution's deposit base, it is clear that the 
term 'deposit base' must be defined adequately. The definition of deposit base is contained in section 
52 (4). The deposit base includes loans made to an institution by other institutions and loans made in 
the course of a lending business other than by the Bank and authorised institutions. lt does not include 
non-Sterling deposits, deposits with an original term to maturity of more than five years, deposits from 
connected persons (as discussed above) and secured deposits. Significantly, deposits over £20 000 
are also covered by the definition, even though these are not protected under the scheme. 
246 An interesting innovation in the 1987 Banking Act is the provision in sections 58 (3) and (4) for 
dealing with situations where there is an overlap between protection afforded under the deposit 
protection scheme and protection under other comparable schemes. Where the board is satisfied that 
comparable protection is available, it has a choice: it may deduct from its payment to the depositor any 
sum due under the comparable scheme or it may arrange with the authority responsible for the 
comparable scheme that the board will pay in full and then recoup an agreed sum from that authority. 
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Once the Board has made a payment to a depositor, the scheme aims to put the 
Board in the shoes of the depositor vis-a-vis the institution and so the institution is 
treated as being directly liable to the board for an amount equal to the payment (less 
any sum recouped from a comparable scheme, as discussed above). Clearly, the 
hope is that as a result of section 62, the Board, having paid out sums to depositors, 
may subsequently recoup a substantial portion of these monies from the institution. lt 
is only at this stage that the Board will concern itself with the circumstances and 
hence risk-profile of a particular bank. 
General 
Hall (1993: 44) argues that the Scheme should be redesigned to reduce the degree 
of eo-insurance required from a depositor and to index the basic level of protection. 
More importantly, Hall ( 1993: 44) also supports the view expressed here in favour of 
risk-related premiums. 
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7.4 Monetary Requirements 
The programme of monetary deregulation and re-regulation in the UK since 1971 is 
chronologically depicted in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 Monetary Deregulation in the UK 
Date effective 
October 1971 
October 1972 
September 1973 
December 1973 
February 1975 
November 1976 
August 1977 
May 1978 
June 1978 
October 1979 
June 1980 
August1981 
July 1982 
Source: 
Reform measure 
Under the Competition and Credit Control approach to monetary policy the 
following reforms were implemented: 
• the interest rate cartel of the clearing banks was abolished; 
• the 8 per cent cash ratio and the 28 per cent minimum liquid assets ratio 
(both imposed only on clearing banks), were replaced by a 12,5 per cent 
minimum reserve assets ratio on clearing banks, secondary banks and large 
finance houses; 
• a 1,5 per cent minimum cash ratio was imposed on the clearing banks; 
• lending ceilings were abolished; and 
• hire purchase terms control were abolished. 
The Bank rate, the traditional rediscount rate of the Bank of England, was 
replaced by a market-determined minimum lending rate (MLR). 
An interest rate ceiling of 9,5 per cent was imposed on the amount that banks 
could pay on Sterling deposits of less than £10.000. 
Hire-purchase terms control was reintroduced; and a supplementary special 
deposit scheme, known as the 'corset', was introduced. 
The 9,5 per cent interest rate ceiling and the corset were abolished. 
The corset was reimposed. 
The corset was abolished once again. 
MLR set by administrative decision rather than using the market-related formula. 
The corset was re-imposed again. 
Exchange control was abolished. 
The corset was finally abolished. 
A new monetary control regime was established under which: 
• the minimum cash ratio and minimum reserve assets ratios were abolished; 
• MLR was suspended; 
• a 0,5 per cent of 'eligible liabilities' non-operational cash ratio requirement 
was imposed on all monetary sector institutions with liabilities averaging at 
least £10 million over a selected period. 
Hire-purchase terms control was finally abolished. 
Ha/11993: 29-30. 
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Since July 1982 banks in th3 UK have not been subject to any direct monetary 
requirements. The only balance sheet ratios imposed on banks for monetary 
purposes is the 'eligible liabilities' cash ratio. The ratio, which is currently at the level 
of 0,4 per cent can be regarded as an implicit tax on the banking sector. 
Monetary policy objectives are pursued purely through open market transactions. 
The ability of the Bank to conduct monetary policy without prescribing a reserve 
asset ratio is retained by means of the balances held voluntarily by the clearing 
banks at the Bank. Furthermore, monetary policy is facilitated by the convention 
requiring the clearing banks to inform the Bank, on a daily basis, of their intended 
clearing balances. This enables the Bank to determine the desired level and 
structure of short-term interest rates in a predictable fashion (Hall1993: 31 ). 
The avoidance of direct monetary requirements by regulatory authorities reflects an 
acknowledgement of the costs (in terms of competitive distortions created, resources 
misallocated etc.) associated with the use of these methods. 
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7.5 Summary and Conclusion 
Table 7.2 below summarises how the various components discussed in this Chapter 
are related to the risk-management activities of UK banks. 
Table 7.2 Prudential Regulation of Banks in the UK 
Component 
Licensing and ownership control 
Foreign bank entry 
Permissible business activities 
Disclosure requirements 
Role of auditors 
Capital adequacy 
Risk asset limits 
Liquidity adequacy 
Risk consideration 
• Management fit and proper to manage banking risks 
• Initial capital of only ECU 5 million required therefore 
relatively low barrier to entry 
• Ensuring home supervisor adequately supervises bank's 
risk as well as own investigation into risk-management by 
branch 
• Broad definition of deposit to ensure supervision of all 
banking institutions engaged in risk-management with the 
main exception being building societies 
• Securities and insurance activities allowed, provided these 
risks are supervised by a relevant authority 
• Voluntary system to supply risk information operates in 
addition to statutory powers to obtain documents and 
information relevant to risk-management 
• Auditors required to supply authorities with risk information 
• Bank management may decide on the involvement of 
internal auditors in the risk-management process 
• Auditors required to report on prudential returns and risk-
management systems, however involvement in risk-
management process is limited unless required by bank 
management 
• Capital adequacy determined with reference to the risk-
weighted assets of a bank 
• Consolidation required to provide overall perspective on 
risk-profile of all operations of a banking group 
• Measurement of capital adequacy takes into account all 
banking risks by means of an informal 'target ratio' and a 
formal 'risk asset ratio' 
• Credit risk regulated by limiting large exposures to 1 0 per 
cent or less of available capital 
• Country risk-related to overall financial position of bank but 
without set guidelines 
• Interest rate risk not formally measured or reported, but 
each bank required to identify and manage interest rate risk 
• Foreign exchange risk regulated by agreeing on dealing 
position guidelines and incorporating structural positions in 
capital adequacy assessment 
• Off-balance sheet risks incorporated into overall risk 
assessment. 
• Liquidity maturity mismatch monitored for normal trading 
conditions supplemented by a liquidity stock requirement 
for crises 
Although the 1987 Banking Act and the regulations thereto have further formalised 
the supervisory process in the UK, the informal supervisory style of the Bank has 
been retained in may respects. The Act requires banks to be authorised, it regulates 
the ownership and activities of banks, imposes disclosure requirements and lays 
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down guidelines for capital adequacy in accordance with BIS directives. Yet it is clear 
that the Act still allows for considerable flexibility within which the supervisory 
authorities are able to monitor banks and banking activities. 
The Bank has assessed the capital adequacy of UK incorporated banks on a risk 
basis since 1980. The Bank is unique in not employing strict gearing ratios, although 
it observes the minimum BIS standards. lt also exhibits great flexibility to take 
account of all risk exposures and to set requirements individually. 
Significantly, each of the banking risks identified at the outset of the dissertation are 
supervised in the UK, adding weight to the argument that this is and indeed should 
be the prime concern of regulators of deposit-taking institutions. 
The discretionary powers afforded to the Bank are also apparent in the Bank's 
approach to emergency assistance, with the emphasis placed on the stability of the 
financial system as a whole. This lends support to the reasoning that financial 
stability is the prime regulatory objective in the case of banks, a point further 
underpinned by the existence of a comprehensive deposit protection scheme. 
However, the UK deposit insurance scheme has moral hazard deficiencies as it does 
not rely on risk-related insurance premiums. A summary of the risk considerations 
underlying the UK system of protective regulation is provided in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3 Protective Regulation in the UK 
Component Risk consideration 
Emergency liquidity assistance • No legal duty to protect depositors 
• Bank of England will provide assistance if the 
failure of a bank poses a risk to the stability of 
the banking and I or financial system 
Corrective action • Risk of contagion countered by formation of 
lifeboats 
Deposit insurance • Compulsory 
• Protection of smaller depositors against risk of 
bank failure with effective limit of £18 000 
• Insurance contributions not related to risks of 
deposits with each bank, thereby increasing 
moral hazard 
Finally, the freedom from direct monetary regulation enjoyed by banks in the UK, 
reflects an awareness by the Bank of England of the costs inherent in these 
restrictions. 
Consequently, the various components of UK Banking Supervision discussed in this 
Chapter demonstrate adherence to the research problem which states that banking 
regulation is concerned with the risk-management activities of banks. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE REGULATION OF DEPOSIT-TAKING INSTITUTIONS IN 
GERMANY 
8.1 Introduction 
This is the second of three country-specific Chapters; covering banking regulation in 
Germany. The framework of this Chapter conforms to the framework for practical 
regulatory analysis as constructed in Chapter 4 and applied also to the UK and 
South Africa. The three broad areas discussed are those relating to prudential 
regulation, protective regulation and monetary requirements. 
Prudential or preventative regulations seek to directly influence the various risks 
assumed and managed by financial institutions whereas protective regulations offer 
protection to depositors or to deposit-taking institutions themselves. Monetary 
requirements are usually instituted with the aim of supporting monetary stability but 
there is little regulatory justification for these requirements. 
This Chapter will demonstrate the manner in which the German regulatory framework 
facilitates the management of various financial risks attached to banking activity. In 
doing so it will be proven that the regulation of deposit-taking institutions in the 
German financial system accords with the research problem of this study, namely 
that regulatory frameworks reflect the realities of financial risk-management. 
As was discussed in paragraph 6.3.2 and as will become increasingly evident below, 
the German approach to banking regulation is formal and narrowly rule-based. 
Consequently, the components of regulation are often complex and detailed to the 
extent that the primary focus on risk-management rather than the adherence to strict 
rules may become diffused. Similarly, the German regulatory methodology which is 
characterised by off-site gathering of relevant information and infrequent interaction 
with bank management does not explicitly indicate a regulatory aim of risk control. 
Nevertheless, all the components below are routed in risk-management activities of 
banks. 
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8.2 Prudential Regulation 
8.2.1 Entry Requirements 
8.2.1.1 Licensing and Ownership Control 
Any enterprise falling within the definition of 'banking institution' as defined247 in 
section 1 (1) of the Banking Act248 and which is not specifically exempted from the 
provisions of the Act must obtain a banking licence from the FBSO prior to the 
commencement of operations (Section 32(1 )). 
A banking licence is likewise required for any foreign enterprise conducting the 
business of a 'banking institution' through a branch in Germany. 
The FBSO may grant the licence subject to the applicant's fulfilment of specified 
conditions or may limit the licence to certain types of banking business (Section 
32(2)) within the meaning of section 1 (1) of the Banking Act. Prior to the issuance of 
a licence permitting the conduct of deposit-taking business, the FBSO must consult 
the appropriate banking association. In the case of private commercial banks, the 
FBSO will normally subject the licence, insofar as it allows the business of deposit-
taking, to the condition that the applicant bank becomes a member of the Deposit 
Protection Fund.249 This evidences the German regulatory concern with the 
protection of depositors. 
Pursuant to section 33 of the Banking Act, a banking licence for German 
incorporated banks may only be refused by the FBSO if: adequate capital necessary 
for the operations is not available; the bank does not appoint at least two managers 
(Geschaftsleiter); the managers are not 'reliable' (zuverlassig); the managers are not 
'professionally qualified' (fachlich geeignet) to direct the affairs of the bank; or the 
application for the licence is not accompanied by a business plan. 
The issue of banking licences is thus not simply at the FBSO's discretion. On 
fulfilment of the aforementioned five requirements, a legal right to the licence, which 
can be enforced in court, is established. 
As was the case in the UK where a 'fit and prudent' criterion is applied to screen 
prospective bank management, the German requirements relating to reliability and 
professional qualifications can be traced to the ability to manage banking risks. 
247 See paragraph 8.2.2. 
248 The most recent amendment of the 1985 Banking Act was the Law for the Amendment of the Banking 
Law and of Other Provisions Relating to Banks (Gesetz zur Anderung des Gesetzes Ober das 
Kreditwesen und anderer Vorschriften Ober Kreditinstitute) (1993). This Chapter contains numerous 
references to the 1985 German Banking Act, as amended. For ease of reference, the word 'section' 
should therefore, for purposes of this Chapter, be regarded as pertaining specifically to this Act, except 
where expressly indicated otherwise. 
249 See paragraph 8.3.2 below. 
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Likewise, the minimum capital required is intended to cushion depositors should 
banks engage in excessive risk taking. 
The initial minimum capital of banking institutions is not fixed by statute or regulation, 
but may be set from time to time by the FBSO as a matter of administrative practice. 
The initial minimum capital required by the FBSO for private commercial banks 
has been OM 6 million for some years. Once a bank is in operation, Principle I of the 
'Principles Concerning the Equity Capital and Liquidity of Banking Institutions' issued 
by the FBSO, which lays down the required ratios between credits extended by a 
bank and its equity capital, effectively determines the necessary minimum capitai.250 
The managers need not be German citizens but they must be resident in Germany 
and must, according to the administrative practice of the FBSO, be fully conversant 
with the German language. The 'professional qualification' (Section 33(1) No. 3) 
requirement of a manager is normally deemed to be fulfilled if he has served for at 
least three years in an executive position with a bank of comparable size engaged in 
a comparable type of business prior to his appointment (Section 33(2)). As the 
business of banking entails managing financial risks, the latter requirement relates to 
the extent and nature of risks in which the manager wil have management 
experience. 
The term 'business plan' (Geschaftsplan) means a detailed description of the kind of 
business which the bank wishes to carry out and of the proposed organisational 
structure of the bank. This enables regulatory authorities to assess both the viability 
and risk of the banking venture. 
A banking licence expires automatically if banking operations are not commenced 
within one year after issue (Section 35(1 )). The FBSO may revoke the licence only 
under specified circumstances, namely, if banking operations have been 
discontinued for a period of one year (Section 35(2)), if the bank ceases to have at 
least two managers (Section 35(2)), if the bank's managers are not 'professionally 
qualified' or 'reliable' (Section 35(2)), or if the fulfilment of the bank's obligations to its 
creditors, in particular the security of the assets entrusted to the bank, is 
endangered.251 As all of the foregoing will be the result of or evidenced by 
inappropriate risk exposures it follows that the revocation a banking licence is 
dependant on proper risk-management. In the case of the expiration or revocation of 
the licence, the FBSO may order that the bank be wound up (Section 38). 
Ownership Control 
As far as the ownership of a bank is concerned, German banking law, prior to the 
1993 Amendments to the Banking Act, did not limit ownership to certain kinds of 
investors or to certain percentages, nor did it require reports about the owners. 
250 See paragraph 8.2.4.2 below. 
251 The 'endangerment' of the security of such assets is presumed to exist in the event of a loss of 50 
per cent of the bank's equity capital or loss of more than 10 per cent of the bank's equity capital in 
each of the three preceding consecutive business years (Section 35(2)). 
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Industrial and commercial companies could own banks, and in some cases the 
FBSO, and even the bank itself, did not know the identity of the owners. 
The 1993 Amendments, which also incorporated the rules of the Second Banking 
Directive (1989) on shareholdings in banks, brought about a change in this regard. 
The new section 2(b) of the Banking Act provides that a person who intends to make 
a significant investment (10 per cent or more) in a bank must promptly inform the 
FBSO and the Bundesbank. The notice must contain information demonstrating the 
reliability of the investor and its officers. 
The owner of a significant investment must also report to the FBSO and the 
Bundesbank any proposed increase of a significant investment that would result in 
the investment reaching or passing the threshold of 20 per cent, 33 per cent or 50 
per cent of voting rights or capital of the bank, or would result in the bank becoming 
such investor's subsidiary.252 These changes to ownership requirements indicate a 
greater awareness by German supervisors of the potential risk attached to a bank 
having a too dominant shareholder.253 
The 1993 Amendments to the Banking Act therefore ensure that the identity of the 
owner of a significant investment in a bank will be known to the German banking 
authorities and that the ability of shareholders to influence the bank management as 
regards the risks in which they engage is supervised; however, it does not change 
the principle that industrial and commercial companies may invest in or own banks. 
8.2.1.2 Foreign Bank Entry 
Foreign banks not authorised in a member EEC state 
A branch of a foreign bank not authorised in a member EEC state that is carrying on 
'banking business' in Germany within the meaning of section 1 (1) of the Banking Act 
is deemed, for purposes of the application of the Banking Act, to be a 'banking 
institution' (Section 53(1 )). Consequently, all provisions of the Banking Act apply 
mutatis mutandis to such branch, subject however, to certain modifications as 
252 The 1993 Amendments to the Banking Act hold 'subsidiary' as an enterprise that is a subsidiary as 
defined in section 290 of the Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB 1970)). Section 290 of the 
HGB defines the subsidiary of a parent as a company in which the parent has the majority of votes, or as 
to which the parent has the right to elect or dismiss the majority of the membem of the administrative or 
supervisory board or as to which the parent has the right to exercise a controlling influence on the basis 
of an agreement with the subsidiary (Behe"schungsverlrag) or on the basis of a provision in the charter 
of the subsidiary (HGB 1970: section 290(2)). 
253 The FBSO can revoke the investment within three months if it is not satisfied with the reliability of 
the investor or its officers (Section 2(b) and 33( 1 )}, or if an effective supervision of the bank is not 
possible on account of the investment or the relationship of the investor with other enterprises (Section 
33(1 )). Likewise, any shareholder owning a significant investment in a bank who intends to dispose of 
that investment, or to reduce it below the benchmarks of 20 per cent, 33 per cent, or 50 per cent 
measured by voting rights or capital, or to reduce the investment below the subsidiary level must 
inform the FBSO and the Bundesbank (Section 2(b )). 
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provided in section 53.254 The absence of a legal distinction between foreign and 
German banks signifies the degree of cross-border competitive neutrality which is a 
facet of the modern German banking system. 
Thus, prior to the co_mmencement of the operations of the branch, a banking licence 
must be obtained. The requirements to be met in order to obtain the licence 
correspond to those which must be fulfilled by German incorporated banks. 
The foreign bank must appoint at least two persons who are authorised to manage 
the business of the branch and to represent the foreign bank. Such persons are 
deemed to be managers (Geschaftsleiter) (Section 53(2)) which means that all 
provisions of the Banking Act relating to the managers of German banks· are also 
applicable. The . managers must therefore fulfil the personal and professional 
qualifications described above for managers of German banks. At least one of them 
must have served for at least three years in an executive position with a bank in 
Germany, which may be a German branch of a foreign bank, of comparable size 
engaged in a comparable type of business prior to his appointment. For the other 
managers it generally suffices if they have served in such a position with a bank 
abroad, but in any event they are required to have had not less than one year of 
banking experience in Germany. 
Similar to the regulation of German banks, the managerial qualifications and 
minimum capital required for foreign banks have their roots in prudential 
considerations relating to the managerial ability and capital base to assume banking 
risks. 
Furthermore, the minimum initial capitalisation requirements applicable to German 
private commercial banks pertain in the form that the foreign bank must supply the 
branch with the appropriate amount of initial capital. 
The foreign branch must be registered and the managers thereof entered in the 
Commercial Register. The FBSO will normally subject the licence to the conditions 
that the branch must, prior to commencement of operations, be registered as a 
branch in the Commercial Register and that deposit-taking business with non-banks 
may only be commenced after the branch has become a member of the Deposit 
Protection Fund.255 
Foreign banks authorised in another EEC state 
The 1993 Amendments to the Banking Act implemented the 'European passport' 
concept of the Second Banking Directive (1989) which provided that banking 
institutions authorised in another EEC member state were entitled to offer their 
services freely to individuals and businesses in Germany and to establish branches 
254 If a foreign bank maintains several branches in Germany, all such branches together are deemed, 
for banking regulatory purposes, to constitute a single 'banking institution' (Section 53(1 )). 
255 See paragraph 8.3.2 below. 
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in Germany without the need for any further authorisation.256 Each member state 
must ensure that at least the activities listed in the Annex of the Directive may be 
pursued in its territory by any banking institution authorised and supervised by its 
EEC home member state (Baums and Gruson 1993: 116). The effect of the 
European Passport concept is that each European supervisory authority will rely on 
the ability of each of the other European regulators to adequately supervise the risk 
of Pan-European banks. 
8.2.2 Permissible Business Activities 
Permitted activities 
The universal banking system in Germany allows banks to offer a variety of financial 
services to their customers, such as the acceptance of deposits, consumer and 
commercial lending, securities underwriting and trading, mutual fund operations, and 
investment advising. Section 1 (1) of the Banking Act enumerates certain activities 
and provides that any enterprise engaging in one or more of such activities on a 
commercialised scale is a banking institution and is subject to the licensing 
requirements and other provisions of the Banking Act. Thus, the purpose of section 1 
of the Banking Act is not to limit activities that are permissible to banks, but to 
establish that a banking licence is required for certain activities. 
Section 1 of the Banking Act does not include certain activities that are frequently 
conducted by German banks, and licensed banks may also engage in activities that 
are not specifically contained in section 1.257 Some non-listed activities are 
underwriting, factoring, forfaiting, financial leasing, dealing in precious metals and 
collectors' coins, and dealing in foreign exchange. Banks may also engage in 
securities business and may even act as real estate brokers. 
Section (1 )1 of the Banking Act specifies nine types of transactions as 'banking 
business' .258 
'Deposit business' is defined as the acceptance of monies from others as deposits, 
irrespective of whether interest is paid thereon. Curiously, the term 'deposit' and its 
distinction from other funds received (such as loans, advances, repayments), the 
acceptance of which does not constitute 'banking business', is not defined in the Act. 
For purposes of bank supervision, particularly for determining whether or not an 
enterprise is engaged in 'deposit business', the FBSO has adopted a definition in its 
administrative practice which has also been accepted by the courts. According to this 
256 The 1993 Amendments assume that the activities listed in Section 1 are identical with, or at least 
not more limiting than, the activities listed in the Annex to the Second Banking Directive. The Annex 
defines the scope of the principle of mutual recognition of the banking licences of other EEC member 
states. 
257 The commencement and termination of activities not enumerated in section 1, must, however, be 
reported to the FBSO. 
258 Under section 1 (1 ), the Federal Minister of Finance is authorised to issue regulations designating 
transactions other than those listed in section 1 (1) of the Act, as banking business. However, this 
power has up to now never been exercised. 
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definition, 'deposit business' constitutes 'the continuous acceptance of monies from a 
multitude of persons who are not banking institutions on the basis of standardised 
contracts in the form of loans or irregular deposits259 without the provision of security 
of a kind customary in banking and without concluding a written agreement in each 
individual case (BGB 1968: section 700). 
Although the definition of a deposit is ambiguous, the definition of deposit-taking 
activity is sufficiently broad to encompass all manner of banking activity and financial 
institutions. The German supervisory net is therefore cast very wide. 
'Credit business' comprises the extension of loans and acceptance credits.26o 
'Discount business' is defined as the purchase of bills of exchange, promissory notes 
and cheques.261 
'Securities business' is defined as the purchase and sale of securities for the account 
of others, i.e. securities broking. The purchase and sale of securities for a bank's 
own account does not constitute traditional banking business yet this does not 
preclude banks from engaging in securities trading for their own account. 
According to the definition, it is irrelevant whether the securities are purchased or 
sold in the name of the banking institution or in the name of its customers. As a rule, 
German banks purchase and sell securities on behalf of their customers in their own 
name, usually as agents earning commission, but in certain cases also as principal. 
The management and underwriting of securities issues do not constitute banking 
business within the meaning of section1 (1) and is as such not subject to any special 
banking regulatory provisions.262 
'Custody business' comprises the custody and administration of securities for the 
account of others (Section 1 (1) No. 5).263 
259 Although the inclusion of the word 'deposit' in the definition is in the opinion of the writer clearly 
circuitous. 
260 Only the extension of loans, not the acquisition of existing money debts, constitutes 'credit 
business', so as to exclude in particular factoring and forfeiting from the definition of banking business. 
However, for purposes of financial reporting by banking institutions, section 19(1) No. 1 provides that 
the term 'credit' includes money debts acquired for consideration, which transactions are accordingly 
subject to bank regulation if carried on by a 'banking institution'. 
261 The discounting of such paper constitutes, in terms of private law, not a credit transaction, but a 
purchase contract. The purchase of securities other than bills, notes and cheques or of book 
receivables does not constitute discount business. 
262 In terms of the current policy of the Bundesbank, the lead management of OM denominated bond 
issues of foreign issuers may be carried out only by banks incorporated in Germany (so as to exclude 
German branches of foreign banks). This regulation does not conform to the requirements of 
competitive neutrality between foreign and local banks. 
263 Bank custody operations occasionally take the form of separate deposits (Sonderverwahrung), but 
more commonly that of collective deposits (Sammelverwahrung), whereby the custodian bank may 
either keep the customer's securities itself or entrust them to a sub-custodian bank (Drittverwahrung), 
such sub-custodian generally being a securities clearing bank. The administration of securities 
includes primarily detaching and collection of maturing coupons, procuring of new sheets of coupons, 
attending to drawings and notices of repayment and liquidation of maturing securities. The securities as 
well as the custody business are regulated by the provisions of the Act Concerning the Custody and 
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Section 1 (1) No. 7 designates a further aspect of banking business as the 'incurring 
of obligations to acquire claims in respect of loans prior to their maturity' .264 
'Guarantee business' is the issuance of guarantees and indemnities of any kind for 
others.265 
Finally, 'giro business' is defined as the effecting of transfers and clearings, i.e. 
traditional payment services. 
The attempt by the German legislator to define various traditional banking activities 
appears archaic in view of the multitude of activities carried out by modern banks. 
Nevertheless, it is significant that each of these activities results in financial risks 
being assumed. Thus credit business, discount business, incurring obligations and 
guarantee business all entail the assumption of credit risk by a bank. Likewise 
securities business is subject to market risk while giro business relates to payment 
risk. Finally, deposit and custody business are those banking activities where the 
consumer of banking services bears the risk of the bank defaulting. 
There are, however, some limitations on the activities in which a bank may engage. 
Banks may not engage directly in investment business (i.e. providing investment 
services and advice) as defined in section 1 of the Investment Companies Act.266 
Banks also may not engage in the insurance business, which means that they may 
not issue insurance policies. Insurance companies require a licence from the Federal 
Insurance Supervisory Office (Bundesaufsichtsamt fOr das Versicherungswesen) to 
conduct insurance business, and such licences will not be granted to banks. 
However, banks may act as brokers for the sale of insurance policies issued by 
licensed insurance companies. As will be discussed below, banks may. also own 
insurance companies. While this does not represent true Bancassurance (namely the 
total integration of banking and insurance activities) the 'firewall' requirements are 
not onerous. 
Exemptions from application of the Act 
Certain institutions are specifically exempted from regulation and superv1s1on in 
terms of the Banking Act, namely: the Bundesbank, the Kreditanstalt fOr 
Wiederaufbau (which is subject to the direct supervision of the Federal Government), 
Acquisition of Securities (1937) and are both subject to special control of the FBSO by means of 
securities deposit audits under section 30 of the Banking Act. 
264 This definition relates to a special kind of revolving credit transaction, commonly referred to as '7-
M-business', by which a party sells long-term loan claims to one or several institutions granting short-
term refinancing and undertakes to repurchase such loan claims on a short-term basis with the aim to 
again re-sell the loan claims for short-term refinancing upon re-purchase. 
265 Examples of guarantee business are suretyships (Biirgschaften), guarantees (Garantien) of any 
nature, and includes bid bonds, repayment bonds, performance bonds and guarantee bonds, the 
endorsement of bills of exchange and cheques and the granting of any other indemnity for others. 
266 On the other hand, investment companies are required to have a banking license (Investment 
Companies Act 1970: section 2(1)) if they want to engage in the business of banking. 
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insurance companies, insofar as they do not conduct banking business, and other 
institutions mentioned in section 2 (such as the Federal Post Office with respect to its 
savings banks and giro operations, and the social security authorities). 
Permitted investments 
A German bank may invest in other banks, as well as in commercial, industrial, and 
insurance companies. 267 The only limitation is that the aggregate book value of the 
investments of a bank that exceed 10 per cent of the capital of the target companies, 
must not exceed the equity capital of the bank.26a 
The 1993 Amendments to the Banking Act provide that a bank's 'significant 
investmenf269 may not exceed 15 per cent of the liable capital of such bank, and all 
such significant investments of a bank in the aggregate may not exceed 60 per cent 
of the liable capital of such bank (Section 12(5)). 
Investments (significant or otherwise) in banks, financial institutions, and insurance 
companies are not subject to the 15 per cent and 60 per cent capital limitation 
(Section 12(5)). Apparently, the Legislator was of the opinion that because 
investments in banks, financial institutions and insurance companies are subject to 
regulation, they do not carry the same risk as investments in unregulated commercial 
and industrial enterprises.21o 
Consequently, investments in excess of 10 per cent of the capital of investee banks 
and financial institutions are not subject to the limitation that the total of such 
investments of an investor bank may not exceed the investor bank's liable capital.271 
The reason for disregarding these investments in banks and financial institutions 
from the 1 0 per cent limitation is that these investments are deducted from the 
267 This is in contrast to the UK requirements which separates banking from commercial, industrial and 
insurance activities. 
268 The 1993 Amendments to the Banking Act provide that the total book value of investments by a 
bank in real estate, buildings, operating and business equipment, ships and shares in banks and other 
enterprises, as well as in rights resulting from capital contributions made in the capacity as a silent 
partner (stille Gesellschafter), rights from participation rights (Genussrechte), and rights from loans 
pursuant to section 1 0(5a) of the Banking Act to other banks (subordinated loans), may not exceed the 
liable capital of the bank. Investments in shares of a company are disregarded for this calculation if 
they do not exceed 10 per cent of the capital of such company. In addition, investments in certain 
securities of a company held in the bank's trading account which do not exceed 5 per cent of the 
capital of such company are also disregarded for such computation (Section 12(2)). 
269 Investment of at least 10 per cent in an enterprise other than a bank, a financial institution, an 
insurance company, or a company providing supporting services to the bank. 
270 The Second Banking Directive (1989) saw a risk in participation by banks in other companies 
because such participation may affect the soundness of the bank if the subsidiary experiences 
financial difficulties (contagion risk) and because such participation constitutes a long-term 
commitment of the investing bank, but the Directive excluded banks and financial institutions from the 
restriction on participation. 
271 Investments of investee institutions are subject to limitations only if they exceed, in the aggregate, 
10 per cent of the liable capital of the investor bank. 
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capital of the investor bank for purposes of computing its liable capital (Section 
1 0(6)a).272 
The above investment regulations are liberal as banks are free to invest as they 
choose but have to consider the effect of these investments on their capital 
adequacy. 
8.2.3 Disclosure Requirements 
Under section 44 the FBSO may: request from a bank any and all information 
pertaining to the bank's operations; inspect all books and records of the bank; carry 
out an audit, even without specific cause; attend shareholders' meetings and 
meetings of supervisory boards of banks and speak at such meetings; require from 
banks the calling of shareholders' meetings and meetings of the supervisory board. 
The FBSO may request that items specified by it for deliberation and resolution be 
placed on the agenda of such meetings. Consequently, section 44 allows the 
German regulator full access to all information related to the activities and hence risk 
exposure of a bank. However, there is no duty by German banks to specifically 
disclose risk-management information or to report excessive risk exposures. 
8.2.3.1 Disclosure in Financial Statements and Supervisory Returns 
Statutory returns 
Banks are subject to comprehensive reporting obligations. The statutory basis for the 
directives on reporting obligations of banks is section 18 of the Bundesbank Act as 
well as numerous regulations or directives of the FBSO and the Bundesbank issued 
under the Banking Act. Most of the reporting obligations, which are required to be 
completed on prescribed forms, relate to financial matters, but reports must also be 
provided on certain organisational and administrative matters. A comprehensive 
tabulation of these reporting obligations would go beyond the scope of this Chapter 
and reference is accordingly only made to the most important or relevant 
requirements. There is no statement regarding the intention of the regulator as to 
why these statutory returns are required. However, as will become evident below, 
each of these reports relate to aspect(s) of banking risks. 
The most important reports on financial matters, which must be furnished to the 
Bundesbank or the FBSO or to both institutions are: 
Monthly returns (Monatsausweise) which are required under section 25 take the form 
of monthly balance sheet statistical reports (Monatliche Bilanzstatistik) conforming to 
section 18 of the Bundesbank Act. These extremely detailed reports constitute the 
core of the financial reporting system. These provide information relating to the 
portfolio of bank assets and thereby the diversification of credit risk. The reports must 
272 Non-significant ( 1 0 per cent or less) investments in investee banks and financial institutions that 
total 10 per cent or less of the liable capital of the investor bank are subject to the overall restriction 
that all such investments of a bank may not exceed the bank's liable capital (Section 1 0(6)a). 
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be submitted to the Bundesbank on prescribed forms in accordance with 
comprehensive guidelines issued by the Bundesbank. The Bundesbank then 
transmits a copy of the monthly returns to the FBSQ.273 
Monthly reports concerning compliance with Principles 1,274 la,21s 11276 and 111,277 must 
be submitted together with the monthly returns. These reports are important from a 
risk-management perspective as they contain the information regarding the capital 
adequacy, interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, off-balance sheet risk and 
liquidity risk of each bank. 
Monthly reports showing the credit commitments to borrowers resident in Germany 
and the amounts drawn thereon (Monatliche Kreditzusagenstatistik) are to be 
submitted to the Bundesbank.27B Parent banks must, in addition, submit 
consolidated monthly returns.279 
Quarterly summary reports on credits extended to German resident borrowers as per 
the end of each calendar quarter (Vierteljahrliche Kreditnehmerstatistik). These 
quarterly reports must be submitted to the Bundesbank, who forwards a copy 
thereof to the FBS0.2eo These monthly and quarterly credit reports provide valuable 
information relating to the credit risk exposure of banks. 
The Bundesbank also requires comprehensive monthly reports showing the foreign 
assets and liabilities of banks (Monat/iche Me/dung 'Auslandsstatus?. In addition, 
less comprehensive weekly status reports showing the short term receivables and 
amounts owing to non-residents must also be made (Bankwochentliche 
Kurzmeldung 'Aus/andsstatusJ,2B1 These reports give regulatory authorities 
additional information on the foreign exchange risks of banks. 
273 Directive of the Bundesbank regarding Monthly Balance Sheet Statistical Reports (Anordnung der 
Monat/iche Bilanzstatistik); Guidelines of the Bundesbank for the Monthly Balance Sheet Statistical 
Reports of Banking Institutions (Richtlinien fur die Meldungen der Kreditinstitute zur monatliche 
Bilanzstatistik). 
274 See paragraph 8.2.4.2. 
275 See paragraphs 8.2.5.3; 8.2.5.4 and 8.2.5.5. 
276 See paragraph 8.2.6. 
277 See paragraph 8.2.6. 
278 Directive of the Bundesbank regarding Monthly Reports on Credit Commitments (Anordnung fiir 
die Kreditzusagenstatistik); Guidelines of the Bundesbank for the Monthly Reports on Credit 
Commitments (Richtlinien zur Monatliche Kreditzusagenstatistik). 
279 Regulation on Monthly Returns (Monatsausweisverordnung). 
280 Directive of the Bundesbank regarding Quarterly Reports on Borrowers (Anordnung fiir die 
Vierteljahrliche Kreditnehmerstatistik); Guidelines of the Bundesbank for the Quarterly Reports on 
Borrowers (Richtlinien zur Vierteljahrliche Kreditnehmerstatistik). 
281 Directive of the Bundesbank regarding Reports on Foreign Assets and Liabilities of Banking 
Institutions (Anordnung fiir den Austlandsstatus der Kreditinstitute); Guidelines of the Bundesbank for 
the Reports on Foreign Assets and Liabilities of Banking Institutions (Richtlinien fiir die Me/dungen der 
Kreditinstitute iiber ihren Aus/andsstatus). 
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On a monthly basis German banks issue minimum reserve reports 
(Reserveme/dung) pursuant to section 9 of the Directive of the Bundesbank 
regarding Minimum Reserves. These reports are required for monetary purposes.282 
Quarterly reports pursuant to the Country Risk Regulation (Landerrisikoverordnung) 
on credits extended to foreign borrowers. Parent banks must also furnish these 
reports on a consolidated basis. These reports are to be made by banks whose 
volume of credits to foreign borrowers exceeds DM 100 million. In the case of groups 
of banks, credits to foreign borrowers are required on a consolidated basis. These 
reports provide information with which country risk exposures by banks can be 
assessed.283 
Separate reports are required on the extension of each large-scale credit (Section 
13(1 ); Section 3 of the Regulation on Reporting), certain credits to related persons 
and entities (Section 16; Section 3 of the Regulation on Reporting) and three-
monthly reports on million mark credits (Section 14(1 ); Regulation on Reporting 
1985: section 5). In respect of large-scale credits an annual summary report must 
also be given, in the case of private commercial banks and branches of foreign 
banks as at September 30 of each year (Section 13(1 ); Regulation on Reporting 
1985: section 3(2)).284 These reports allow the management of the credit risks 
attached to large exposures.285 
Together the above statutory returns required by the FBSO and Bundesbank allow 
the regulators to assess the risk-profile of each bank. 
Other reports 
Apart from these aforementioned reports on financial matters, certain reports on 
organisational or administrative matters must be made to the FBSO and the 
Bundesbank in terms of section 24. Such reports are to be provided, inter alia, on the 
appointment and removal of managers; the purchase and sale, or changes in the 
extent, of a participation in another company; changes of legal form, capital or 
articles of association; a loss of 25 per cent or more of the equity capital; the 
commencement and discontinuation of business activities not constituting banking 
business as defined in section 1 (1 ); and intended mergers with other banks.286 
Obviously all of these factors will impact on the risk-profile of a bank and therefore 
need to be disclosed. 
282 See paragraph 8.4.1 below. 
283 See paragraph 8.2.5.2. 
284 The details regarding the procedure for these reports, including the forms to be used, are provided 
in the Regulation on Reporting (1985) issued by the FBSO. Certain exemptions from the duty to report 
on these matters are set out in the FBSO's Exemption Regulation. 
285 See paragraph 8.2.5.1. 
286 The details concerning the procedure for these reports are set out in section 8 of the Regulation on 
Reporting (1985). 
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Financial statements 
Specific requirements apply to the preparation, auditing, reporting and publication of 
the annual financial statements of banks. As a rule, the annual financial statements 
must be compiled within the first three months following the end of the business year 
and be filed with the FBSO and the Bundesbank (Section 26). The format, 
presentation and contents of the annual financial statements for banks organised as 
corporations (i.e., AG's KgaA's and GmbH's)287 are regulated by numerous 
regulations, guidelines and prescribed forms. Branches of foreign banks must also 
submit the annual financial statements of the foreign bank (in addition to the branch's 
annual accounts) (Section 53(2)) No. 3). This permits the regulatory authorities to 
gain an understanding of the risk-profile of the local branch as well as the parent 
bank. 
Within five months after the end of the business year, the annual financial statements 
must be audited by an independent public accountant, approved by the appropriate 
organ of the bank (Section 27).288 
Upon approval, the certified and approved financial statements and the annual report 
must be filed with the FBSO and the Bundesbank (Section 26(1 )). 
The annual financial statements and the annual report must be published in the 
Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger) within nine months after the end of the business 
year (Section 25(1 ); HGB 1970: section 325). This requirement is intended to 
facilitate general disclosure of the financial status of all banks. However the time limit 
allowed is such that a bank may have significantly altered its risk exposure by the 
time of publication, thereby detracting from the value of the publication requirement. 
Finally, the approved annual financial statements and annual report of the bank must 
be filed with the Commercial Register (Section 25(1); HGB 1970: section 325) where 
they are open to public inspection. This ensures that the consumers of banking 
services are able to assess the risk-profile of a bank to the extent that this is possible 
utilising financial statements. 
287 The pertinent rules are primarily contained in the Regulation on the Forms for the Presentation of 
the Annual Financial Statements of Banking Institutions (Verordnung Ober FormbUitter fOr die 
Gliederung des Jahresabsch/usses von Kreditinstituten)(FBSO 1968), the Form for the Annual 
Financial Statements of Banking Institutions Incorporated as Stock Corporations, Partnerships Limited 
by Shares and Limited Liability Companies (Formblat fOr den Jahresabsch/u/3 der Kreditinstitute in der 
Rechtsform der Aktiengesel/schaft, der Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien und der Gesel/schaft mit 
beschrankter Haftung), and the Guidelines of the Banking Supervisory Authority for the Preparation of 
the Annual Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Statement of Banking Institutions Incorporated as Stock 
Corporations, Partnerships Limited by Shares and Limited Liability Companies (Richtlinien fOr die 
Aufstel/ung der Jahresbilanz sowie der Gewinn- und Verlustrechnung der Kreditinstitute in der 
Rechtsform der Aktiengesel/schaft, der Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien und der Gesel/schaft mit 
beschrankter Haftung) (Schneider 1986: 91 ). 
288 The format, presentation and contents of the audit reports are again prescribed by fairly extensive 
guidelines of the FBSO (1968). 
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In general the regulations relating to financial statements are disappointing as there 
is no requirement to shed greater light on the risk-profile of a bank as opposed to a 
mere accounting disclosure, as well as the lenient time limits allowed before 
disclosure of the information. 
8.2.3.2 The Role of Auditors 
Appointment and responsibility 
In Germany, the extent of the auditor's involvement in the prudential control of banks, 
is determined by the supervisory authorities. The results of activities investigated as 
part of the audit, have to be incorporated into the audit report as part of the annual 
accounts (FEE 1993: 33). 
No prior consultation with the supervisory authorities is required regarding the 
appointment or reappointment of auditors. However, the authorities have the power 
to veto the auditor's appointment or reappointment if the authorities consider that the 
appointed auditor lacks appropriate experience (FEE 1993: 40-41 ). 289 
The auditor's responsibilities are laid down in a general statement on responsibilities: 
General Conditions of Assignment (AIIgemeine Auftragsbedingungen). These 
general conditions are not mentioned in the auditor's report, but are attached to 
every report (FEE 1993: 58). There are no special regulations pertaining to auditors 
in relation to interim reports (FEE 1993: 58). Auditors are required to present an 
opinion on the reliability and continuity of computer systems designed for prudential 
purposes and the production of information used for financial reporting but not for 
management purposes (FEE 1993: 60). The auditor is required to state whether the 
internal accounting is in accordance with professional standards. 
Relationship with the supervisory authorities 
In the case of a normal audit of the bank's annual accounts, the auditor may 
communicate any information obtained in connection with his work to the client bank. 
The auditor is bound to keep such information confidential from the tax authorities 
and other third parties. However, the auditor must notify the supervisory 
authorities of other facts of which he becomes aware during the audit which 
indicate that the business of the bank was not conducted properly (FEE 1993: 
46). 
The auditor is required to provide the FBSO with a description of and an opinion on 
the bank's exposure to the different banking risks, the bank's approach to the 
monitoring of risks and the adequacy of the bank's assessment of risks and their 
cover in the form of a long report (FEE 1993: 61 ). The long form report includes a 
commentary on the following banking risks: credit risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk, 
289 Audit appointments which have been accepted by the supervisory authorities can subsequently 
only be rejected for important reasons. Important reasons, in this context, do not include differences of 
opinion regarding the contents of the audit report, its qualification or disclaimer. The fact that an auditor 
does not seek re-election does not have to be reported to the supervisory authorities (FEE 1993: 42). 
221 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions 
currency risk and market risk. Comment is also required on the development of the 
bank's operations; the internal organisation, profits, prudential returns, control of 
prudential ratios, legal lending limits, violation of the law and I or banking regulations 
or other irregularities; and observance of conditions for obtaining and maintaining a 
bank licence (FEE 1993: 63-64 ). 
The auditor is also required to provide a special report to the supervisory authorities 
should he become aware of any of the following: material liquidity problems; material 
defects in the financial systems and controls; material inadequacies in, or omissions 
from any returns of a financial nature; any criminal offence; irregularities or 
infringements; serious shortcomings in the relationship between the bank and one or 
several of its customers; or any other circumstances indicating a risk or serious loss 
for the depositors (FEE 1993: 65). 
The auditor is required to disclose facts which would justify a qualified opinion or the 
withholding of an opinion, or which relate to a deterioration in the bank's existence or 
development, or a serious violation of law or statutory regulation by the bank's 
management. The auditor is also required to provide the supervisory authorities with 
an opinion on the adequacy and reliability of the bank's internal control system and 
procedures in respect of: the accuracy, completeness and validity of prudential 
returns; the truth and fairness of the annual financial statements; as well as the 
adequacy and reliability of the bank's internal control procedures in respect of 
lending, foreign exchange trading and trust activities (FEE 1993: 67). The auditor is 
also required to provide the FBSO with an opinion on the following financial ratios: 
solvency; liquidity; capital adequacy and the coverage of investments by equity 
capital (FEE 1993: 68). Finally, auditors have to provide the FBSO with an opinion on 
the procedures for the evaluation of the provision for problem loans and other risk-
related provisions as well as high level controls (i.e. the controls by which senior 
management assures itself that it is in possession of reliable information needed for 
the management of the bank) (FEE 1993: 69). 
Relationship with the bank 
The responsibility for the management of all corporations is spelt out in the HGB. In 
addition, the Banking Act specifies that bank management is responsible for the 
financial statements and returns that are submitted to the FBSO; and these 
responsibilities are explicitly set out in the auditor's report (FEE 1993: 51). In the 
case of a normal audit of a bank's accounts, the audit report must be sent to both the 
bank and the FBSO. The auditor is required to report to the supervisory authorities re 
the annual accounts and is obliged to give an opinion on whether the financial 
information present a true and fair view; whether the financial information is 
complete; whether the information is in accordance with instructions given by the 
supervisory authorities; and an opinion regarding the valuation policies applied (FEE 
1993: 56). 
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The role of external auditors 
In Germany, there is no distinction between a 'bank auditor' and a 'statutory auditor'. 
For the audit of the annual accounts, there is only one auditor who is appointed by 
the shareholders at a general meeting.290 
8.2.4 Capital Adequacy 
8.2.4.1 The Definition of Capital for Regulatory Purposes 
The regulations pertaining to capital adequacy and liquidity which predate the Basle 
Agreement on Capital Standards, may be regarded as the core of German banking 
regulation. 
The term 'liable capital' (haftendes Eigenkapital) is defined in section 10 which has 
been amended by the 1993 Amendments to incorporate the rules of the Own Funds 
Directive (1989). Section 10 lists the items that comprise liable capital.291 
Section 10 further stipulates that specific items which do not serve as loss or 
insolvency protection be deducted from liable capital.292 Furthermore, the sum of the 
reserves and provisions, capital received from participation rights (Genussrechte), 
and subordinated debt may not exceed 50 of the remaining items of liable capital, 
known as core capital (Kemkapita/)293. 
8.2.4.2 Measurement of Capital Adequacy 
The measurement of equity capital is based on the last approved annual balance 
sheet (Section 1 0(7)), except in the case of branches of foreign banks, where the 
latest monthly supervisory return is applied (Section 53(2)). 
290 The FBSO has powers to appoint an auditor to carry out specific investigations on its behalf 
('extraordinary auditors') in addition to the statutory auditor. The extraordinary auditor would normally 
be from a different firm of auditors than the bank or statutory auditor (FEE 1993: 71-73). 
291 These items include: the different types of equity capital; depending on the legal form of 
organisation of the bank (Section 1 0(2)); net profit to the extent such profit is allocated to the capital or 
retained earnings reserves of the bank (Section 10(3)); preferred stock (Section10(4a); certain 
reserves and provisions, subject to limitations (Section 10(4a), (4b) & (4c)); contributions of silent 
partners (stille Gese/Jschafter) meeting certain requirements (Section 10(4)); subordinated debt 
meeting certain requirements (Section 1 0(5a)), and, capital paid ·in against issue of participation rights 
(Genussrechte) meeting certain requirements (Section 10(5)). 
292 These items include: losses (Section 1 0(6a)); certain intangible assets (Section 1 0(6a)); certain 
holdings in other credit institutions or financial institutions exceeding 1 0 per cent of such other 
institution' capital (Section 10(6a)); and, certain holdings in other credit institutions or financial 
institutions of up to 1 0 per cent of such other institutions' capital to the extent that the total of such 
investments exceed 10 per cent of the liable capital of the investor bank (Section 1 0(6a)). 
293 For branches of foreign banks, the equity capital is deemed to comprise the operating capital made 
available to the branch by the foreign bank plus any retained operating surplus minus the credit 
balance on inter-branch account (aktiver Verrechnungssaldo), if any (Section 53(2)). 
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On the basis of the statutory authorisation set out in section 1 00( 1 ), the FBSO has 
issued Principles I and la forming part of the 'Principles Concerning the Equity 
Capital and Liquidity of Banking Institutions' (Griindsatze fiir die Angemessenheit 
des Eigenkapitals und der Liquiditat der Kreditinstitute)(1969). 
Until December 31, 1992, Principle I required that credits extended and participations 
held by a bank may not exceed 18 times the equity capital. Detailed rules applied as 
to the definition of the term credits and the credits not to be included, or to be 
included only in part, in the computation of such ratio. 
As described above, the 1993 Amendments to the Banking Act transformed the Own 
Funds Directive (1989) into German Law, including its definition of liable capital, 
which is termed 'Own Funds'. In 1993 the FBSO incorporated the corollary to the 
Own Funds Directive (1989), the Solvency Ratio Directive (1989) of the EC, and its 
concept of risk-based capital adequacy by way of regulation under section 10. This 
regulation created a new Principle I which requires a solvency ratio of liable 
capital to risk-adjusted assets and certain off-balance sheet items of at least 8 
per cent. The hitherto existing rule which required that assets of a bank do not 
exceed 18 times its liable capital was therefore superseded. 
In terms of Principle I, the following are regarded as risk assets, namely: asset 
items294, off-balance sheet transactions, financial swaps, forward contracts and 
option rights. 
Consolidation 
Section 1 Oa295 prescribes that banks forming part of a group must, as a group, 
maintain adequate equity capital. Principle I provides, accordingly, that the 
fundamental rule according to which risk-adjusted asset may not exceed a ratio of 8 
per cent of liable capital, also applies to a consolidated group of banks. The 
determination as to whether a group of banks has adequate capital is to be made on 
the basis of consolidation of the equity capital on one hand and the risk assets, i.e. 
the credits and participations pursuant to the modified Principle I, on the other. Such 
consolidation of group equity capital and group risk assets is to be made in 
proportion to the share of nominal capital held by the parent bank in the respective 
affiliates. Included in the consolidation are all domestic and foreign banking, factoring 
and leasing affiliates in which the parent bank holds 40 per cent or more of the share 
capital or of the voting rights; or similar institutions over which the parent bank can 
exercise a controlling influence. 
294 The following are regarded as asset items: balances with central banks and postal giro offices; 
public sector debt instruments and bills eligible for refinancing with central banks; cash items in the 
process of collection; loans and advances to banks and customers; debt securities; shares; 
participating interests; shares in associate companies; fixed assets; assets in respect of which a bank 
has concluded leasing assets as the lessor; other assets and prepayments. Subject to a lower 
weighting being applied in some exceptional cases, these asset items are counted at 1 00 per cent of 
their basis of assessment. 
295 Introduced by the 1985 amendments of the Banking Act in implementation of the EC Directive of June 
13, 1983 on the Supervision of Credit Institutions on a Consolidated Basis. The consolidation 
requirements became effective as of July 1, 1985. 
224 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions 
The consolidation requirements result in group capital being measured in relation to 
group risk. 
8.2.5 Risk Assets Limits 
8.2.5.1 Loan Concentration 
Sections 13 to 20 contain detailed rules regarding the extension of credits. The terms 
'credit' ('Kredit') and 'borrower' ('Kreditnehmer') as employed in these provisions are 
defined in section 19.296 
Large-scale credits 
Large-scale credits (i.e. large credit exposures) are defined as credits to any one 
borrower which exceed 15 per cent of the equity capital of the bank (Section 13(1 )). 
Section 13 deals with large-scale credits of an individual bank, section 13a thereof 
with their consolidation within a group of banks. 
No single large-scale credit may exceed 50 per cent of the bank's equity capital 
(Section 13(4 )). The aggregate of all large-scale credits together may not exceed 8 
times the equity capital of the bank; in the application of the 'eight-times' rule, credit 
commitments not yet utilised are not taken into account, but only amounts actually 
taken up (Section 13(3)).297 
Section 13a requires the consolidation of large-scale credits and essentially 
prescribes that the rules applicable to large-scale credit of an individual bank, 
according to which any credit may not exceed 50 per cent of the equity capital and all 
large-scale credits together may not exceed eight-times the equity capital of a bank, 
likewise apply to a group of banks on a consolidated basis. Consolidation is to be 
made in proportion to the share of nominal capital held by the parent bank in the 
respective affiliates. Included in the consolidation are all domestic and foreign 
banking, factoring and leasing affiliates in which the parent bank holds 50 per cent or 
more (as opposed to 40 per cent or more in the case of capital adequacy) (Section 
13a(2)) of the share capital or of the voting rights or affiliates over which the parent 
bank can exercise a controlling influence. 
296 'Credit' includes inter alia: loans of any kind; debts acquired for a consideration; acceptanc•3 
credits; the discounting of bills of exchange, promissory notes and cheques; money claims originating 
from other commercial transactions of the bank; guarantees or other indemnities; the liability arising 
from the provision of security for the liabilities of others; participations of the bank in a borrower's 
enterprise amounting to 25 per cent or more of the share capital of such enterprise; and assets with 
respect to which the bank as lessor has entered into leasing agreements (Section 19( 1 )). In terms of 
the definition of 'borrower' certain related persons or entities are deemed to be a single borrower; in 
particular, all companies which belong to the same group of companies, count as one borrower 
(Section 19(2}). 
297 Guarantees of any kind are normally to be taken into account at their full nominal amount, but in 
certain exceptional cases, only at one-half of their nominal amount (Section 13(6)). 
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These regulations relating to large credit exposures relative to a bank's capital base 
have the prudential purpose of managing credit risk by means of diversifying a 
bank's asset portfolio. 
Million Mark credits (Millionenkredite) 
Section 14 requires each bank to report to the Bundesbank, every three months, the 
names of those borrowers who have had at any time during the preceding three 
months obligations to the bank amounting to DM 1 000 000 or more resulting from 
loans extended. The report must state the amount of such obligation and provide 
certain information on the term and type thereof. Where the reporting bank has a 
non-German subsidiary which is to be included in the consolidation of large-scale 
credits, such report must include the respective information on million mark credits of 
such subsidiary (Section 14(1 )). If a borrower has taken up million mark credits with 
more than one reporting bank, each bank will be advised by the Bundesbank of the 
total obligations of the borrower arising from such credits, the number of banks 
involved (but not of their names or the individual amounts) and of certain details re 
the term and type of the obligations (Section 14(2)). 
This innovative regulation, of the German regulatory system, permit banks to 
improve their credit risk-management on a customer level as banks can form a better 
understanding of the total loans of a customer including those made by other banks. 
In effect, the Bundesbank fulfils a function akin to that of credit bureaux but on a 
wholesale level. 
The Fifth Amendment to the Bank Act amended sections 13 and 14 of the Act to the 
extent that derivative exposures are also taken into account in the determination of 
large-scale and Million Mark Credits (Handelsblatt 1994: 37). 
Credits to related persons or entities ( Organkredit) 
Special rules apply to loans extended to persons or entities having a special 
relationship with the bank, such as companies which are affiliated to the bank, or 
managers or members of its supervisory board, managers, partners, executive 
employees, supervisory board members, spouses and minor children of such 
persons, as per section 15. 
An Organkredit may only be extended upon a unanimous resolution of senior bank 
management and must be expressly approved by the bank's supervisory board (if 
any) (Section 15(1 )). In the event of failure to comply with these rules, the credit must 
be repaid immediately (Section 15(5)). Furthermore, if these rules are violated, 
managers and supervisory board members may be jointly and severally liable to 
compensate the bank for damages incurred in connection with the granting of such 
an Organkredit. The bank's claim for compensation may be enforced by a creditor of 
the bank to the extent that such creditor cannot obtain relief from the bank (Section 
17). 
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Each Organkredit must be reported promptly to the FBSO and the Bundesbank if: it 
exceeds OM 250 000 where the borrower is an individual; or where the borrower is a 
juristic person, it exceeds both OM 250 000 and 5 per cent of the equity capital of the 
bank (Section 16). 
The Organkredit regulations have the function of controlling credit risk attached to 
loans which are granted to persons closely associated with a bank. The regulatory 
concern is that such loans may have a higher credit risk as due care may not have 
been taken in approving the loans. 
8.2.5.2 Country Risk 
The issue of country risk is covered by the Regulation Regarding Information with 
Respect to Credits of Foreign Borrowers pursuant to the Banking Act (Verordnung 
ilber Angaben zu den Krediten an Aus/andi§chen Kreditnehmer nach dem Gesetz 
Ober das Kreditwesen), (FBSO 1985) which was promulgated in compliance with 
section 25( 4) of the Banking Act. 
Banking institutions whose volume of credit to borrowers with registered offices 
outside German territory exceeds OM 100 million are required to provide information 
on such transactions to the Bundesbank (Section 1 (1 )). The same applies to bank 
holding institutions (Ubergeordnete Kreditinstitute) with proportionally consolidated 
credit exposures to borrowers outside German territory exceeding OM100m. 
Subordinate banking institutions are obliged to furnish the bank holding institutions 
with the information required for such a report (Section 1 (2)). In determining the duty 
to report, all credits (commitments and utilisations) within the meaning of section 
19(1) are taken into account in full (Section 1(3)). 
8.2.5.3 Interest Rate Risk 
Principle la was promulgated after the failure of Bankhaus Herstatt in 197 4 to limit 
the risks from exposures to risks in foreign currency and precious metals. lt has since 
been revised to extend the scope beyond such exposures to include risk exposures 
arising from derivative products. Principle la determines that certain specified interest 
risks arising from interest rate futures and interest rate options may, at the close of 
each business day, not exceed 14 per cent298 of a bank's liable capital. 
8.2.5.4 Foreign Exchange Risk 
Principle la limits the fo'"eign currency risk exposure299 to specified percentages of 
the equity capital in order to prevent the incurrence of foreign currency risks which 
are disproportionate to equity capitalisation. The Principle requires that at the close 
298 As the 1993 Amendments to the Banking Act expanded the definition of liable capital in accordance 
with the Own Funds Directive, the percentage figure was reduced from 20 per cent to 14 per cent. 
299 The foreign currency risk exposure is determined on the basis of the middle rates of exchange for 
those currencies quoted on the Frankfurt Foreign Exchange Market (Frankfurter GeldbOrse), and on 
the buying rates for unofficial dealings in other currencies. 
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of business on each business day a bank's net open position in foreign currencies 
irrespective of maturities shall not exceed 21 per cent3oo of its equity capital. 
Principle la(2) limits the open position in foreign currencies which mature in each 
calendar month to 40 per cent of the banking institution's equity capital and principle 
la(3) limits the open position in foreign currencies which mature within a calendar 
half year to 40 per cent of the bank's equity capital. 
8.2.5.5 Off-balance Sheet Business 
Principle la requires that at the close of each business day the net price risks under 
forward and option contracts involving price risks other than interest rate risks -
provided that these contracts do not hedge the price risk of a portfolio of instruments 
- may not exceed 7 per cent of a bank's liable capital. 301 
In June 1986, new regulations were issued, requiring banks to cover themselves 
against off-balance-sheet risks. With effect from 1 October 1986, the FBSO 
amended Principles I and la. The new provisions were designed to take supervisory 
account of the growing tendency of German banks to conduct off-balance sheet 
transactions.302 In effect, the FBSO adopted the method provided by the EC 
Solvency Ratio Directive (1989) in calculating credit equivalent amounts. 
Banks may use either the original exposure method or the marking-to-market 
method. Under the original method the credit equivalent exposure is calculated by 
multiplying the relevant factor (see Appendix V) by the notional amount of the 
contract. 
Principles 1 and 1 a determine that off-balance sheet transactions are included in 
order to determine the risk assets of a bank. 
8.2.6 Liquidity Adequacy 
Under section 11, banks must at all times maintain sufficient liquidity. Based on the 
statutory authorisation contained in section 11, the FBSO has issued Principles 11 
and Ill of the 'Principle Concerning the Equity Capital and Liquidity of Banking 
Institutions'. 303 
Principle 11 aims at keeping long-term lending and investments in a reasonable 
relationship to long-term financial resources by providing that the aggregate of 
300 In line with the 1993 Amendments to the Banking Act, the percentage figure was accordingly reduced 
from 30 per cent to 21 per cent. 
301 The percentage figure was reduced from 10 per cent by the 1993 Amendments. 
302 These transactions expanded from 29 per cent of banks' on-balance sheet business in 1986 to 56 
per cent in 1989 (Bundesbank 1990). 
303 Swary and Topf (1992: 68) maintain that the German liquidity requirements constitute one of the 
most advanced banking regulatory frameworks in the world. 
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certain specified long-term asset items304 shall not exceed the aggregate of certain 
specified long-term liability items.3os Principle Ill limits the use of outside resources 
(i.e. deposits) for assets that cannot at all times be relatively easily sold.306 
These Principles are a very inflexible and complicated set of rules and may not be 
the most efficient means of managing liquidity risk. 
304 The following are regarded as long term assets: balances with banks and advances to customers 
with maturities of four years or more; unlisted securities; participating interests; shares in a controlling 
company or a company holding a majority interest; land and buildings; furniture and equipment. 
305 The following are regarded as long-term financial resources: capital and reserves; liabilities (other 
than savings deposits} to banks and other creditors with maturities of four years and more; 10 per cent 
of call liabilities (other than savings deposits) to other creditors payable on demand and with maturities 
less than four years; 60 per cent of savings deposits; bonds outstanding with maturities of more than 
four years; 60 per cent of provisions for pensions; 20 per cent of amounts due to associated banks 
with maturities of six months and more but less than four years (Bundesbank 1993: 123). 
306 Principle Ill requires that: 20 per cent of balances with banks with maturities or periods of notice of 
three months and over but less than four years; loans and advances to customers with maturities or 
periods of notice of less than four years; bills of exchange drawn by the banks, discounted and 
credited to borrowers, and promissory notes drawn by borrowers, discounted and credited to them, in 
the bank's portfolio, and contingent claims in respect of such bills and notes in circulation; listed shares 
and investment fund units; and 'other assets'; less the value adjustments, must not exceed the sum of 
the following financial resources: 10 per cent of liabilities to banks payable on demand and with 
maturities or periods of notice of less than three months, other than loans and advances to customers 
on behalf of the bank; 50 per cent of liabilities to banks with maturities or periods of notice of three 
months and over but less than four years, other than loans and advances to customers on behalf of the 
bank; 80 per cent of liabilities to banks in respect of loans and advances to customers on behalf of the 
bank; 20 per cent of saving deposits; 60 per cent of other liabilities to other creditors payable on 
demand and with agreed maturities or periods of notice of less than four years; 80 per cent of liabilities 
in respect of business in goods and trade payables; 20 per cent of bonds outstanding with maturities of 
four years and less; 80 per cent of own acceptances and promissory notes in circulation and of bills 
drawn by the bank, discounted and credited to borrowers and promissory notes drawn by borrowers, 
discounted and credited to them, in circulation; plus the financial surplus or minus the financial deficit 
in Principle 11, as the case may be (Bundesbank 1993: 123-125). 
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8.3 Protective Regulation 
8.3.1 Crisis Management 
8.3.1.1 Emergency Assistance 
The German supervisory approach towards emergency assistance reflects the desire 
to rely on market forces, where possible. When Bankhaus Herstatt failed in 197 4, 
there was no regulatory intervention to compensate bank creditors. Even Herstatt's 
cleared, but unsettled payments were allowed to default.307 This consistent policy of 
providing little public support has enhanced the role of the market in restraining risk-
taking at German banks (Kaufman 1991: 581), but evoked great criticism globally on 
the Bundesbank's unwillingness to compensate other banks for their settlement 
losses. 
The measures applicable to failed or failing banks are formalised under section 4 7. If 
the economic difficulties experienced by banking institutions could lead to serious 
disruptions of or damage to the economic system, particularly the functioning 
of the general payment system, the Federal Government is, upon advice of the 
Bundesbank, authorised to: 
• allow a banking institution a moratorium on the fulfilment of its obligations 
(Section 4 7 No. 1 ); 
• disallow all or certain groups of banks from undertaking further banking activities 
(Section 4 7 No. 2); and 
• temporarily close all stock exchanges (Section 47 No. 3). 
The Federal Government must, in its announcement, regulate the terms applicable to 
the above. Although no further guidelines in respect of emergency assistance by the 
Bundesbank have been issued the wording of the Act suggests that systemic stability 
is the most important criterion and that the integrity of the payment system is viewed 
as important in this regard. 
There is no duty to provide emergency assistance to failing banks. This can mainly 
be attributed to the existence of a very comprehensive deposit protection scheme3oa 
which serves to protect the major portion of individual depositors. Nevertheless, 
sections 4 7 and 48 provide the Government with considerable discretionary powers 
in dealing with problems of a systemic nature. The treatment of the Herstatt failure by 
the Bundesbank underlines these discretionary powers and indicates that the 
Bundesbank is willing to allow banks to fail if the stability of the banking system is not 
put in jeopardy. 
307 Leading to the identification of a hitherto unknown risk, namely settlement risk. See paragraph 
3.4.1. 
308 See paragraph 8.3.2 below. 
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On the other hand, Muller (1993: 184) has argued that the emergency measures 
contained in sections 45-4 7 of the Act are inadequate to protect the interests of 
depositors or to prevent the dangers of chain reactions. Muller (1993: 185) therefore 
proposes that the Banking Act should specifically require that banks subscribe to 
deposit protection schemes. lt is furthermore argued that the introduction of a legal 
duty to belong to such a scheme would remove one of the main conceptual flaws in 
the Banking Act, namely that is has been based on normal circumstances 
(Normal/fall), whereas deposit protection assumes a worst case scenario according 
to the so-called Maximalbe/astungstheorie (Muller 1993: 185). Nevertheless, Muller 
(1993: 185) concedes that the present voluntary system of deposit insurance largely 
addresses the issue. 
8.3.1.2 Corrective Action 
A bank's failure to comply with the equity capital or liquidity requirements laid down 
by the FBSO creates a presumption that the equity capital of the respective bank is 
inadequate or its liquidity insufficient. The bank must either provide reasons, to the 
satisfaction of the FBSO, that justify lesser requirements with respect to its equity 
capital or liquidity or must remedy the failure within a reasonable time. If it fails to do 
so, the FBSO may act in terms of section 45(1) and prohibit or restrict the distribution 
of profits or the extension of further credit by the bank. If the liquidity is insufficient, 
the FBSO may in addition prohibit the bank from investing available funds in certain 
assets as detailed in section 12. 
A bank suffering from inadequate capital or liquidity has obviously taken excessive 
risks. Consequently the above regulations can be construed as an intervention by 
regulatory authorities to improve the risk-profile of a bank. 
If a bank fails to maintain adequate equity capital or liquidity or to observe the 
restrictions on investments and does not remedy the situation, the FBSO has a right 
of more direct intervention in the activities and hence risk-management of a bank as 
laid down in section 45. 
If the fulfilment of a bank's obligations towards its creditors, in particular if the 
security of the assets entrusted to the bank, is threatened, the FBSO may take 
appropriate action under section 46. In particular, it may: 
• issue directives concerning the management of the bank's operations; 
• prohibit or restrict the acceptance of deposits and the extension of credits; 
• prohibit or restrict the managers' administration of the bank's operations; and 
• appoint supervisors. 
In such an event the FBSO may also proceed under section 46a and take the 
following temporary actions for the purpose of preventing the bankruptcy of the bank, 
namely: prohibit any transfer of assets and payments; close the bank for business 
with customers; and unless one of the deposit protection schemes undertakes to 
indemnify those making such payments, prohibit the acceptance of payments not 
made in or towards the settlement of debts owing to the bank (i.e. deposits). 
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If a manager of a bank is not 'professionally qualified' or 'reliable' or if the fulfilment of 
a bank's obligation to its creditors is under threat, the FBSO may require his removal 
and prohibit him from exercising his functions (Section 36(1 )). The same applies if a 
manager intentionally or because of gross negligence violates provisions of the 
Banking Act, the regulations issued thereunder, or directives of the FBSO. 
The above corrective measures are intended to provide protection to depositors by 
preventing bank management from engaging in further risks when banks have not 
adequately managed risks in the past and thereby caused deposits to be 
endangered. 
The authority to move for bankruptcy proceedings and ultimately liquidation against a 
bank is vested exclusively in the FBSO (Section 46b ). Also, a petition for judicial 
composition proceedings requires the consent of the FBSO (Act on Judicial 
Composition Proceedings: section 112(2)). 
The FBSO may also revoke the banking licence and order the winding up of the bank 
in any of the circumstances described above. 
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8.3.2 Deposit Insurance 
A deposit protection fund of German banks ('the fund') was established by the 
Federal Association of German banks ('Federal Association') (Bundesverband 
deutscher Banken e. V.). 
The purpose of the fund 
The purpose of the fund is to provide assistance, to depositors, in the event of 
imminent or actual financial difficulties of banks, particularly when the suspension of 
payments is probable, in order to prevent the loss of public confidence in private 
banks (Section 2(1 )). 
Participation in the fund 
All banks which are members of the Federal Association may participate in the fund 
provided that they: have an equity capital which meets the requirements of the FBSO 
when it grants banking licences in terms of paragraphs 32 and 33 of the Banking Act; 
have at least two suitably qualified and reliable managers; have a consistent 
(ausgegliechenis) profit history from current business; maintain the necessary 
liquidity; fulfil the requirements to be met for the orderly conduct of banking business 
in accordance with the provisions of the Banking Act; and are members of the 
auditing association of German banks (PrufOngsverband deutscher Banken e. V.) 
(Section 3(1 )). Although the fund is voluntary the FBSO will in practice require that all 
new banking institutions become members.309 
Private commercial banks, private mortgage banks, shipping mortgage banks and 
private banking institutions with special functions, which are not members of the 
Federal Association, may apply to participate in the fund if they meet the conditions 
set out above (Section 3(2)). 
Funding provisions 
Participating banks are required to pay to the Federal Association a yearly 
contribution of 0,3 per thousand German Marks of the balance sheet item 'liabilities 
from other credits arising from banking business' (Verbindlichkeiten aus dem 
Bankgeschaft gegenuber anderen G/aubigern) (Section 5(1 )). In special cases the 
board of management of the Federal Association may determine a different base for 
calculating the contribution of individual institutions. 
For newly established institutions, the lump sum payment and the first annual 
contribution may be decided subjectively, taking into account the business purpose 
and the expected development of the institution (Section 5(2)). 
309 See paragraph 8.2.1.1 above. 
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The board of management of the Federal Association may decide on a suspension 
of the payment of the annual contribution, if the assets of the fund have reached a 
reasonable level. If the assets are not sufficient for measures of assistance, the 
board of management may approve up to double the annual contribution (Section 
5(3)). 
Although the annual funding requirement of the deposit protection fund is related to 
the volume of deposits accepted by each bank, these contributions are not related to 
the riskiness of each bank and hence the risk attached to the deposits. 
Consequently, the fund has attached to it the moral hazards costs which arise when 
insurance premiums do not distinguish between differing degrees of risk. Effectively, 
the safer German banks covered are subsidising the more risky banks also covered 
by the fund. 
Banks are permitted to disclose their participation in the fund by means of displays in 
their offices, by means of individual letters or in reply to questions regarding the kind 
of liabilities that are protected and the amount up to which liabilities are protected. 
However, banks are not permitted to advertise the protection of deposits or their 
participation in the fund in the media (Section 5(13)).310 
Scope of protection 
The following liabilities of banks are protected: all liabilities to non-banking 
institutions (in particular private persons, business enterprises and public agencies) 
which are shown in the balance sheet item 'liabilities to other creditors arising from 
banking business'.311 This balance sheet item comprises mainly demand, term and 
savings deposits, and investment fund liabilities.312 
310 Each bank is required to include the following clause in its general business conditions (AIIgemeine 
Geschaftbedingungen): 
'The bank is a member of the deposit protection fund of the Federal Association of German Banks e. V. 
Insofar as the fund or the nominee thereof shall make payments to a customer, the corresponding 
amount of the claim of such customer against the fund shall be transferred simultaneously to the fund. 
The same shall apply if in the absence of instructions from the customer, the fund makes payment to 
an account opened in his favour with another bank. The bank shall be entitled to furnish to the fund or 
its nominee all information and documents required in this connection.' (Section 5(4)). 
311 In determining protected liabilities, all liabilities to one creditor is added together; counter-claims of 
the bank, if any, are deducted (Section 6(4)). Payments also cover claims for interest falling within the 
protection limit. In principle, such claims accrue until the earlier of either the date of repayment of the 
principal or the institution of bankruptcy proceedings. However, the fund will only make payments of 
interest at market rates. In determining the market rates of interest, the interest rates of several 
deposits of the same type may be aggregated. Furthermore, the circumstances prevailing at the time 
when the fund declares its willingness to make payments may also be taken into account (Section 
6(5)). 
312 The following liabilities are not protected even if they are included under the balance sheet position 
'liabilities from other creditors arising from banking business': liabilities which are evidenced by bearer 
bonds; liabilities to managers, general partners, limited partners, shareholders, silent partners and 
members of the supervisory board of the bank; spouses and minor children of the above persons; and 
third persons acting for the account of any of the persons referred to above (Section 6(3)). 
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Each deposit is protected up to a protection limit of 30 per cent of the total equity 
capital of each bank. In respect of branches of foreign banks, the deposits are 
protected under section 6(1) up to a limit of 30 per cent of the equity capital of the 
branch.313 
If a bank terminates its participation in the fund, the bank is required to give notice 
thereof to creditors to whom liabilities are owed and shall bring the consequences of 
the termination to their attention (Section 6(8)). A legal right to enforce the 
intervention of or payments by the fund does not exist (Section 6(10)). 
General 
The European Community Directive on a Community-wide scheme to insure 
depositors against bank failures came into effect on 1 January 1995. The Directive 
decrees that all depositors in a failed bank will be refunded at least 90 per cent of 
their first ECU 20 000 value in any account in an EC currency. The impetus behind 
the directive is the single European market which allows any bank properly 
supervised in one EC country the freedom to establish a branch in another EC 
country. The directive thus seeks to avoid a situation whereby different banks in the 
same country offer different levels of compensation (The Economist 1993(b) ). 
Within the bounds described above, German banks offer their depositors virtually 
unlimited protection. Consequently, foreign banks wishing to establish branches in 
Germany are required to 'top up' the insurance they offer to reach the German 
domestic level. 
313 In addition to the latest published annual financial statements, increases in capital which are 
recorded in public registers or recognised by the FBSO may also be taken into account on application 
by the bank (Section 6(1 )). 
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8.4 Monetary Requirements 
There are no regulations relating to credit ceilings or credit allocation in Germany. 
Interest rate ceilings apply only in the context of consumer protection as formalised 
in terms of the Consumer Protection Act (Verbraucherschutzgesetz). The only 
monetary requirements of relevance in the regulatory context of risk-management is 
the use of variations in reserve requirements by the German Bundesbank. 
8.4.1 Variations in Reserve Asset Requirements 
Based on section 16 of the Bundesbank Act, the Bundesbank may require banks to 
hold a specified percentage of their liabilities arising from deposits or from short- and 
medium-term borrowings in non-interest-bearing accounts with the Bundesbank. 
Within certain limits the Bundesbank is authorised to set the percentages at different 
levels. The Directive of the Bundesbank on Minimum Reserves (Anweisung der 
Deutschen Bundesbank iiber Mindestreserven) (AMR) (1983), sets out the reserve 
requirements, the classes of liabilities for which minimum reserves must be 
maintained, and the balance to be held in the accounts. The minimum reserve 
system is intended to give the Bundesbank a flexible and effective instrument of 
monetary policy. 
With effect from March 1994, certain changes were implemented with regard to the 
reserve requirements of the Bundesbank. The reserve requirement for call liabilities 
('Sichtverbindlichkeiten? was reduced to a uniform 5 per cent, thus doing away with 
the hitherto existing categories; whilst the distinction between short-term liabilities to 
clients inside as well as outside the German territory was removed. 
The minimum reserve requirement for savings and term deposits remained 
unchanged at 2 per cent; but at the same time the eligible cash requirement 
('Anrechenbarkeit von Kassenbestanden? was reduced from 50 per cent to 25 per 
cent of the total reserve requirement. 
In addition, the Bundesbank announced a number of simplifications regarding the 
AMR. Specifically, the concessions applicable to certain earmarked monies 
(zweckgebundene Gelder) (AMR: Section 2(4)b); as well as the liabilities flowing 
from foreign loans taken up on behalf of customers (AMR: Section 2(4 )f) were 
withdrawn, and the calculation of 'eligible cash' for purposes of minimum reserves 
was simplified for the banks. 
According to Meister and Hofmann (1994: 210-212) the motives of the Bundesbank 
for the changes were twofold: monetary considerations and competitive neutrality. 
Monetary considerations 
The reduction in costs associated with the simplification of the minimum reserve 
requirements allowed for a reduction in the interest rates charged by banks. 
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Furthermore, the reduction in the reserve requirement applicable to call liabilities 
relieved the pressure on banks to circumvent the requirements. Previously, the 
degree of differentiated treatment of call liabilities and savings I term liabilities 
prompted banks to develop deposit structures which, although in effect call liabilities, 
were treated as term liabilities or even as liabilities not subject to reserv~ 
requirements. Although such term manipulation (Fristenmanipulation) was not 
generally undertaken, the intensification of competitive conditions increased the 
potential of such instruments being used. 
The relatively high reserve requirements which previously existed for call liabilities 
led to the outflow of funds to foreign financial centres. Such financial 
disintermediation negatively influenced the development of the German financial 
system (Finanzplatz Deutschland) and moreover confused the interpretation of 
monetary aggregates. 
Competitive neutrality 
Although acknowledging that no monetary policy measures can have an equal 
impact on the nearly 4000 banks in Germany, Meister and Hofmann (1994: 212) 
argue that the Bundesbank positively strives to achieve competitive neutrality to the 
extent that this can be reconciled with monetary objectives. 
The concession regarding liabilities emanating from foreign loans favoured foreign 
banking institutions and presented practical difficulties. 
Finally, the simplification and in some cases reduction of the m1mmum reserve 
requirements increased the efficiency of monetary regulation in Germany.314 
314 lt is interesting to note that the Maastricht Treaty provides for the existence of minimum reserve 
requirements, although the scope and purpose thereof is not defined. Ten of the European Union's 
central banks use minimum reserves as a monetary tool. According to the Bundesbank, minimum 
reserves are an absolute necessity, however the German commercial banks disagree. Objections from 
the Bank of England have not made the Bundesbank budge from its position (Weller 1996: 18). 
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8.5 Summary and Conclusion 
An analysis of the unique position of banks in any financial system has accentuated 
the role of regulations in protecting depositors from the serious consequences which 
could follow from bank failures. This is confirmed by the German legislator, which in 
the 1985 Banking Act, has provided for both prophylactic measures, aimed at 
regulating the risks which banks manage, as well as symptomatic treatment for 
banks who have failed to manage risks correctly. The German model of universal 
banking is commendable as it accommodates the tendency for financial 
conglomeration within a risk-related supervisory framework. The various regulatory 
components as well as the accompanying risk perspective thereon is summarised in 
Table 8.4. 
Table 8.4 Prudential Regulation in Germany 
Component 
Licensing and ownership control 
Foreign bank entry 
Permitted activities 
Permitted investments 
Disclosure requirements 
The role of auditors 
Capital adequacy 
Risk asset limits 
Risk Consideration 
• Bank management must be reliable and professionally 
qualified to manage banking risks. 
• Shareholders should not be able to unduly influence 
bank management in the management of risks 
• Initial capital of DM 6 million results in a relatively low 
barrier to entry 
• Risk considerations similar to the entry of German 
banks 
• Definition of banking business covers some but not all 
financial risks managed by modern banks 
• German universal banking entails that banks may 
engage in insurance braking and all manner of 
securities business 
• Investment business may be carried out by separately 
capitalised subsidiaries 
• Banks may invest in other banks, as well as 
commercial, industrial and insurance companies. The 
risks attached to these investments are regulated by 
means of deductions from a bank's liable capital 
• Statutory returns contain all the information necessary 
to gauge the risk-profile of a bank although by means 
of financial disclosure 
• Financial statements prepared with reference to 
accounting standards rather than reflecting a bank's 
risk-profile 
• Auditors are required to provide FBSO with all 
information related to risk-management 
• Principle I requires liable capital in relation to the risk-
adjusted assets of a bank 
• Credit risk regulations cover large exposures, million 
mark credits and loans to related entities 
• Country risk in excess of DM 100 million to be reported 
• Principle la limits interest rate risk, foreign exchange 
rate risk and off-balance sheet business 
• Principle 11 and Ill regulate liquidity risk, but are 
complicated and inflexible 
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lt is significant that the Germar. deposit protection fund offers depositors nearly 
unlimited protection. Although it can be argued that this leads to moral hazard, as the 
fund is not based on the risk-profiles of the contributing banks, the fund has lent a 
great degree of stability to the German banking system. 315 
A summary of protective regulation arrangements in Germany is contained in Table 
8.5. 
Table 8.5 Protective Regulation in Germany 
Component Risk Consideration 
Emergency assistance • Prevention of systemic risk 
• Discretionary reliance on market forces to penalise 
banks taking excessive risks by failure 
Corrective action • Regulations allow the FBSO to intervene in the risk-
management processes of banks 
Deposit insurance • Membership in the deposit protection fund is voluntary 
but encouraged by the FBSO in the case of new banks 
• Flat rate funding does not distinguish between the risk-
profile of banks 
• Depositors have nearly unlimited protection against 
the risk of bank failure 
As in the UK the efforts of the BIS and the European Community has had a 
significant impact on the German Banking Act. Obviously this has brought an added 
dimension of risk orientation to the German banking supervisory system, yet it is 
clear that the Act has always been directed at the supervision of banking risks. 
The avoidance of direct monetary requirements by the Deutsche Bundesbank 
signifies awareness by the German regulator of the prudential and monetary 
disadvantages inherent in such regulations. 
In conclusion, the German system of banking regulation conforms to the research 
problem which argues that regulation in the practical world is directed at the risk-
taking and risk-managing activities of banks with the objectives of protecting financial 
consumers and preventing systemic instability. The German regulatory framework 
takes cognisance of the fact that deposit-taking financial intermediation amounts to 
the management of a series of financial risks and seeks to regulate the management 
of these risks by banks. 
315 The deposit protection fund is, in a sense, the banking counterpart to the Deutsche Bundesbank, 
which has so cautiously guarded the stability of the German currency. 
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CHAPTER9 
THE REGULATION OF DEPOSIT-TAKING INSTITUTIONS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
9.1 Introduction 
This is the last of the three country-specific Chapters on banking regulation and 
deals with South Africa. Again the framework used is based on the concept 
expounded in Chapter 4 and distinguishes between prudential regulation (which 
directly influences the risks managed by banks); protective regulation (which seeks 
to protects depositors and I or deposit-taking institutions themselves); and monetary 
requirements which are instituted for purposes of monetary stability. 
The aim of this Chapter is to demonstrate that South African banking regulation 
conforms to the postulated version of banking regulation which entails the regulation 
and supervision of a series of financial risks. lt will be demonstrated that South 
African regulators have embraced the principles of risk-management as the 
conceptual basis of banking regulation. In terms of the theoretical model of financial 
regulation, South Africa has a very advanced banking supervisory system. 
This is borne out by the SA regulatory approach which focuses not only on the 
regulations which will be discussed below, but also on the underlying considerations 
which are the optimisation of risk-management by banks. Consequently, SA banking 
regulators focus on the spirit rather than the letter of the law. This combination or 
formal rules which allow for informal adaptation has also impacted on the SA 
regulatory methodology which although primarily off-site in nature, relies on frequent 
interaction between banks and the regulator in order to discuss issues related to 
banks' risk-management. 
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9.2 Prudential Regulation 
'The major question for the supervisor is whether a bank is sound. This is referred to as 
'prudential' supervision. As a general rule the Bank does not concern itself with the individual 
contractual relationships a bank has with those who borrow from it, or its customers more 
widely, unless these matters raise clear prudential questions. Neither does the Bank become 
involved in the disputes that sometimes arise between banks and their customers.' 
Wiese (1991: 313) 
9.2.1 Entry Requirements 
9.2.1.1 Licensing 
'The requirements for banking licences are somewhat higher than those applicable to cafes -
and for good reason.' 
Jacobs (1987: 10) 
Chapter Ill of the 1990 Banks Act316 deals with the authorisation to establish, and the 
registration and cancellation of registration of banks. Section 11 (1) determines that 
no business may conduct the activities of a bank unless it is a public company and is 
registered as a bank in terms of the Act. Any person who wishes to conduct the 
business of a bank must therefore apply to the Registrar for authorisation to establish 
a bank (Section 12(1 )). The Registrar may, after considering all information, 
documents and reports furnished to him, grant or refuse the application or grant the 
application subject to certain conditions in his discretion (Section 13(1 )). 
The Registrar may not grant an application unless he is satisfied that: the 
establishment of the proposed bank will be in the public interest; the business the 
applicant proposes to conduct is that of a bank; the applicant will conduct the 
proposed business of a bank in the capacity of a public company; the applicant will 
be able to establish itself successfully as a bank; the applicant will have adequate 
financial means; the business of a bank will be conducted in a prudent manner; 
every person who is to be a director or an executive officer of the proposed bank is a 
fit and proper person to hold the office of such director or executive officer; and 
every person who is to be an executive director of the proposed bank has sufficient 
managerial experience (Section 13(2)).317 
The above requirements are in accordance with the theoretical model of banking 
regulation as these relate to the soundness of new financial institutions based on the 
316 This Chapter contains numerous references to to 1990 Banks Act (previously Deposit-taking 
Institutions Act). Except where otherwise indicated all references to 'section' in this Chapter should be 
construed as pertaining to this Act. Likewise, all references to 'Registrar' refer to the Registrar of 
Banks. The regulations issued in terms of this Act were most recently consolidated in 1993. Where 
additions and alterations to these regulations have been made, these will be specifically refered to in 
the text or footnotes. 
317 The Registrar is able to revoke any authorisation given to establish a deposit-taking institution prior 
to the provisional registration if he is satisfied that: false or misleading information was furnished in the 
application; or the proposals contained in the application have not met with success within six months 
of registration (Section 14). 
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'fitness' of management to control and manage financial risk and adequate financial 
support which is required to engage in risk-management activities. 
9.2.1.2 Foreign Bank Entry 
Representative offices 
A representative office may not conduct the business of a deposit-taking institution 
such as the accepting of deposits (Section 34 ). Consequently it is not necessary that 
requirements relating to risk-management apply to representative offices. Prior to 
establishing a representative office in the Republic, a deposit-taking institution 
established in a foreign country must however obtain the written consent of the 
Registrar. This consent will only be given if the competent authority in the foreign 
country certifies that the foreign institution concerned is authorised to conduct 
business in such foreign country which is similar to banking. 
South Africa's re-entry into the global markets has prompted a number of requests by 
foreign banks to also establish subsidiaries and branches in South Africa. In light of 
the above developments, the South African Reserve Bank have set out a number of 
specific statutory requirements to be included with the application for the 
establishment of a banking operation in South Africa. 
Subsidiaries 
In respect of subsidiaries of foreign banks these requirements include the following 
(KPMG 1995: 1-2): 
• two copies of the Memorandum and Articles of Association; 
• the names, and curricula vitae, of directors and executive officers of the 
proposed bank; 
• the predominant business activities in which the bank is likely to be engaged; 
• an outline of a business plan in the short, medium and long term; 
• a selected number of risk returns to be completed for the ensuing year; and 
• the policy to be followed by the proposed bank in the management of each 
type of banking risk and the effect, quantified if possible, of each type of risk 
on the business. 
In the case of domestic subsidiaries of foreign banks the risk of bank failure 
ultimately lies with the parent banking institution. Consequently the regulatory 
responsibility lies primarily with the relevant foreign supervisory authority. 
Nevertheless subsidiaries of foreign banks may accept deposits and South African 
regulatory authorities are therefore correct in requiring a degree of information 
related to the risks managed by subsidiaries. 
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Branches 
In the final parliamentary session of 1994, the Banks Act was amended to allow 
foreign banks to open branches in South Africa. In 1995 the South African Reserve 
Bank drew up the regulations governing their entry. 
The current Registrar of Banks, Christo Wiese (Business Day 1995: 1) said that the 
South African Reserve Bank had recommended that foreign branches fulfil the 
capital requirements demanded of local banks. The branches would also have to 
provide domestic cover, which means that their local capital requirements would 
have to be met by local assets. The South African Reserve Bank had furthermore 
recommended that the activities of foreign banks be limited to wholesale business 
and that any retail activity be conducted through a fully fledged subsidiary in South 
Africa.31B 
Local branches of foreign banks are subject to virtually all of the regulations, 
including reporting procedures, which apply to locally registered banking 
companies.319 Branches must maintain a minimum 'Endowment capital' of the 
greater of R50 million and 8 per cent of risk-weighted assets as calculated for locally 
registered banking. companies. 320 Endowment capital can essentially comprise the 
head office account including retained branch profits.321 
Foreign banks with net assets greater than US$1 billion and an investment grade 
rating from an international rating agency may apply to form a local banking branch. 
The procedures to be followed are similar to those of full banking subsidiaries. The 
foreign bank holding company is required to provide a letter of comfort and 
understanding, confirming certain matters including that it: 
• understands and accepts the objective of maintaining financially sound branches 
in the interest of an efficiently functioning financial system in South Africa; 
• will adhere to the minimum standards of consolidated supervision of banking 
groups set ouf by the Basle Comr)'littee on Banking Supervision; 
• understands and accepts its responsibility to comply with the Banks Act and 
related regulations; 
• undertakes to ensure that branch management are fit and proper to fulfil their 
duties; 
• accepts responsibility for the operations of the branch; and 
318 Wiese (Business Day 1995: 1) warned, however, that the proposed regulations would not 
automatically guarantee the legitimacy of the branches of foreign instititutions. 'If you cross-checked 
the failed BCCI bank against the criteria I've mentioned, it would have met them all.' The SARB would 
therefore have additional discretionary powers. 'We will have to look at the capital structure and 
attempt to pierce the corporate veil before allowing it to open up here'. 
319 For a more comprehensive discussion see South African Reserve Bank (1995: 12-14). 
320 See paragraph 9.2.4.1. 
321 The regulations do not preclude funding of a branch by means of interest bearing debt but the tax 
implications of such funding would need to be carefully considered. 
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• undertakes to maintain the endowment capital of the branch and to safeguard the 
financial soundness and stability of the branch. 
The Registrar of Banks must also be satisfied that the foreign bank's home 
supervisor applies certain minimum standards (primarily those set out by the Basle 
Committee on Bank Supervision); accepts its responsibility as home-country 
supervisor; will endeavour to ensure that the holding company directors and 
management are fit and proper to carry out their duties; is satisfied with the standard 
of risk-management by the parent bank; and is committed to keeping the Republic's 
supervisory authorities informed of market information regarding the safety and 
soundness of the foreign bank and the branch. 
This demonstrates the importance attached to prudent risk-management by foreign 
branches even if the bank holding company has very large net assets. 
While the South African Reserve Bank attempted to achieve competitive neutrality 
between local and foreign banks as regards banking regulation, this was not fully 
achieved on the taxation front as foreign banks operating through a branch were not 
subject to the 15 per cent secondary tax on companies levied on local financial 
institutions (Sharpe 1995: 7). This brought down the effective tax rate of foreign 
banks and allowed them to put pressure on the margins of local banks. 
Consequent criticism by the local banking industry was passed on to the Finance 
Ministry, as tax legislation falls outside the ambit of the South African Reserve Bank. 
In the 1996 Budget, legislative changes to the Income Tax Act were announced 
which brought foreign and local banks on an equal footing as far as taxation is 
concerned. 
However, local banks may still be at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreign banks as their 
margins are slimmed by the foreign risk premium attached to attracting funds from 
outside South Africa; and the cost of liquid assets322 and reserve requirements323 for 
locally sourced deposits. Koseff (Finance Week 1996: 34) estimates that local banks 
may pay up to 89 basis points more for funds than their offshore competitors. 
322 See paragraph 9.2.6 below. 
323 See paragraph 9.4.1 below. 
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9.2.1.3 Ownership Control 
'Prior to authorisation, anyone who is to occupy a position as a Managing Director or a Director 
of a bank, and anyone who is to control a bank as shareholder or in any other way must satisfy 
the South African Reserve Bank that he has sufficient experience for the position he is to 
occupy. Essentially the considerations are probity, competence, diligence and soundness of 
judgement' 
(Wiese 1991: 314}. 
Restriction on shareholding 
Under the 1965 Banks Act, as amended, a natural person and his associates' 
shareholding could not exceed 10 per cent and a financial company and its 
associates could not hold more than 30 per cent of the total nominal value of the 
shares in the deposit-taking institution. 
The restriction on shareholding of a deposit-taking institution and of a controlling 
company has been amended as the concentration of ownership in the relatively 
small South African economy made it difficult to keep ownership within the 
regulations of the Banks Act. The change in the definition and the increase in the 
percentage holding allowed, are aimed at preventing financial institutions falling into 
financial difficulties as they are more likely to obtain support if needed from 'big 
brother' with a 49 per cent holding than from and entity with a 30 per cent holding. 
The initial approach was to protect the independence of banks as intermediaries, 
whereas the present approach assumes a reduction in the risk of bank failure if large 
and financially sound shareholders exist. 
Section 36(1) of the 1990 Banks Act accordingly now prevents any person or his 
associates holding shares in a deposit-taking institution or its controlling company in 
excess of 49 per cent of the total nominal value of the shares in the deposit-taking 
institution or its controlling company, although the Minister may make exceptions.324 
Permission for acquisition of shares 
The Banks Act of 1990 introduced a new principle whereby permission has to be 
obtained prior to the acquisition of a shareholding in excess of 10 per cent (including 
existing holdings) of the issued shares. The reason for this new principle is to ensure 
that only fit and proper persons become large shareholders and to prevent the 
exercising of undue influence on the affairs and consequently risk-management 
activities of a deposit-taking institution. The ownership control regulations underline 
the importance which South African regulatory authorities accord to the stability of 
the financial system and its susceptibility to inadequate risk-management as a 
consequence of ownership influence.325 
324 The only exception known to the writer is Advocate Christo Wiese (not to be confused with the 
Registrar of Banks} who individually controls in excess of 49 per cent of the shares in Boland Bank 
Limited via a series of pyramid companies. 
325 The provisions of section 37 regarding the permission for acquisition of shares are summarised as 
follows: a person cannot acquire shares in a deposit-taking institution or controlling company if the 
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Restriction of right to control a deposit-taking institution 
Subject to the provisions of section 36(2), only the following 'persons' may exercise 
control over a deposit-taking institution: a deposit-taking institution itself, or a public 
company registered as a controlling company in respect of such deposit-taking 
institution.326 
This provision exists to ensure that all controllers of banks are subjected to various 
prudential requirements. 
Application for registration of a bank holding company 
Under the 1965 Banks Act, as amended, registration as a bank controlling company 
was merely a formality and once the minimum requirements had been fulfilled, the 
application was duly granted. The 1990 provisions provide higher barriers of entry 
into the financial market, thereby ensuring that a deposit-taking institution is not 
manipulated for the benefit of the controlling company, but is rather able to fulfil an 
independent function in the interests of all shareholders and depositors. If for 
example a holding company were to experience financial difficulties, a bank might 
suffer by association or even come under pressure to lend to the holding company. 
The application for registration as a holding company must be made in writing to the 
Registrar and he has the power to request such additional information in connection 
with the application as he requires to make his decision. The application for 
registration as a controlling company can only be made in respect of a registered 
deposit-taking institution (Section 43). 
An application will not be granted unless the Registrar is satisfied that: the 
registration is not contrary to the public interest; every director or executive officer is 
a fit and proper person to hold such office and that they have sufficient knowledge 
and experience to manage the affairs of the applicant in its capacity as a controlling 
company; no interest which any person has in the applicant is inconsistent with a 
provision of this Act; and the applicant is financially sound (Section 44 ). 
total nominal value of shares held will exceed 10 per cent of the issued share capital, without first 
obtaining written permission. For an anticipated shareholding of: more than 10 per cent but not more 
than 17,5 per cent; more than 17,5 per cent but not more than 25 per cent; or more than 25 per cent 
but no more than 30 per cent, the permission of the Registrar is also required. A more onerous 
provision is made for shareholdings in excess of 30 per cent in that the Minister has to approve the 
shareholding. Such permission will not be granted unless the Registrar and Minister are satisfied that 
the proposed acquisition of shares: will not be contrary to the public interest; and will not be contrary to 
the interests of the deposit-taking institution or its depositors or of the controlling company. In both 
instances, the permission is only granted after consultation with the Competition Board. 
326 Section 42(2) states that a person shall be deemed to exercise control over a deposit-taking 
institution if that person and/or his associates: hold shares in the deposit-taking institution in excess of 
50 per cent of the nominal value of issued share capital (unless due to limitations on voting rights 
attached to those shares they are unable decisively to influence the outcome of the voting at a general 
meeting of the deposit-taking institution) or are entitled to exercise more than 50 per cent of the voting 
rights in respect of the issued shares; or have the power to determine the appointment of the majority 
of directors of that deposit-taking institution. 
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Permitted investments 
The restrictions on a controlling company's non-banking investments contained in the 
1965 Banks Act, as amended, have been retained in the 1990 Banks Act, but no 
provision has been made for a situation where the restriction has been exceeded. 
Section 50 which deals with this can be summarised as follows: A controlling 
company investing money in: undertakings other than deposit-taking institutions or 
controlling companies; or foreign banking institutions; or companies of which the 
main object is the holding or development of property which is used for the purpose 
of conducting the business of a deposit-taking institution; or fixed property which is 
not used for the purpose of conducting the business of a deposit-taking institution, 
are required to limit the total of these investments to 40 per cent of its total share 
capital and reserves. 
The purpose of these investment restrictions is to ensure that a controlling company 
does not over-extend itself in other investments and thereby limit the access of a 
bank to the capital resources of the controlling company. 
9.2.2 Permissible Business Activities 
Classification as a deposit-taking institution 
The 1990 Banks Act removed the distinction between the various types of deposit-
taking institutions in existence prior to this Act. The Act adopts a functional rather 
than an institutional approach insofar as it addresses the function of accepting and 
employing deposits and not the institutions acting as deposit-taking institutions. 
Consequently, two of the most important definitions in the Act are those relating to 
'the business of a deposit-taking institution' and 'deposit'. 
A company will be classified as a deposit-taking institution if it carries on any or all of 
the following: acceptance of deposits from the general public as a regular feature of 
the business; soliciting of, or advertising for, deposits; utilising the money accepted 
by way of deposit or any income earned from such money for the granting of loans to 
other persons, investment by any person acting as investor, or financing by any 
person of any other business activity conducted by him; obtaining as a regular 
feature of the business, money through the sale of an asset to any person other than 
a deposit-taking institution, subject to an agreement in terms of which the seller 
undertakes to purchase from the buyer at a future date the asset so sold or any other 
asset (i.e. repurchase agreements); or any other activity which the Registrar may 
declare to be the business of a deposit-taking institution. 
The business of a deposit-taking institution does not include: acceptance of a deposit 
by a person who does not do so on a regular basis and who has not solicited or 
advertised for such deposit and does not hold deposits from more than twenty 
persons nor do these deposits amount to more than RSOO 000; the borrowing of 
money from its members by a co-operative; any activity of the public sector, 
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governmental or other institution or anyone else designated by the Registrar; or, an 
act of money braking which culminates in a money lending transaction on the same 
day on which the money broker concerned received his instructions; the acceptance 
of money against debentures provided such money is used for granting normal trade 
credit; or any deposit-taking activities which are performed under, authorised or 
controlled by an Act of Parliament. 
The 1994 amendment to the Banks Act excludes from 'banking business' the 
operation of a stokvel,327 a credit union, an employees' savings scheme and a 
temporary building society, which are allowed to operate as savings schemes. As 
these are not banks, they are not required to comply with the prudential and 
reporting requirements of the Banks Act. In order for self-regulation to be effective, 
modest restrictions were imposed, such as a R9,9 million limit on the value of 
'deposits' which a savings scheme may accept from the public. The exemption of 
stokvels from complying with the Banks Act indicates that the South African Reserve 
Bank recognises the role of these informal financing schemes and, as such, was the 
first regulatory authority in Africa to do so. Organisations which desire to accept a 
greater quantity of deposits have to register as mutual banks. These are required to 
have a capital base of R10 million (as opposed to RSO million for banks), but are 
otherwise subject to the same requirements as banks. 
Sokvels are allowed to operate as savings schemes, provided members have a 
common bond (through membership of a society of some sort) and accept and use 
money pooled for a specific purpose, such as maintenance or laying-in-expenses at 
childbirth. 
The three largest types of stokvels are savings, burial and party stokvels, which 
constitute roughly 40 per cent, 30 per cent and 1 0 per cent of the market (Financial 
Mail 1996(b): 32). They are effectively investment syndicates as the savings are 
awarded to an individual member on a strictly rotational basis. 
Other lesser-known schemes fall outside the scope of the net as they operate 
informally on a lesser scale.328 
The issue of informal financing schemes has been highlighted by the recent (January 
1996) decision of the Registrar of Banks to close down the operations of Sun 
Multiserve, an 11 month-old scheme bearing no resemblance to a traditional 
stokvel.329 Investigations revealed that the organisation had 28 branches and offered 
exceptionally high returns to about 53 000 investors. Sun Multiserve did not comply 
327 The concept of a stokvel has existed for decades in South Africa. The name is a corruption of the 
'stock fairs' held by early settlers. Participants used to pool money and the benefit (the animal bought) 
went to one member at a time. 
328 An example of such a scheme is Mashonisa, which involves one person borrowing from another 
and paying back at month- end with up to 60 per cent interest. The loans involved do not fall within the 
ambit of the Usury Act as they are below the R6000 barrier. 
329 The 1995 Bank Supervision Department Annual Report highlights the main differences between 
bona fide stokvels and pyramid schemes (South African Reserve Bank, 1995: 8). 
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with any of the requirements of the Banks Act. The high returns of up to 300 per cent 
a month offered to "depositors" were generated by means of a pyramid structure. 
Definition of a deposit 
A deposit is defined as an amount of money paid by one person to another person 
subject to an agreement in terms of which: an equal amount or any part thereof will 
be conditionally or unconditionally repaid with or without a premium on demand or at 
specified or unspecified dates or in circumstances agreed upon and interest may or 
may not be payable at specified intervals or otherwise even though the initial 
payment is limited to a fixed amount and may not be subject to repayment terms and 
interest clauses. 330 
Should legislation enabling the establishment of money market funds become 
effective, as is currently anticipated, the Banks Act will have to be amended to make 
provision for money market fund 'deposits'. 
Exclusions from the application of the Act 
Section 2 specifically excludes the following entities from the provisions of this Act: 
the South African Reserve Bank; the Land Bank; the Development Bank of Southern 
Africa; the Corporation for Public Deposits; the Public Investment Commissioner; and 
the Mutual Building Societies.331 
The most significant institution no longer excluded from the provisions of the Act is 
the Post Office Savings Bank which was previously regulated in terms of its own Act. 
The inclusion is believed to be a result of the possible future privatisation of Post 
Office functions, although the Post Office Savings Bank may be retained by the State 
for providing financial services to the rural areas. 
The Minister can also designate, by notice in the Government Gazette, that any other 
body or institution is to be exempt from the provisions of the Act. This exemption has 
been introduced with the objective of accommodating certain exceptions, e.g. local 
authorities and mining finance houses. 332 
The scope of financing activities not falling within the application of the 1990 Banks 
Act is a contentious issue. The quantum of assets exempted is large and the 
inherent risks not immaterial. 
330 A deposit does not include an amount of money paid: as an advance in terms of a contract for the 
sale, letting and hiring or other provision of movable or immovable property or of services; as security 
for the performance of a contract or as security in respect of any loss arising from non-performance of 
a contract; as security for the delivery or return of any movable or immovable property; by a person 
who is a close relative, a director or executive officer of the person to whom the money is paid; or as a 
contribution by a member of a registered Pension Fund. 
331 The latter grouping is regulated in terms of the Mutual Banks Act (Act 124 of 1993 ). 
332 At present these exemptions include the following: mining houses, securitisation schemes, 
commercial paper, a group of persons between whom a common bond exists, participation bond 
schemes, unit trust schemes, Post Office Savings Bank and Industrial Development Corporation of SA 
Limited. 
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While it is accepted that not all these activities can be married with the Banks Act, it 
should nevertheless be the aim to foster the risk-management philosophies 
expounded in terms of the Act. The permission granted to mining houses to conduct 
inter-group lending should be reconsidered. Mining houses should be treated in the 
same manner as other companies in the South African economy. The accepting of 
inter-group deposits is by no means a core activity of a mining house. Considering 
the parlous state of the South African mining industry, it is the writer's opinion that 
the mining houses face considerable and inevitable restructuring in the near future in 
order to remain globally competitive. One aspect of such restructuring would be to 
'outsource' deposit-taking and other treasury functions of mining houses to banks 
who are better equipped for the financial risk-management requirements of such 
activities. 333 
Permitted activities 
Section 80 determines that no bank and no associate334 of a bank, should, either 
jointly or individually, hold shares in any registered insurer as defined in section 1 of 
the Insurance Act, 1943, to the extent to which the nominal value of those shares 
exceeds 49 per cent of the nominal value of all the issued shares of such insurer. In 
cases where at the commencement of the Banks Act this ratio was exceeded, the 
bank and its associates were permitted to retain the shares in question, but they 
were not allowed to acquire any further shares in the insurer as long as the 49 per 
cent ratio was exceeded. 
However, regulatory authorities are paying increasing attention to the diversity of 
financial services (e.g. portfolio management, banking, assurance) offered by 
financial conglomerates. The Jacobs Committee (Republic of South Africa 1992: 69) 
supported the opportunities for rationalisation offered by the formation of financial 
conglomerates, provided that separate subsidiaries are established for the various 
financial services. The Jacobs proposals envisage banks owning insurance 
companies and vice versa, thereby increasing the options available to 
management. 335 
The South African banking landscape has to a large degree been shaped by the 
withdrawal of foreign banks from the domestic economy in the wake of financial 
333 Indeed, a practical example is provided by the Anglovaal group and Randgold who have both 
mandated Rand Merchant Bank Limited to manage their treasury functions. 
334 For the purposes of the aforegoing: 'associate', in relation to a bank, means a holding company of 
that bank; or a company of which such holding company is a subsidiary; or a fellow subsidiary of that 
bank; or a subsidiary of that bank or of such fellow subsidiary. 
335 The RMB Holdings Limited structure represents a unique example in which a bank holding 
company controls a life assurer who in turn controls a bank (Ed Hern, Rudolph lnc 1992:4). In terms of 
this structure Momentum Life Assurers Limited took over Rand Merchant Bank Limited in exchange for 
which the former shareholders in Rand Merchant Bank Limited acquired control over Momentum Life 
Assurers Limited via the RMB Holdings Limited vehicle. However, for purposes of complying with the 
Banks Act, Momentum Life Assurers is the registered bank holding company. 
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sanctions.336 In most cases the vacuum left by the departing controlling shareholders 
could only be filled by the life insurers who had funds available for such large 
investments. Consequently, all the major South African banking groups are presently 
owned by insurance companies (Wiese 1996(a)). 
Interestingly, Wiese (1996(b)) argues that this shareholding structure is undesirable 
and should ideally be the converse, i.e. banks owning assurer I insurance 
companies, although this is presently not allowed in terms of section 80 of the Act.337 
However, it is evident that the demarcation lines between South African banks and 
life assurers are fading. The traditional distinction, where long-term and short-term 
savings products were associated with life companies and banks respectively, is no 
longer appropriate.33B Consequently, the existing corporate controlling structure may 
need to be adapted by either a divestiture or merger of respective interests. 
Restrictions on securities business 
The deregulation of the JSE339 in 1996 permitted corporate membership of the 
exchange and thereby paved the way for banks to trade both as brokers and as 
principals in the South African equity market. In contrast to the UK and Germany, 
South African banks are required to conduct their securities activities through 
separately capitalised entities. 
After much debate the FSB in 1996 imposed uniform capital adequacy requirements 
for all members of financial exchanges - the JSE, the South African Futures 
Exchange and the Bond Market Exchange. This preserved competitive neutrality for 
banks and non-banks operating securities business.340 However, banks may not be 
in a position to make a clear distinction between banking and securities business, 
especially when it comes to hedging risk. 
336 Foreign banks re-entering the South African economy will probably experience greater difficulty 
regaining market share than at the time of severing South Africa's umbilical cord. 
337 See paragraph 7 .2.2 for discussion of the UK approach which does not expressly prohibit banks 
from investing in insurance companies but relies on moral suasion to discourage banks from doing so. 
338 For example, Standard Bank and Liberty Life have since 1978 had a successful association; with 
operational (in terms of the cross-selling of products) and financial benefits to both companies. 
Speculation (lvor Jones & Roy 7 December 1995) is that Standard Bank would like to earn 
underwriting profits on traditional life products while Liberty Life may apply for a banking licence. 
339 See paragraph 5.5.2.2. 
340 The capital adequacy requirements ('CAR') on the securities trading activities of banks are based 
on the Capital Adequacy Directive of the European Union. The Basle Committee's proposals on 
market risk had not been finalised by the end of 1995. Consequently, these CAR requirements will 
apply to South African banks until the Basle Committee's proposals are finalised. Banks are permitted 
to apply a simplified method of calculating the capital requirement, which results in a relatively higher 
capital requirement, or a more complex building block approach, which results in a relatively lower 
capital requirement. 
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Permitted investments 
A deposit-taking institution is restricted by the Act in the amount which it may invest 
in immovable property. The total investment341 in fixed property and equities is not 
to exceed the total of its issued primary share capital and primary unimpaired 
reserve funds. Properties taken into possession to protect an investment are not 
included in this calculation for a period of five years from the date of purchase. 
The Act also restricts the amount which a deposit-taking institution may invest in or 
lend to its associates - this maximum is 1 0 per cent of the institution's liabilities 
(Kelly 1993: 272).342 
While not explicitly stated, the restriction on property investments by banks exists for 
prudential purposes, i.e. to reduce the exposure of banks to investment risk.343 
Consequently, these restrictions fit into the general model of regulation of risk-
management. 
9.2.3 Disclosure Requirements 
9.2.3.1 Disclosure in Financial Statements and Supervisory Returns 
'Reels en regulasies kan maklik omseil word, maar die beginsels en standaarde nie so maklik 
nie. Ons wit eerder 'n omgewing skep en standaarde en beginsels neerle wat gesonde 
beginse/s van risikobestuur bevorder. Dit kom uit die ondervinding toe ons gekyk het na die 
bestuurstate van goeie banke om te leer hoe hulle hut risikos bestuur.' 
Dr Hennie van Greuning quoted by Von Kyserlingk (1994: 53). 
A deposit-taking institution cannot be managed prudently without adequate systems 
for keeping up-to-date records of all its transactions and commitments in. such a 
manner that management is continuously aware of the bank's financial condition and 
the risks to which it is exposed. The South African Reserve Bank views the 
supervisory returns required in terms of the Banks Act as an appropriate risk-
management tool for management. 
Relatively onerous disclosure requirements and the submission of information have 
been regarded by certain bankers as a limitation on a bank's autonomy. However, as 
Booysen (1991: 292) argues, most of the disclosures made to the South African 
Reserve Bank are not available for external purposes and are treated as extremely 
confidential by the regulatory authorities. Compliance with disclosure requirements 
may be onerous to bank management. On the other hand, increased disclosure to 
the general public should strengthen the role of the market in disciplining bank 
341 The investment in property may be made by way of investment in or loans to a property owning 
subsidiary. 
342 See paragraph 8.2.2 for a discussion of the German approach which similarly allows banks to 
invest in other banks, as well as in commercial and insurance companies, subject to certain capital 
restrictions. 
343 lt is an obvious principle of risk-management that the same capital cannot support the risk 
exposure of various companies. 
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management. 344 lt is therefore important that the costs and benefits of disclosure are 
carefully weighed up against one another. 
Risk-based disclosure 
Table 9.1 provides a summary of the risk-based returns required from South African 
banks. These returns encompass all the financial risks that are managed by banks. 
The objective of these disclosure requirements is to provide both bank management 
and regulators with information relevant to the maintenance of effective risk-
management by banks. As banks are able to use the statutory returns for their own 
risk-management purposes, the benefits derived by banks from compliance with 
these disclosure regulations are intended to exceed the costs entailed by such 
compliance. 
Table 9.1 Risk-based Returns required from South African Banks 
FORM 
NUMBER HEADING OF FORM 
01100 Balance sheet 
01110 Off-balance-sheet activities 
01200 Income statement 
01300 Liquidity risk-maturity ladder 
01310 Minimum reserve balance and liquid assets 
01400 Capital adequacy 
01401 Consolidated balance sheet 
01402 Counterparty risk 
01403 Foreign operations of South African banks 
01410 Interest-rate risk 
01420 Market risk (Position risk) 
01430 Trading risk 
01500 Credit risk 
01505 Report of large exposure 
01510 Large exposures 
01520 Assets bought in 
01600 Currency risk 
01700 Restriction on investments, loans and advances 
01701 Asset-backed securitisation 
01702 Return regarding investments and interests held 
01703 Return regarding shareholders of bank I controlling company 
Pursuant to Section 75(3), the Registrar can require that a deposit-taking institution 
furnish him with information relating to the extent and management of risk exposures 
in the conduct of its business. The Registrar can also request further information 
regarding a deposit-taking institution's assets and liabilities. 
Where a deposit-taking institution carries on its activities through a subsidiary, 
branch office or other agency outside the Republic, then it must incorporate, in the 
returns noted above (re prudential requirements), the information relating to such 
entities as well as furnishing the information separately. 
344 See paragraph 10.3.4. 
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In the case of a group of deposit-taking institutions, the holding company of the 
group must, in addition to the returns furnished by each deposit-taking institution, 
furnish the Registrar, by means of a consolidated return, with the required details of 
the group as well as any information relating to the above-mentioned entities. 
In January 1994 the South African Reserve Bank issued a circular expressing 
concern about banks that directly or indirectly guarantee financial services 
transactions of entities within the group, thus binding the bank 'legally or morally' to 
meet the obligations in case of default (Business Day 1994: 3). Banks are therefore 
required to submit a consolidated balance sheet and an organogram of the group, as 
well as details of non-bank entities in the group that are involved in financial 
activities. 
lt is also required that banks disclose the market and trading risks in financial 
markets: fixed interest securities, currency, equity and commodity markets. Banks 
have to distinguish between whether the company was acting as a principal or agent 
in those markets, and must show its capital and reserves, own assets and assets 
under management. The South African Reserve Bank must also be informed of the 
number of non-bank entities on behalf of whom banks are acting as risk managers; 
settlement volumes and outstanding contracts of all entities and their settlement 
limits (Business Day 1994 : 2). 
Generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP) 
Unless expressly otherwise provided in the Act or the Regulations, all the prescribed 
risk-based returns have to fairly present the financial position and the results of the 
operations of a bank. Unless departures therefrom are specifically authorised by the 
Act or by the Registrar, the annual financial statements of a bank and of a controlling 
company are required to be compiled in accordance with GAAP as required by 
section 286(3) of the Companies Act, 1973.345 
Of particular relevance to banks, Accounting Standard AC 120, which was issued by 
the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants, became effective as from 1 
January 1996. The principal objective of this statement is to prescribe specific 
disclosure in the financial statements of banks in order to give users a better 
understanding of the special characteristics of banks and to assist them in evaluating 
the banking risk, financial position, performance, cash flow information and 
investment activity of such enterprises. lt also encourages the presentation of a 
commentary on the financial statements which deals with such matters as the 
management and control of banking risk. This statement does not deal with the 
measurement of the elements of financial risks of banks. 
345 The South African accounting profession is currently engaged in a harmonisation project that will 
bring local accounting standards in line with those issued by the International Federation of 
Accountants. Changes in accounting policies and refinement of the basis of measurement by South 
African banks can therefore be expected over the next years (Price Waterhouse 1995: 36). 
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The disclosure requirements of AC120 are more extensive and specific than those 
contained in the Companies Act. The detailed requirements are set out in Appendix 
VI. 
Specific risk-related disclosures required by AC 120 include: significant concentration 
of assets, off-balance sheet liabilities; movements in provisions against loans and 
advances; specific bad debt provisions; general bad debt provisions; commentary on 
banking risk-management and control; commentary on adequacy of capital; and 
commitments made and other contingencies. 
Audit report 
In addition to any report that a bank is statutorily required to obtain from the auditor 
of a bank, the auditor is also required to report on the bank's financial position and 
the results of its operations as reflected in all the returns that were submitted to the 
Registrar as at the financial year-end.346 
The auditor is also required to report whether, in his opm1on, the information 
contained in the returns at year-end in all material respects: reasonably reflects the 
information of the management accounts; is complete in so far as all relevant 
information contained in the accounting and other records at the reporting date has 
been extracted therefrom and recorded in the returns; is accurate in so far as it 
correctly reflects the information contained in, and extracted from, the accounting 
and other records at the reporting date; and is prepared using the same accounting 
policies as those applied in the management and statutory accounts. 
In arriving at his opinion, the auditor has to report the extent of reliance placed on the 
internal risk controls of the bank, as established and maintained by directors, relating 
to financial and regulatory reporting, and compliance with the Banking Act and risk 
regulations. 
General 
Accounting Standard AC 120 has significantly improved the disclosure by banks of 
financial information and will enable users to obtain a greater understanding of the 
risk-profile of a bank. However, financial statements are still drawn up on the basis of 
historic-cost accounting which in an inflationary environment such as the South 
African one, inevitably fail to fully capture the various banking risks. The deficiency in 
accounting requirements accentuates that banking auditors have an increased 
responsibility relative to auditors of non-financial companies as they are an important 
role player in the overall risk-management process. 
346 The audit report is required to be rendered in accordance with the wording and practices 
recommended from time to time by the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants. 
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9.2.3.2 The Role of Auditors 
The role of the auditing and accounting profession has become very important in the 
bank supervision process. Bank supervisors need not duplicate the contribution of 
auditors as one of the key players in the risk-management process, provided that 
proper liaison mechanisms are established. 
Appointment 
The appointment of an auditor of a deposit-taking institution falls within the ambit of 
the Companies Act with two provisos, namely: the appointment of the auditor has to 
be approved by the Registrar; and where the total assets of the deposit-taking 
institution exceed R1 0 billion, two auditors independent of each other have to be 
appointed (Section 61 ). 
The Registrar has the power to refuse an application of appointment as auditor. 
Function of the auditors in relation to the Registrar 
The Act requires that the auditor may inform the Registrar of any matter relating to 
the affairs of the deposit-taking institution of which the auditor became aware whilst 
performing his function as auditor and which relates to the Registrar's supervisory 
functions, although there is no legal duty to do so. 
The Registrar can request the auditor to provide written information on any matter 
mentioned above or any matter which concerns the Registrar's supervisory function. 
In addition, a specific provision has been included in the Act which indemnifies the 
auditor who furnishes such information in good faith from any provision of the law, 
any breach of professional conduct or any liability to any person. 
Audit committee 
In 1988 the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (commonly 
called the Treadway Commission) in the UK recognised the audit committee as a 
keystone of corporate governance. In the light of the South African King Committee's 
report on corporate governance and its terms of reference, which included, inter alia, 
the monitoring and quality of information received by the board, the Bank 
Supervision Department believes that the audit committee and internal auditors have 
a vital role to play in ensuring that the board receives relevant and reliable 
information to enable the board to make decisions regarding the operations of a 
company. The concept of an audit committee, which was generally found to be 
operating effectively in practice for the leading South African banks, was introduced 
as a specific legal requirement in Section 64. 
The role and responsibilities of the audit committees and internal auditors is 
highlighted in the 1994 Annual Report of the Bank Supervision Department (South 
African Reserve Bank 1994: 12-14). 
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Examples of issues that fall within the responsibilities of the audit committee follow 
below. 
The audit committee should ascertain that management is prepared to report on the 
effectiveness of the internal controls over financial reporting and compliance with law 
and regulations, and is addressing other requirements pertaining to the safety and 
soundness of the institution. Since internal control has increased in importance 
owing to the emphasis placed on corporate governance and the concerns expressed 
about the standards of financial reporting and accountability in South Africa, it is 
imperative that the audit committee should assess whether the internal control 
systems are effective and that they ensure the reliability of financial reporting, as well 
as compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 
The functions of the audit committee are: to assist the board of directors in the 
evaluation of the internal control system, accounting practices, information systems 
and auditing processes applied in the day-to-day management of its business; to 
facilitate communication of above matters between the board of directors, auditors 
and internal audit function; and to introduce such measures which will enhance the 
credibility and objectivity of annual financial statements and reports prepared by the 
deposit-taking institution. 
The audit committee must consist of at least three members of the deposit-taking 
institution's board of directors and the majority of the committee members must be 
persons who are not employees of the deposit-taking institution (Section 64 ). 
Internal auditors 
The internal audit department of a bank should be directly accountable to the audit 
committee, thereby enhancing the internal auditors' independence. The internal audit 
function of a company should have as its mission to provide the board of directors 
with an independent review of the bank. Internal auditors should ascertain that 
adequate accounting systems and internal controls are in place and operating 
effectively to ensure proper disclosure of banking risks and that the affairs of the 
company are managed according to the policies adopted by the board of directors. 
However, the delegation of these duties by the board of the directors to the internal 
auditors does not relieve the directors of their responsibilities. The internal auditors 
should be seen as a management tool by the board of directors and should be used 
to: 
• Identify risk exposures within the group and to review the systems of internal 
controls in order to determining their effectiveness. 
• Assist the audit committee in assessing whether the risk-management process is 
effective. 
• Propose solutions to resolve problems and to improve future performance. 
• Monitor the implementation of and compliance with approved policies and internal 
control systems. 
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To achieve the above, the internal auditors should be independent from 
management and have full, free and unrestricted access to all activities, records, 
property and personnel of the group. They should therefore report to the audit 
committee, which consists mainly or solely of non-executive directors. 
The role of external auditors 
The 1990 Banks Act emphasises the role of the external auditor by stating that the 
Registrar of Banks may direct a bank to furnish him with a report by a public 
accountant on any matter or any aspect relating to that institution (Section 7). The 
regulator can also identify a specific risk (and statutory return) that should be 
evaluated by accounting firms (Van Greuning 1993: 88). The role of the external 
auditor is further defined in Section 63 which requires the auditor to inform the 
Registrar when he becomes aware of anything regarding a bank that may be of 
concern to the regulatory authority. 
A new development in the 1990 Banks Act is that the external auditor is required to 
meet with the supervisory authorities, as well as the audit committee directors and 
bank management in a trilateral meeting once the audit has been completed 
(Section?). 347 
lt is important that the role of auditors should change from a mere balance sheet 
audit to an audit of banking risks in order to enhance the overall risk-management 
process. 
General 
The extensive functions of auditors are directly related to the prudential concerns of 
South African banking regulators who rely heavily on the information as presented in 
supervisory returns and financial statements. lt is also clear that auditors have a 
specific role to play in the overall risk-management process of banks by their 
assessment of the effectiveness of internal risk controls and the risk exposure of 
banking institutions. The acceptance of the proposals in AC120 should enhance the 
information contained in the financial statements of banks, while the additional 
reporting responsibilities for auditors and increased independence of auditors will 
assist in ensuring the credibility of the information reported in the financial system. 
One of the most effective measures available to harness the power of the market is 
to publicly disclose relevant and reliable information, in order for the market to come 
to its own conclusion based on its assessment of the risks and returns involved. 
While annual financial statements of banking institutions are generally available to 
the public, the only return disclosed is the Dl 900. lt is therefore recommended that 
the Banking Supervision Department should consider disclosing a greater degree of 
risk-based information to financial market participants. 
347 According to Van Greuning (1993: 89) this meeting has been instituted following the success of a 
similar approach in the UK. See paragraph 7.2.3.2. 
258 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions 
9.2.4 Capital Adequacy 
9.2.4.1 The Definition of Capital for Regulatory Purposes 
The Basle Agreement on Risk-based Capital was signed at the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) in Basle, Switzerland in July 1988 by Central Bank representatives 
from the Group of Ten (G1 0) countries and Luxembourg.34a The agreed framework is 
designed to establish minimum levels of capital for internationally active banks. 
National regulators were therefore left at liberty to adapt the arrangements by setting 
higher levels. Although South Africa was not a signatory to this agreement, its legal 
framework conforms closely to the Basle standards as adapted to the specific South 
African circumstances. 
One of the main objectives of the Banks Act was to bring South African banking 
legislation into line with accepted international standards in order to ensure a sound 
and efficient banking system, thereby affording greater protection to depositors. 
A deposit-taking institution is required to ensure that the total of its Tier One and Tier 
Two capital is never less than: the greater of R50 000 000 or a percentage of certain 
assets and other risk exposures multiplied by risk-weights, as is prescribed by 
regulation. The Banks Act definition of capital (as well as a comparison with the BIS 
definition) is contained in Appendix VII. The applicable risk-weightings in South 
Africa and a BIS comparison are contained in Appendices VIII and IX. 
South African capital requirements have been raised significantly to fall in line with 
the guidelines set by the BIS, although the phase-in period to meet requirements, 
meant that South African banks need only have complied with the minimum of 8 per 
cent risk-weighted capital by 1995 as opposed to 1993 in the case of G 1 0 countries. 
The phase-in prescriptions were as follows: 
Periods Percentage 
1 January 1991 to 31 December 1991 4.5 
1 January 1992 to 21 January 1993 5.0 
22 January 1993 to 20 January 1994 6.0 
21 January 1994 to 19 January 1995 7.0 
20 January 1995 and thereafter 8.0 
According to Wiese (Business Day 1996: 17) the South African Reserve Bank would 
be more comfortable with a risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio of over 1 0 per cent, 
although no regulatory steps have been taken in this regard. As banks are at their 
greatest risk during the first years of their existence, the South African Reserve Bank 
348 The Basle Agreement demonstrates the commitment of international bank regulators to capital 
adequacy as the centerpiece of regulation. lt recognises that capital adequacy and other forms of bank 
regulation must be co-ordinated on an international level with the objectives of the new framework 
being to strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system and to reduce 
competitive inequality among international banks through the consistent application of the framework 
to banks in different countries. 
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requires at least 10 per cent capital adequacy from new banks entering the market 
(Business Day 1996: 17). 
Undisclosed reserves 
Historically, banks have been entitled to avail themselves of certain provisions of the 
Companies Act enabling them not to disclose certain information in their annual 
financial statements. In terms of the 1965 Banks Act, banking institutions were not 
required to disclose their true profits or hidden reserves. 
Hidden reserves, the amount of which had to be reported to the Registrar once a 
year, could not be used by a bank to comply with its capital requirements. A bank 
could at any time transfer a portion of its hidden reserves to its unimpaired reserve 
funds, in which event such reserves became part of its capital resources (Jacobs 
1983: 5). 
Booysen (1991: 292) notes that past empiric research has revealed that accounting 
principles have often not been adhered to in South Africa, as these were not legally 
enforceable. Booysen (1991: 293) argues that the historic purpose of accounting 
principles is to identify the appropriate accounting standards and to limit the 
differences in variety of the various accounting conventions without striving for strict 
conformity or a set of inflexible rules. Accordingly, Booysen (1991: 293) concludes in 
favour of an accounting principle to ensure uniform disclosure by banks and related 
companies. 
With effect from 1 January 1994 however, the disclosure requirements relating to 
financial statements of banks have been expanded in that the exemptions previously 
allowed both in terms of GAAP and in terms of the Companies Act no longer apply. 
In addition, the revised accounting statement AC120349 requires full disclosure of 
hidden reserves of banks. 
In terms of the overall risk-management paradigm, the full disclosure of hidden 
reserves is favoured as it enables regulatory authorities and investors alike to assess 
the true amount of capital which is available to cushion the loss which may arise from 
the exposure of a bank to financial risk. 
Consolidated supervision 
Another issue presently confronting regulators in South Africa is the application of 
consolidated supervision. Consolidated supervision is required in the case of: 
• conglomerates of multifunctional institutions; 
• financial groups under a bank holding company; and 
• institutions which operate across borders. 
349 Vide supra paragraph 9.2.3.1. 
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The South African Reserve Bank's concern about the risks incurred by banks on 
behalf of non-bank companies were brought to the fore in the Sechold debacle. In 
December 1993, an unsupervised subsidiary of the Sechold banking group, 
Securities Equities Limited, incurred large losses in futures trading when it entered 
into a large bear position and the JSE experienced a bull run. This resulted in the 
bank itself eroding its capital base as it had not only financed Securities Equities, but 
also guaranteed its liabilities. Sechold was eventually rescued by Investee Holdings 
while the futures portfolio which had caused the failure was taken over by Rand 
Merchant Bank; thereby averting any danger of systemic repercussions. 
In 1996 the Banking Supervision Department implemented a manual on 
consolidation supervision. The Banking Supervision Department's supervision of 
group risk covers only those non-banking companies within a banking group whose 
activities may affect the operations of the bank itself (South African Reserve Bank 
1955: 11 ). In line with the minimum standards set by the Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision, banking groups are required to report on consolidated capital 
adequacy and consolidated large exposures. 
However, should banking groups contain entities that are regulated by the FSB these 
are merely discussed at quarterly meetings with representatives of the FSB. 
This is regarded as insufficient supervision as banks may still be subject to risks not 
captured in terms of the processes set out by the Bank Supervision's manual on the 
management of group risk and not detected at quarterly FSB meetings. lt appears 
improbable that the latter can provide a proper understanding of consolidated risk of 
all the various banking groups in the South African economy, especially considering 
the often complicated group structure of the conglomerates in question. 
Moreover, banks may be affected by the operations of other institutions within a 
group even if these institutions do not engage in risk-management themselves. 35o 
Finally, as cross-border expansions of South African financial institutions increase, 
so will the host country responsibilities of banking and other supervisors. 
9.2.5 Risk Assets Limits 
The capital requirements imposed by the South African Reserve Bank are based on 
the BIS risk assets approach. The use of the risk assets ratio method as a prime 
banking regulatory tool once again confirms the research problem which states that 
current supervisory techniques are aimed at controlling the risk exposure of banks. 
However, this approach which entails weighing a bank's assets into broad categories 
according to their risk-profile, and then expressing the capital base as a percentage 
of the weighted portfolio of risk assets, differs in some instances from the weightings 
used by the BIS. 
350 Some of the individuals who sold debentures in Masterbond and Supreme were associated with 
banking subsidiaries engaged in insurance braking. In order to protect their reputation, certain banking 
groups reimbursed individuals who suffered losses due to the demise of Masterbond and Supreme. 
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A comparison between the BIS and Banks Act risk-weightings of various on-balance 
sheet risk assets is provided in Appendix VIII. 
9.2.5.1 Loan Concentration 
The risk assets approach is appropriate when a bank has a diversified portfolio of 
loans and investments. Particular risks may, however, arise when a bank puts too 
many of its eggs in one basket and lends heavily to a single borrower. 
In 1977, following the failure of certain smaller banks, the supervisory authorities 
investigated the possibility of imposing a limit on a bank's exposure to any one 
customer and its associates. However, in view of the predominantly large role played 
by large companies and integrated groups of companies in the economy, the idea 
was eventually discarded. 
In order however, to alert the attention of the authorities when a bank extends too 
large a share of its credit facilities to a particular client and its associates, a system of 
reporting these large credits once a year to the Registrar was introduced in 1978. In 
terms of this requirement a banking institution had to furnish the Registrar at the end 
of its financial year with a return reflecting all instances where its financing facilities 
to a client and customer exceeded 10 per cent of its paid-up capital and unimpaired 
reserves (Jacobs 1983: 5). 
Section 73 of the current Banks Act requires approval of the Board of Directors (or a 
Credit Committee appointed by the Board) before a bank can invest with or grant 
loans, advances or other credit to an individual person and its associates in excess 
of 15 per cent of the bank's capital and reserves. Where any transaction which on its 
own or together with any other previous transaction exceeds 15 per cent of the 
aggregate capital and reserves, the bank must report such exposure to the Registrar. 
The absolute limit placed on large exposures to an entity is 25 per cent of a bank's 
capital, compared with the 15 per cent ceiling required by the BIS. According to 
Wiese (1996(b)) this can be ascribed to the concentrated nature of the South African 
economy and the fact that a small number of companies dominate the economic 
scene. 
lt is of relevance that a new derivative instrument is emerging in international 
financial markets to manage the risks of loan concentration. Credit derivatives can be 
applied by South African banks with large exposures to single entities which may 
occur due to the concentrated nature of the South African economy. Essentially, 
credit derivatives are loan substitutes: rather than to syndicate a loan, a bank can 
enter into a risk participation agreement with another bank. The second bank would 
be paid a fee for accepting the risk of default; while the interest income is paid to the 
bank which extended the loan. Newly established foreign banks may be the most 
active in the local credit derivative market as it provides a means of quickly 
generating an income stream (Financial Mail 1996(a): 35). 
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The employment of such credit deri·tatives would clearly allow more prudent credit 
risk-management by banks as well as allowing regulatory compliance with BIS 
guidelines. 
9.2.5.2 Country Risk 
South Africa introduced stringent exchange controls on non-residents in 1961 when 
large outflows of capital occurred.351 The existence of these controls has to a large 
extent obviated the need for country risk guidelines. While most banks have in-house 
procedures for managing country risk where applicable, these are not prescribed by 
regulation other than those imposed by exchange controls. 
Exchange Control Regulations, Orders and Rules are amended from time to time, 
and are issued in terms of the Currency and Exchanges Act (1933). These 
regulations define the range of foreign currency transactions that may take place in 
South Africa or may be carried out with the permission of the Treasury by residents 
of South Africa. The Treasury has delegated authority to deal with most exchange 
control matters to the South African Reserve Bank, which in turn has delegated 
considerable authority to certain commercial banks which have been licensed as 
authorised dealers.352 
The Exchange Control Rulings issued by the Exchange Control Department of South 
African Reserve Bank set out the powers granted to authorised dealers and the rules 
and procedures to be followed by them in dealing with day-to-day matters relating to 
exchange control. 
The published regulations regarding South African exchange control practice and 
policy are not exhaustive. A considerable degree of flexibility is built into the system 
in that the authorities exercise substantial discretionary powers in approving or 
rejecting applications that fall outside basic policy. Because of the technical nature of 
the terminology, exchange control rulings are not made available to the public (Price 
Waterhouse 1995: 21 ). 
9.2.5.3 Interest Rate Risk 
The South African Reserve Bank views interest rate risk as relating to the impact on 
income resulting from the repricing of assets, liabilities and derivatives at different 
points in time (RSA 1993: 69). The market risk353 of changes in the capital value of 
investments resulting from changes in interest rates are reported in form Dl 420. 
351 For a short overview on exchange controls in South Africa see paragraph 5.5.2.3. 
352 In the strict sense this practice is legally unsound as it conflicts with the legal maxim delegatus 
delegare non potest which holds that delegated powers may not be further delegated. 
353 Market risk is the risk that the market price of an asset could change, which will result in a potential 
loss to the reporting bank on realisation of that asset. Examples of market I price movements are 
changes in interest rates, share prices and prices of commodities. The financial instruments, assets 
and related derivatives to be included in the return are those that can be readily disposed of in 
established or acknowledged markets for financial instruments, derivatives and commodities (RSA 
1993: 72). 
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Three elements primarily encompass the risk associated with interest rates, namely, 
the margin between the rates earned on assets and paid on liabilities, the repricing 
potential of assets and liabilities at different points in time, resulting in mismatches in 
various time bands between assets, liabilities and derivatives and, lastly, the period 
over which these mismatches persist. 
The 'flow' approach is used, to reflect, per time band, the total amounts of assets and 
liabilities and derivatives that can be expected to reprice. All balance-sheet items and 
derivative market activities that have a bearing on the interest-rate exposure of a 
bank should be included in this return. 
All on-balance-sheet items are reported at book value, while derivative market items 
are reflected on an equivalent basis. All relevant foreign-exchange items are also 
included in this return (RSA 1993: 69). 
9.2.5.4 Foreign Exchange Risk 
The information required by the South African Reserve Bank in form Dl 600 
comprises the reporting bank's: 
• foreign-currency assets (except infrastructural investments used for purposes 
of carrying banking activities) and liabilities; 
• commitments to purchase or sell foreign currency; and its 
• net long or short position in options and futures contracts in foreign currency 
and gold.354 
Commitments of the reporting bank to purchase or sell foreign currency under 
forward contracts are shown at their market values at the close of business on the 
reporting date. 
The effective net open position in any one foreign currency and in all foreign 
currencies taken together, should not at the close of business on any one day 
exceed an amount equal to 10 per cent of the net qualifying capital and reserves of 
the reporting bank (RSA 1993: 90). 
9.2.5.5 Off-balance Sheet Business 
The risk asset approach described in 9.2.5 also incorporates certain risks run by a 
bank but not shown on its balance sheet, such as guarantees. Again, the weightings 
used by the South African Reserve Bank may differ from those of the BIS, as can be 
seen in Appendix IX. 
354 The net long/short position in options and futures contracts in foreign currency and gold is 
calculated as follows: The sum of the gross value of potential purchases of foreign currency and gold 
in terms of put options granted, call options held and futures contracts, minus the sum of the gross 
value of potential sales of foreign currency and gold in terms of put options held, call options granted 
and futures contracts (RSA 1993: 90). 
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9.2.6 Liquidity Adequacy 
Banks seldom hold enough 'ready' money to meet all of their obligations at once, but 
they are required to have adequate liquidity to meet their obligations as they fall due. 
This entails holding enough cash I liquid assets and ensuring that the future profile of 
cash flows is appropriately matched (Wiese 1991: 314). 
During the first quarter of 1993, the basis for the calculation of liquid assets was 
amended. The calculation is presently based on 5 per cent of total liabilities to the 
public, reduced by cash-management schemes and set-off.355 
The minimum balance of liquid assets held at any time may not be less than an 
amount equal to 75 per cent of the average daily amount of liquid assets required to 
be held by the bank. The daily liquid asset holdings should average out at a 
minimum of 100 per cent of the required holding for the month. 
No foreign currency assets, except gold coin and bullion shall qualify as liquid 
assets. Only assets not pledged or otherwise encumbered may be utilised as liquid 
assets.356 
Although true liquidity risk may be less than 5 per cent of deposits, the South African 
liquidity requirements have the advantage of being uncomplicated and hence easy to 
administer. 
355 The basis for the calculation of liquid assets was amended in 1993. Previously, the calculation was 
based on 20 per cent of short-term liabilities, less certain short-term transactions in respect of 
repurchase agreements. At the same time the definition of liquid assets was amended to exclude 
bankers' acceptances, and other acknowledgement-Jf-debt instruments, so as to ensure that a 
conceptually sounder basis was employed. This resulted in a decrease in the level of the statutory 
liquid assets required to be held (South African Reserve Bank 1994: 13). 
356 Liquid assets comprise: South African Reserve Bank notes and coin, gold coin and bullion; Gold 
coin and bullion; Clearing account balances with the South African Reserve Bank; Treasury bills of the 
Republic; Stocks issued under Section 19 of the Exchequer Act, 1975 with a maturity of not more than 
3 years; Securities of the South African Reserve Bank with a maturity of not more than 3 years; Short 
term bills issued by the Land Bank. 
Only cash that is physically held by banks, in their own vaults, or held on their behalf at and by SBV 
Services (Pty) Limited, may be claimed as credit in respect of vault cash when the cash-reserve and 
liquid-asset requirements are determined. 
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9.3 Protective Regulation 
The above paragraphs have all clearly demonstrated that South African banking 
supervisors aim to regulate banks by virtue of their various risk exposures. By means 
of the risk-asset ratio these risks are weighed against the capital required to assume 
and manage financial risks. South African prudential regulation is consequently 
directed at the management of these risks by deposit-taking institutions. However, 
where prudential regulations and supervision have failed to bring about effective risk-
management by a banking institution, undue risk exposure may cause a bank to fail. 
This triggers various forms of protective regulation which are discussed below. 
9.3.1 Crisis Management 
9.3.1.1 Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
Stals (1994: 2) argues that conventional operational instruments used by central 
banks for macro-economic objectives, such as open market operations, 
accommodation to banking institutions at the discount window and interest rate 
policy should not be used for micro-economic objectives as this would undermine the 
objective of financial stability. In order to overcome this problem, Stals (1994: 5) 
notes that central banks often introduce special lender of last resort facilities that can 
be implemented to provide special assistance to individual institutions in specific 
circumstances. However, Stals (1994: 5) stresses that such lender of last resort 
assistance should be applied with great circumspection for reasons such as 
transparency or objective criteria. As Stals (1994: 5-6) states, the disclosure that a 
specific banking institution is dependent on special bank assistance for its survival 
'could indeed be a kiss of death that could force the institution into liquidation'. 
As regards objective criteria, Stals (1994: 6) reiterated the stance of the South 
African Reserve Bank that it will 'only provide special assistance to a bank to bridge 
a temporary liquidity problem, where there is a reasonable chance that the bank can 
recover from its ailment in a relatively short period of time, and where its demise 
poses a threat to the banking system as a whole'. 
While it is the role of the bank regulatory authorities to combine the objectives of the 
central bank of maintaining overall financial stability with the objective of providing 
security for the individual institution and its clients, Stals (1994: 7) warns that: 
'despite all the precautions taken by the bank regulators and supervisors in the 
world, working closely with the central bankers of their countries, security for 
depositors cannot be guaranteed by the monetary authorities. Each depositor 
must therefore carry his own responsibility for his own decisions of and where 
and how his money and his savings will be invested'. 
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Indeed, the South African Reserve Bank has often allowed b;mks to fail or be taken 
over by other banks.357 
The most widely publicised case of South African Reserve Bank assistance relates 
to the Bankorp group. In 1985 Bankorp approached the South African Reserve Bank 
with a request for special assistance to enable it to cope with bad investments and 
other non-performing assets inherited with the take-over of Trust Bank in 1977 and 
Mercabank in 1984. The year 1985 was extremely difficult for South Africa due to 
international sanctions, trade boycotts, disinvestment campaigns and international 
loan withdrawals which put severe pressure on the balance of payments and the 
external value of the rand. In the process a domestic liquidity squeeze adversely 
affected the banking sector and exposed the weaker banks. 
Against the background of the debt moratorium and the declining creditworthiness of 
South Africa in the international credit markets, a domestic banking crisis would have 
had serious systemic repercussions. In the judgement of the monetary authorities, 
the potential failure of Bankorp, one of the major banks with extensive international 
relations (Stals 1996 (b): 18-19), created a serious threat of systemic contagion. 
Consequently, the South African Reserve Bank provided Bankorp with a low interest-
rate loan of R 200 million in April 1985 which was increased to R 300 million in April 
1985. When in 1990 it emerged that Bankorp was unable to repay the first instalment 
of the loan an extensive investigation into the bank was launched. As Stals (1996 
(b): 21-22) submits: 
'the picture that emerged ... was rather desperate. Bankorp made no profit 
during the 1989-1990 financial year, and only about 32 per cent of the bank's 
total assets at that stage were profitable' 
The South African Reserve Bank, faced with the decision of providing further 
assistance or closing down Bankorp, decided to increase the lender of last resort 
loan to Bankorp from R 300 million to R 1 000 million. This decision was based on 
the fact that the economy was at the time in a recession and the liquidation of 
Bankorp would have adversely affected not only other banks and depositors, but 
would also have forced the liquidation of many debtor clients of the bank (Stals 1996 
(b): 22). Moreover, the group had a foreign presence in London, New York and Hong 
Kong and a domino effect on the creditworthiness of other South African banks in the 
international sphere was of concern. 
In June 1991 the external auditors of Bankorp informed the South African Reserve 
Bank that the income of about R 150 million generated by the support package was 
not sufficient to salvage Bankorp which had since further deteriorated. After 
extensive negotiations, it was agreed that the shareholders of Bankorp would have 
357 Broadway (1994: 122-123) lists the various bank failures in South Africa during the period 1972-
1993: These are Clanwilliam Eksekuteurshamer Beperk (1973); UDC Bank Limited (1978); Rand Bank 
Limited (1980); Rondalia Bank Limited (1980); Breda Bank Limited (1978); Spes Bona Bank Limited 
(1978); Concorde Bank Limited (1980); Alpha Bank Limited (1990); Cape Investment Bank Limited 
(1991) and Pretoria Bank Limited (1991 ). 
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to cover approximately R 800 million of the potential loss and the South African 
Reserve Bank loan would be increased to R 1 500 million. The latter would enable 
the bank, through the income earned on an investment in government stock, to 
generate approximately R 1 125 million over a period of five years, which would be 
applied towards the write-off of accumulated losses. The substance of the 1991 
agreement was not affected by amendments made in 1994 when ABSA took over 
Bankorp. On 25 October 1995 the accumulated total of R 1 125 million in financial 
assistance was reached and the South African Reserve Bank loan of R 1 500 million 
to Bankorp I ABSA was fully repaid.3sa 
The above case has provided the clearest policy formulation of the South African 
Reserve Bank stance regarding support for failing banks and is therefore worth 
quoting at length. As Stals ( 1996(b ): 13-14) commented: 
'Some general rules can be derived from the practices followed universally by 
central banks: 
• Firstly, financial assistance is applied very sparingly, and as a general rule only 
when a particular case provides a threat of contagion of the whole banking 
system. 
• Secondly, protection of depositors is a major consideration that must be taken 
into account, especially by central banks that have to operate in a vacuum 
where there is no public systems of depositor protection. 
• Thirdly, confidence in the banking system must be preserved, without providing 
open-ended support for mismanagement, fraud or internal inefficiencies in 
banking institutions. 
• Fourthly, arising from the foregoing, financial assistance emanating from the 
central bank I government must, as far as possible, serve to protect depositors 
and not shareholders of banking institutions. 
• Fifthly, in order to assist the banking institution to overcome its problem, the 
central bank may provide a loan at a nominal rate of interest , or perhaps 
provide guarantees for raising low interest rate loans from other institutions. 
358 The assistance rendered to Bankorp and later the ABSA group has been widely publicised (and 
often criticised) in the popular financial press. lt is submitted that much of the criticism stems from a 
lack of understanding of the aim of such emergency measures by a central bank. The supportive 
actions taken by the South African Reserve Bank are justified as the failure of Bankorp certainly posed 
a risk to the stability of the domestic financial system. Moreover, considerations of depositor protection 
(in the absence of a formal deposit protection arrangement) favoured such assistance. Finally, the fact 
that the assistance was not disclosed at the time is understandable as public confidence had to be 
maintained in the bank despite its previously disastrous risk-management practices. Although the 
costs of such assistance is known it is obviously difficult to quantify the benefit (i.e. avoidance of 
losses which would have been suffered had the banking group been allowed to fail). Nevertheless, it 
would appear that measures were worthwhile from a cost-benefit point of view as ABSA is presently 
the largest South African banking group in terms of bank assets and is in sound financial health. 
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• Sixthly, the assistance must be conditional upon remedial action that will lead 
to recovery and may often require a change of ownership, of senior 
management, and even of the structure of the affected institution. 
• Seventhly, there must be possible exit for the central bank from the assistance 
programme, perhaps only after credibility, credit-worthiness and public trust in 
the institution have been re-established. 
• Eighthly, it may in certain circumstances be necessary to keep the assistance 
package secret, particularly if disclosure could be counter-productive and 
defeat the objective of the exercise.' 
These are generally the considerations that the South African Reserve Bank appliea 
in providing assistance to South African deposit-taking institutions. 
Finally, Oelkers (1995) considered the question of liability in banking supervision and 
re-scue operations with reference to existing South African law. Oelkers (1995: 150) 
concludes that 'liability in banking supervision does not direct the right way to solving 
the problems that exist between the depositors and their bank'. Oelkers (1995: 149) 
furthermore argues that: 'from the point of view of (social) justice and equity the 
situation in banking supervision remains unsatisfactory. The depositors are not 
protected from loss. The State does not take responsibility'. Accordingly, Oelkers 
(1995: 149) raises the possibility that an answer to the problem of unprotected 
depositors may be deposit protection schemes or deposit insurance. 359 
9.3.1.2 Corrective Action 
Curatorship 
Section 69 provides for the appointment of a curator if it is the op1mon of the 
Registrar that a bank is experiencing financial difficulties.36o A curator may be 
granted extensive powers to intervene in the risk-management of a bank, such as: 
• suspending or reducing the rights of creditors; 
• making payments to creditors as he sees fit; 
• cancelling any agreements between the bank and any other party; 
• grant loans or extend a facility 
• cancel leases of movable or immovable property; and 
• dispose of any assets of the bank. 
Section 69A furthermore permits the Registrar to appoint a person to investigate the 
affairs of a bank under curatorship. 
359 This is discussed in paragraph 9.3.1.3 below. 
360 During 1996 the Community Bank failed as it was unable to fund its growing asset portfolio. The 
Community Bank was placed under curatorship and the curator was, at the time of writing, considering 
various offers made by potential purchasers (Financial Mail1996(b): 32). 
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Powers of the Registrar 
The Registrar can restrict361 the deposit-taking institution's activities where the 
deposit-taking institution: has, or any of its directors or executive officers have, been 
convicted of an offence in terms of the Act; does not carry on satisfactorily the 
business of a deposit-taking institution; has failed to comply with an applicable 
requirement of the Act;362 continues to employ an undesirable practice; or has in a 
material respect misrepresented the facilities which it offers to the general public. 
The Registrar can immediately take legal action by way of criminal proceedings 
and I or impose a fine based on a percentage of the shortfall for each day that the 
failure or inability to meet the requirement exists. The percentage fine imposed 
depends on the infringement and is set out more fully in the Act. 
The Registrar has the authority to condone such failure or inability and to give the 
institution concerned an opportunity, subject to predetermined conditions, to comply 
with the relevant provision I requirement. 
Process followed 
The perspective of the Bank Supervision Department of the South African Reserve 
Bank is that a supervisor cannot prevent bank failure. Instead, it is regarded as a 
sign of a properly functioning banking system that both free entry and free exit can 
take place. According to Oosthuizen (1994(b)) the supervisor's role regarding bank 
failure should consist of the following actions: 
• early detection of distress; 
• assess systemic risk potential; 
• involving appropriate players; 
• keeping the Governor363 advised throughout; 
• if a third party becomes involved, insist on an independent, due diligence 
investigation; 
• if all else fails, trigger the above statutory problem resolution mechanisms. 
Accordingly, Oosthuizen (1994(b)) argues that the supervisor should not become 
involved in a private sector resolution of distress and that the first prize is a market 
based solution. 
However, should it become necessary to decide whether a failed bank should be 
bailed out by the South African Reserve Bank, the Bank Supervision Department 
would firstly insist on a due diligence and solvency examination in which an 
361 Instead of applying to a court for cancellation of permission to conduct banking business under 
Section 25(1) of the Act. 
362 As soon as a deposit-taking institution fails to or is unable to comply with the prudential 
requirements of this Act, it must immediately report this fact to the Registrar giving reasons (Section 
74). 
363 lt is assumed that the Governor would, in turn, keep the Minister of Finance fully informed. 
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independent specialist performs an investigation to verify the facts as presented by 
the failed bank. 
The stages of the process would be that the Bank Supervision Department would 
identify the situation and advise the Governor thereof. The Governor would then 
assess the situation and determine his advice to the government. Ultimately, the 
decision on whether to assist a failed or failing bank is a political decision to be made 
by the government in conjunction with the South African Reserve Bank (Oosthuizen 
1994(b)). 
Should assistance be approved, the format of the assistance would be a 
recapitalisation by means of a direct transfer without a quid pro quo, a low interest 
loan or a rights issue taken up by the South African Reserve Bank. The latter 
possibility is not favoured as it is not in the South African view a function of a central 
bank to be an equity participant in another bank. 
The South African Reserve Bank would insist on the management being replaced as 
a pre-requisite to providing assistance.364 
Oosthuizen ( 1994(b)) concedes that the implication of assisting a failed bank is that 
of subsidising a less efficient institution, undermining the efficiency of the banking 
system in the interest of financial stability, creating an unlevel playing field and 
undermining the risk versus reward equation. Consequently, the following 
parameters are utilised in arriving at a decision: the risk profile of the bank and the 
probability of receiving a return on the funds utilised to assist the bank; the effect on 
inflation if the assistance causes monetary expansion; the direct or indirect cost to 
the taxpayer; systemic stability, efficiency and consumer protection. 
As bank regulation and supervision amounts to intervention in banking activity, these 
are subject to moral hazard which may lead to an expectation gap between what the 
South African Reserve Bank could, should and should not do. Oosthuizen (1994(b)) 
therefore proposes an alignment of supervisory structures with the objectives of 
regulation as shown below: 
Regulatory Objective 
Stability 
Efficiency 
Consumer Protection 
Supervisory Structure 
Systemic Risk UnitJ65 
Bank Supervision 
Financial Services Board 
Deposit Insurance Corporation 
364 In the case of Bankorp this did not occur as the losses were suffered by the newly acquired Trust 
Bank and Mercabank. lt was left to the new managing director of Bankorp, Piet Liebenberg to rectify 
the mismanagement of his predecessors. 
365 lt is assumed that one of the prime functions of such a systemic risk unit would be to maintain the 
integrity of the payments mechanism. 
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Example 
The most recent bank failure in South Africa was that of African Bank,366 for which a 
rescue package was put together by NBS in partnership with New Africa Investments 
and Metropolitan Life,· in October 1995. A due diligence investigation had revealed 
that African Bank suffered from chronic mismanagement problems despite 
fundamentally sound information and other systems. Arrear payments had not been 
collected for at least six months prior to African Bank's slide into curatorship, while 
several key management members - including the financial manager who had 
resigned in mid 1994 - had not been replaced. Many of the staff were unable to 
operate the bank's systems (Vermeulen 1995). 
These deficiencies in African Bank's risk-management capabilities reflect less 
favourably on the prudential supervision of the Reserve Bank who arguably did not 
make full use of the corrective measures at their disposal. However, it was possible 
that information had been suppressed or not fully disclosed or that appropriate 
corrective measures were politically sensitive. Ultimately, the decision by the 
Reserve Bank not to support the failed African Bank was theoretically sound as it did 
not pose any risk to the stability of the South African banking system. 
However, the subsequent actions by the South African government cannot be 
justified on prudential grounds. In 1996 an assistance package was unveiled which 
entailed that the government would take up a 20 per cent stake in the bank by 
expending up to R262 million of public money to cover its bad debts. The then 
Minister of Finance, Chris Liebenberg, justified the state's assistance on the grounds 
that bids by the rescue parties (in particular NBS Holdings) were submitted on 
condition of significant government help. The government also stated its intention of 
distributing its shareholding in time to faCilitate further black economic empowerment. 
Moreover, strong social, economic and practical factors had led government to 
believe that aid to facilitate the bank's rescue would be justified. Finally, it was also 
said to be a commercial decision as the government could have lost R262 million 
held in deposits with the bank, had it been allowed to go into liquidation (Vermeulen 
1995). 
The issues surrounding the assistance rendered to the African Bank have important 
regulatory repercussions. 
First, it is clear that the rescue package was a political decision made at cabinet level 
and that taxpayers money was used for this purpose. While the South African 
Reserve Bank has in the past rescued a number of banks, this never occurred at the 
direct expense of the taxpayer. lt is conceded that the cost of assistance rendered 
to failing banks by the South African Reserve Bank would have impacted indirectly 
on the fiscus as all profits accruing to the South African Reserve Bank above a 
certain level is paid over to the government. This leads to another observation: in the 
case of bank failure there is always a cost, the only consideration is who assumes 
366 Interestingly, African Bank was rescued once before, in 1985. 
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responsibility: depositors, shareholders, the central bank, a deposit insurance fund 
or the government. In the case of African Bank it is not prudentially sound. that 
taxpayers had to suffer the consequences of bank failure. 
Despite assurances to the contrary, the assistance package to African Bank could 
not have been based on commercial considerations otherwise the funds required 
would have been forthcoming from the private sector. As it were, the private sector 
would not be drawn into African Bank without government enticement. 
Second, the assistance rendered was selective in nature as state deposits were not 
written off while those monies owed to several municipalities had to be forfeited. 
Admittedly, the typical depositors in African Bank were not necessarily seeking the 
highest return, unlike depositors in other small banks. While those who placed funds 
in Prima, Alpha and Pretoria banks were relatively sophisticated investors attracted 
by higher interest rates, many of African Bank's depositors were insensitive to 
interest rates (Financial Mail 1995(a): 36). Yet the protection of these individuals who 
supplied circa a third of total deposits of more that R 600 million does not warrant the 
protection afforded to state deposits. 
Thirdly, the collapse of African Bank did not pose any risk to the banking system367 
which is the main criterion for a rescue by the South African Reserve Bank. 
The conclusion is that the assistance provided in the case of African Bank can only 
be justified prudentially on account of consumer protection. However, as will be 
argued in the following paragraph, consumer protection should rather occur by 
means of explicit deposit protection than by South African Reserve Bank support. 
9.3.2 Deposit Insurance 
South Africa has no formal deposit insurance scheme. After the collapse of a few 
small banking institutions in 1977, serious consideration was given to the institution 
of a mandatory deposit insurance scheme in South Africa. In view of the strong 
opposition this proposal encountered from the five big banking groups, who agreed 
that such a scheme would raise the cost of banking and also in practice result in the 
big banks subsidising smaller banks, the efforts were discontinued (Jacobs 1983:5). 
In effect the de facto non-discretionary application of emergency assistance 
measures by the Reserve Bank to banks experiencing liquidity and I or solvency 
problems prior to the passing of the 1990 Banks Act, also obviated the need for a 
formal deposit insurance arrangement as there was a high probability that banks 
would be rescued and hence depositors protected. 
Three arguments against deposit insurance in South Africa were submitted to the De 
Kock Commission (Republic of South Africa 1984: 56) namely: that the limited 
number of banks in South Africa would make it difficult to operate such a system on 
a sound actuarial basis; that large and secure banks would feel themselves unfairly 
367 The monthly Dl 900 returns for July 1995 for African Bank show no inter-bank funding, which is 
incidentally similar to its previous insolvency in 1985. 
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burdened with having to make insurance contribL·tions towards the safety of deposits 
held with less secure institutions; and that 'group formation' amongst banks had 
further reduced the need and basis for a deposit insurance system. 
Other objections to deposit insurance in a South African context are the following 
(Hudgson 1994: 9-10): that the cost will be passed on to the client which will further 
increase the cost of banking; and that compulsory deposit insurance will lead to a 
decline in lending standards in the pursuit of profits, as the fiduciary duty owed to 
depositors has been eliminated. 
However, as was established in paragraph 4.3.2, deposit insurance is a feature of 
nearly all developed financial systems.368 Moreover, many of the objections listed 
above would fall away under a system of deposit insurance based on risk-related 
premiums. Finally, and probably most important, is the existence of a large number 
of unsophisticated depositors in the South African financial system, all of whom 
clearly need to be protected in some way or another. Most of the general public is 
incapable of assessing the risk quality of the bank they use, due to insufficient 
information being available to them or an insufficient ability to make such an 
assessment. 369 
As a result of comments and requests received from various parties, the Banking 
Supervision Department hosted a workshop on Investor Protection in South Africa in 
September 1994, attended by the writer. The objectives of the workshop were to: 
• open the debate on deposit insurance. 
• identify the strategic issues to be addressed in setting up and operating such a 
scheme, should it be deemed desirable to do so; alternatively, to identify the 
strategic issues to be addressed should it not be deemed desirable to set up and 
operate such a scheme. 
• set up a working committee, whose task would be to pursue and bring to finality 
any matters that may need to be resolved subsequently to the workshop. 
The following pertinent questions posed by Stals (1994: 9) served as a broad 
guideline to the committee, which had to report back to the South African Reserve 
Bank, the Council for Southern African Bankers and the FSB. 
• who should run and manage and own the scheme? 
• what role should Government or its agencies (the Registrar of Banks and the 
Reserve Bank, for example) play in funding and managing the scheme? 
368 Interestingly, De Swardt (1987: 12) in 1987 again mooted that deposit insurance should be 
considered as an alternative to financial support by the central bank. 
369 Stals ( 1994: 7-8) admits that many small depositors have neither the skills nor the information 
required to judge the riskiness of banks' activities. lt is therefore reasoned that 'given the fact that 
neither the central bank nor the bank regulatory and supervisory officers can provide adequate 
protection for small depositors, and accepting the importance of maintaining trust and confidence in 
the banking system, the need arises for some additional protection scheme for depositors'. 
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• how will the scheme in total be funded, or, in other words, who shall pay for the 
scheme? What contribution, if any, will come from depositors themselves, and 
from the participating banking institutions? 
• should depositor protection be optional or compulsory? 
• what amounts should be covered? Should both large and small deposits be 
included and what limits should be set for the liability of the fund? 
• what effect will depositor insurance have on the maintenance of sound norms and 
standards in the banking system? 
Not all interested parties were adequately represented at the workshop. lt was 
therefore decided that a committee should be appointed to undertake an in-depth 
investigation of the issue, with a view to formulating proposals and 
recommendations. The Bank Supervision Department was tasked with establishing 
such a committee.37o 
At the Committee's first meeting on 9 November 1994, it was agreed that more 
parties would have to be consulted on the issue. Organisations such as the National 
Economic, Development and Labour Council (commonly known as 'Nedlac') and the 
Standing Committee on Finance of Parliament would be invited to act as observers 
and to take part in the discussion. 
lt was resolved that the Committee would focus on the protection of deposits at 
banks and mutual banks, as defined in the Banks Act, 1990, and the Mutual Banks 
Act, 1993. A recommendation was also made to the Policy Board for Financial 
Services and Regulation that the Policy Board investigate protection measures for 
investors in financial institutions other than banks and in emerging financial markets. 
In the second half of 1995 the committee submitted a report to the Policy Board, 
containing the following summarised recommendations (South African Reserve Bank 
1995(a): 17-18): 
• 'The committee is not in favour of an exclusive deposit protection scheme for 
banks only, but recommends that the protection scheme include all financial 
institutions. 
• The acceptance and implementation of an investor protection scheme should 
not further distort the already unlevel playing fields between the various 
financial institutions. 
• Careful consideration should be given to the level at which protection could be 
introduced, for example, on a preventative level through more supervision; or 
on a reactive level, by means, of an explicit investor protection scheme.' 
The committee recommendation of a protection scheme for all financial institutions is 
theoretically unsound as all financial institutions do not display the unique 
370 The following parties are represented on the Working Committee on an Investor Protection 
Scheme for South Africa: The banking sector {through the Council of Southern African Bankers); 
South African Reserve Bank; Department of Finance; Financial Services Board; Life Offices' 
Association of South Africa; The South African Insurance Association; South African Insurance 
Brokers Association; and public-interest bodies. 
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characteristics of banks.371 In particular, financial institutions other than banks do not 
provide payment services, do not (with the exception of life assurers) serve as a 
major depository for the public's savings, and do not have a similar propensity to 
cause financial instability. lt is difficult to conceive how a financial industry wide 
protection scheme could operate in a competitively neutral manner. This would 
require making provision for the differing risks attached to the various types of 
financial institutions, each with differing arrays of,financial products and services. In 
this respect the first and second recommendations of the committee are conflicting. 
Moreover, the nature of the modern financial system is such that it encompasses an 
extremely wide range of financial institutions catering for an equally broad spectrum 
of consumer needs. lt is questionable whether consumers on either polar end of this 
range would welcome protection.372 lt is proposed that banks who (by virtue of the 
legal nature of a deposit) guarantee repayment to the members of the general public 
and are uniquely incentivised to assume risk, should be the sole subject of a 
protection scheme. 373 · · 
On a practical level, deposit protection schemes are a feature of most modern 
financial systems whereas evidence of a scheme for all financial institutions, as 
envisaged by the committee, could not be found in any comparable countries. 
Consequently, it is recommended that the regulatory authorities apply greater 
pressure to the arguably resistant South African banking industry to implement a 
deposit-protection scheme. In line with the regulatory goal of consumer protection, 
such a scheme should only cover the smaller and unsophisticated investor (i.e. it 
should provide for maximum levels of protection). Finally, deposit insurance should 
be funded by risk-related premiums which take explicit cognisance of the risk-profile 
of each bank. 
371 See paragraph 2.3 for a full discussion of these characteristics. 
372 For example it can be argued that such protection is inapproprate for members of a stokvel and 
investors in a hedge fund alike. The former are attracted by the simplicity of such schemes whereas 
the latter have an appetite for high risk. Either way consumers have made sovereign decisions to 
accept the risk involved. 
373 In the case of insurance products the consumer carries the performance risk of the 
insurance/investment products. This is not the case for deposits. 
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9.4. Monetary Requirements 
9.4.1 Variations in Reserve Asset Requirements 
Minimum reserve requirements were included in the Banks Act of 1965 and 1990 for 
prudential purposes. Since the regulatory authority could no longer justify the need 
for such a requirement in the legislation administered by them, they proposed that 
the minimum reserve requirement should rather be included in the South African 
Reserve Bank Act (Van Greuning 1993: 263). 
In the first quarter of 1993, section 71 of the Banks Act, regarding the minimum 
reserve balance requirements relating to banks, was repealed and incorporated into 
the South African Reserve Bank Act (1989), in order to reflect the monetary-policy 
nature of this policy instrument (South African Reserve Bank 1993(b) : 13 ). 
The Reserve Bank regards the variable cash-reserve requirement as a useful 
instrument of monetary policy, although the significance thereof has diminished 
because of the employment of more flexible open-market policies. 
Cash reserves include the total amount of bank notes and coins in bank vaults as 
well as deposits with the Reserve Bank.374 As from 21 March 1995, the basic 
minimum reserve requirement was increased from 1 per cent to 2 per cent of the 
defined total liabilities of each banking institution. A supplementary minimum cash-
reserve requirement of 1 per cent of all liabilities to the public exists, on which a 
market-related interest rate is paid by the Reserve Bank (South African Reserve 
Bank 1995(b): 25). 
Van Greuning (1993: 265-266) argues that the possibility of applying the minimum 
reserve requirement to the growth in credit extension (asset side of the balance 
sheet), rather than to liabilities should be considered, despite the fact that the 
international trend does not support this approach.375 Van Greuning (1993: 265-266) 
states that the implications of such an approach would be: 
• the minimum reserve requirement would be clearly identified as a monetary 
policy instrument. 
• the minimum reserve requirement would perform a 'credit limiting' or 
absorption function. 
374 The basis for the calculation of the required reserve balance was changed to phase out certain 
deductions allowed in respect of repurchase agreements. During the third quarter of 1993, the majority 
of such deductions were reintroduced, so as to level the playing-fields between banks and non-bank 
securities dealers, until such time as legislation detailing prudential requirements for securities trading 
activities are finalised (South African Reserve Bank 1993(b ): 13). 
375 This approach is similar to the UK corset which was abolished in 1980. See table 7.5. 
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9.4.2 Interest Rate Controls 
BrOmmerhof (1988: 55-61) covers the history of deposit and lending interest rate 
controls in South Africa. In March 1980 interest rate controls on deposits were finally 
abolished. Limitations on interest rates charged for certain credit transactions are still~ 
in existence, yet these are not an instrument of monetary policy but rather have the 
objective of preventing the exploitation of borrowers. 
While the Banks Act contains comprehensive prescriptions regarding deposits and 
the business of deposit-taking, the Act contains little by way of prescription regarding 
banks' lending activities. Certain aspects of banks' lending activities are, however, 
regulated by the Usury Act, (Act 73 of 1969) and by the Credit Agreements Act, (Act 
75 of 1980). 
The Usury Act, (Act 73 of 1969) provides for the limitation and disclosure of finance 
charges levied in respect of money lending transactions, credit transactions and 
leasing transactions and for matters incidental thereto.376 
The Credit Agreements Act, (Act 75 of 1980) provides for the regulation of certain 
transactions in terms of which movable goods are purchased on credit, or certain 
services are rendered on credit, and for incidental matters. 
9.4.3 Credit Ceilings 
BrOmmerhof (1988: 52-55) relates the history of quantitative restrictions on credit 
extension. This form of direct monetary control was implemented for the first time in 
South Africa on 1 November 1965. In November 1972 all credit ceilings were 
abolished and replaced by higher cash~reserve and liquid-asset requirements. On 1 
January 1976 a dual set of credit ceilings was announced; viz a ceiling for loans and 
acceptances to the private sector and a ceiling for banks' investment in paper issued 
by the private sector (excluding banks). The administration of these credit ceilings 
3?6 More specifically, some of the matters dealt with in the Act are as follows (Kelly 1993: 284): 
maximum annual finance charge rates which may be charged in connection with a money lending 
transaction, a credit transaction and a leasing transaction; limitation of finance charges in respect of 
money lending transactions secured by certain mortgage bonds; limitation of finance charge rate at 
conclusion of contract; compulsory disclosure of finance charges; particulars in instrument of debt 
relating to payment of outstanding principal debt and finance charges before due date; limitation of 
sum recoverable on default or deferment of payment; sum recoverable on expiry of period of notice by 
money lender, credit grantor or lessor; limitation of sum recoverable from borrower, credit receiver or 
lessee; reduction of instalments in the event of advance payments, refinancing or consolidation of 
debt; payment of portion of principal debt and finance charges before due date; consequence of notice 
relating to payment before the due date of outstanding principal debt and finance charges in terms of 
certain money lending transactions or credit transactions; position regarding recovery of additional 
finance charges and other costs; recovery of amount overpaid in connection with money lending 
transaction, credit transaction and leasing transaction; position of bona fide holder of instrument of 
debt; money lender, credit grantor or lessor to furnish borrower, credit receiver or lessee with copy of 
instrument of debt and with certain information; legal proceedings for recovery of debt incurred in 
connection with a money lending transaction, a credit transaction or a leasing transaction; and legal 
proceedings for recovery of costs of repair or maintenance of leased property. 
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became increasingly cumbersome over time (Republic of South Africa 1984: 233-
234 ), and led to increased disintermediation. With effect from 1 September 1980 all 
credit ceilings in South Africa were abolished. 
9.4.4 Credit Allocation by Regulation 
In line with the general market-orientated monetary policy measures, the use of 
credit allocation by regulation is not favoured in South Africa. Certain prescribed 
investments for banks were phased out in 1986. 
There have been some unsuccessful efforts to implement prescriptive legislation 
which would require banks to disclose how credit is granted on a racial, geographical 
and gender basis. The draft proposal required banks to provide rejected applicants 
with written reasons for non-approval. lt was claimed that the legislation would not 
require banks to make loans which do not fit with sound risk criteria and that client 
confidentiality would be guarded.377 This particular proposal was never pursued. 
However, there is still pressure on banks to provide financial services to poorer 
sections of the community. As the nature of these services, especially as far as credit 
extension is concerned, entails higher risks, this may still become a sensitive and 
problematic issue. 
Such proposals have drawn strong criticism from the banking industry, as is evident 
from an article by Piet Liebenberg (1994) the Chief Executive of the Council of 
Southern African Bankers entitled 'A future financed by unpayable debt is I are built 
on sand'. The thrust of the argument is that banks do not discriminate on race but 
rather on risk. As Liebenberg ( 1994) puts it: 
~ bank lends to creditworthy customers, taking into account their ability to service 
and repay debt and the availability of acceptable security. In other words, it 
discriminates purely on commercial grounds. That is the essence of risk-
management'. 
Liebenberg (1994) continues by stating that 'pressure on banks to make loans and 
credit facilities available might not be frivolous or ill-intended, but it is dangerous. lt 
obscures the deeper problem that bedevils much thinking concerning the 
development challenges facing South Africa namely the widespread belief that the 
quick and easy solution to our difficulties lies in individual ownership through 
incurring excessive private debt.'378 
377 The proposed legislation is similar to legislation enacted in the US in 1977. The Community 
Reinvestment Act was initially introduced to stop banks discriminating . against people who live in 
certain geographical areas, particularly black inner-city areas. 
378 Liebenberg's (1994) point is well illustrated in the South African housing dilemma. The White Paper 
on a New Housing Policy and Strategy for South Africa estimates a housing backlog of 1 ,5 million units 
whereas an estimated 720 000 serviced sites in the urban areas require upgrading. As noted by 
Jacobs ( 1995), one of the positive features of the above White Paper is the proposals put forward to 
normalise the housing market for low income households, especially those desiring access to the 
credit markets for housing finance. Clearly, the housing problem can only be solved by co-operation 
and not coercion to reduce perceived risk. This is an example of a more general application of risk-
management outside of the financial sphere. 
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9.5 Summary and Conclusion 
The South African Reserve Bank's continuing supervision is conducted by means of the collection 
of returns, through the auditors' reporls, and regular visits to and interviews with banks. The South 
African Reserve Bank does not attempt to unduly protect the banking system, or to prevent banks 
from making their own commercial decisions. The supervisors do not attempt to supplant a bank's 
management but have to be satisfied that the risks are adequately assessed and proper risk-
management takes place 
(Wiese 1991: 315). 
Table 9.2 summarises the various components of prudential regulation in South 
Africa with regard to the respective risk issues. 
Table 9.2 Prudential Regulation in South Africa 
Component 
Entry requirements 
Foreign bank entry 
Ownership control 
Permitted activities 
Permitted investments 
Disclosure requirements 
The role of auditors 
Capital adequacy 
Risk asset limits 
Liquidity risk 
Risk consideration 
• Licensing requires adequate financial means to support risk-taking and 
management to be fit and proper to manage risks 
• Initial capital requirement of R50 million is a relatively high barrier to 
entry 
• Foreign bank branches subject to the same risk requirements as 
domestic banks 
• No economic needs test applies 
• A person may hold up to 49 per cent of a bank provided they are fit 
and proper to prevent undue influence on the risk-management of a 
bank 
• Banks may hold up to 49 per cent interest in insurers and may engage 
in securities activities via separately capitalised entities to prevent the 
contagion of risk to the bank 
• Investment limitations exist with respect to property and associates 
and are related to the bank's risk capital 
• Statutory returns specifically designed to address all the financial risks 
that make up overall risk-management for banks 
• Accounting standards have significantly improved the disclosure of 
financial information to enable users to gauge the risk-profile of banks 
• Internal auditors may (but are not required to) provide the Registrar 
with risk information 
• Audit committee provides additional internal but independent control to 
risk-management 
• Internal and external auditors have extensive responsibilities in the 
overall risk-management process 
• BIS risk-weighted capital adequacy requirements with adaptation to 
local circumstances 
• Large exposure limit is 25 per cent of bank capital and not the 15 per 
cent recommended by BIS 
• No country risk guidelines exist due to exchange control regulations 
• .Interest rate risk, foreign exchange rate risk and off-balance sheet 
risks managed in relation to bank capital 
• Liquidity risk-related to total liabilities to the public utilising an 
uncomplicated requirement 
This Chapter, which has focused on banking regulation in South Africa, has clearly 
shown that the banking supervisory authorities have as their prime aim the 
achievement of effective risk-management by the supervised banks. This is attained 
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by an overall assessment of a bank's management expertise, the efficiency of its 
internal control systems, the management of individual financial risks and 
consequently, places great reliance on the role of auditors and the risk-related 
information generated by banking activities. These points comply with the research 
problem which asserts that the regulation of deposit-taking institutions reflect the 
realities of risk-management. 
As Van Greuning (1993) notes, the acknowledgement that a regulator has a limited 
role to play in preventing bank failure, redirects the focus towards what the bank 
supervisor can realistically achieve - namely facilitating the optimisation of risk-
management. In South Africa this is done by requiring statutory information from 
banks based on risk information that bank management can use in their banking 
activities. The aim of banking supervision in South Africa is the creation of an 
environment that optimises the quality and effectiveness of risk-management - and 
for bank supervisors to evaluate the risk-management within individual banks. 
Consequently the overall approach adopted by South African regulators is not only 
theoretically sound but also advanced by international standards. 
Furthermore, the attitude of the South African Reserve Bank towards emergency 
assistance measures as iterated by Stals ( 1996(b)) is theoretically correct as it 
focuses on consumer protection and systemic stability, which are the main goals of 
financial regulation in the case of deposit-taking institutions. One area of concern 
was the assistance provided to the failed African Bank. Although considerations of 
depositor protection did play a role it appears as though the assistance was primarily 
motivated by social considerations which should not play a role in prudential policy. 
Table 9.3 Protective Regulation in South Africa 
Component Risk consideration 
Emergency assistance • Only provided when bank failure presents a risk to the banking system 
• Protection of depositors is a major consideration as no public system 
exists 
• Secrecy may be necessary 
Corrective action • Curator may be appointed to take remedial action to improve the risk 
of a bank 
• Market based solution preferred but statutory problem resolution 
mechanism exists 
Deposit insurance • Existence of large number of unsophisticated investors indicate need 
for such a system in South Africa 
• Risk-related premiums would counter most objections to deposit 
insurance 
One area of concern, however is the absence of any explicit means of depositor 
protection. This contrasts markedly with the UK which offers deposit protection on 
individual deposits up to £15 OQQ379 and Germany where banks offer depositors 
virtually unlimited protection.3Bo lt was argued that the findings of the Working 
379 See paragraph 7.3.2. 
380 See paragraph 8.3.2. 
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Committee on Investor Protection in South Africa do not provide a workable 
solution.381 
Possible future changes in banking regulation are linked to the removal of remaining 
exchange control restrictions. This will impact on the current liberal requirements 
regarding loan concentration (as the concentrated nature of the South African 
economy changes over time) as well as the development of presently non-existent 
guidelines regarding country risk. 
The absence of direct monetary requirements indicates the lesser reliance of 
monetary authorities on these methods of maintaining monetary stability and again 
reflect favourably on the South African regulator. Any political pressures towards the 
re-application of credit allocation by regulation cannot be justified on account of 
social considerations and should be rejected on prudential grounds. 
381 Very little evidence of research into deposit insurance in a South African context could be found. 
Steward (1993) discusses investor protection in a general public policy framework. The academic 
impulse is to require more research into this area. However, as the African Bank example has 
demonstrated, the absence of such a system is already tainting the supervisory system. Further 
research, should be conducted expeditiously and implemented with greater vigour by regulatory 
authorities themselves. 
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CHAPTER10 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATION OF DEPOSIT-TAKING 
INSTITUTIONS WITH REFERENCE TO SELECTED FINANCIAL 
SYSTEMS 
10.1 Introduction 
This concluding Chapter weaves together the multiple threads of fact and reason 
presented in all of the preceding Chapters. As such it is appropriate to revisit the 
research problem and general framework which served as leitmotiv throughout this 
study. 
lt was clearly demonstrated that the regulation of deposit-taking institutions in all 
three the selected financial systems undeniably conforms to the research problem. 
Accordingly, the risk-management approach to banking regulation is the subject of 
the first section of this chapter. The discussion covers the rationale and the principles 
of financial regulation as well as the application thereof by regulatory authorities. 
Second, the main conclusions derived from applying the risk-management approach 
to prudential regulation in the UK, Germany and South Africa are presented. 
Third, the main risk-considerations underlying the protective regulatory arrangements 
in all three systems are summarised and the South African deficiencies in this regard 
pointed out. 
Fourth, the monetary requirements which may hamper the implementation of risk-
based regulations are analysed. This section indicates that regulators have generally 
steered clear from this mode of regulation. 
Fifth, the risk-management model is fitted to the South African deposit-taking 
regulatory framework. A number of improvements to overall financial regulation are 
suggested. The dissertation ends with a conclusion and general recommendation. 
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10.2 Consideration of Major Issues 
1 0.2.1 Rationale of Financial Regulation - Risk-management 
'Risk-management is not a modern invention. The Old Testament tells the story of the 
Egyptian Pharaoh who dreamed that seven healthy cattle were devoured by seven sickly 
cattle and that seven healthy ears of corn were devoured by seven sickly ears of corn. 
Puzzled by the dream, Pharaoh called on Joseph to interpret it. According to Joseph, the 
dream foretold seven years of plenty followed by seven years of famine. To hedge against that 
risk, Pharaoh bought and stored large quantities of corn. Egypt prospered during the famine, 
Joseph became the second most powerful man in Egypt, the Hebrews followed him there, and 
the rest is history.' 
Froot et a/ (1994: 91 ). 
Existing approaches to financial regulation have not adapted adequately to the 
realities of modern deposit-taking financial intermediation. While a host of 
explanations exist, each covering a unique aspect of banking, none of these are 
singularly convincing as a justification for the complex system of regulation existing 
in modern banking systems globally. For example, the outdated approach which 
holds that protective I preventative regulation exists to counteract the possibility of a 
run-induced bank collapse, fails to include the multitude of other risks run by, actively 
managed by, and (in extreme cases) even caused by banks today. Prompted by 
significant changes which occurred in financial systems across the globe, banks and 
regulatory authorities have developed and implemented a new approach to deposit-· 
taking intermediation and the regulation thereof. 
The research problem developed in this dissertation holds that modern banking 
practice amounts to the management of a series of financial risks. Regulatory 
authorities - aware of the unique role of .banks in the financial system - strive to keep 
the risk exposure of individual banks within acceptable limits. These regulatory 
actions decrease the possibility of individual bank failure which in turn decreases the 
probability of systemic financial failure. Prudential regulation is concerned primarily 
with the former, while the pro-active support functions of regulatory authorities are 
aimed mostly at the latter. The risk-management approach to banking regulation 
does not disprove existing financial theory, rather, it can be usefully employed to 
marry existing theories of banking regulation. 
The research problem of banking regulation based on risk management was applied 
in three selected financial systems. In each case the basis for regulation and the 
manner in which the various financial risks are regulated in each financial system 
were discussed. While some regulatory differences continue to exist it is theoretically 
pleasing that implementation of the BIS proposals have resulted in a remarkable 
degree of regulatory convergence across financial systems. This has reduced 
significantly the incentives for cross-border regulatory arbitrage. More importantly, 
the BIS standards have . generally brought an even greater risk awareness to 
regulatory frameworks. Nevertheless, the historical risk-orientation of banking 
legislation cannot be denied. In the German instance, the central banking legislation 
is to this day based on an act passed in 1934. 
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In each of the financial systems examined, the various financial risks are quantified 
and measured against the capital'cushion' of a bank. This is done to ensure that the 
overall risk-exposure of a given bank is not excessive. Various bank asset classes 
are accorded certain risk-weightings which, when aggregated, and viewed relative to 
a bank's capital, are used to derive a risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. The use 
of this ratio, although of necessity somewhat simplistic, is the prime indicator of the 
risk exposure of any given individual bank in all three systems. 
lt is not only banking regulators who are concerned with the risk-management 
activities of banks. In the face of increasingly intense competitive pressures, banks 
themselves are continually improving risk-management techniques in order to 
optimise their own risk-return relationships. Indeed, the internal risk-management 
rules and procedures employed by the banks themselves today, may often be far 
superior to those required by regulators. Superior risk-management is viewed as a 
competitive advantage by banks. The future for the regulator will be to steer the 
difficult course between the opposing beacons of standardised (but simplified) and 
sophisticated (but complex) risk-management regulation. 
1 0.2.2 Principles of Financial Regulation 
1 0.2.2.1 Efficiency 
Once it has been established that banking regulation is intended to prevent banks 
from taking excessive financial risks, the question as to the most efficient means of 
regulation becomes paramount. The 'risk-management approach to banking 
regulation' serves to illuminate various advantages, but also certain inefficiencies of 
modern regulatory frameworks. The major inefficiency of the relatively simplistic risk 
regulations imposed is inadequate measurement of true risk. The following aspects 
impact negatively on the efficiency of risk-regulation: definition of risk measures; 
imperfect measure of credit risk; portfolio considerations; risk-return considerations; 
and off-balance sheet items. 
Definition of risk measures 
Regulation based on risk-management should measure and control all the risks 
inherent in modern banking. Risk-management should entail the measurement of 
interactions, defined as co-variances among the different types of risk and their 
combined input on a bank's overall risk-profile. The main disadvantage of a more 
accurate but inevitably more complex measurement of risk lies in the standardised 
application of such a measure to financial institutions with differing characteristics 
and varying degrees of sophistication.3B2 
382 Although such a measure may be difficult to obtain, the US Investment Bank JP Morgan has made 
freely available its version of a market risk-management package called Riskmetrics™ (1994) which 
may generally assist in the standardisation of market risk-management processes of banks. This 
product which is the result of a great deal of practical and statistical research is inevitably much more 
complex than the simplistic approach adopted by regulators, yet it utilises a set of consistently 
calculated volatilities and correlation forecasts for input application to estimate market risks. 
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Generally, individual banks will not readily part with their superior techniques for 
measuring risk. lt will therefore be the responsibility of the BIS as well as domestic 
regulators to strive for improved assessment of risk. A great deal of further 
quantitative research in this field is required. 
Imperfect measure of credit risk 
The regulators in all the countries surveyed made little formal distinction between the 
classes of creditworthiness of borrowers. Thus, all three regulators employ a 100 per 
cent risk-weighting for general loans although the default probability of the borrowers 
may vary considerably. 383 
Portfolio considerations 
Regulatory risk-management techniques ignore the interaction of different assets in 
banks' portfolios. Expressed in micro-economic terms, the risk of a particular asset 
should be measured by its marginal contribution to the risk of total assets. 
Regulators treat a highly diversified and consequently less risky loan portfolio 
similarly to a portfolio of loans concentrated in one industry or region. 
Risk-return considerations 
The probability of bank failure depends not only on its risk-profile but also on the 
returns associated with that risk. Existing regulatory approaches focus primarily on 
risk and tend to neglect the profitability criterion. Banks engaged in high risk activities 
do so in the expectancy of higher returns, which may serve as a cushion against 
future losses. In certain instances a bank's high risk-profile may actually reduce the 
probability of bank failure. 
lt was postulated at the outset that banking activity inherently entails the 
management of risks. The true test is therefore to measure whether a bank's risk-
profile is commensurate with its returns.384 Capital adequacy only relates to this 
consideration in so far as historic returns have improved a bank's capital position. 
Off-balance sheet items 
Based on BIS proposals, all the regulators surveyed have, to a greater or lesser 
degree, incorporated the risks associated with off-balance sheet items in their 
Consequently, this package is capable of being utilised as a common framework for measuring market 
risks. Similar risk frameworks need to be developed for other financial risks. 
383 For instance, the probability that Anglo-American Corporation will default on its loan obligations is 
infinitely smaller than the credit risk attached to Michael Jordaan (who should not qualify for a loan in 
excess of R 1 0). Nevertheless, loan obligations to either of these two parties result in similar capital 
requirements. 
384 The classic insurance adage - there are no bad risks, only bad premiums - is instructive in this 
regard. lt is permissible for banks to engage in high risk activities provided that the risk is priced 
correctly. 
286 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The Regulation of Deposit-taking Financial Institutions 
banking regulations. However, in a financial world progressively exposed to 
derivative financial instruments, these are regarded as increasingly inadequate. 
Historically, the main cause of bank failure was the inability to manage the most 
basic of banking risks, namely credit risk. The Barings failure in the UK and the 
Sechold debacle in South Africa have illustrated how the demise of otherwise sound 
banks will occur if off-balance sheet risk in the form of derivative financial instruments 
is not managed properly. 
10.2.2.2 Competitive Neutrality 
At a . gathering of European central bank governors to discuss the steps towards monetary 
union, much was said about the need to create a level playing field. Eventually Eddie George, 
Governor of the Bank of England, became dissatisfied with the somewhat pretentious 
discussions. 'Gentlemen,' he is reported to have declared, 'the only level playing field I have 
ever seen was an ice rink.' 
(Finance Week 1994: 40) 
In practice, it is no easy task to create and maintain a financial system which in all 
respects ensures fair and equitable competition between the various categories of 
financial intermediaries. lt is therefore significant that the South African model of 
supervision displays the greatest degree of competitive neutrality as regards deposit-
taking financial intermediation. This is due to the elimination of any legal distinction 
between various classes of deposit-taking institutions; a distinction which is still 
maintained in the UK, in the case of building societies. 
The inclusive nature of the German definition of banking activity also lends itself to 
competitive neutrality. Yet although various classes of banking institutions are 
regulated according to one Banking Act, differing legal and taxation arrangements 
still apply to many of these institutions. In particular, separate regulations pertaining 
to mortgage banks as well as the state ownership of savings banks is not conducive 
to competitive neutrality. 
1 0.2.2.3 Stability 
Stability-related principles relate to the promotion of a high measure of stability in 
financial markets by maintaining the appropriate degree of safety and soundness. 
Three such principles apply from a risk-management perspective: 
• a proper assessment and management of risks; 
• the use of regulatory requirements based on current market values rather 
than historic values; and 
• a willingness by the regulators to take timely action. 
In all three systems that have been surveyed, regulatory authorities have imposed 
acceptable risk-management standards to be observed in respect of the risk-
management activities of banks. The procedures for identifying various financial risks 
and establishing adequate capital requirements for banks, indicate observance of 
this principle. 
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In order to analyse a bank's risk-profile it is theoretically correct to mark-to-market a 
bank's entire balance sheet. However, as it is difficult to obtain reliable estimates of 
market value in all instances, there is still heavy reliance on book values based on 
historic costs. In the inflationary South African environment the absence of inflation-
adjusted accounting practices may tend to understate the true value of a bank's 
equity and investments and thereby reduce the bank's capital ratio. The degree of 
current-value accounting practised is still lacking in all the systems. 
The use of market values (or approximations thereof) in regulatory returns as well as 
financial statements should be further encouraged. 
Banking regulatory authorities have taken corrective action when detecting market 
deficiencies. In the vast majority of such cases supervisors have attempted to 
preserve systemic stability and adaptations to regulations have been made in 
response to any regulatory defects.385 
1 0.2.2.4 Social Objectives 
Social objectives have not been found to influence the regulation of banks in any of 
the banking systems analysed here with the sole exception of maximum lending 
rates. However, South Africa differs from the UK and Germany as it faces huge 
social challenges for change in its economic system and, as such may be more 
prone to political pressures in this regard. In future, it may become increasingly 
important not to allow social objectives to overly influence South African financial 
regulation. 386 
Since 1995 South African banks have been permitted to manage the accounts of 
regional governments, which were previously handled by the Reserve Bank. The 
allocation of these accounts was not done purely on cost considerations but banks 
also had to demonstrate their commitment to the government's Reconstruction and 
Development Programme. Although McConnochie (1995: 9) correctly argues that the 
costs of such actions are minimal compared to the benefits of the peaceful political 
transition, the setting of these requirements represent a form of regulation by social 
objectives, which are not desirable in the financial system. 
The most significant influence on banking regulation by social objectives was the 
assistance rendered to the failed African Bank. As the failure of this bank posed no 
systemic risk, the South African regulatory authorities correctly refused assistance. 
The insistence by political authorities that African Bank be saved in order to protect 
its unsophisticated depositors and foster economic empowerment of the 
385 See for instance paragraph 6.2.1 for the reponse of UK regulators to the failure of Barings Bank. 
386 Quinn (1995) makes a relevant point when he discusses banking supervision in a transitional 
economy by stating that the stability of any banking system is a blend of market discipline and official 
intervention, but points out that ultimately the blend is a political decision, in the sense that it reflects 
the social objectives of a country. However, Quinn (1995: 198) argues that there is little room for social 
compromise in the system of supervision, saying that 'the banking system never will become strong if 
the supervisory arrangements do not seek to reflect the highest international standards from the 
earliest stage'. 
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underprivileged has underlying social considerations which cannot be justified from a 
risk-management perspective. 
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1 0;2.2 Regulatory Authorities 
A comparison of banking regulatory authorities was conducted in Chapter 6 and 
summarised in Table 6.1. As regards the supervisory approach adopted by the three 
banking supervisors it is evident that South Africa utilises elements of both the 
German and UK approach. Thus the South African Banking Supervision Department 
employs risk-related rules based on risk-management optimisation principles, 
whereas Germany is narrowly rule-based and the UK focuses on principles rather 
than on strict rules. The same applies to the degree of formality: the Bank of England 
prides itself on its informal approach while the FBSO is very formalised in its 
approach towards regulation. In South Africa a combination of formal adherence to 
and informal consultation on risk-management regulation is practiced by banking 
regulators. The SA regulatory approach is unique in its identification of various key 
players in the risk-management process and in assigning appropriate responsibilities 
to these parties. Moreover, the SA regulator has explicitly stated that the supervisory 
approach entails the optimisation of risk-management- an objective which has not 
been unambiguously stated by either the FBSO or the Bank of England. 
The three regulatory authorities have all adopted a supervisory methodology which is 
primarily based on off-site examinations (and hence place great reliance on third 
parties such as auditors). lt is of significance that in the wake ofthe Barings disaster 
the UK regulator has signalled that it will place more emphasis on on-site supervision 
in future. 
German regulatory authorities do not interact as frequently with bank management 
as do the UK and SA regulators. German banking regulators are also dissimilar to 
the UK and SA for another reason, namely that the FBSO is not a department of the 
Bundesbank (although it closely interacts with the latter). 
Historically, regulatory authorities have adopted an institutional approach to the 
regulation of financial market activity, mainly as a result the specialist nature of 
financial institutions. Both the UK and South Africa are placing more emphasis on the 
functional approach to regulation. The German institutional approach is so wide that 
it implicitly covers a great variety of financial activity. In effect, all three systems 
employ the institutional and functional approach to regulation in parallel, as the 
regulatory authorities are concerned with the soundness of institutions, as well as the 
way in which particular services are provided. lt is submitted that this is the correct 
conceptual approach, due to the reason put forward by Llewellyn in Falkena (1994: 
5) namely that ultimately: ' .. it is institutions that become bankrupt and not functions'. 
The proposals put forward by the Jacobs and Melamet Committees provided for the 
creation of a single regulatory authority which would have entailed a combination of 
functional and institutional regulation. The fact that these proposals have not been 
implemented and that the Policy Board is not vested with executive powers, means 
that in practice South African regulation is still conducted mainly along institutional 
lines. 
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10.3 Prudential regulation - Comparative Analysis 
Table 10.1 Prudential regulation in the UK, Germany and South Africa: a 
comparison 
Component UK Germany South Africa 
Entry Requirements 
Minimum Capital Yes Yes Yes 
'Fit and proper' test Yes Yes Yes 
Economic needs test No No No 
Foreign entry Yes Yes Yes 
Permissible business activities 
Limitation on insurance business No No Yes 
Limitation on securities business No No No 
Disclosure requirements 
Financial statements Yes Yes Yes 
Supervisory returns Yes Yes Yes 
Auditor involvement in risk disclosure Yes Yes Yes 
Capital adequacy 
Risk-based approach Yes Yes Yes 
Risk Assets limits 
Loan concentration Yes Yes Yes 
Country risk Yes Yes N/A 
Interest rate risk Yes Yes Yes 
Foreign exchange risk Yes Yes Yes 
Off-balance sheet risk Yes Yes Yes 
Liquidity Adequacy Yes Yes Yes 
As can be seen from Table 10.1 which compares prudential regulations in the three 
countries, there is a high degree of similarity in that all the regulatory frameworks are 
geared at the management of risks assumed by banking institutions. 
This is particularly evident as regards entry requirements. Accordingly, a minimum 
capital requirement and 'fit and proper' test are applied in all three countries. The 
Bank of England and the Bundesbank have set relatively ·low capital requirements 
which result in a relatively modest barrier to entry. In contrast, the South .African 
regulators require a more substantial injection of initial capital which implies that the 
barrier to commencing banking is relatively high. An economics needs test is not 
applied in any of the three systems as there is no prudential justification for such 
regulations. In Germany and South Africa, little distinction is made between the entry 
requirements applicable to local and foreign banks, whereas there appears to be 
somewhat more concern by UK regulators to ensure a strong British presence in the 
UK banking system. 
In terms of permissible business activities both Germany and the UK allow banking 
groups to fully integrate securities business and to full ownership of insurers. In 
South Africa banks have been permitted to engage in securities activities through 
subsidiaries since 1995. However, the interests of SA banks in insurers are limited to 
49 per cent of the share capital. 
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As regards disclosure requirements all three regulators require banks to make 
disclosures which are relevant to assessing the risk-profile of each bank. However, 
South Africa can be singled out as the only system where the disclosure 
requirements relate directly to the various risks managed by banks. In Germany, the 
risk-information can be deduced from financial returns although it is not evident that 
this is the regulatory intention and in the UK greater reliance is placed on 
management interviews to form an overall risk-assessment. In all three countries 
auditors have a legal duty to provide the regulatory authorities with information on 
the risk-profile of a bank. In South Africa auditors are legally required to be 
extensively involved in the overall risk-management process. This is less so in 
Germany, while in the UK it is up to bank management to decide to what extent to 
which extent auditors form part of risk-management. 
In the assessment of capital adequacy the risk-based approach is favoured by all 
three countries. The Bank of England is unique in employing an informal risk-asset 
and target ratio for each bank. Germany and South Africa have adopted the 
minimum 8 per cent ratio of liable capital to risk-adjusted assets, favoured by the 
BIS. All three supervisory authorities have set limits to traditional banking risks. 
Regarding liquidity adequacy, the Bank of· England distinguishes between normal 
trading conditions and crisis conditions whereas the Bundesbank employs a 
complicated and inflexible set of rules. In contrast the South African approach to 
liquidity risk-management is uncomplicated, thereby allowing for ease of compliance. 
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10.4 Protective regulation - Comparative Analysis 
Table 10.2 Protective regulation in the UK, Germany and South Africa: a 
comparison 
Component UK Germany South Africa 
Emergency liquidity assistance 
Criterion: Systemic stability Yes Yes Yes 
Discretionary Yes Yes Yes 
Deposit insurance Yes Yes No 
Compulsory Yes No -
Private I Public Public Private -
Fee structure risk-related No No -
Funding provisions risk-related No No -
Degree of coverage Limited Unlimited -
The major differences and similarities in the policies adopted towards protective 
regulation in the UK, Germany and South Africa are set out in Table 1 0.2. The most 
important aspect is that all three regulatory authorities will only provide emergency 
liquidity assistance to a bank, if the failure thereof poses a risk to the stability of the 
banking system. Consequently, there is no legal duty in any of the systems imposed 
on banking regulators to provide assistance and they may exercise a great degree of 
discretion. 
Deposit insurance arrangements exhibit a much greater variety. In South Africa a 
deposit insurance scheme is conspicuously absent, in Germany the deposit 
protection fund is private and voluntary (but encouraged by the Bundesbank) while 
the UK has a public and compulsory deposit insurance scheme. 
Neither Germany nor the UK make use of risk-related premiums to fund deposit 
insurance schemes, which means that these schemes suffer from moral hazard and 
that less risky banks are cross-subsidising more risky banks in both systems. The 
German deposit insurance system is remarkable for offering nearly unlimited 
protection to depositors, whereas the UK scheme is geared specifically towards 
smaller depositors. 
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10.5 Monetary requirements - Comparative Analysis 
Table 10.3 Monetary requirements in the UK, Germany and South Africa: a 
comparison 
Component UK Germany South Africa 
Variations in reserve asset requirements No Yes Yes 
Interest rate controls No No No 
Credit Ceilings No No No 
Allocation by regulation No No No 
Exchange control No No Yes 
The policy applied regarding monetary requirements and adopted by banking 
regulators in the UK, Germany and South Africa is highlighted in Table 1 0.3. In all 
three systems the regulators steer away from the use of interest rate controls, credit 
ceilings and allocation by regulation as elements of prudential, monetary or even 
social policy. Direct monetary requirements have a malign influence on the risk-
management activities of a bank. The avoidance of such regulations by all three 
regulators reflects an acknowledgement of the costs associated with these 
instruments. The UK is unique in so far as it does not make use of prescribed 
reserve asset ratios as an instrument of monetary policy. Finally, South African 
banks are singularly restricted to manage foreign exchange risk or assume country 
risk due to the existence of exchange control restrictions. 
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10.6 South African Issues 
In principle the aims of banking supervision as well as the means to be employed are 
similar across financial systems. South African banking supervisory authorities have 
historically paid much attention to the practical implementation of regulations based 
on financial risk-management, in accordance with the standards laid down by the 
BIS. On various occasions the supervisory framework has been amended in 
response to changes in the local anGi global financial system. 
The following suggestions arise from the supervisory processes in the UK and 
Germany as well as the initial theoretical foundations of this dissertation. In many of 
the instances further research will be required before these suggestions can be 
implemented, while other aspects are already under discussion. · 
In future, it is expected that six issues will dominate the agenda of South African 
regulatory authorities; first the extension of the regulatory net across all financial 
intermediaries in the financial system: second the further adaptation to international 
regulatory requirements, as a consequence of the accelerating financial integration 
of South Africa in the global financial system; third, the possible acceptance that a 
deposit protection scheme is the most appropriate means of serving the interests of 
consumers of banking services (i.e. depositors) who are in need of a degree of 
protection against possible bank failure; fourth, the application of consolidated 
supervision; fifth the impact of further deregulation and finally, a degree of re-
regulation to improve the regulation of risk. 
1 0.6.1 Regulatory Coverage 
This study has shown that South African deposit-taking institutions are well-regulated 
as regards both regulatory coverage of all deposit-taking activities and content of the 
regulations. 
Informal savings schemes 
The few instances in which deposit-taking activities do not yet reside under the 
auspices of supervisory authorities, most notably in the case of informal savings 
schemes, are expected to be accommodated in the near future. As these quasi-
banks are not financially sophisticated, it is proposed that amendments to the Banks 
Act are not appropriate to effect the regulation of these entities. 
Instead, these informal 'banks' should be regulated informally, with the main object of 
supervision being to ensure that commitments made to the public can be honoured, 
rather than seeking to thrust the principles of risk-management onto such 
schemes. 387 
387 This would be similar to the two tier banking system which existed in the UK as described in 
paragraph 6.2.1. Care should therefore be taken that informal banks do not expand to such an extent 
that it could give rise to a similar crisis. 
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The sophisticated nature of banking regulation in South Africa contrasts with the 
relatively 'under'-regulated activities of other financial intermediaries such as life 
assurers and investment businesses. 
Assurance institutions 
The growth of the insurance industry at the expense of the banking sector has been 
documented in the Jacobs Report (1992: 5-23). Banking activity in South Africa is 
subject to extensive prudential controls based on the optimisation of risk-
management by the banks. However, as Jacobs remarked (1987: 4) 
'it is unfair to single out banks for control in respect of these activities and for 
instance not the similar activities engaged by insurers. The upshot of such a 
discriminating policy is that certain financial activities tend to move from the 
balance sheets of the banking industry to those of the insurance industry and 
this is a typical example where lack of co-ordination in the application of 
supervisory control can result in the distortion of equitable competition.' 
Although some exogenous factors, such as a consistently high inflation rate, have 
contributed to the dominant position of insurers in the South African financial system, 
regulatory considerations (in particular those related to taxation), have skewed the 
competitive playing fields between insurance and banking activities. For instance, life 
insurers do not have to maintain liquid asset and reserve requirements even though 
a large part of their business is very similar to deposit-taking. Banks face the 
constraint of not being allowed to invest their operating income in equity but have to 
finance such investments out of their own capital. The life assurers on the other 
hand, invest the gross of their operating income (premiums) in equity and other 
related instruments which offer a much higher return than can be generated in 
ordinary banking business. While the nature of an insurance policy is conceptually 
different from a deposit claim,388 it is submitted that the underlying activity of these 
institutions merely amount to varying modes of financial intermediation. Each form of 
intermediation is concerned with the management of financial risks. 
Once it has been accepted that the optimisation of risk-management is the primary 
purpose of regulatory authorities, this theory should also be applied to the insurance 
industry and indeed to all forms of sophisticated financial intermediation. As such, 
the general application of risk-management regulations may serve to marry hitherto 
diverse regulatory techniques and approaches. In the wake of increasing 
conglomeration of financial institutions and the trend towards the creation of 
institutions offering a full range of financial services, only the theory of financial risk-
management developed here is able to serve as a conceptually sound rationale of 
regulation in all instances of financial intermediation.389 
388 In the case of insurance products the investor usually carries the risk whereas banks assume risks 
and cannot pass these on to depositors. 
389 For example insurance companies providing guarantees without being subjected to capital 
requirements. 
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Investment businesses 
While not in the strict purview of this dissertation, one cannot escape the impression 
that banks are more extensively regulated than insurers I assurers who are in turn 
more regulated than investment businesses. lt is therefore appropriate from the point 
of view of competitive neutrality that the investment businesses be subjected to a 
greater degree of supervisory regulation. On the wholesale level possible systemic 
dangers can be averted through the imposition of capital adequacy requirements; 
whereas more intensive regulation aimed at consumer protection (e.g. increased 
disclosure requirements) is required on the retail level (e.g. agents, advisors and 
brokers). 390 
10.6.2 Internationalisation 
Despite years of relative economic isolation, the South African regulatory framework 
conforms to international standards as most clearly formulated in the BIS proposals. 
However, the recent re-entry of South Africa into the global financial market has 
serious regulatory implications. The regulatory issues related to the increasing 
internationalisation of South African banks may be explained as follows: 
Level of integration with international markets 
The political and social reforms in South Africa over the past few years were 
accompanied by equally important changes in South Africa's international financial 
relations.391 Stals (1996(a)) reasons that South Africa has already gained some 
useful experience from again being part of the global financial markets: 
'We have seen the importance of being on our guard for unexpected changes 
in international market conditions over which we have no control. We have 
learned to be cautious about excessive speculative capital inflows into the 
country, and how important it is to take account of the effects of such flows on 
domestic monetary policy. We have experienced the abruptness of changes in 
the direction of capital flows, and the consequences thereof for the exchange 
rate of the rand. We have learned how important it is to remain flexible in 
times of essential adjustment, and to respect the forces of the global market.' 
390 The Policy Board for Financial Services and Regulation (1996) recently issued a consultative paper 
on the regulation of retail investment services in South Africa. The paper recommends a code of 
market conduct as the main instrument to be employed in the regulation of retail investment service 
providers. In particular, disclosure requirements constitute a major regulatory instrument for the 
achievement of investor protection. The regulation of retail investment services will require the 
introduction of new legislation. lt is the intention to present draft legislation to Parliament in 1997. 
391 Stals (1996(a)) lists the major events which accelerated integration in the global financial markets: 
the termination of the 1985 Debt Standstill arrangements in 1994; the removal of international 
sanctions and boycotts after the election of the Government of National Unity in April 1994; the re-
accessing of global capital markets when South Africa received a formal credit rating; and the 
abolishment of the financial rand system in March 1995 to remove the remaining exchange controls 
applicable to non-residents. 
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The most conspicuous regulations which contrast with international norms concern 
the restrictions placed on residents on the free flow of capital into and out of South 
Africa. While these exchange control regulations apply only to South African 
residents and have been significantly relaxed of late, a greater degree of 
liberalisation is espoused. Relatedly, the restrictive foreign currency risk exposure 
regulations, hamper the overall risk-management activities of South African banks 
and place them on an unequal competitive footing vis-a-vis foreign banks. 
Capital flows 
Capital flows to and from South Africa are the result <?f both the financing portion of 
real transactions and financial portfolio adjustments. Technological progress has 
enabled the large scale flow of funds across national market frontiers. Globally, 
capital movements have come to vastly outweigh trade transactions. Due to the 
inhibiting effect of foreign exchange controls, this does not appear to have occurred 
to a similar extent in South Africa. South African regulatory authorities are bound to 
experience great difficulties in maintaining capital controls. Once these are relaxed, 
many domestic banks will see fit to establish a greater degree of physical presence 
overseas. This will need to be accompanied by a certain amount of re-regulation, to 
ensure the risk-related to offshore activities can be both adequately measured and 
controlled. 
Regulatory arbitrage 
The South African banking regulator appears committed to comply with 
internationally accepted standards of banking supervision. The Standing Committee 
for the Revision of the Banks Act has resolved that all pronouncements by the Basle 
Committee would be adopted. This approach should minimise regulatory arbitrage. 
Remaining banking regulations that hamper banking activity in South Africa (such as 
reserve requirements, restrictions on non-bank activities, credit allocation for social 
purposes) together with deregulation (relaxation of exchange controls in respect of 
South African residents) will further encourage international banking. In a barrierless 
global economy, South African banks may attempt to operate in a foreign regulatory 
framework if the regulatory burden is thereby reduced. The trend towards the 
international convergence of regulatory measures is therefore likely continue in 
South Africa. 
Money laundering 
One regulatory implication of the internationalisation of South African banking is the 
need to make more explicit provision for the prevention of money laundering. The 
South African Law Commission is establishing a legal framework to combat local 
money laundering. In a paper entitled 'International Co-operation in Criminal 
Prosecution' three proposed bills are set out: international co-operation in criminal 
matters, proceeds of crime and extradition amendment. These bills have been tabled 
in Parliament and are expected to be passed in February 1997 (KPMG 1996: 3). 
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Foreign banking activity 
The growth in the presence and activities of foreign banks in South Africa has 
become a feature of the re-acceptance of South Africa in the global financial system. 
As of yet, most of these banks have not made significant inroads into the South 
African banking market as they mainly serve the corporate sector. However, the 
proven sophistication, much higher capital base, obvious cross-border expertise and 
certain regulatory advantages (i.e. absence of liquid-asset requirements) may 
negatively alter the competitive position of South African banks in their own market. 
Should this be the case, regulatory authorities may experience pressure from local 
banks to 're-regulate' in order to protect the domestic banking institutions. 
Metcalfe (1996) recently surveyed the activities and strategies of foreign banking 
institutions in South Africa. The foreign banks believe that the most important 
changes occurring in the South African market are the anticipated future lifting of 
exchange controls. These banks feel restricted by these regulations. They recognise 
that significant deregulation has already taken place but await the lifting of exchange 
controls to put planned strategies into action. Nevertheless, the South African market 
is unlikely to be very attractive to foreign banks as the market is relatively small, 
endures political uncertainty and does not offer a gateway to a large international 
market (as for instance a deregulated Australia offered into Asia). 
Interestingly, the Reserve Bank of Australia requires all foreign banks who wish to 
establish a presence in Australia, to pass an 'economics benefits test' in addition to 
normal prudential requirements; which entails proving that the activities of the foreign 
bank will bring net benefits to the Australian economy. A 'needs test' is also applied 
at the licensing stage in Japan and the USA but not in the UK. From a prudential 
perspective there is no justification for an economics benefits test to be applied as it 
has no relevance on the risk-management abilities of a prospective banking entrant. 
The South African regulatory authorities have consequently been correct in following 
the UK and German example in this regard. 
1 0.6.3 Depositor Protection 
A third important regulatory issue, namely the possibility of introducing a deposit 
protection scheme in South Africa, is currently under investigation by representatives 
of the banking sector as well as the relevant supervisory authorities. Two points are 
relevant here: first, that individual banks will continue to fail despite the application of 
advanced risk-based regulations, and second, that bank failures inevitably result in 
costs which have to be borne by one party or another. The choice from a regulatory 
perspective is merely who has to foot the bill of consumer protection. If the consumer 
is to be indemnified against certain losses, the state may wish to recompense 
customers on political considerations or the task may be assumed by the regulatory 
authorities themselves. South Africa emerges as a notable exception being the only 
financial system without explicit deposit protection. The stated attitude of South 
African regulatory authorities, namely that banks should be allowed to fail, underlines 
the need for such a scheme. The desirability of deposit protection acquires further 
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justification in view of the relatively unsophisticated nature of a large proportion of the 
consumers of financial products and services in South Africa. 
According to Wiese (Financial Mail 1995(b ): 36) there appear to be three 
possibilities: 
One is to establish a small deposit insurance fund which requires mandatory 
participation by banks. In the case of a bank failing to meet its commitments, 
depositors would be entitled to a predetermined limited amount as a reimbursement 
of their deposits at the failed bank. 
An alternative would be to have a fully funded deposit insurance fund for all deposits. 
This could be funded by diverting a certain proportion of banks' interest income to 
this fund. 
Thirdly, private insurance on a voluntary basis could be considered. This 'market-
based solution' is the preferred alternative of the South African Reserve Bank 
(Financial Mail 1995(b ): 36). 
While the South African Reserve Bank is correct in striving to attain a market-led 
solution to deposit insurance, banks are equally correct in seeing such a scheme as 
an additional regulatory burden and I or cost. Without the exercise of moral suasion 
or the application of political pressure, the introduction of a South African deposit 
protection scheme is unlikely to come about expeditiously. lt is suggested that such a 
scheme should cover only small depositors and that insurance premiums should take 
cognisance of the risk-profiles of the bank of which the liabilities are insured. The 
proposed system addresses the issue of the costs associated with consumer 
protection by means of applying the theory of bank risk-management. 
Fortunately the South African Reserve Bank deputy governor Chris de Swardt has 
said that 'it seems likely that a limited depositor protection scheme will be 
established and the funding of such schemes is now being investigated.' (Financial 
Mail 1996(b ): 32). lt is hoped that the above considerations are taken into account 
when a proposal is made to the Minister of Finance. 
1 0.6.4 Consolidated Supervision 
Consolidated supervision in South Africa has improved considerably since the 1994 
failure of Securities Holdings Limited as it now explicitly assesses consolidated group 
risk and consolidated group capital adequacy. Nevertheless, the ?resent supervisory 
process whereby consolidated supervision of financial conglomerates is conducted 
by means of quarterly discussions between the Financial Services Board and the 
Banking Supervision Department is considered inadequate. This problem is 
exacerbated by the ill-defined overall structure of regulatory authorities. lt is therefore 
recommended that consolidated supervision of conglomerate financial institutions be 
exercised by a single regulatory authority namely the Policy Board which should be 
vested with executive powers to regulate the overall risk-management of a financial 
institution. 
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1 0.6.5 Deregulation 
lt has been the leitmotiv of this dissertation that the regulation of banks finds its 
economic justification in the risk-management activities of banks. lt was 
demonstrated that the regulation of financial and systemic risk is the prime concern 
of regulatory authorities in the three systems that were surveyed. Although the 
comparison was mainly of a static nature, it was also evident that all three systems 
have been subject to forces of deregulation as the regulations which were 
inappropriate (from a risk-management perspective) were relaxed by the authorities. 
Remaining regulations 
The level of financial and banking deregulation in South Africa is advanced as 
indicated by the following: the BIS guidelines in respect of banking supervision are 
adhered to closely; there is not artificial separation between various classes of 
deposit-taking institutions (e.g. commercial and merchant banks); foreigners have full 
access to ownership of domestic banks provided they meet the necessary 'fit and 
prudent' criteria. 
Exchange control regulations 
The major remaining regulation to be deregulated relates to exchange control 
restrictions on South African residents. Should these controls be further deregulated 
or abolished it is expected that the major impact in the banking industry will relate to 
the shareholding in banks. As opportunities for investments abroad become 
available, South African insurance companies (who are the main banking 
shareholders) are expected to divest from the often complicated share - and cross 
holdings in the South African economy. This could conceivably result in greater 
foreign ownership of South African banks, including at the retail level, as 
shareholding in established banks becomes more available. 
The further remaining regulation is the limitation of banks' shareholding in life 
insurers. As there is no compelling prudential justification for the separation of these 
financial services it is expected that the pressures towards deregulation in this area 
will increase over time. 
Conglomeration 
The global trend towards financial conglomerates has not yet impacted on the unique 
shareholding composition of South African banks (according to which all major South 
African banks are owned by life assurers). The applicability of section 80 of the 
Banks Act which limits the interests of banks in insurers to 49 per cent should be 
reviewed in the light of the German model of bank insurance or universal banking. 
While South African banks distribute investment products such as unit trusts they do 
not offer insurance products. These they should be able to distribute at a much lower 
cost than insurance companies with their old-fashioned and costly brokerage 
networks. 
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Minimum reserve assets· 
A unique aspect of UK monetary deregulation is the ability of the Bank of England to 
conduct monetary policy without a minimum reserve requirement. This is facilitated 
by the convention requiring the clearing banks to inform the Bank of England of their 
daily target clearing balances. This enables the Bank of England to influence short-
term interest rates by means of open market operations. The South African Reserve 
Bank employs a variable reserve requirement as an instrument of monetary policy.392 
As minimum reserve requirements impose a regulatory compliance cost on the 
banking sector (in the form of unearned interest) the feasibility of abolishing the 
minimum reserve requirements should be investigated. Alternatively, the South 
African Reserve Bank should consider paying a market-related rate of interest to the 
banks on their full minimum reserve balances. 
Separately capitalised entities for the conduct of securities businesses 
The most visible process of deregulation in the South African financial markets has 
been the recent changes in the JSE. The JSE no longer prescribes brokerage 
commissions, corporate membership is allowed and brokers may trade as agents 
and I or principals. As part of the deregulation of the South African equity market, 
banks are now permitted to be corporate members of the JSE. South African as well 
as foreign banks have actively acquired interests in existing stockbrokers or have 
established their own operations. lt is instructive that these changes appear to have 
significantly enhanced competitive forces and have led to increased foreign 
participation in the equity markets and in broking firms. 
Banks were required to set up independently capitalised entities to conduct securities 
business. In the UK and Germany, banks are able to engage in all securities 
activities without any prescribed holding company structure. Therefore, under these 
arrangements, full functional integration of banking and securities activities is 
possible, albeit at the cost of allowing risk to 'spill over' from the securities business 
into banking. The managing of the risks inherent in securities business are similar to 
other financial risks and the South African approach of requiring a legal separation to 
compartmentalise the risk is not supported. 
1 0.6.6 Re-regulation 
Large exposures 
An important aspect of regulatory policy where South Africa is not yet in 
conformance with BIS guidelines is the more generous large exposure allowance of 
25 per cent of a bank's capital.393 In the opinion of the writer, the use of credit 
derivatives should be encouraged by the South African Reserve Bank and the 
stricter 15 per cent large exposure limit should be imposed. This recommendation is 
in accordance with the general thrust of this study, namely that banks are managers 
392 See paragraph 9.4.1. 
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of risks and that in this particular instance the credit risk can be managed by means 
of a derivative financial instrument. 
Increased understanding of risk 
As the sophistication of banks to manage banking risks increases, so will the 
demand made on regulatory authorities to understand the impact of these risks and 
hence to regulate them appropriately. lt is therefore likely that a degree of re-
regulation to manage complicated banking risk more effectively and efficiently may 
occur. 
Reform of the reporting system 
The South African variation of banking regulation is theoretically and practically 
commendable as the only regulatory approach which explicitly regards the principles 
of sound risk-management as the basis for regulation. This is, for instance, 
exemplified by the various regulatory returns which have been designed in 
accordance with the requirements of a number of surveyed banks and have the aim 
of serving as a useful risk-management tool for the bank management itself. While 
new regulations are issued frequently it may at present be necessary to once again 
overhaul the reporting system. This was last done in 1991, following an investigation 
by Van Greuning (1991) into the effectiveness of the risk-management returns which 
are required by the Banking Supervision Department. 
393 See paragraph 9.2.5.1. 
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10.6.7 General Issues 
Apart from the above five major issues, a number of more general-suggestions with 
regard to South African banking supervision can be made: 
Supervisory disclosure to the public 
The South African Reserve Bank has made it clear that the responsibility for 
ensuring sound risk-management rests primarily with the directors of a bank, 
whereas internal and external auditors are responsible for identifying problems. 
Depositors are expected to keep themselves informed about the risk-profile of the 
bank to whom they entrust with their deposits. However, of all the comprehensive 
returns supplied to the South African Reserve Bank (see Table 9.1) only form 01900 
is made available to the public. The remaining returns often contain information that 
is vital in determining the financial soundness of a bank. Financial statements, 
despite much increased disclosure requirements, are insufficient to provide adequate 
information on the risk position of a bank in the modern financial environment. lt is 
therefore recommended that the South African Reserve Bank consider disclosing 
more risk-based information in respect of individual banks. lt is recognised that in 
some cases the disclosure of negative information may induce further distress for the 
banking institution concerned. However, the advantages of such a market based 
approach is favoured above intransparency. 
According to Wiese (Financial Mail1995(b): 36) the South African Reserve Bank has 
realised that there are few systemic repercussions when there is a run on a small 
bank. Only the financial market can impose the discipline to ensure that domestic 
banks remain competitive. Consequently, more risk-based information on all banks 
should be made available to the public. 
Statutory disclosure by banks 
Wiese (1995) states that in almost every instance of problems experienced by a 
bank, the transactions that were causing the problems were not adequately 
disclosed in the statutory returns submitted to the supervisors and, in certain cases, 
in the management accounts presented to the board of directors. The lack of proper 
disclosure and reporting implies that the concept of risk-management as a 
partnership between the various key players394 may not always be fully appreciated -
by some members of the banking sector. This could result in a broadening of the 
supervisory approach towards a greater degree of 'on-site' supervision, similar to 
current UK efforts. 
394 See paragraph 6.4.2. 
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10.7 Conclusion and Recommendation 
' ..... the development of quantitative techniques for the management of risk has enhanced our 
quality of life and set the accelerating tempo of modern times. These methods allow people to 
take more risks than they otherwise would - a benefit to society which cannot advance without 
risk takers. Without the Jaws of probability, no great bridges would span widest rivers, polio 
would still be crippling children, and no airp/anes would fly .... Without fire insurance only the 
wealthiest could afford to own homes ... If there had been no liquid capital markets allowing 
savers to diversify their risks, the spirit of enterprise would have been stifled. ' 
Peter L. Bernstein (1996) in The New Religion of Risk-management 
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Specifically, the protection of consumers and the safeguarding of the stability of tlie 
financial system provide the rationale of the regulation of banks. 
How is banking ~g~tion .. best~appl.ied.? If it is the business of banks to manage 
financial risks, the only conceptually sound manner in which to do so is to direct ~ 
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In the real world achievement of such a high standard - namely the optimisation of 
risk-management- is certainly not always possible. Consequently banks will continue 
to fail despite the efforts of cautious regulators and management alike. In this case 
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the regulatory framework should provide for measures which safeguard the financial 
system, when an important intermediary can no longer fulfil its obligations. While 
consumer protection is an issue linked to systemic stability, it is the latter which 
should be of greater concern to supervisory authorities. 
The existence or introduction of a deposit-guarantee scheme poses the opportunity 
for unburdening the regulatory authorities of the responsibility of consumer protection 
in most instances. Moreover, deposit protection schemes can be organised in a 
manner which links insurance premiums with the risk-profile of a given bank, which 
constitutes the direct (and correct) application of the general theory of risk-
management. This is viewed as a market-based solution to address the concerns of 
(and regarding) banking customers. 
The research problem - that the regulation of deposit-taking financial intermediaries 
should be (in theory) and is (in practice) no more than an effort to guide the risk-
management activities of banks - has been the golden thread of this dissertation. lt 
has been proven that the theory of risk-management regulation applies to banks in 
all the systems surveyed. Moreover, it has been argued that the theory also provides 
a useful conceptual basis for a more general application in other spheres of financial 
regulation. 
No doubt the further refinement of risk-management philosophies, rules and 
principles will occupy much academic thought in years to come. There is ample 
scope for further rigorous and quantitative research in this fascinating field of finance. 
The rewards lie not only in extending the boundaries of science but also in the 
practical prevention of banking crises which will for the time being remain an 
endemic feature of the market-orientated financial system. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: UK Definition of Bank Capital 
Tier One: Core capital 
• Permanent shareholders' equity; 
• Allotted, called up and fully paid share capital I common stock; 
• Perpetual, irredeemable, non-cumulative preferred, and perpetual, non-cumulative preferred 
shares convertible at the issuer's option into common shares with the Bank's prior consent; 
• Disclosed reserves in the form of general or other reserves; 
• Published retained profit or loss (i.e. net of anticipated tax, dividends and any other appropriations) 
arising during the course of the current year; 
• Minority interests arising on consolidation from interests in permanent shareholders' equity; 
less 
• Goodwill and other intangible assets; 
and 
• Current year's unpublished losses. 
Tier Two: Supplementary capital 
• Undisclosed reserves and unpublished current year's retained profits; 
• Reserves arising from the revaluation of tangible fixed assets; 
• General provisions; 
• Hybrid capital instruments; 
• Perpetual irredeemable cumulative preferred shares; and perpetual cumulative preferred shares 
redeemable at the option of the issuer and with the prior consent of the Bank; 
• Convertible subordinated bonds; 
• Perpetual subordinated debt which meets the conditions for primary perpetual subordinated debt; 
• Subordinated term debt; 
• Dated preference shares (irrespective of original maturity); 
• Subordinated term loan capital with a minimum original term to maturity of over five years, subject 
to a straight-line amortisation in the last five years, leaving no more than 20 per cent of the original 
amount issued outstanding in the final year before redemption; 
• Minority interests arising on consolidation from interests in Tier Two preference shares. 
Deductions from total capital (total of Tier One and Tier Two): 
• Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries and associates; 
• Connected lending of a capital nature; 
• All holdings of other banks' and building societies' capital instruments. 
Limits and restrictions: 
• The total of Tier Two should not exceed a maximum of 100 per cent of Tier One elements; 
• Subordinated term debt should not exceed a maximum of 50 per cent of Tier One elements; 
• General provisions should not exceed 1.25 per cent of weighted risk assets. 
Source: Ha/11989: 75. 
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Appendix 11: UK Risk-weights applied to On-Balance Sheet Assets 
0 per cent Risk-weighting 
1. Cash. 
2. Gold and other bullion held in its own vaults or on an allocated basis. 
3. Loans to OECO central governments and central banks. 
4. Claims collateralised by cash or guaranteed by OECO central governments and central banks. 
5. Loans to non-OECO central governments and central banks denominated in local currency and 
funded in that currency. 
6. Loans guaranteed by non-OECO central governments or central banks, where denominated in 
local currency and funded in that currency. 
7. Certificates of tax deposit. 
10 per cent Risk-weighting 
1. Loans to discount houses, gilt-edged market makers, institutions with a money market dealing 
relationship with the Bank of England and those Stock Exchange money brokers which operate in 
the gilt-edged market, where the loans are secured on gilts, UK Treasury bills, eligible local 
authority and eligible bank bills, or London COs. 
2. Holdings of fixed-interest securities issued by OECO central governments with a residual maturity 
of up to one year, and floating rate OECO central government securities of up to one year, or 
similar floating rate securities of any maturity. 
3. Claims collateralised by OECO central government fixed-interest securities of up to one year, or 
similar floating rate securities of any maturity. 
4. Holdings of non-OECO central government securities with a residual maturity of up to one year 
denominated in local currency and funded by liabilities in the same currency. 
20 per cent Risk-weighting 
1. Holdings of OECO central government fixed-interest securities with a residual maturity of up to one 
year denominated in local currency and funded by liabilities in the same currency. 
2. Holdings of non-OECO central government securities with a residual maturity of up to one year 
denominated in local currency and funded by liabilities in the same currency. 
3. Claims on multilateral development banks: IBO (including IFC), IAOB, AsOB, AfDB, EIB, and COB 
and claims guaranteed by or collateralised by the securities issued by these institutions. 
4. Claims on banks incorporated in the OEco· and exposures guaranteed (or accepted) by OECO-
incorporated banks (as before, UK building societies are treated as banks for capital adequacy 
purposes). 
5. Claims in gold and other bullion on those market making members of the London Bullion Market 
Association which are not included in (4) above. 
6. Claims on banks incorporated outside the OECO with a residual maturity of up to one year and 
loans of the same maturity guaranteed by non-OECO banks. 
7. Claims on OECO public sector entities (PSEs) and loans guaranteed by such entities. In the UK, 
PSEs are defined as local authorities and other non-commercial public corporations. 
8. Loans to discount houses which are unsecured or secured on assets other than specified with a 10 
per cent risk-weighting (above). 
9. Cash items in the process of collection. 
50 per cent Risk-weighting 
1. Loans to individuals and to housing associations registered with the Housing Corporation, fully 
secured by a first equitable or legal charge. 
2. Holdings of securities issued by special purpose mortgage finance vehicles where the risk to the 
security holders is fully and specifically insured against residential mortgage loans which would 
themselves qualify for the 50 per cent weight or by assets which qualify for a weight of less than 
50 per cent. 
3. Mortgage subparticipations, where the risk to the subparticipating bank is fully and specifically 
secured against residential mortgage loans which would themselves qualify for the 50 per cent 
weight. 
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100 per cent Risk-weighting 
1. Claims on the non-bank private sector. 
2. Claims on banks incorporated outside the OECD with a residual maturity of one year and over. 
3. Claims on central governments outside the OECD (unless denominated in the national currency 
and funded in that currency). 
4. Loans guaranteed by claims on non-OECD central governments or central banks, which are not 
denominated in local currency and funded locally. 
5. Claims on commercial companies owned by the public sector. 
6. Claims on public sector entities outside the OECD. 
7. Premises, plant, equipment and other fixed assets. 
8. Real estate, trade investments and other assets not otherwise specified. 
9. Aggregate net short open foreign exchange position. 
Source: Bank of England 1988(b). 
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Appendix Ill: UK Large Exposures Regulations 
1. As a general rule no exposure to a single counterparty should exceed 10 per cent of an 
institution's available capital resources without thorough justification, and no such exposure should 
exceed 25 per cent of available capital resources other than in the most exceptional 
circumstances. 
2. The main exceptions to the 25 per cent rule are: 
• exposures to other banks with a maturity of one year and under; 
• exposures to overseas central governments; 
• certain exposures of up to one year to group financial companies and connected banks; 
• exposures secured by cash or British government stocks; 
• in the case of bank subsidiaries, exposures guaranteed by the parent bank; and 
• security in the form of cash, British Government stocks or an ECGD bank guarantee will also be 
considered sufficient justification for an exposure to exceed 25 per cent. 
3. 'Available capital resources' will be defined as the capital base of an institution which is used for 
calculating the risk asset ratio. However, an institution's holding of another bank's capital will not 
be deducted. 
4. The definition of 'exposure' adopted by the Bank for the purpose of section 38 is very wide and 
generally covers 'all claims on a counterparty including, for example, undrawn facilities, contingent 
liabilities, other counterparty risks and equity holdings'. 
5. For the purpose of (4) above, the exposure will usually be taken as the full amount (namely, the 
book value) of all claims on a particular counterparty. However, in the case of underwriting 
commitments and interest and exchange rate related contracts, only a proportion of the nominal 
value of the commitment will be taken into account. 
6. Exposures of UK-incorporated institutions will be considered, and will require to be reported on 
both an unconsolidated (solo) and consolidated basis. Exposures calculated on an unconsolidated 
basis will require quarterly reports and those calculated on an consolidated basis, six monthly 
reports.1 In assessing an institution's exposures on a consolidated basis, the companies to be 
consolidated with the institution (which may include sister companies and holding companies as 
well as subsidiaries) will be agreed to by the Bank in accordance with the principles set out in the 
Bank's notice on consolidated supervision. 
7. In the case of the UK branches of overseas institutions, the Bank recognises that large exposures 
can only be properly assessed in relation to the capital and exposure cif the institution as a whole. 
In other words, it is the home supervisor's responsibility to carry out an assessment of 'large 
exposures'. The Bank as host supervisor is also concerned with the large exposures of UK 
branches particularly, but not solely, in order to carry out a full assessment of the branch's liquidity. 
The notice makes it clear, therefore, that the principles adopted by the Bank will, as far as 
possible, be applied to UK branches of overseas institutions, which are now required to report their 
twenty largest exposures. 
8. The Bank requires each institution to set out a formal and acceptable policy on large exposures 
which should not be significantly changed without prior notification to, and discussion with, the 
Bank. The Bank will require reporting accountants to pay particular attention to the systems for the 
control and reporting of the large exposures. 
1 Included within the coverage of an institution's unconsolidated returns are: all of its branches 
(including overseas branches); and any subsidiaries that the Bank has agreed in writing may be 
consolidated for the purpose of reporting the bank's solo (i.e. unconsolidated) capital ratio in 
accordance with the principles set out in the Bank's notice on consolidated supervision. The reporting 
institution's exposures to such subsidiaries will not be separately assessed nor required to be reported. 
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9. Where a UK-incorporated institution has a number of. exposures to a non-bank counterparty of 
more than 10 per cent of its capital base, the Bank will generally require higher capital ratios to be 
maintained than would otherwise be the case. The amount of extra capital required will depend on 
a number of factors but will be significantly higher where the exposure exceeds 25 per cent of the 
institution's capital base. 
Source: Bank of England 1987(b). 
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Appendix IV: UK Credit Conversion Factors for Off-Balance Sheet Risk 
Instruments 
A Direct credit substitute~ 1 including general guarantees of 
indebtedness, standby letters of credit serving as financial 
guarantees and acceptances. 
B Sale and repurchase agreements and asset sales with recourse 
where the credit risk remains with the bank.2 
C Forward asset purchases, forward deposits and the unpaid 
part of partly paid shares and securities, which represent 
commitments with a certain drawdown. 
D Transaction-related contingent items (e.g. performance bonds, bid 
bonds, warranties and standby letters of credit related to particular 
transactions). 
E Short-term self-liquidating trade-related contingent items (such as 
documentary credits collateralised by the underlying shipments). 
F Note issuance facilities and revolving underwriting facilities.3 
G Other commitments (e.g. formal standby facilities and credit lines) 
with an original maturity of one year and over. 
H Similar commitments with an original maturity of up to one year, or 
which can be unconditionally cancelled at any time. 
Endorsement of bills.4 
Credit 
Conversion 
Factor 
100 per cent 
100 per cent 
100 per cent 
50 per cent 
20 per cent 
50 per cent 
50 per cent 
0 per cent 
0 per cent 
Multi-option facilities should be disaggregated into their component parts and each component part 
weighted according to the above classification, subject to the limitation that the total value of all the 
components does not exceed the value of the_ facility. 
Source: Bank of England 1988(b). 
1 That is, where the risk of loss in the transaction is equivalent to that of a direct claim on the 
counterparty. Where the risk of loss depends on the likelihood of a future event which is independent of 
the creditworthiness of the counterparty, the transaction should be classified as either D or E. 
2 These items are to be weighted according to the category of the issuer of the security and not according 
to the counterparty with whom the transaction has been entered into. Reverse repos (i.e. purchase and 
resale agreements where the bank is the receiver of the asset) should be treated as collateralised loans, 
with the risk being measured as an exposure to the counterparty. Where the security temporarily acquired 
attracts a preferential risk-weighting, this will be recognised as collateral and the risk-weighting 
accordingly reduced (e.g. an OECD government security). 
3 To be applied to the total amount of the institution's underwriting obligations of any maturity. Where the 
facility has been drawn down by the borrower and the notes are held by anyone other than the reporting 
institution, its underwriting obligation must continue to be reported as the full nominal amount. (Own 
holdings of notes underwritten should, however, be deducted from the overall value of the commitment 
because they are weighted as an on-balance sheet item.) 
4 Endorsement of bills which have not been accepted by a bank carry a credit conversion factor of 100 
percent. 
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Appendix V: German Off-Balance Sheet Regulations 
Original method of calculating off-balance sheet exposure: 
Up to one year 
More than one year but 
less than two years 
For every additional year 
Interest rate 
contracts 
percent 
0,5 
1,0 
1,0 
Currency 
contracts 
2 
5 
3 
per cent 
Under the marking-to-mark method, the credit equivalent exposure is the market value of the contract, 
according to the following table: 
Marking-to-mark method for calculating off-balance sheet exposures 
Basis 
Add on: 
Residual maturity 
Up to one year 
More than one year 
Interest rate 
contracts 
contract replacement 
cost 
0,0 per cent 
0,5 per cent 
Credit conversion factors applied to off-balance sheet transactions 
At 1 00 per cent of their basis of assessment 
Currency 
contracts 
contract replacement 
cost 
1 per cent 
5 per cent 
1. Bills of exchange in circulation drawn by a bank, discounted and credited to the borrower. 
2. Liabilities arising from the endorsement of rediscounted bills. 
3. Guarantees for asset items. 
4. Assets pledged as collateral security for third-party liabilities. 
5. Assets purchased under outright forward purchase agreements. 
6. Forward deposits. 
7. Asset sales with recourse, where the credit risk remains with the selling bank. 
8. Assets which the borrower has sold to the lender, and which are transferred subject to the 
condition that they must be retransferred or redeemed at the lender's request. 
At 50 per cent of their basis of assessment 
1. Documentary credits issued and confirmed. 
2. Warranties and guarantees other than those in 3 above. 
3. Note issuance facilities (NIFs) and revolving underwriting facilities (RUFs). 
4. Undrawn credit facilities with an original maturity of more than one year which may not be 
cancelled by the bank unconditionally and without notice. 
At 20 per cent of their basis of assessment 
1. Documentary credits issued and confirmed in which the underlying shipment acts as the collateral 
Source: Bundesbank 1993: 109-114. 
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Appendix VI: Disclosure in Financial Statements by South African Banks 
Accounting Policies 
In addition to the normal standards governing disclosure of accounting policies, the following are 
required: 
• basis of recognition of principal types of revenue; 
• basis of valuation of investments, dealing securities and financial derivative instruments; 
• basis of distinction between items disclosed as assets, liabilities, contingencies or commitments; 
• basis of valuation of loans and advances; 
• condition under which accrual of interest on loans or advances is not recognised as income; and 
• basis for providing for and writing off uncollectible loans and advances. 
Income Statement 
Disclosure in the income statement and its notes should include: 
• interest and similar income; 
• interest and similar expense; 
• dividend income; 
• fee and commission income; 
• net gains or losses from each of foreign currency dealing, other dealing and investment activities; 
• other operating income; 
• losses on loans and advances; 
• general administrative and other operating expenses; and 
• taxation. 
Generally, items of income and expenditure, assets and liabilities, should not be set off, subject to a 
few exceptions (e.g. right of legal set off) so that analysts can assess performance of the separate 
activities of banks and the return they obtain on particular classes of assets and liabilities. 
Balance Sheet 
The balance sheet should group assets and liabilities by nature and list them in a sequence that 
reflects relative liquidity. Disclosure in the balance sheet and notes should include: 
Assets 
• cash, call deposits, balances with the central bank; 
• government and other securities held for dealing; 
• placements with and loans and advances to·other banks; 
• other money market placements; 
• loans and advances to customers; and 
• investment securities. 
Liabilities 
• deposits from other banks; 
• other money market deposits; 
• amounts owed to other depositors; 
• certificates of deposits; 
• promissory notes and other liabilities evidenced by paper; and 
• other borrowed funds. 
Fair value of trading and non-trading investments must be disclosed when they differ from carrying 
values. Amounts set aside in respect of future risks must be accounted for in accordance with GAAP 
and disclosed as movements in retained earnings. An analysis of assets, liabilities and off-balance 
sheet items into relevant maturity groupings should also be disclosed. 
Cash Flow Statement 
As an integral part of the financial statements, the cash flow statement should report cash flows during 
the period, appropriately classified. 
Source: Price Waterhouse 1995. 
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Appendix VII: Comparison between BIS and South African Banks Act 
Definitions of Tier One and Tier Two Capital 
Basis of Calculation 
BIS BANKS ACT 
Tier One • Ordinary shares 
• Paid up Ordinary Share Capital and Non- • Non-redeemable non-cumulative 
redeemable Non-cumulative Preference shares preference shares (Primary unimpaired 
• Disclosed Reserves reserve funds) 
• Less Goodwill • Premiums on above-mentioned shares 
• Special reserves 
• Actual earnings 
Tier Two • Cumulative preference shares 
• Undisclosed Reserves • 50 per cent capitalisation of specified 
• Asset Revaluations revaluation reserves (Secondary 
• General Provisions I General Loan Loss unimpaired reserves funds) 
Reserves • 50 per cent from revaluation of assets 
• Hybrid Capital Instruments • General provisions 
• Subordinated Term Debt • Premiums on the issue of cumulative 
preference shares 
• Subordinated term debt 
Less: Investments in unconsolidated banking and Less: Items not charged to profit 1 
financial subsidiary companies 
Investments in capital of the banks and financial 
institutions (at discretion of national authorities) 
Total to be applied in formula Total to be applied in formula 
Source: KPMG 1995(b). 
1 The following items must be deducted if not already charged against capital: depreciation of assets; 
the South African Reserve Bank has to satisfy itself that provisions for bad and doubtful debts are 
adequate; operating and accumulated losses, including accumulated depreciation and bad debts not 
yet written off; establishment costs; costs in respect of organisation and extension of business; excess 
purchase price arising on the purchase of a business or goodwill; underwriting commission paid. In 
addition the following items are regarded as 'impairments' to capital: the value of assets lodged or 
pledged to secure liabilities where such liabilities are not included in the calculation and where the 
effect of lodging or pledging is that such assets are not available for the purposes of meeting the 
liabilities of the Bank; the book value of shares and debentures (which rank as secondary capital of 
that other bank) held by a bank in any other bank; any amount made available by the bank for the 
purpose of permanent funding of the capital requirements of any of its foreign branches; the amount by 
which the required capital holding of a foreign subsidiary exceeds issued primary and secondary share 
capital and unimpaired reserve funds of that foreign subsidiary i.e. capital shortages of subsidiary 
banks. By applying these deductions to the sum of Tier One and Tier Two Capital, the Banks Act is 
being more conservative than the BIS guidelines as Tier Two Capital may not exceed 50 per cent of 
the total amount that a bank is required to maintain. Unlike the BIS guidelines, the Banks Act does not 
deduct goodwill from Tier One Capital but requires it to be deducted from the sum of Tier One and Tier 
Two Capital if not already deducted from profits. 
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Appendix VIII: Comparison between BIS and South African Banks Act 
Risk-weightings of On-Balance Sheet Items 
815 Banks Act 
Money 
0 per cent Bank notes, subsidiary coin, gold coin and bullion 0 per cent 
Investment Deposits, Loans and Advances 
20 per cent • Intragroup advances to banks 0 per cent 
• Inter bank funding: 
20 per cent • Domestic bank, mutual building societies 20 per cent 
and banks in OECD 
• Banks in non - OECD countries 
20 per cent • Residual maturity up to 12 months 20 per cent 
100 per cent • Residual maturity more than 12 50 per cent 
months 
20 per cent • Concluded with Land Bank 10 per cent 
• Concluded with public sector bodies in RSA 10 per cent 
• Public sector bodies in countries in common 
monetary area 20 per cent 
• Concluded with governments of Botswana, Lesotho, 10 per cent 
Swaziland or Namibia 
100 per cent • Other 100 per cent 
Mortgage Loans 
50 per cent • Secured residential property payable in equal 50 per cent 
monthly instalments 
100 per cent • Secured non-residential property and residential 100 per cent 
overdue or residential where value less than 
outstanding loan 
100 per cent Redeemable Preference Shares 100 per cent 
Investments 
100 per cent • Debentures issued by banks Impairment 
100 per cent • Other debentures and investments 100 per cent 
Equity 
100 per cent • Investment in non bank 100 per cent 
100 per cent • Investment in bank Impairment 
(or impairment) 
100 per cent Fixed Assets 100 per cent 
Other Assets 
0 per cent • Relating to central government of RSA and OECD 0 per cent 
countries 
10 per cent • Relating to public sector bodies 10 per cent 
100 per cent • Other 100 per cent 
50 per cent Remittances in transit 50 per cent 
Deferred Tax 
• Deferred tax not arising from an assessed loss 0 per cent 
• Debits on deferred tax account arising from an 
assessed loss Impairment 
100 per cent Other 100 per cent 
Source: KPMG 1995(b). 
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Appendix IX: Comparison between BIS and Banks Act Risk-weightings 
for Off-Balance Sheet Items 
BIS Banks Act 
100 per cent Bills endorsed and rediscounted 100 per cent 
Indemnifies and Guarantees 
• Performance related on behalf of RSA government and public 0 per cent 
sector bodies and governments in common monetary area 
• Performance related on behalf of RSA banks and banks in 
OECD countries 10 per cent 
• Lending related 
100 per cent • Performance related 100 per cent 
50 per cent 10 per cent 
/"evocable Letters of Credit and /"evocable Unutilised 
Facilities 
20 per cent • Letter of credit 
• Original maturity of up to 3 months 0 per cent 
• More than 3 months 20 per cent 
• Unutilised facilities 
• Where amounts drawn down during pre-arranged 50 per cent 
period but only to extent that the bank is committed to 
advance in the quarter following on the reporting date 
of the return 
0 per cent • With an original maturity of less than one year 0 per cent 
• To public sector bodies 5 per cent 
50 per cent • With an original maturity of one year and over 50 per cent 
50 per cent Underwriting exposures 50 per cent 
100 per cent Other contingent liabilities 100 per cent 
0 per cent Committed Capital Expenditure 20 per cent 
** Effective net open position in foreign cu"ency 100 per cent 
0.5 per cent • - Interest rate contracts 0 per cent 
1.0 per cent • Less than one year 0 per cent 
1.0 per cent • One year and less than two years 0 per cent 
• For each additional year 0 per cent 
2.0 per cent • - Exchange rate contracts 0 per cent 
5.0 per cent • Less than one year 0 per cent 
3.0 per cent • One year a-nd less than two years 0 per cent 
• For each additional year 0 per cent 
Source: KPMG 1995(b). 
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